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This thesis deals with the problem of conceptualizing human agency in a complex 
late modern world. By theorizing the constantly shifting interaction between 
discourse and dissent, I advance a positive notion of human agency that is neither 
grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a presupposed notion of the 
subject. Such an endeavor entails searching for a path between essentialism and 
relativism, between suffocating in the narrow grip of totalizing know ledge claims and 
blindly roaming in a nihilistic world of absences. 
I begin my research task by analyzing how the question of human agency has 
arisen historically. The focus rests in particular on the theory and practice of 
popular dissent as it emerged and evolved from the Renaissance to today. The 
underlying assumptions that have been formed during the modern period are seen as 
overlapping layers of contemporary consciousness that continue to influence current 
social dynamics. Prevalent images of popular dissent revolve around great 
revolutionary events. While opposing some overt forms of repression, these 
narrowly constructed images, and their ensuing political practices, have often further 
entrenched more subtle, discursive systems of exclusion. I demonstrate the practical 
relevance of these assertions through a detailed analysis of the events that led to the 
collapse of the East German regime in 1989. 
The thesis then uses the space opened up by the preceding genealogical critique 
to prepare the ground for a more differentiated understanding of domination and 
resistance. Central to this task is a methodological shift away from grand theories of 
dissent towards a discursive understanding of power and human agency. Equally 
important is an approach to social change that focuses less on spectacular 
revolutionary events and more on the slow transformation of values that precedes 
them. 
The most promising manifestations of human agency are located, I argue, in 
seemingly mundane and often neglected aspects of daily life. I pay particular 
attention to everyday forms of resistance embedded in the use of language. An 
analysis of Paul Celan' s poetic engagement with the Holocaust and its legacy 
illustrates how language can function as discursive dissent. Poetry may occupy a 
relatively minor role in cultural dynamics today, but its approach to resisting 
discursive domination can facilitate understanding of how dissent functions in more 
daily acts of speaking and writing. By self-consciously stretching the boundaries of 
existing linguistic conventions, poetry demonstrates how it is possible to engender 
human agency - not by directly causing particular events, but by transforming values, 
by creating possibilities to think and act in more inclusive ways. 
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Introduction 
HUMAN AGENCY 
AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD 
Gcxl is dead; but given the way people are, there may still be caves 
for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. - And we -
we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft 
tr. W. Kaufmann (translation altered) 
The concept of human agency occupies a central position in the history of Western 
thought. From Aristotle onwards countless leading minds have philosophized how 
people may or may not be able to influence their social environment. Do our 
actions, intentional or not, bear upon our destiny? Or are we simply creatures of 
habit, blind followers of cultural and linguistic orders too large and too powerful to 
be swayed? 
Today, the echoes of these questions resonate more than ever. One of the most 
intensely debated themes in contemporary social theory revolves around the complex 
interactions between agency and structure. Can there be human agency in the late 
modem world, an epoque of rapid change and blurring boundaries between nations, 
cultures, knowledges, realities? Who or what shapes the course of social dynamics 
at a moment when new communicative technologies constantly redefine time, space 
and the ways in which people relate to each other? Can shifting social designs and 
their designers be discerned at all? 
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These are some of the central puzzles that stood at the outset of this thesis 
project; they have guided my research directions, opened up a myriad of other 
questions and fed my motivation to struggle with them. The result of these 
ruminations can be summarized quite easily: it is an argument for retaining the 
concept of human agency despite serious obstacles to this endeavor. Outlining the 
long and sometimes crooked path that leads to this position is, however, far more 
intricate than merely presenting its affirmative endpoint. It requires a fundamental 
rethinking of what human agency is and how we could possibly understand it 
without imposing our preconceived ideas upon a complex mesh of social 
phenomena. 
I rethink human agency through a detailed scrutiny of the interactive relationship 
between discourse and dissent. I locate the most promising manifestations of human 
agency in forms of resistance that engage discursive struggles and engender a slow 
transformation of societal values. What such a position precisely entails can only be 
elucidated in the context of my overall approach, which the present chapter now 
introduces. 
I 
My project of rethinking human agency owes its methodological starting point to 
Martin Heidegger's study of Being. Before even addressing the substantive aspects 
of this topic, Heidegger emphasizes that we always . already live in a preconceived 
understanding of what Being is, and that this understanding is part of the meaning of 
Being. He thus rejects an approach that relies upon an a priori notion of Being. 
Instead, he stresses that the question of Being must be posed by investigating the 
very process of posing the question of Being.1 
Likewise, the question of human agency cannot be understood independently of 
how it has arisen in the first place. The concept of human agency is as elusive as the 
concept of Being. Human agency, accordingly, cannot be apprehended as part of a 
natural order of things, as something that exists out there, waiting to be unveiled 
through the right methodological tools. Human agency is, at least in part, 
determined by what is asked about it in the process of imbuing human action with 
socio-linguistic meaning. 
An analysis of human agency, consequently, must begin by investigating how we 
have come to think about this issue. Expressed in Heideggerean terms, we must find 
out how, if we ask 'what is human agency,' we already have a certain preconceived 
understanding of the 'is.' Exploring this framing of questions is only possible in the 
context of an historical account. Heidegger's approach to this task takes the form of 
Destruktion, a process of deconstructing history, of disclosing what a tradition of 
1 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Ttibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993/1927), § 2, pp. 5-11. 
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thought transmits and how it does so.2 While accepting the overall spirit of this 
endeavor, my own inquiry relies more upon Nietzsche's method of genealogy, 
expanded and popularized through the work of Michel Foucault. 3 
Genealogies attempt to trace the processes by which we have come to accept 
our world as natural and meaningful. They are historical investigations into the ideas 
and events that have shaped our thinking, speaking and acting. The task of 
genealogies, however, is not to discover a single meaning in history or an authentic 
origin, an Ursprung. Nietzsche employs the terms Entstehung and H erkunft to 
explain the task of genealogies. These terms do not indicate an authentic starting 
point, a source to which everything can be traced back. Genealogies, by contrast, 
focus on the process by which we have constructed origins and given meaning to 
particular representations of the past, representations that continuously guide our 
daily lives and set clear limits to political and social options. 
A genealogy of human agency? An analysis of how we have come to represent 
the history of thinking about human action? Such an immodest undertaking is 
doomed to fail, at least as long as it strives for completeness. The history of human 
agency is far too complex and diverse to be retraced coherently through a single 
genealogical study. Virtually every philosopher has explicitly or implicitly dealt with 
human agency. These innumerable inquiries range from questions of intentionality, 
causality and responsibility to ruminations about the evaluation of desire or the moral 
dimension of human action. I am not trying to comprehend these debates in their 
totality. 
II 
My genealogical research deals with the specific domain of human agency that 
relates to the capacity to act and promote social change. In this sense, my focus lies 
on the interactions between social actors and such aspects as structure, culture and 
language. 
I retrace the constitution of human agency by observing the theory and practice 
of popular dissent. Why this particular choice? The question of human agency as 
capacity to act and promote social change is above all a question of power relations. 
And power relations are best understood, Foucault claims convincingly, by 
examining specific attempts that are made to uproot these relations. 4 This is why an 
2 Ibid., § 6, p. 20. 
3 
See, in particular, Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral (Frankfurt: Insel Taschenbuch, 
1991/1977); and Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," tr. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon, in 
The Foucault Reader, ed. P. Rabinow (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984/1971), pp. 76-100. 
4 
Foucault, 'The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
ed. H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 210-1. 
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analysis of popular resistance against authoritarian rule is ideally suited to scrutinize 
the discursive formation of human agency. 
I start my genealogical inquiry into popular dissent with a rhetorical Renaissance 
text, Etienne de la Boetie's Contr'un, or Anti-One. La Boetie claimed, in 1552, that 
any form of rule is dependent upon popular consent. In the context of its 
articulation, sixteenth century France, this was a radical claim. But the idea that 
people hold the key to social change, which is implied in la Boetie's treatise, was 
also part of a larger humanist movement that started to challenged the prevalent 
medieval order. In this sense, the Anti-One symbolized the reemergence of the 
concept of human agency, which had been celebrated in ancient Greece, but was 
largely pushed into obscurity during the Middle Ages. 
La Boe tie's Anti-One is a relatively unknown text today. Yet, it played an 
important role in shaping practices of popular dissent during the preceding 
centuries.5 Comparable to Niccolo Machiavelli's humanist texts, which became 
catalysts for the burgeoning literature on the art of governing the State, la Boetie's 
Anti-One gave rise to a body of literature that deals with radical resistance to 
government. I carefully retrace the history of this tradition of dissent in chapters 1 to 
3, which constitute the first of three major parts to this thesis. My task is to observe 
how la Boetie's text was interpreted at various historical intersections and how these 
interpretations have shaped practices of popular dissent such as mass demonstrations 
and civil disobedience. 
A genealogical task cannot be fulfilled without attention to detail. Indeed, 
genealogies are all about detail, about the meticulous collection of a multitude of 
source materials. 6 Shifts in historical consciousness and their bearing upon political 
practice cannot be assessed adequately through sweeping statements about 
philosophical trends. Such shifts do not occur as factual events that can be 
understood on their own terms. They are shaped by the ways in which historical 
observers interpret events around them. 7 A genealogy of popular dissent cannot be 
separated from the individuals who, in various time periods, ruminated about the 
subject in question. This is why I examine closely the work of several authors who 
wrote directly or indirectly in the wake of la Boe tie's Anti-One; among them are 
Michel de Montaigne, Felicite de Lamennais and, as the legacy of this French text 
grew more international, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas Gandhi, 
Martin Luther King and several contemporary writers, such as Gene Sharp and John 
5 La Boetie still featured prominently in Pierre Mesnard's path-breaking work on early modern 
thought, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Sciecle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951/1935), pp. 389-
406. By contrast, many contemporary historians of political thought do not deal with the influence 
of la Boetie. His work barely warrants a mention, for instance, in Quentin Skinner influential The 
Foundations of Modem Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
6 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," pp. 76-7. 
7 Paul de Man, Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), pp. 95-6, 
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Rawls. What is human agency for them? How does it function? Who is endowed 
with the capacity of agent? What values are implied in these respective views and 
how did they differ from other, more dominant approaches at the time? How did 
they influence political practices? These are the questions to be asked of the la 
Boetian tradition in its various evolutionary stages from the sixteenth century to the 
present 
But the la Boetian tradition, which developed at times in a close relationship 
with anarchist thought, is not the only story about popular dissent in the modern 
period. Of course not. Countless other and often better known stories could be 
narrated too. There are influential liberal and Marxist narratives of resistance and 
social change. There are structural and functional approaches to revolutionary 
upheavals, psychological analyses of the crowd or, more recently, inquires into social 
movements. 8 All of these different stories are part of how we have come to perceive 
human agency today. Rather than synthesizing all of them in a sweeping intellectual 
tour de force, a genealogy must aim at appreciating the complexity and multiplicity 
of our past. Its power lies in telling different stories about our world, in making 
room for voices that have been silenced by conventional historiography. In this 
sense a genealogy reveals, as Michael Shapiro notes, the arbitrariness of the 
constitution of meaning "by producing unfamiliar representations of persons, 
collectivities, places, and things, and by isolating the moments in which the more 
familiar representations have merged."9 
The la Boetian story is one of many that have been laid to rest in the graveyards 
of our collective memory. It is a story about dissent that is worth unearthing, worth 
being retold in a different light - not to be exhaustive, not to be true or even 
representative, but to problematize what has been constituted as unproblematic, to 
illustrate the framing of dominant narratives, to make room for more inclusive 
approaches to h urn an agency. 
8 For key contributions to the sociology of action see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social 
Action (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1949/1937); Alain Touraine, Sociologie de l'Action (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1965); Jurgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1988); and Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). For analysis of the psychological and social impact unleashed by the 
gathering of large crowds see Elias Canetti, Masse und Macht (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994/1980); 
Gustave le Bon, Psychologie des Foules (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911) and George Rude, The Crowd in 
History (London: Lawrence And Wishart, 1981). Among the many works that deal with collective 
action and new social movements are Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action 
and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to 
Revolution (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1978); and Alain Touraine, La Voix et le Regard 
(Paris: Seuil, 1978). 
9 
Michael J. Shapiro, Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 2. 
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Ill 
A brief look ahead into the results of my genealogical inquiry is necessary at this 
point to map out the remaining course of my attempt to rethink human agency. The 
la Boetian tradition of dissent proved to be not nearly as subversive as its outspoken 
anti-authoritarian message suggested at first sight. While standing in radical 
opposition to dominant ideas and political practices, it shared with them similar basic 
assumptions about the world. 
In a mirror image of mainstream modern discourses, the theory and practice of 
popular dissent has been characterized by the recurring inability to come to terms 
with what Nietzsche called the death of God, the disappearance, at the end of the 
medieval period, of a generally accepted world view that provided a stable ground 
from which it was possible to assess nature, knowledge, common values, truth, 
politics, in short, life itself. The la Boetian tradition of dissent was one of many 
humanist attempts to find replacements for the fallen God, to search for new 
foundations from which humanity could safely reflect upon itself and the world. 
Details on this will follow later. Suffice it at this point to mention that the 
compulsion to anchor perceptions of popular dissent in Archimedean foundations 
took various superseding forms. They include, painted in broad strokes, an 
unbounded Renaissance trust in the ability of human beings to elevate themselves to 
the measure of all things (chapter 1), an Enlightenment belief in reason and science, a 
Romantic reassertion of human agency grounded in the notion of an autonomous 
Self (chapter 2), and more contemporary positivist attempts to master the question 
of popular dissent by reducing complex social dynamics to a few universal and 
empirically assessable laws (chapter 3). 
These superseding attempts to ground an understanding of the world in stable 
foundations are not just linearly unfolding events, historical epoques with a clear 
beginning and end. They are, rather, overlapping layers of contemporary 
consciousness, sets of carefully crafted lenses that are still used to look at today's 
world. · This is why an investigation into their formation is of utmost importance to 
gain a more inclusive view of dissent and human agency in today's late modern 
world. 
The larger picture that emerged from my genealogy of popular dissent is, of 
course, neither new nor particularly surprising. The right to criticism has been 
recognized, at least since Hegel, as a key feature of modernity. Thus, the existence 
of strong similarities between radical dissident movements and the political practices 
they oppose only confirms the larger boundaries that surround modernity's 
celebration of diversity. And that these boundaries are drawn, at least in part, by the 
inability to come to terms with the death of God, has been discussed extensively 
since Nietzsche first tried to capture the modern condition with this metaphor. 
William Connolly is among those who have most convincingly elucidated the long 
struggle in a world where there is no longer a God that serves as a unifying center 
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for humanity. He shows that while successive attempts to ground certainty in other 
external sources run into grave difficulties, the insistence that such foundations must 
be found remained a prominent modern theme. This quest for a grounded and 
perfectly ordered world, Connolly argues, can only be sustained by treating 
everything that does not fit into this order as irrational, perverse, in need for 
punishment or destruction. 10 It is self-evident that systems of exclusion emerge from 
such practices, even if they engage, as the la Boetian tradition does, in the very 
attempt to resist domination. 
IV 
I accept the absence of stable foundations. I affirm life in a Nietzschean way, that is, 
without grounding this affirmation in essences. My task, however, is not to tackle 
anew this complex problematique, but merely to rethink aspects of human agency in 
its light. Chapters 4 to 6, which comprise the second part of this thesis, prepare the 
ground for this endeavor. 
How does one start to take on, rather than deflect the responsibility that shifted 
from God upon the shoulders of humanity? First, it is necessary to recognize that 
once one has accepted the contingency of foundations one can no longer theorize 
human agency in ahistoric and universal terms. Meaningful answers to questions of 
social change can only be gained by analyzing the interaction between domination 
and resistance in a specific historical and geographic -context. With this recognition 
in mind, I focus on events in East Germany to scrutinize the theoretical puzzles I am 
dealing with. 
The spectacular collapse of the East German regime could be read as a clear 
endorsement of the la Boetian idea of popular dissent. During the autumn of 1989, 
after decades of harsh authoritarian rule, hundreds of thousands of East Germans 
took to the streets and demanded political reform. Day after day, their monophonic 
battle cry 'we are the people' echoed throughout the country, in East Berlin, 
Dresden, Leipzig, Karl-Marx-Stadt and many other cities. The effects were startling: 
one of the most repressive regimes in east-central Europe collapsed like a house of 
cards. The scenes of common citizens walking through the Berlin-Wall remains one 
of the key images that symbolize the end of the Cold War. A sense of optimism was 
in the air. It was a time of crumbling walls and falling dictators. It was a time of 
turmoil and change. Decades of entrenched political structures were swept away by 
popular dissent. The Romantic subject reemerged, inflated with unbounded 
confidence. History was once more open to be shaped by human agency. 
10 
William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993/1988), p. 13-14 
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But was all this really a result of popular dissent? Can the East German 
revolution be explained adequately by the la Boetian proposition that power is 
dependent upon popular consent? Does human agency work so directly? Can it be 
understood in the context of structural or relational links between ruler and ruled? 
A critical look at the events in East Germany reveals a much more complex 
picture (chapter 4). A whole range of intertwined factors, domestic and 
international, contributed to the fall of the regime. The societal context within which 
the events unfolded was far too intricate to be assessed by a parsimonious model of 
power relations, let alone by a grand theory of popular dissent. This, too, is not 
necessarily a very surprising finding. It is consistent with an already widespread 
Foucaultean position that views power as working in a diffused and stratified way, 
constantly intersecting with the production and diffusion of knowledge. More 
interesting, and far more relevant for a rethinking of human agency, are questions 
that interrogate the characteristics and effects of these processes of social change. 
The East German revolution perfectly matches the dominant image of popular 
dissent, a spectacular unfolding of social change through great events. But such 
events are often far less potent than their dramatic appearance suggests. This is not 
to say that the East German revolution was ineffective. It did, after all, uproot one 
of the most ruthless dictatorships of the Cold War period. But in doing so it also 
entrenched more subtle and persistent forms of domination that are embedded in 
discursive practices. A rather harsh judgment? I sustain it by examining the 
interaction between popular dissent and patriarchy, discursively embedded identity 
constructs which support gender hierarchies (chapter 5). For women in East 
Germany, the democratic dawn ushered in drastic setbacks in such realms as 
reproductive rights, access to daycare or employment opportunities. A revived civil 
society which identifies men with the public and women with the private sphere 
further increased the patriarchal character of post-wall German politics. Whether or 
not other emerging benefits for women will outweigh these setbacks in the long run 
remains to be seen. At this point the East German case only strengthens a 
revolutionary model to whose preeminence the la Boetian tradition already 
contributed substantially: it is a model based on the image of a male revolutionary 
riding into the sunset of freedom, while ignoring and even entrenching the patriarchal 
social order that makes this heroic fight possible. 
The mapping out of my inquiry into human agency has so far revolved around a 
discussion of existing theories and practices of popular dissent. Such an approach 
could easily be perceived as a predominantly negative exercise. But critique, 
genealogical or deconstructive, is not just negative. It opens up spaces to think and 
act in different ways. My first step into these spaces takes the form of an alternative 
understanding of social change in East Germany (chapter 6), one that resists the 
temptation of subsuming unique features into a universalized and foundationalist 
narrative. For this purpose I focus not on the spectacular manifestation of popular 
dissent, but on the slow transformation of values that precedes them. Such an 
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alternative, discourse oriented approach to power and social change creates various 
possibilities to rethink human agency. But as soon as this thinking space is ripped 
open, new puzzles and dilemmas start to flood through its gaping doors. 
V 
How to lift a concept of human agency out of a genealogical critique? How to 
ground an understanding of human agency in nothingness? How to retain a positive 
approach to the problem of action without having to anchor one's position in stable 
foundations? 
The third and last part of this thesis engages with these questions. I assume, 
with Heidegger, that the nature of human agency is intrinsically linked to how we 
have come to think about it. But if this is the case, then a critical inquiry into the 
question of human agency, no matter how eye opening, remains confined by the 
larger boundaries that were established through the initial framing of the question. 
To escape the parameters of existing debates, critique must be supplemented with a 
process of forgetting the object of critique. Such an "active forgetfulness," as 
Nietzsche calls it, is a form of "tabula rasa for the consciousness." It makes room 
for new things, opens up spaces to pursue issues without being constrained by how 
we have experienced and absorbed them so far. I I With this ambition in mind, the last 
part of the thesis builds upon the know ledge derived from the previous two parts, 
but does so by pursuing entirely different domains of inquiry. 
The main focus now rests with discursive forms of dissent, that is, terrains of 
resistance that operate through a slow transformation of societal values. This shift is 
not meant to replace concrete practices of resistance, but to supplement them with a 
more subtle understanding of the effects that they produce. 
But are discourse and dissent not contradictory terms? Is not discourse a 
concept that emphasizes the process of societal conditioning that allegedly deprives 
the subject of his/her capacity for authentic cognition, a capacity that presumably is 
needed for a meaningful expression of dissent? Critics of what is commonly referred 
to as postmodernism certainly believe so. They draw attention to the relativist 
pitfalls of such approaches as well as to their inability to speak of agents and agency. 
Seyla Benhabib represents many concerned scholars when arguing that a postmodern 
position mistakenly dissolves the subject into chains of signification that lie beyond 
human influence. I2 We would find ourselves in a conceptual order dominated by 
overarching discursive systems. People would be reduced to mere bystanders, 
passive, impotent, irrelevant. Crushed into oblivion. Or so at least we are told. 
11 Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, pp. 48-9. 
12 Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and Postmodernism," in Feminist Contentions (New York: 
Routledge, 1995,p.20. 
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Admonishingly. But is this elusive specter called postmodernism really so menacing 
that it must be warded off at any cost? Is it leading us into an apocalyptic world in 
which "man would be erased," as a famous Foucaultean passage speculates, "like a 
face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea"?13 
VI 
I argue that it is possible to retain a positive but non-essentialist notion of human 
agency. 
We know of proclamations that herald the return of the actor.14 Most of them 
were advanced against the determinism of structuralist scholarship. Structuralist 
positions locate the emergence of social change not in agents and their actions, but in 
the structural conditions within which their behavior is confined. Revolutionary 
change is said to be dependent not upon conscious subjectivity, but upon the 
underlying logic of functional and structural necessity .15 
Parallel to this defense of the actor against structural determinism, I attempt to 
salvage the notion of human agency from postmodern annihilations of the subject. 
However, I advance this position not against, but through the body of knowledge 
referred to, in the largest sense, as postmodernism. I elaborate what could be called 
a postmodern position on human agency, except that I discard the actual term 
postmodernism as an unfortunate misnomer. It is misleading in designating a new 
historical epoque, not only because we have hardly transgressed the parameters of 
modernity, but also because the act of compartmentalizing history expresses an 
inherently modern urge to control our environment. The term postmodernism may 
be more useful to indicate a certain epistemological or ontological stance. Yet, many 
of the authors who are labeled postmodern, such as Foucault, Derrida or Cixous, do 
not actually use this term. And those who do barely have enough in common to be 
lumped together into the same category. If anything unites them, it is the acceptance 
of difference and the willingness to come to terms with the death of God. 
Affirming from negation and grounding an understanding of human agency in 
nothingness is not as problematic as it may appear at first sight. Judith Butler has 
demonstrated this convincingly. For her, the recognition that power pervades all 
aspects of society, including the position of the critic, does not necessarily lead to a 
nihilistic relativism. It merely shows that political closure occurs through attempts to 
establish foundational norms that lie beyond power. Likewise, to reopen this 
13 Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 398. 
14 
Most notably Alain Touraine, Le Retour de I' Acteur (Paris: Fayard, 1984). 
15 Representative are Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1966) and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
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political domain is not to do away with foundations as such, but to acknowledge 
their contingent character, to illuminate what they authorize, exclude and foreclose. 16 
One must come to terms with how the subject and its agency are constituted and 
framed by specific regimes of power. But this is not the end of human agency. 
Quite to the contrary. Butler argues persuasively that "the constituted character of 
the subject is the very precondition of its agency. "17 To appreciate the practical 
relevance of this claim one must investigate the possibilities for agency that arise out 
of existing webs of power and discourse. One must scrutinize how social change can 
be brought about by a reworking of the power regimes that constitute our 
subjectivity.18 
It is in this constantly shifting mesh of power, discourse and dissent that I 
ground my own attempt to rethink human agency. What happens if we try to grasp 
our elusive subject status, build a notion of human agency upon contingent 
foundations? How to deal with the urge to order and control our lives? How to 
avoid superimposing preconceived ideas, inadequate as they are, upon a set of highly 
complex and maybe incomprehensible social phenomena? How to act on the 
Wittgensteinean warning "to say no more than we know"? 19 
VII 
I anchor my rethinking of human agency not in a systematic theory, but in a 
specification of what Michel de Certeau called "operational. schemes."20 
Attempts to establish a systematic theory of human action will always run the 
risk of reifying the elusive subject they are trying to capture. A theory is a method of 
delineation. It objectifies what should be understood in its fluidity. 
An approach that specifies operational schemes recognizes these limits to 
cognition. Instead of establishing a new and better theory of agency, I am content 
with formulating a framework that facilitates understanding of how human agency is 
incessantly reconstituted. I seek to comprehend forms of action in the context of 
their regulatory environment. Such an approach departs not only from the positivist 
practices identified in my genealogical critique of popular dissent, but also from the 
16 Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism, "' in J. 
Butler and J.W. Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-7. 
See also Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity. esp. pp. 138-40. 
17 Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
18 Ibid., p. 13. 
19 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical 
Investigations' (New York: Harper Torchbooks 1964), p. 45. 
20 
De Certeau, Arts de Faire, Vol. I of L'Invention du Quotidien (Paris: Gallimard, 1990/1980), p. 
51. 
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ways in which traditional philosophy has framed the understanding of human action. 
This framing process has revolved around three ways of explaining action: 
teleological, causal and intentional.21 I break with all of them: I do not assume that 
agency can be assessed only by establishing links between means and ends; I do not 
assume that every form of agency needs an identifiable agent that causes an 
identifiable outcome; I do not assume that agency occurs only if it stands in a 
relationship with a declared intention. 
What is left of the concept of human agency if one no longer relies upon 
teleological, causal or intentional explanations? The Interlude situated between 
chapter 7 and 8 deals with this question at a conceptual level. The objective is to 
outline a framework that facilitates a discursive understanding of human agency. 
From this vantage point, dissent operates in tactical, rather than strategic ways. It 
moves along an indeterminate trajectory, transgresses places, slowly transforms 
values. It becomes visible and effective only through maturation over time. 
A further deconstruction of the notion of discourse is necessary to appreciate 
this unfolding of dissent through tactic and temporality. Despite their power to 
frame the world, discourses are not monolithic forces that crush everything in sight. 
They are often thin, unstable, fragmented. They contain cracks. By moving from 
epistemological to ontological levels of inquiry, I explore the ways in which people 
can resist discursive domination (chapter 7). Human beings have hyphenated 
identities. Furthermore, these identities are not frozen in time, but part of a 
constantly unfolding process of becoming. By tapping into these multiple and 
shifting dimensions of Being, individuals are able to think and act beyond the narrow 
confines of the established discursive order. They engage in everyday forms of 
resistance that allow them to reshape the social context in which they are embedded. 
Such forms of discursive dissent can be found in countless seemingly insignificant 
daily acts of defiance. They engender transformations of values that may promote 
social change far more effectively than the so-called great events of history. 
VIII 
I illustrate the power of discursive dissent by scrutinizing the forces of domination 
and resistance entailed in one of our most daily activities, speaking and writing 
(chapter 8). Language is in many ways the most representative everyday form of 
resistance. Whatever we think and do is framed by the language within which these 
acts are carried out. Hence, an engagement with the philosophy of language must be 
part of an adequate approach to the question of human agency, especially if this 
21 See Rtidiger Bubner, Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft: Grundbegriffe praktischer Philosophie 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982/1976), pp. 125-156. 
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approach rests upon a post-Heideggerean view of human life as constituted by self-
understanding.22 
My attempt to elucidate everyday forms of resistance embedded in language 
draws in particular on Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work, which views language no 
longer as a way of objectively representing the world, but as "part of an activity, a 
way of life. "23 Such a position has far-reaching consequences. If language expresses 
a particular way of life it is also responsible, at least in part, for the constitution of 
this way of life. Human agency cannot take place outside language, in some pre- or 
extra-linguistic realm. It can only take place through language. Indeed, languages 
are not just frameworks to assess actions. They are themselves forms of action. 
This is why an inquiry into the links between human agency and language must 
observe how words are used in the concrete context of everyday life. The repressive 
and enabling aspects of languages can be revealed only at this level of practice, for 
outside this realm there is no authentic link between words and what they represent. 
I focus on poetry to illustrate how a specific discursive/linguistic practice of 
dissent works in practice (chapter 9). Poetry is not necessarily representative for all 
everyday forms of resistance. But it is particularly suited to demonstrate how 
language and human agency are intrinsically linked, how the content of speech is 
inseparable from the form through which it is expressed. Poetry is discursive dissent 
because it creates thinking space by deliberately and self-consciously stretching, even 
violating existing linguistic practices. In doing so, poetry gains potential to engender 
human agency - not by directly causing particular events, but by transforming values, 
by creating a language that provides us with different eyes, with the opportunity to 
reassess anew what has always been taken for granted. It creates possibilities to 
think and act in more inclusive ways. 
Poetry, and discursive dissent in general, unleash their power only through a 
long process, a process that entails digging, slowly, underneath the foundations of 
authority. Poetic dissent works through a gradual and largely inaudible 
transformation of values. It acknowledges that there are no quick and miraculous 
forms of resistance to discursive domination. It resists the temptation to provide 
'concrete' answers to 'concrete' questions. It does not bring certainty. In fact, 
poetry generates more questions, creates ambivalence and doubt. And in doing so 
poetry comes to terms with the death of God, makes room for a more tolerant 
politics, recognizes that a society is oppressive and closed if all major questions 
either have an answer or are considered irrational, absurd, taboo.24 Could it even be 
22 See Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995/1985), pp. 3-4, 9. 
23 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, in Werkausgabe Band 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1993/1952), p. 250, § 23. 
24 Cornelius Castoriadis, "Ontologie et Antropologie," seminar presented at the Ecole Normale 
Superieure, Paris, 26.10.1996. 
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that the poetic imagination, by abandoning the search for foundational truth and 
certainty, leaps towards the impossible, towards a fragmented and momentary 
glimpse of subjective 'authenticity'? Paul Celan, in one of his poems that stretches 
the limits of linguistic forms of expression: 
Eroded by 
the beamwind of your speech 
the gaudy chatter of the pseudo-
experienced - my hundred-
tongued perjury-




the path through the men-
shaped snow, 
the penitent's snow, to 
the hospitable 
glacier-parlors and -tables. 
Deep 
in the timecrevasse, 
in the 
honeycomb-ice, 
waits a breathcrystal, 
your unalterable 
testimony .25 
I analyze in detail the form and social impact of Paul Celan' s poetry. His work 
exemplifies the potential and limits of poetic dissent, of exerting human agency 
through the linkage of (aesthetic) form and (political) substance. Writing in the 
immediate post-war period, Celan tried to open up thinking space by dissociating the 
German language from its Nazi past. Mixed success characterized this poetic 
rethinking of the Holocaust, the search for voices and perspectives that had gone 
missing in dominant discursive practices. Celan's early poetry stands today as an 
important critical engagement with the Nazi period and its aftermath, a way of 
coming to terms with this problematic historical burden. His reworking of linguistic 
practices played an influential part in a larger societal process of struggling for a 
more inclusive and tolerant politics in post-war Germany. Celan's later and far less 
accessible poetry, however, has not yet been able to influence social dynamics with 
equal success. Their influence has been confined largely to small intellectual 
audiences. 
25 Celan, "Weggebeizt" tr. P. Joris in Breathturn (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1995/1967), p. 
215. 
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Celan's later poems, of which the above is an example, illustrate the difficulties 
and dangers of working at the edge of language games. One step before the edge 
and the poetic message is sucked back into dominant discursive practices - one step 
beyond and it plunges into obscurity and drowns in irrelevance. Because Celan's 
later poems explore the outer limits of this dangerous ground, they are still too 
difficult to exert widespread influence. Their potential for human agency still drifts 
somewhere on a desolate ocean, waiting to be washed ashore and embraced by a 
discursive practice that embodies dialogue, openness, transfonnability. 
IX 
Inevitable problems arise with a move that links human agency with language. If 
human agency can only be understood in the context of language, then this 
understanding is never absolute. It never escapes language. If fonn is substance, 
then the language through which a rethinking of human agency takes place is itself 
linked to a particular representation of human agency. This dilemma cannot be 
avoided. It can only be recognized. And it engenders the long needed modesty to 
engage in less ambitious and more tolerant forms of theorizing. 
The dilemma of language and human agency becomes further accentuated by the 
fact that the nature of my research requires constant negotiating between German, 
French and English forms of expression. Poetry, again, highlights this 
problematique. Comparable to the above Wittgensteinean transformation of 
linguistic philosophy, the work of Stephan Mallarme marked a turning point in 
poetics. Henceforth poetry was perceived to be about words, rather than about 
ideas or meaning. This is to say that the poetic imagination does not search for 
motives exterior to language, for some authentic link between words and what they 
signify. Instead, poetry engages with the internal logic of specific linguistic 
practices. Its method of dissent takes the form of a conscious protest against social 
exclusions embedded in language. 
Does this mean that poetic dissent is a mere play with words? An intellectual 
game void of social significance? No. Quite to the contrary. Language is always 
already politics. The links between words and what they signify may not be 
authentic, but they are constituted as real through the language in which they are 
embedded. And the ensuing forms of representation, partial and subjective as they 
are, become our social and political realities. Hence, to engage with language is to 
engage directly in social struggle. In this sense, poetic dissent is as real as the 
practices of Realpolitik. 
The poetic search for spaces to think and act creates major problems for a 
critically inquiring mind. The unity of form and substance that characterizes the 
poetic imagination is particularly difficult to translate. If poetry engages in 
discursive dissent by transgressing the boundaries of specific linguistic practices, then 
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its main message is, by definition, untranslatable. Each language has its own 
grammatically and syntactically entrenched systems of exclusion and each must be 
addressed on its own terms. This is why poetry, for Celan, is "the fateful uniqueness 
of language."26 But there is also room for optimism. Michael Bakhtin, for example, 
reminds us that translation, broadly perceived, is the essence of all human 
communication. We are always crossing language boundaries, not just among 
different national languages, but between language games that exist within a single 
culture, a single speaking community.27 
How can we preserve as much substance as possible in this process of crossing 
language boundaries? Walter Benjamin has carved out a convincing and well used 
path. I have pursued it as faithfully as possible in this thesis. For Benjamin, 
translation is a provisional way of grappling with the foreignness of a language. A 
translation must reproduce the echo of the original. It does so by focusing not 
primarily on meaning and sense, but on the original's way of representing and 
signifying. It approximates, as closely as possible, the syntax of the original. A 
translation should not try to produce a smooth and stylistically flawless English text. 
Instead, it should be as syntactically literal as possible and retain, at the risk of 
sounding awkward, the spirit of the foreign language.28 
I drew the following practical consequences from this insight: If possible, I 
based my research on original texts, not to unveil some authentic meaning in them, 
but to acknowledge the links between form and substance. When directly citing 
foreign language passages, I use official translations, unless they are not available or 
depart too drastically from the above Benjaminean principles. In the latter case, I 
either present my own translation or alter the official one while indicating that I am 
doing so. The original text of all important citations can be found in an appendix to 
this thesis, providing the reader with the opportunity to retrace my journey within 
and across linguistic boundaries. 
X 
One more preliminary account needs to be settled before heading into the first 
research task of this thesis. Do we really need one more treatise on human agency? 
Or, more specifically, can the present tour d' horizon of discourse and dissent 
advance any new insights? Most of what I have mapped out so far is not uncharted 
terrain. Where can we still reach further, dig deeper, stretch wider? 
26 
Celan, "Antwort auf eine Umfrage der Librairie Plinker, Paris, 1961," in Gesammelte Werke, 
vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), p. 175. 
27 
Caryl Emerson, "Editor's Preface" to Bakhtin 's Problem of Dostoevsky's Poetics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. xxxi. 
28 
Walter Benjamin, "Die Aufgabe des Obersetzers," in Illuminationen: Ausgewahlte Schriften 1 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995/1923), pp. 50-62. 
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I see the main contribution of my research in the process of drawing together 
insights advanced by fields of knowledge that have so far existed in relative isolation 
from each other. Distinct boundaries, often hermetically sealed, separate many of 
the academic disciplines I draw upon. Among them are political theory, history, 
comparative politics, sociology, international relations, literary criticism, feminist 
theory, philosophy, linguistics and poetics. Few observers gaze across these multiple 
fences. But academic disciplines discipline the formation of discourses. They are 
powerful tools to direct and control the production and diffusion of knowledge. 
They establish rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques and 
instruments that are considered proper for this purpose. Such conventions not only 
suggest on what ground things can be studied legitimately, but also decide what 
issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first place. Thus, as soon as one 
addresses academic disciplines on their own terms, one has to play according to the 
rules of a discursive "police" which is reactivated each time one speaks. 29 In this 
case, one cuts off a whole range of innovative thinking spaces that exist on the other 
side of this margin. It is within these largely unexplored spaces that this thesis seeks 
to make its innovative contribution to discussions of human agency. 
Relying upon an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human agency entails 
making a number of deliberate choices. Insight between disciplines can be carved 
out only to the detriment of a detailed engagement with specialized and often highly 
complex debates. The disadvantage that such a lack of 'expertise' may entail is 
more than compensated by the benefits derived from escaping the entrenched and 
constraining intellectual rules of conduct established by academic disciplines. 
An approach that focuses on linkages between debates is able to deal more 
adequately with the interaction between revealing and concealing. Every process of 
revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. Even the most convincing 
position cannot provide a form of insight that does not at the same time conceal 
other perspectives. Revealing occurs within a frame. Framing is a way of ordering. 
And ordering banishes all other fonns of revealing. This is, grossly simplified, a 
position that resonates throughout much of Heidegger's work. 30 I have taken this 
argument to heart in the sense that I refuse to rely upon one specific form of 
revealing. My theoretical position is informed by various authors, Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, Adorno, Foucault and Celan are among them. I am aware that their 
positions differ, that their work has given rise to intensive debates. I purposely 
glance over these differences and open up thinking space by moving back and forth 
between various positions - not to end up with a grand synthesis, but to make most 
out of each specific fonn of revealing. 
29 Foucault, L'Ordre du Discours (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 37. 
30 
Heidegger, "Die Frage nach der Technik," in Vortrage und Aufsatze (Pfullingen: Gunter Neske, 
1954), p. 35. 
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The structure of this thesis is influenced by my engagement with circles of 
revealing and concealing. A structure is like a straitjacket. It is another form of 
framing. It protects a coherent and bounded whole. It paralyzes thoughts. It 
squeezes them, against their natural inclination, into particular directions. Or so at 
least claims Wittgenstein when justifying his preference for unstructured aphorisms.31 
I have nevertheless retained a conventional structure and outlined its logic 
throughout this introduction. But I am aware that many of my most central puzzles 
cannot be contained in water-tight compartments. They cannot be tackled chapter 
after chapter and be put to rest in proper order, one after the other. Some key 
dilemmas, like the search for a middle ground between essentialism and relativism, 
will cyclically reappear, penetrating the core of virtually every topic I address. Each 
chapter will have to deal with the death of God. Each will have to discover anew 
this fine line between suffocating in the narrow grip of totalizing knowledge claims 
and blindly roaming in a nihilistic world of absences. Hence, what follows is to be 
seen less as a linear progression towards a peak, but more as a circular journey 
around a cluster of pivotal problematiques. 
31 





The first part of this thesis investigates how the question of human agency has arisen 
during the modem period. I scrutinize how it has been framed and imbued with meaning, 
and how his framing and rendering meaningful is part of what human agency is today. 
To limit the scope of this genealogical endeavor, I focus my inquiry on the theory 
and practice of popular dissent. My starting point is a sixteenth century French text, ,, 
Etienne de la Boetie' s Contr'un, or Anti-One. Despite its relative obscurity today, this 
text has played an important role in shaping modern approaches to dissent. Its legacy has 
given rise to a powerful tradition of radical resistance to authoritarian rule. I retrace the 
. evolution of this tradition by focusing on images of human agency that it espouses at 
several historic turning points, the Renaissance ( chapter 1 ), the Enlightenment and 
Romanticism (chapter 2), and the contemporary period (chapter 3). 
A short qualifying remark is necessary before heading into the details of my 
genealogical inquiry. Most of my analysis deals with popular dissent in modern Europe. 
In this sense, my inquiry is historically and geographically specific. Yet, many ideas and 
modes of life that initially emerged in modern Europe have subsequently achieved 
worldwide influence. In the wake of this phenomenon, Eurocentric perceptions of 
human agency have acquired significance on a global scale. This is why the present 
genealogical inquiry into the framing of modern popular dissent is not only a historical 
analysis, but also an engagement with the political consequences that issue from the 
spread of European cultural hegemony. 
Chapter One 
RHETORICS OF DISSENT 
IN 
RENAISSANCE HUMANISM 
Quoniam Dominus excelsus, terribilis: 
rex ma gnus super omnem terram. 
Subiecit populos no bis: 
et gentes sub pedibus nostris. 
[For the Lord is high, terrible; 
a great king over all the earth. 
He hath subdued the people under us; 
and the nations under our feet] 
Psalm 46, 11th-12th century version 
After a celebratory spree in ancient Greece, particularly among the Sophists, the 
concept of human agency all but vanished in the Middle Ages. Life was said to be 
governed by laws that lie beyond human influence. The medieval world-view 
revolved around an undisputed theological core that left little room for privileges 
associated with subjecthood. Common people were reduced to spectators, impotent 
onlookers in a unfolding human drama. They were caught in an immense mesh of 
fate and sacrifice, spun by the hands of God and his quasi-divine earthly 
embodiments. 
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Or so at least resonates a common image of the medieval period. Somewhat 
correct, but oversimplified. Black and white, with black prevailing most of the time. 
But there was, of course, much more to the Middle Ages than an omnipotent God. 
The theocentric vision was only the frame within which a whole range of complex 
and highly diverse dynamics took place. Even in the pre-modern period strong ideas 
about popular sovereignty existed. 1 The transition from the medieval to the early 
modern period is equally complex. It is a long and gradual evolution that cannot be 
grasped satisfactorily by rehearsing a few key events deemed crucial by subsequent 
historical interpretations. Indeed, some argue that the respect for and interest in the 
individual, a key theme of modern thought, had its origin as far back as the second 
half of the twelfth century. 2 
Despite this blurring image one can identify a number of shifts that occurred in 
the transition from the medieval to the modem period. With the rise of Humanism 
during the Italian Renaissance, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the prevalent 
theocentric vision of the world came under increasing challenge. A good century later, 
the new humanist message gradually penetrated the remaining parts of Europe. It 
resurrected the notion of human agency and challenged God's monopoly to anchor all 
aspects of human existence. Humanism placed the subject at the center of history and 
expressed a profound belief in peoples' dignity, in their own ability to solve 
problems. 
The present chapter demonstrates how these emerging humanist ideas provided 
the foundations for a tradition of popular dissent that espouses a strong belief in 
human agency. For this purpose I turn the clock back to 1552. We are in early 
,, 
modern France. Writing is Etienne de la Boetie, a young student who expresses 
profound disgust with all forms of governing that entail some people dominating 
others. He protests against divine authority, against royal absolutism and, maybe 
most importantly, against the deprivation of subjecthood: 
Is this a happy life? Can this be called living? ... What condition is more miserable 
than to live such that nothing is one's own, such that one derives from someone else 
one's entire well-being, one's freedom, ones bcxiy & one's life?3 
La Boetie's work first lingered in obscurity. But the rhetorical reflections that 
followed his initial fury eventually gave rise to a powerful tradition of dissent that 
deals with radical resistance to authoritarianism. This chapter takes the first step in 
retracing this tradition. It engages in a reading of la Boetie' s work and examines its 
influence on ideas and political practices in sixteenth century France. Placing la 
Boetie in the context of larger discursive trends entails searching for unpronounced 
1 
See Walter Ullmann, A History of Political Thought in the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 200-228. 
2 
Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual: 1050-1200 (London: SPCK, 1972). 
3 
Etienne de la Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, ed. P. Bonnefon in Oeuvres Completes 
(Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1967 /1552), p. 49. 
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assumptions that are entailed in his \\'Ork, assumptions about society, power, the 
subject and, above all, human agency. But analyses of social dynamics, especially if they 
date as far back as the sixteenth century, can never be authentic representations of events. 
My reconstruction of the context within which la Boetie's work unfolded is inevitably 
colored by my views of history, by the sources I have chosen to investigate, and by the 
motivations that lie behind my effort to come to terms with them. Hence, a 
reconstruction of historical dynamics must be sensitive to multiple voices from the past 
and compare various subsequent interpretations of them. 
FROM HEAVEN TO EARTH: THE NEW HUMANIST VISION 
" Etienne de la Boetie was born in 1530 in Sarlat, a small town in the south-west of 
France. He grew up in a well-placed aristocratic family. 4 La Boetie wrote his main 
political text as a student at the University of Orleans. It is a relatively short 
polemical treatise, officially entitled Discours de la Servitude Volontaire. I will refer 
to its widely used alternative title Contr'un, or Anti-One. 5 
La Boetie addresses his main theme without hesitation. The Anti-One's opening 
lines reveal the author's profound abhorrence of all forms of governing that are 
based on some people ruling over others: 
[l]t must be said that the domination of several could not be good for the power of 
one alone, as soon as he acquires the title of master, is harsh & unreasonable ... it is 
extremely unfortunate to be subjected to one master, whose kindness one can never 
be assured of, since it is always in his power to be cruel whenever he desires; & as 
for having several masters, the more one has, the more extremely unfortunate it is.6 
4 The text that comes close.5t to a serious biography of la Boetie remains Paul Bonnefon's intrcxluction to 
the 1892 edition of la &)6tie's Oeuvres completes, pp. xi-lxxxv. In researching the context of la &)6tie's 
life I also drew upon Jacques Joseph Desplat, La Boetie: le magistrat aux nombreux misteres (Le Bugue: 
PLB Editeur, 1992); Jean-Michel Delacompte, Et g'un seul-soit l'ami: la Boetie (Paris: Gallimard, 
1985) and several intrcxluctions to French and English editions of la Boetie's writings, especially Simon 
Goyard-Fabre, ''Intrcxluction," Discours de la Servitude Volontaire (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), pp. 17-
127; Nadia Gontarbert, ''Presentation," De la Servitude Volontaire ou Contr'un (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 
pp. 12-45); and Murray N. Rothbard, "The Political Thought of Etienne de la &)6tie," The Politics of 
Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, tr. H. Kurz (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975), pp. 
9-35. 
5 Fer a non-specialist in medieval French language, the subtleties of this sixteenth century text are not 
easy to decipher. Besides using specialized dictionaries, I contrasted the original text (er what comes 
close.5t to it, the so-called manuscript of de Mesmes), with various versions transcribed into mcxlem 
French. I also compared my translations with the ones by Harry Kurz in la Boetie, The Politics of 
Obedience. 
6 
La Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, pp. 1-2. My translation and comments throughout 
part one of this thesis concur with the common practice of using male gendered nouns and 
pronouns to denote human beings in general. I am concurring with this practice not to sanction its 
semantic form of exclusion, but to emphasize that the tradition of dissent I am analyzing is by and 
large a story of men talking about men. Subsequent parts of this thesis, especially chapter 5, will 
then further problematize the gender dimensions of popular dissent. 
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What precisely is the object of la Boetie's rage? Where are we? What is happening? 
We are, as mentioned, in the south-west of France, in the middle of a century that is 
characterized by rapid change, radical turmoil, and bloody civil wars. All power is 
claimed by the King, but he does not have the ability to enforce it. The regional 
gentry is seeking to profit from the power vacuum, the Catholic church desperately 
attempts to hold on to at least some of its fading strength, peasants rebel, and 
religious strife is soon to bring the entire country to a standstill. 
As he was writing, la Boetie may have had the rebellion of Guyenne in mind, 
which dominated politics in the region at the time.7 In 1548, when la Boetie was 
eighteen years old, thousands of repressed peasants of the Guyenne region opposed 
the gabelle, a salt tax, and started to rebel. In August the insurgents entered 
Bordeaux. Meeting up with sympathetic commoners, they soon took control of the 
city. Its authorities first entered into a dialogue with the protesting population and 
actually revoked the gabelle, but this conciliatory approach was soon replaced by an 
extremely brutal crackdown. Local authorities called upon Henri II, the King of 
France, whose army then crushed the rebellion and established an extended reign of 
terror. The leaders of the uprising were executed in various tortuous ways -
decapitated, burned, broken, impaled, or torn apart by horses - as part of a carefully 
orchestrated public display of vengeance and intimidation that lasted for weeks. 
If la Boetie indeed wrote about the 1548 uprising, the first of a series of big 
peasant revolts in France, then he did it without direct reference to the events. But 
even in its abstraction the message of the Anti-One was clear. Its description of 
servitude, violence, and suffering under a tyrant reflected the frustrations of a whole 
generation of commoners and captured the spirit of popular protest that soon was to 
take hold of Renaissance France. 8 
With or without the repressive regime of King Henri II in mind, la Boetie's essay 
was a devastating critique of existing practices of governance. Its condemnation of 
one man rule fundamentally opposed the prevailing absolutist theory of monarchy, 
which rested on the idea of a princeps, a ruler who has a divine mission and to whom 
unlimited obedience is due. The very term monarch is a combination of the Greek 
words monos (alone) and archein (to rule). Charles de Grassaille's Regalium 
Franciae, published in 1538, is representative of the prevalent position. It portrays 
the King of France as "imperator in suo regno," as "quidem corporalis Deus": a 
prince of divine appointment, a ruler whose power extends to virtually all domains 
7 
See Juleps Jolly, Histoire du Mouvement Intellectuel au XVIe Sciecle, Vol. 1. (Geneve: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1969), pp. 35-6. 
8 
Henry Heller, Iron and Blcxxi: Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century France (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1991), p. 40. 
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except the law of his own succession. He reigns as an earthly embodiment of God, 
entirely independent of popular consent.9 
La Boetie attacked the very core of these doctrinal foundations of royal 
absolutism. He dared to problematize the links between power and consent: 
The one who controls you so much has only two eyes, has only two hands, has only 
one body & has nothing more than what the large and infinite number of men in 
your villages have. All he has is the means that you give him to destroy you. From 
where does he get all these eyes to spy upon you, if you do not give them to him? 
How can he have so many hands to hit you with if he does not take them from you? 
The feet that trample down your cities, where does he get them if not from among 
you? How can he have any power over you except through you?10 
La Boetie's contention that any form of rule is dependent upon popular consent is 
both radical and subversive in the context of sixteenth century France. A clear 
concept of human agency is implied in these lines, for la Boetie dares to speak of 
subjects and, even more courageously, of subjects who act independently of a divine 
will. Justifying this radical stance purely on secular grounds, particularly on the 
power of reason, logic and a natural right to freedom, he argues that sovereignty 
belongs to the people, and not to the King or to God. But before discussing the 
consequences of these claims in more detail it is necessary to place the Anti-One 
again in the context of larger discursive struggles that were waged at the time. 
Some elements of la Boe tie's writings reflect the ideas and assumptions of the 
humanist movement that started to take hold of France at the time. Humanism was 
anticipated by several medieval poets - Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch among them -
and it reached its heyday in fifteenth century Italy. In its broadest meaning, 
Humanism refers to an "interest in Latin and Greek literature which sets a high value 
on the lessons to be drawn from it. " 11 It is the gaze back to the classical period, the 
attempt to revive a long past culture, that gave the corresponding period, the 
Renaissance, its name. The revival of classical culture took on a specific form. 
Some commentators emphasize that the rereading of Hellenistic philosophy via 
Cicero, which was the most popular approach at the time, amounted to a revival of 
skepticism - the belief that 'man' is caught in a web of illusory perceptions, unable to 
gain secure knowledge of the physical world. 12 Hence, instead of searching for a 
Platonic truth, humanists were usually more concerned with rhetoric, with practicing 
the art of convincing others by drawing on the power of persuasion. It is in the 
9 J.W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1941/1928), 
p. 283-4, xiii-xxii. 
10 La Boetie, Discoors de la Servitude Volontaire, pp. 12-13. 
11 George Holmes, "Humanism in Italy," in A. Goodman and A. MacKay (eds), The Impact of 
Humanism on Western Europe (London: Longman, 1990), p. 118. 
12 Richard Tuck, "Humanism and Political Thought," in The Impact of Humanism, pp. 43-4. 
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passion for rhetoric that they grounded their basic intellectual identity. 13 But the 
society at the time did not easily lend itself easily to such endeavors. Humanists first 
needed to carve out institutional and political spaces that allowed them to engage in 
rhetorical interactions. Universities provided these spaces. It is through them that 
Humanism gradually moved north and penetrated France towards the end of the 
fifteenth century. 
When la Boetie commenced his studies, in the late 1540s, Humanism had already 
spread throughout most of Western Europe. The University of Orleans, one of the 
most prestigious universities in France, enjoyed an unusually wide range of 
intellectual freedom. Students read classical philosophy and waged debates about it. 
Criticism was encouraged. Within the confines of university life, a general 
atmosphere of free inquiry and discussion prevailed. Not surprisingly, la Boetie's 
Anti-One, composed during his student days in Orleans, bore the mark of this 
humanist environment. His opening argument, the condemnation of all tyranny, is 
presented as a critical dialogue with Ulysses, as narrated in Homer's Iliad. He 
continues to draw upon Greek philosophy, ruminates about the politics of Brutus or 
Nero, and illustrates his points by reference to ancient history and mythology. His 
style is abstract, theoretical, polemical. This is why many portray la Boetie's work 
as a typical Renaissance exercise in classical rhetoric. 14 
There was, of course, more to Renaissance Humanism than rhetoric, a spirit of 
free inquiry, and an interest in classical literature. Rhetoric was only the mean to a 
much more ambitious political end: Humanism was a revolt against a long tradition 
of grounding truth and authority in religion. It fundamentally restructured the 
relationship among the individual, the Church and the emerging State. A glimpse 
back to the Italian Renaissance illustrates this point. As early as 1484, Pico della 
Mirandola dared to reinterpret the Biblical creation myth. He argued that by the 
time God finished his creation, no archetypes remained with which to create 'man'. 
Hence, God gave his last piece of work the following advice: 
You, who are confined by no limits, shall determine for yourself your own nature, 
in accordance with your own free will, in whose hand I have placed you. I have set 
you at the center of the world, so that from there you may more easily survey 
whatever is in the world. 15 
Pico reveals here the overwhelming vortex of humanist philosophy, its piece de 
resistance: 'man'. The focus of attention moved from heaven to earth, from the 
13 
Jerrold E Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968). 
14 C.A. Sainte-Beuve, Causeries du Lundi (Paris: Gernier Freres, 1858/1856), Vol. XI, p. 144; Paul 
Bonnefon, Montaigne et ses Amis (Paris: Armand Colin: 1898), vol. I, p. 150; Pierre Mesnard, 
L 'Esser de la Philosophie Politigue au XVIe Siecle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951/1935), p. 405. 
15 
Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, cited in Richard Tamas, The Passion of the 
Western Mind (New York: Ballatine Books, 1991), p. 215. 
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truth prescribed by the holy scripts to the power of reason and persuasion, from the 
Church's doctrinal morality to a loosening of norms and a secularization of values. 
La Boe tie's Anti-One was deeply embedded in this humanist attempt to create a 
vision for the future, a vision that rested upon human dignity, to be fought for with 
rhetorical means. At the center of this tradition was Renaissance 'man', penetrating 
nature's secrets, venturing out into the sea to discover new worlds, producing 
stunning works of art that celebrate the human body. An unprecedented sense of 
optimism arose. People, unchained from the confines of God's will, became masters 
of their own destiny. Nothing seemed out of their reach. There was no hesitation. 
The subject was born and took responsibility. With it appeared an unlimited faith in 
human agency and in the ability to solve the world's problems. Paradoxically, like so 
much in the Renaissance, this process of secularization was accompanied by a new 
glorification of the church, a last resurrection before this institution faced the 
Reformation and embarked upon a journey that led towards what Nietzsche later 
called nihilism, or the death of God. 
THE RHETORICAL ORIGINS OF POPULAR DISSENT 
The particular way in which la Boetie sought to confront the problem of freedom 
and human agency made the Anti-One a much-quoted and combated essay in the 
centuries to come. His idea of freedom entails· that no government can survive 
without the support of the population. He argues that there is not even a need to 
fight a tyrant, for 'he' is defeated as soon as the population refuses to consent to its 
enslavement.16 Numerous passages in the Anti-One deal with this possibility of 
withdrawing consent. They later became the conceptual foundations of an entire 
literature on popular dissent. Here are its Renaissance roots, expressed in la 
Boetie's rhetorical Humanism: 
If one concedes nothing to them [ the tyrants], if one refuses to obey them, then 
without fighting, without striking, they become naked & defeated & are no more, 
just as when the root is deprived of water and nourishment, the branch withers and 
dies. 17 
Be resolved to serve no more & you will be free. I do not want you to hurt or 
unsettle the tyrant, but simply that you serve him no more, & you will see how he 
collapses under his own weight and brakes into pieces, just like a large Colossus 
whose base has been snatched away. 18 
By linking any form of government to popular consent and ruminating about the 
possibilities that could arise when this consent is withdrawn, la Boetie advances a 
16 
La Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, p. 9. 
17 
Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
18 Ibid., p. 14. 
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fundamental proposition about the nature of power. Contrary to the prevalent view 
of the time, he does not perceive power as something stable and restraining, a 
privilege that some have and others don't. Power emerges from popular consent. 
Maybe even more importantly, it is enabling, it provides people with the chance to 
create opportunities for social change. Power is relational, a constantly changing 
force field located in the interactive dynamics between ruler and ruled. 
_ La Boetie was, of course, not the only early modern voice that opposed 
domination. Fran~ois Rabelais' famous novels Gargantua and Pantagruel, published 
two decades before the composition of the Anti-One, described the traditions of 
laughter in sixteenth century France. This popular culture of humor was deeply 
subversive, for it ridiculed the official feudal culture and thus revealed its hypocrisy. 
Laughter was freedom, because "it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, 
privileges, norms, and prohibitions. " 19 Not much of this subversive style can be 
found in la Boe tie's writings. His rhetoric was as humorless as the practices of 
domination he opposed. But his critique was also more direct than Rabelais', it went 
straight to the core of the problem, the issue of popular consent. 
Other antecedents are more closely related to la Boe tie's rhetorical assertion of 
popular dissent. Already in the early Italian Renaissance, various authors, such as 
Marsiglia of Padua and Bartolus of Saxoferrato, had openly condemned tyranny and 
advocated government by the people. But most of these and subsequent writers did 
not question the foundations of existing regimes. Instead, they were concerned with 
the proper functioning of the machinery of government. Out of this concern 
emerged a long lasting humanist tradition of giving advice to princes, kings, and 
magistrates. Humanists from Niccolo Machiavelli to Justus Lipsius counseled their 
rulers how to be virtuous, how to govern best, or how to retain a position of power 
in adverse circumstances. 
La Boe tie's writings clearly went further than these concerns with proper 
government, political stability and the functioning of power politics. What was more 
radical in his position was not the claim that any form of rule is or should be 
dependent upon popular consent. This relational perspective on power was implied 
in most of the advice given to the princes of Renaissance Italy and France. Where 
the Anti-One differed sharply from the advice-book tradition was in its claim that 
popular consent can be withdrawn at any time and that this act disempowers even 
the most ruthless dictator. It was this identification with the people and their claim 
to sovereignty that made the Anti-One stand apart from more immediate 
contemporary concerns with the machinery of the newly emerging modern State. 
The Anti-One's radicalism is best exemplified in its opposition to Machiavelli's 
The Prince, which was published in Rome two decades before la Boetie's student 
days in Orleans. It is likely that la Boetie knew The Prince since it was available in 
19 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, tr. H. Iswolsky (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), p. 10. 
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France at that time and constituted normal reading material for students. Parallels 
between la Boetie and Machiavelli are clearly visible, albeit not at first sight. Both 
situate power in the relationship between ruler and ruled, an idea that was alien to 
the preceding medieval period. Pierre Mesnard, in his classical study of Renaissance 
political theory, detects this common humanist trait but also draws attention to the 
above mentioned important difference: 
For la Boetie as well as for Machiavelli, authority can only emerge through 
acceptance by the subjects: except that one teaches the prince how to enforce their 
acquiescence while the other reveals to the people the power entailed in refusing it. 
In other words, the remedy of the Anti-One, whose political effectiveness we know 
today, is passive resistance, civil disobedience, the refusal to collaborate with an 
order one disapproves of. 20 
Mesnard's summary makes clear that Machiavelli, at least in his best known 
passages, was primarily operating within a framework of realist power politics. 
Viewing the world as a place where the struggle for power and the survival of the 
fittest determines the outcome of events, he advised the prince to abandon all 
precepts of morality if he is to retain his position. La Boetie, of course, positioned 
himself at the other side of the social spectrum. His focus on withdrawing popular 
consent suggests that the Anti-One was written for the people and their quest for 
freedom, rather than for the prince and his attempts to cement authoritarian rule. 
La Boetie' s work represents the radical element of the emerging humanist 
movement. He dares to speak of a subject, places 'man' at the center of attention, 
and displays an unbounded optimism in 'his' ability to exert human agency and 
change the course of history. But the Anti-One has other faces too, faces that 
cannot be classified easily, faces that do not fit neatly into preconceived intellectual 
spaces, at least not the ones that existed in Renaissance France. These are the 
aspects of the Anti-One that most subsequent interpretations neglect. They are the 
pluralities of a text, the faces that grimace, mock, provoke, the ones that contradict, 
disturb and rebel. A short elucidation of them is necessary at this point. 
La Boetie tried to open up possibilities to resist tyranny. But he was equally if 
not more concerned with explaining the puzzling lack of such resistance. Why is it 
that so many people serve a tyrant who, if the premises of the Anti-One are correct, 
they need not fear at all? Exclaims a perplexed la Boetie: 
If two, if three, if four do not defend themselves against one, this is strange but 
nevertheless conceivable; ... but a thousand, but a million, but a thousand cities, if 
they do not defend themselves against one, then this is not cowardice, for cowardice 
does not sink to such a low point. ... What monstrous vice is this then that does not 
even deserve to be called cowardice?21 
20 Mesnard, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Siecle, p. 400. 
21 
La Bretie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, pp. 5-6. 
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The vice has a name: voluntary servitude. La Boetie explains its existence in two 
ways, one deals with the force of customs, the other with a system of positive and 
negative privileges. Both of them entail, in essence, clear limits to human agency. 
The first is linked to a tyrant's ability to deprive his subjects of their memory of 
freedom: 
It is this, that men born under the yoke & thereafter nourished & brought up in 
servitude are content, without searching any further, to live like they are used to, & 
not being aware at all of any other situation or right than the one they know, they 
accept as natural the condition into which they were born.22 
La Boetie' s argument that the emergence of a quest for freedom requires a prior 
experience of it departs quite radically from his earlier polemics about a natural right 
to freedom. Facing the political reality of the time, he now admits that nature has 
less power over us than customs do. No matter how benevolent nature wanted us to 
be, our environment shapes us to the point that, against our own disposition, we 
learn "how to swallow, & not find bitter at all, the venom of servitude."23 
There are three sorts of tyrants, la Boetie argues, the ones who achieve power 
by force of arms, the ones who have inherited their position, and, last but not least, 
the ones who are elected by the people.24 In today's parlance we would call these 
three forms of tyranny dictatorships, monarchies and democracies. They are all 
equally ruthless and despotic, la Boetie shockingly proclaims. The ruler who is 
elected by the people may have come to power through more legitimate means and 
may appear more bearable at first sight. Yet, as soon as he consumes the authority 
people have bestowed upon 'him', 'he' rises above them and does everything 
possible not to relinquish 'his' position. Since depriving the people of their longing 
for liberty is the only way to secure this newly acquired form of power, the elected 
ruler and 'his' successors often surpass other tyrants in various vices, even in 
cruelty.25 
La Boetie also illustrates how the population can be misled and driven into 
submission. When Cyrus took the Lydian city of Sardis, the example goes, its 
citizens rebelled against the occupation. Instead of simply repressing the uprising, 
which would have entailed the problematic and continuous employment of an 
expensive army, Cyrus opted for a much more subtle and powerful form of 
domination: he established brothels, taverns, public games and then encouraged the 
people to go and enjoy them. This kind of garrison proved to be so effective that 
Cyrus henceforth could subjugate the Lydians without the least use of force.26 
22 Ibid., p. 22. 
23 Ibid, p. 23. 
24 Ibid, p. 19. 
25 Ibid, p. 20. 
26 Ibid., pp. 35-6. 
Rhetorics of Dissent in Renaissance Humanism 38 
La Boetie mentions a second reason for the existence of voluntary servitude. It 
revolves around pyramidically structured systems of threats and privileges. Indeed, 
this is the secret of domination, he claims. The key to such a system lies in a tyrant's 
ability to corrupt his people, particularly those who strive for power and wealth. La 
Boetie explains how each ruler is dependent on his closest advisers, a half a dozen 
men, at most. They are accomplices in 'his' cruelties and share the profits of 'his' 
plundering sprees. In this way, the system replicates itself endlessly, because: 
Those six have six hundred who profit under them & they proceed with these six 
hundred as they do with the tyrant. These six hundred have six thousand under 
them, they promote them in rank and give them the provinces to govern or the 
finances to manage, so that they too become entangled in avarice and cruelty ... 
Devastating are the consequences of all this, & whoever is willing to follow this 
trace will realize that not six thousand, but hundred thousand, even millions are tied 
to the tyrant by this one cord. 27 
Implied in these lines is the suggestion that a ruler can only maintain 'his' position if 
a large number of people profit from the existing system and thus have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. The tyrant, who lacks independent foundational sources 
of power, is able to subjugate the people only through them. 'He' is protected by 
those who could easily end the charade if they had the courage to resist. 
Despite its multiple faces, the Anti-One never loses sight of its radical humanist 
message. Even while elaborating on subtle systems of exclusion, la Boetie's main 
interest is not analyzing domination as such, but demonstrating how it can be 
overcome. In perfect humanist rhetoric, he reasserts his faith in agency, practices the 
art of persuasion, tries to incite people to overcome voluntary servitude. He 
constantly reminds the reader that systems of domination are fragile and dependent 
upon popular consent. As long as there are thinking subjects a tyrant's position is in 
danger. And there will always be thinking minds, people who cannot be fooled 
easily, who sense the weight of the yoke, people who open their eyes and reclaim 
their natural right to freedom.28 
Renaissance 'man' looms around the corner, able to see it all, equipped with the 
vision, the will, and the strength to change the world. Will 'he' succeed? 
PROTESTANTISM AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL 
I now move to the task of examining the impact of la Boe tie's writings. How were 
they received? How did they influence practices of dissent? How did they shape 
perceptions of human agency? 
27 Ibid., p. 45-6. 
28 Ibid., p. 30. 
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It is important to distinguish between la Boetie as an author and the Anti-One as 
a text. After its composition, a text takes off in multiple directions and becomes an 
object of appropriation over which the author inevitably loses control. In Michel 
Foucault's words, "writing unfolds like a game that invariably goes beyond its own 
rules and transgresses its limits. "29 One must then locate and explore the spaces that 
are left by the author's disappearance. A text is read in many different ways, it 
becomes a political tool that continuously changes shape and content. A reader of a 
text is, as Roland Barthes notes, an active producer, rather than simply a passive 
consumer. 30 Readers constantly reinvent texts, view them in light of particular 
experiences, note some passages and neglect others. Reading becomes 
appropriation. Appropriation becomes politics. Politics shapes our lives. 
Viewing the Anti-One as an object of appropriation is necessary to understand 
how its intellectual legacy has given rise to a tradition of popular dissent. Not long 
after its composition in the 1550s, the Anti-One and its author parted company. La 
Boetie turned into a conservative diplomat concerned with law and order while his 
text became part of a long crusade to promote the humanist concept of free will. 
The remaining sections of this chapter join the Anti-One's journey in its initial phase, 
the second half of the sixteenth century. 
We are in a period that is dominated by one key phenomenon, the Reformation. 
Like Humanism, the Reformation is a complex ser of ideas and events, susceptible to 
many different interpretations. At its most uncontested site, the Reformation was a 
movement that questioned the Pope's monopoly over the interpretation of the Bible. 
It tried to liberate Christianity from corrupt practices that the Roman Catholic 
Church had superimposed on it. It was a return to what was claimed to be the only 
authentic source of knowledge, the Bible. The Reformation was a second 
Renaissance, directed not at reviving classical Greek philosophy, but at reasserting 
the original faith, at halting the decay of Christianity. The Reformation's protagonist 
was the Augustinian monk Martin Luther, preaching and writing in the Saxon city of 
Wittenberg. Luther's famous posting of ninety-five theses to the door of his church, 
on the eve of All Saints in 1517, marked the beginning of a turbulent period that 
undermined most of the Catholic Church's spiritual, jurisdictional, and political 
power. 
But the Reformation was more than just a fight against the corruption of the 
Catholic church. At its core, the Reformation was, as one commentator puts it, "a 
life-or-death attack on Humanism. "31 From this perspective, the main battle was 
waged in 1524/5 between Luther and Erasmus, a Christian humanist writing in Basel. 
29 Michel Foucault, ''What is an Author," tr. J.V. Harari, in P. Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 102. 
30 Roland Barthes, ~ (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), pp. 9-23. 
31 
John Carroll, Humanism: The Wreck of Western Culture (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 47. 
Rhetorics of Dissent in Renaissance Humanism 40 
The focus of attack was not the Papacy, but Renaissance 'man', the secularization of 
life, the faith in reason and free will, the very concept of human agency. Luther 
opposed Erasmus by arguing that true freedom cannot be reached by asserting 
human independence. Our own actions cannot lead to freedom or salvation because 
we are corrupt, helpless and entirely dependent upon God's grace. Luther's concern 
reflects a key dilemma that permeated Renaissance thought. Ever since Pico della 
Mirandola's celebration of the dignity of 'man,' a double-edged message haunted the 
rising humanist movement. It was double-edged, "for to be uniquely privileged man 
was also uniquely burdened. "32 There was no longer an omnipotent God that could 
take over the responsibility for humanity's fate. Renaissance 'man' had put 'himself' 
into a state of suspense, having taken over command, but not yet assumed 
responsibility for it. Luther recognized this dilemma. Free will, for him, was an 
illusion that robed us of all foundations for life. 'Man' was left with nothing to stand 
on, no fixed world-view, no certainty, only despair and sin. True freedom, he hailed, 
can only arise from faith, from obedience to God's will. 
The tensions surrounding this dispute over religion and free will started to take 
hold of France at about the time when la Boetie ruminated about withdrawing 
consent at the University of Orleans. Protestant reformers, the Huguenots, were 
trying to practice their subversive form of Christianity. The Catholic church and its 
secular representative, the deified French monarch, increasingly saw their authority 
undermined and started to adopt more hostile positions. France was about to turn 
into a battle ground between adherents of the Catholic status quo and its Huguenots 
opponents. 
La Boetie finished his studies and was admitted to the Parliament of Bordeaux in 
1554. By then religious strife had already come to dominate political issues. Six 
years later, in the midst of various controversies triggered by the persecution of 
Protestants, la Boetie was entrusted with a delicate diplomatic mission. He was 
asked to mediate between his own parliament in Bordeaux and the court of King 
Charles IX, who had just succeeded his father Henry II. Catherine de Medicis, who 
had taken over the regency for her ten year old son Charles IX, initiated a politics of 
appeasement and gave la Boetie the task of returning to his Parliament, known for an 
inflexible Catholic stance, to explain this new, more tolerant approach towards the 
Huguenots. De Medicis' first attempt at appeasement failed. Violent confrontations 
between Catholics and Protestants increased and in 1562 she signed the Edit de 
Janvier, which was intended to protect the Huguenots from persecution. 
A long report, a Memoire, that la Boetie wrote about this edict reveals how 
much his opinions changed in comparison to the Anti-One, composed a decade 
earlier in his student days. La Boetie' s rhetoric is gone, and so is the quest for 
freedom beyond the confines of the newly emerging State. His language is no longer 
one of anger, of defiance. It is the language of order, of discipline and of diplomatic 
32 John Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 208. 
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maneuvering. La Boetie defends the King and sanctions the use of force to restore 
peace and order. While the Anti-One aimed at unchaining the people, the Memoire 
provided instructions about how to further enslave them. 33 La Boetie the student 
angrily and passionately condemned the forces of Henry II that crushed the revolt 
against the Gabelle, whereas la Boetie the diplomat defended and revered these very 
same instruments of repression. But la Boetie could not control the fate of his 
earlier, radical text. The Anti-One was to take a different route. Somewhat like 
Foucault describes the evolution of madness since the classical age, 34 the Anti-One 
came to force at the end of the sixteenth century and turned into an instrument of 
rebellion. Henceforth it was treated as ill, hostile and threatening. 
RAGE, REBELLION AND THE VOICE OF THE SKEPTIC 
After la Boetie's death at the age of thirty-two (most likely of the plague), his 
intellectual legacy, including the radical Anti-One, was entrusted to his close friend, 
the famous essayist Michel de Montaigne.35 Without Montaigne's protection and 
leverage, the Anti-One may have remained an unknown and obscure Renaissance 
text. La Boetie never saw his rhetorical treatise published. It only circulated as a 
manuscript among a small group of personal friends. In August 1570, seven years 
after la Boetie's death, Montaigne traveled to Paris to arrange the publication of 
some of his friend's writings, particularly poems and translations of classical Latin 
texts. But he decided against publishing la Boetie's more political Anti-One. 
Montaigne defended his editorial choice by arguing that this piece of writing was 
simply "too delicate and subtle to be abandoned to the rough and den-se climate of 
such a mischievous season. "36 
The early 1570s was indeed a 'mischievous season,' and this even by the 
standards of a century that is dominated by insecurity, civil wars, revolts and brutal 
repression. The tension between the entrenched, defensive Catholicism and the new, 
dissident Protestantism was at its peak. Reacting to a number of intricate domestic 
and foreign policy issues, King Charles IX was persuaded that the Huguenots were 
trying to overthrow him. On Saint Bartholomew's Day 1572 he ordered the 
execution of Protestant leaders. Events escalated dramatically when the Parisian 
militia precipitated a grand scale massacre of Protestants, a slaughter that lasted for 
33 
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six days in Paris and even longer in some provincial towns. An estimated 16,000 
Protestants were slain. 37 
The Saint Bartholomew massacre, publicly celebrated by Pope Gregory XIII, 
was an important turning point in terms of both political struggles and the history of 
ideas. 38 The civil war in France intensified again. Catherine de Medicis, who had 
argued strongly for an empathetic politics of religious compromise, sanctioned the 
killing of Protestant leaders and adapted a much more combative stance. Huguenot 
activists too abandoned tolerance and moved towards an uncompromising defiance 
of all Royal authority. This constituted a dramatic shift away from earlier Protestant 
positions that advocated a strict doctrine of non-resistance to tyranny. The old 
position claimed that since God instituted princes, political authority was 
unquestionable and obedience to it was due as an act of religious faith. Calvin 
summarized this position perfectly when claiming that "there can be no tyranny 
which in some respect is not a defense to conserve the society of men."39 But Luther 
had already abandoned this doctrine of non-resistance and argued that it is moral and 
lawful to oppose forcibly a ruler who turns tyrant.40 The Saint Bartholomew 
massacre clearly fueled this more subversive and radical strand of Protestantism, 
which eventually turned it into a revolutionary political ideology. Pamphlets 
advocating radical forms of resistance started to emerge all over France: Fran~ois 
Hotman's Franco-Gallia (1573), Theodore de Beze's De iure magistratuum in 
subditos (1574), and Du Plessis-Mornay's Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579). 
The Reformation, initially a conservative religious reaction, now began to look 
like a radical political movement. While trying to reassert Christian faith, it 
undermined the only theological authority and thus contributed to a further 
secularization of Europe, to the ultimate death of God. The most paradoxical aspect 
of this evolution was that Luther's doctrines, which were primarily aimed at 
undermining the humanist concepts of free will, turned out to be Humanism's most 
important catalyst. The Reformation became the ultimate affirmation of rebellious 
individualism. Liberated from the dogmatism of the Catholic church, 'man' now 
stood alone in front of God. Out of these theoretical foundations emerged an 
unprecedented revolutionary movement that transformed the entire continent. The 
37 See J.H.M Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century (London: Ernest Benn, 
1975), pp. 183-195. 
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concept of human agency was no longer simply a rhetorical positions. It was by now 
a radical political practice.41 
La Boetie's political writings made their public debut in the context of this 
emerging Huguenot radicalism. The Anti-One was first published in 1574, in French 
and in a Latin translation. Both were anonymous and ruthlessly mutilated versions 
of the original text. The pirated extracts were published as part of a militant 
Protestant pamphlet, the Reveille-Matin des Francois. It contained a detailed 
account of the Saint Bartholomew massacre and, directed personally against the 
. King and his Regent, Catherine de Medicis, called for the "revolt of the many against 
the tyranny of one-man rule. ,,42 The actual text of the Anti-One was reduced to a 
dozen pages that included all rhetorical condemnations of tyranny, but none of the 
more subtle discussions on systems of domination and the engineering of consent. 
Two years later, the Anti-One was printed again in a similarly combative collection 
of essays, Les Memoirs de l'Estat de France sous Charles Neufiesme, edited by 
Simon Goulart, a Protestant pastor from Geneva. This publication, reprinted twice 
in Holland, not only condemned one man rule and feudal hierarchy, but also 
provided a much more sweeping criticism of contemporary society in general.43 
By the mid 1570s the Anti-One was relatively widely known and associated with 
radical Huguenot positions. However, this originally complex rhetorical text was by 
now reduced to an anonymous and impoverished political pamphlet, a mere battle 
cry for radical political action, a dogmatic assertion of human agency. Thus, the 
concept of human agency, which had emerged only recently in the transition from the 
Middle Ages to the Renaissance, was helplessly entangled in the religious strife of 
the Reformation. 
Montaigne was clearly upset by this myopic usage of la Boetie' s work. He 
initially intended to give the Anti-One a prominent place in his own Essais, but given 
its entanglement in political battles this was not to happen. When the first edition of 
the Essais appeared, in 1580, Montaigne again refused to publish la Boetie's 
controversial text.44 
To protect the Anti-One from being misused as a tool for radical political action, 
Montaigne downplayed its importance. He claimed that la Boetie wrote this essay 
"in his infancy, by way of exercise, as a common subject that had already been 
41 
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treated in a thousand books. ,,4s Is Montaigne's attempt to moderate the 
appropnation of the Anti-One a mere expression of conservatism? Not likely. 
Montaigne was concerned with more than just hostility towards change. His work 
embodies the skeptical element of Renaissance Humanism. For him, the world is a 
place of diversities and idiosyncrasies, of unique events that cannot be assessed 
through a Platonic search for truth. There have never been two opinions alike, he 
claims, not any more than two hairs or two grains are alike. "Their most universal 
quality is diversity. ,,46 Knowledge of the world can never be absolute. People are 
deceived by appearances and hence cannot judge things objectively. Montaigne's 
philosophical skepticism is not to be equated with a simple relativism.47 But it 
questions people's abilities to reach a consensus about what is good for them. It 
raises suspicion about a dogmatic belief in human agency. 
The dispute between Montaigne and radical Huguenots over the interpretation 
of the Anti-One set the framework for many subsequent debates about human 
agency. Huguenots employed la Boe tie's message as a battle cry to support their 
rebellious individualism. Montaigne, by contrast, drew attention to the authoritarian 
aspects of the Huguenot revolution. His view implies that dogmatic political actions, 
even if they seek more freedom, are likely to create new forms of oppression. 
Hindsight clearly vindicated Montaigne. But in the late sixteenth century his critical 
voice drowned in the roaring of myopic political battles. 
SUMMARY 
In a world where the subject and the very notion of human agency barely existed, , 
Etienne de la Boetie' s Anti-One was a radical text. The prevailing sense of authority 
at the time consisted of "a right to demand obedience as a duty to God. ,,4s La Boetie 
broke radically with this deeply entrenched discourse. He condemned unequivocally 
all forms of governing that entail some people dominating others. The Anti-One 
claimed that people hold the key to social change, that any form of government, no 
matter how despotic, is dependent upon popular consent. Because people can 
withdraw this consent, they can precipitate the downfall of even the most tyrannical 
ruler. 
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La Boe tie's rhetorical position was part of an emerging humanist challenge that 
symbolized the transition from the medieval to the modern period. Humanism defied 
the prevalence of God and placed humanity at the center of attention. With it 
reemerged the long lost notion of human agency, the idea that people are their own 
masters, equipped with the ability to change both the world and themselves. 
The Anti-One's subversive message entered the public realm in the context of 
the civil war between rebellious Huguenots and defensive Catholic authorities. But 
la Boetie's text was immediately appropriated. It was bent, cut, mutilated. Virtually 
all of its rhetorical complexities vanished. Left were only the passionate 
condemnations of tyranny, which were then used to promote popular uprisings 
against the King of France. The Anti-One had turned into a political weapon for 
radical Huguenots, an instrument of resistance and revolution, an object of contempt 
and abhorrence. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Anti-One was reduced to a 
mere political pamphlet that did little more than inflate and do gmatize the concept of 
human agency. 
The public appropriation of the Anti-One symbolizes how human agency was 
constituted at .the time. The Reformation, which challenged the newly emerging 
humanist concept of free will, paradoxically provided it with unprecedented 
momentum. Luther passionately believed that freedom can only arise out of 
obedience to God's will. If humanity is deprived of this foundation, it will inevitably 
plunge into a moral and spiritual abyss. But by trying- to purify Christian doctrines, 
the Protestant reformers undermined the only theological authority, the Papacy. The 
Reformation became an expression of rebellious individualism that eventually led to a 
secularization of Europe. Humanism emerged victorious. So victorious that it was 
to transform the entire Western world in the centuries to come. But one of 
Humanism's key components, the concept of human agency, had become 
impoverished to a narrow and dogmatic political tool, a dangerously repressive 







VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 
That you were God's voice: I believed it once, 
In my sacred youth - yes and I say it still! 
Heedless of our wisdom though 
The rivers too thunder on and yet, .... 
Friedrich Holderlin, "Stimme des Volkes" 
tr. R.G. Eisenhauer 
The previous chapter has shown how Renaissance humanists stepped out of the 
theocentric medieval discourse and placed 'man' at the center of the world. By 
focusing on Etienne de la Boe tie's Anti-One, I demonstrated how the notion of 
popular dissent reemerged, first as a rhetorical argument, and then as a practice of 
political protest. The present chapter examines how this early and often tentative 
articulation of resistance turned into a radical tradition of popular dissent - one that 
started to influence social dynamics far beyond the boundaries of Europe. I observe 
the maturation of this tradition as a way of continuing my genealogical inquiry into 
the framing of human agency. The focus now lies on the period between the 
seventeenth and the nineteenth century. La Boetie remains central, or at least the 
dancing shadows of his quill. 
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Just as Machiavelli's work served as a catalyst for the burgeoning literature on 
the art of governing the State, la Boetie's intellectual legacy played a crucial role in 
precipitating the emergence of a body of knowledge that deals with radical resistance 
to government. But before this was to happen, the Anti-One and its more eminent 
Renaissance rival, The Prince, plunged into relative anonymity. In my attempt to 
come to terms with this phenomenon, I will brush over broad discursive trends, 
particularly the Enlightenment, to then examine more carefully how the Anti-One 
reemerged in the context of nineteenth century Romanticism. 
The intertwinement of popular dissent with romantic ideas is important because 
the ensuing characterization of human agency has contributed substantially to how 
we today perceive the interaction between domination and resistance. Romanticism 
is more than simply an historical epoch. It is, as Paul de Man noted, a powerful 
source for our own contemporary consciousness, 1 a source that often does not 
receive sufficient attention, especially among social scientists. The same can be said 
of the tradition of dissent that emerged in the wake of the Anti-One. Most of the 
time it lingered in the margins of dominant discourses. Yet, because it has waged a 
constant struggle, both in theory and practice, with mainstream societal positions, 
the Anti-One's intellectual legacy shaped the representation of modem popular 
dissent. 
ENLIGHTENED AND ANNIHILATED: THE SCIENTIFIC 
EROSION OF THE SUBJECT 
Before la Boetie's intellectual legacy could unfold, French history entered calmer 
waters and the Anti-One disappeared from the stage of political struggles. The 
coronation of Henri IV signified the advent of a more tolerant phase, albeit a short-
lived one. The Edict of Nantes, pronounced in 1598, guaranteed freedom of 
worship and ended almost four decades of bloody religious wars. 
A combative text like the Anti-One found few interested readers in such a period 
of healing. It is unlikely that a marginal comment to an Anti-One manuscript, which 
reads "seditious against the monarchy" and is dated 22 February 1602, reflected 
popular opinions at the time. 2 Devastated by decades of religious and political 
conflicts, Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century was not looking for 
radical dissident ideas. People longed for a practical philosophy that could secure 
order and tranquillity. Neostoicism was among the emerging movements that 
provided such a stable framework though which people could orient themselves and 
deal with the problems of everyday life. Political Neostoicism, championed in 
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particular by Justus Lipsius, a professor at Leiden University, stressed that order was 
needed for the development of the individual. People were expected to obey a ruler 
who could provide the discipline necessary for the maintenance of stability. The 
ruler, in turn, was supposed to honor this commitment and govern fairly.3 
The concept of popular dissent vanished even more when the recently gained 
tolerance gave way to another wave of absolutism. The new authoritarian practices 
were epitomized by the governing style of cardinal Richelieu and the subsequent 
reign of Louis XIV. After the Catholic Church had lost most of its power during the 
Reformation, the king, as the remaining established authority, was able to profit from 
the power vacuum and further extend his rule. Jean Bodin had already provided the 
conceptual foundations for this new authoritarianism. His Six Livres de la 
Republique granted the sovereign - now installed within a modernized absolutist 
State - the unlimited power of making law for itself.4 The Anti-One literally 
drowned in a dominant societal discourse that once more elevated absolutism to the 
center of political practice. On rare occasions some obscure intellectual still tried to 
get hold of the Anti-One, suggesting that its subversive flame was not entirely 
extinguished. A text by the cardinal of Retz, written in 1633 and anonymously 
published in 1665, is said to be influenced by a reading of la Boetie.5 And no lesser 
than Richelieu, who had read Montaigne's praise of la Boe tie, gave orders to search 
all libraries and book stores on rue Saint-Jacques in Paris for this obscure text. Yet, 
when Richelieu was finally able to get a hold of the Anti-One, his grip on power was 
most likely secure enough that he could easily be amused by la Boe tie's utopian 
rhetoric.6 
While political practices were confined within the parameters of seventeenth 
century royal absolutism, the world of thought entered a highly innovative period. 
Expanding upon the propositions that Copernicus had advanced in the previous 
century, curious minds such as Newton, Kepler and Galileo ushered Europe into an 
unprecedented scientific revolution. Philosophers soon started to borrow the 
methods with which the spectacular scientific discoveries became possible. Rene 
Descartes occupies a pivotal role in this attempt to locate ahistoric and universal 
laws that govern both nature and 'man.' His much-rehearsed 'cogito, ergo sum' 
symbolizes the search for irrefutable knowledge. Although Descartes agrees with 
Montaigne that much is uncertain in the world, he asserts that the actual process of 
thinking cannot be doubted. 'I think, therefore I am.' The awareness of the thinker 
is a fact and 'his' capacity to reason opens up possibilities to understand the world. 
3 John Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (London: Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 
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The quest for objectivity culminated in the following century, the so-called 
Enlightenment. In an influential essay, first published in 1784, Immanuel Kant 
portrays the this epoque as "a way out," a process of emancipation, the liberation of 
humanity from a self-imposed state of immaturity. 7 Its is not my intention to engage 
with the various complex debates that characterize the Enlightenment - a period that 
exerted a monumental influence on science and the history of ideas. My objective is 
merely to provide a rudimentary, and consequently somewhat stereotypical, image of 
this epoque, so that I can then analyze more carefully how la Boe tie's intellectual 
legacy reemerged in the subsequent romantic era. Both the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth century produced a range of enigmatic political philosophers (Spinoza, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, Hume and Kant, among others, spring to mind) whose work not 
only shaped, but also defied the mainstream discursive patterns that I am painting 
here with broad and slightly rushed strokes. 
The dominant strains of Enlightenment thought embody the victory of reason 
over superstition, science over mythology, progress over tradition, and human kind 
over nature. They capture the death of God in the language and logic of physics, 
mathematics and modern rationality. But humanity now faced the problem Luther 
had anticipated one and a half centuries earlier: there was nothing left to stand on. 
Humanism had dismantled the theocentric universe and replaced it with rather shaky 
foundations, based upon honor and the dignity of man, upon what Machiavelli called 
virtue. The Enlightenment used a different strategy to regain the certainty that had 
existed during the medieval period. It now focused the word around an unbounded 
confidence in man's ability to reason. Science replaced Christianity as Europe's 
principal religion. Mainstream Enlightenment thought discovered the Archimedean 
foundation that modern 'man' had long searched for: an objectified Humanism, 
stripped of Renaissance rhetoric and skepticism. 
La Boetie' s radical portrayal of popular dissent stands in an ambivalent 
relationship with Enlightenment thought. Some of his ideas fit well into the new 
context, others contradict its most fundamental tenets. La Boe tie's emphasis on 
natural rights, his belief in the power of logos and emancipation, clearly had some 
appeal to an audience who increasingly became captured by themes of reason, 
progress and the search for a secular autonomy of the Self. Not surprisingly, la 
Boetie's rhetoric slowly started to reemerge. Several new editions of Montaigne's 
Essais, appearing between 1727 and 17 45, now included the text of the Anti-One. 8 
This brought la Boetian rhetoric to an ever wider circle of readers. In the 
revolutionary period, between 1789 and 1792, the Anti-One was reprinted several 
7 Immanuel Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Auflkarung?" in Werke, Vol IV (Berlin: 
Bruno Cassirer, 1922), p. 169. This essay is often considered an extraordinary attempt to analyze 
critically an intellectual and social movement that had not even fully emerged at the time. See 
Michel Foucault, ''What is Enlightenment," tr. C. Porter in P. Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader 
(New York: Pantheon Books, I 984), pp. 32-50. 
8 See Goyard-Fabre, "Introduction," pp. 45-6. 
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times on its own. But as radical Huguenots had done two centuries earlier, 
revolutionaries now appropriated the Anti-One to promote an activist celebration of 
human agency. The text appeared in various forms, alone or in annexes to other 
texts, prefaced and postscripted with combative introductions and comments. There 
is even good reason to believe that J.P. Marat's influential 1790 edition of Les 
Chaines de l'Esclavage contains passages that are plagiarized from la Boetie.9 
Despite this renewed interest in popular dissent, the Anti-One was unable to 
escape from the margins of Enlightenment thought, at least in part because la 
Boe tie's rhetorical defense of human agency was incompatible with a quest for 
scientific objectivity. In a world of pure reason there was little scope for 
Renaissance skepticism, for ruminations about limits to cognition. Paradoxically, the 
Enlightenment became increasingly incompatible with the crux of Humanism, the 
concept of free will. In this sense Enlightenment and Humanism were, as Foucault 
notes, "in a state of tension rather than identity. " 10 Expressed in a crass and 
simplified manner: if 'man' was still autonomous, then only as an observer, not as an 
agent. There was no place for human agency in a world that allegedly worked 
according to a set of fixed, universal and ahistoric principles. 'Man' was alienated, 
depersonalized - a small and irrelevant part of a much larger, automatically 
functioning machine driven and controlled by rigid scientific laws. 
ROMANTICISM AND THE AESTHETIC REVIVAL OF HUMAN 
AGENCY 
Romanticism was, amongst other things , a reaction against Enlightenment 
determinism. It penetrated France towards the end of the eighteenth century and 
took hold of a disintegrating world characterized by Napoleonic wars and turmoil. 
One of the key assumptions of the Enlightenment, the idea that the spread of reason 
and science would inevitably lead towards progress, towards a better world, had not 
materialized. With the failure of the French revolution, the belief in linear progress 
was shattered. Disillusioned with their predecessors' trust in reason, some romantics 
were now looking for suppressed voices in their cultural heritage. Rousseau was 
remembered, or at least the passages in which he defies his contemporaries and 
portrays the achievements of civil society as leading humanity to nothing but further 
enslavement.. Reason, Rousseau claimed, alienates 'man' from nature, engenders 
egocentrism (amour propre ), and turns humani ty against itself.11 
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Joining Rousseau in his philosophical journey back to the peaceful state of 
nature, romantics tried to escape the deterministic and suffocating world of scientific 
laws by creating space for self-expression and imagination. The focus now shifted 
from the realm of objectivity to the subjective, the unconscious and the mystical, 
from reason to emotion, passion and spontaneity. Truth no longer lay in science, but 
in aesthetics - which then comprised not just art or music or literature, but all aspects 
of human sensation and cognition. With this aesthetic move, predated by Kant, the 
whole register of human experiences suddenly appeared less marginal than before. 
The world centered again around the human subject. 12 Modern thought increasingly 
recognized, as Wolfgang Welsch points out, that the foundations of what we call 
reality are primary fictional. This is to say that our perceptions of the world are not 
authentic, but part of specific forms of life. "Reality," in this sense, was 
acknowledge as being "aesthetically constituted."13 
Being skeptical of universalized norms, romantics generally refused to rely upon 
rational and abstract notions of the subject - they opposed the Enlightenment themes 
of liberte, egalite, fraternite. Instead, romantics celebrated the diversities of the 
human drama, its destructive and creative moments, the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual mind. Although Romanticism is often considered to be Europe's last 
common cultural approach, it embraced a different mantle in each of the various 
countries, walks of life and academic disciplines it penetrated. One would be hard 
pressed to find a lowest common denominator that unites French Romanticism with 
German romantic pioneers like Goethe, Herder, Holderlin, Schiller, Schlegel, 
Schelling and Schleimermacher, or with the Anglo-Saxon literary Romanticism of a 
Byron, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelly and Yeats. · 
Because romantic ideas are characterized above all by heterogeneity, it is not my 
task here to search for a set of common beliefs. Neither can it be my ambition to 
give a coherent account of the highly complex romantic movement. Instead, I focus 
on a specific form of Romanticism, the one that shaped the emergence of a coherent 
tradition of popular dissent: an activist form that often lacks some of the more subtle 
nuances that were articulated in philosophical, literary and poetic circles. 
In the realm of politics, this activist form of Romanticism signified above all a 
strong reemergence of the concept of human agency. The subject was no longer 
simply a perceiver in the world, but again an agent. History was once more open to 
be shaped by the will and actions of people. 
Which text could be better suited for this romantic celebration of human agency 
than the Anti-One? In 1835, against the backdrop of an emerging proletarian 
struggle and a radical insurrection that stretched from Paris to Lyon, the Abbot 
Felicite de Lamennais revived some of la Boetie's ideas. Initially one of the Catholic 
u Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1990), p. 102. 
13 .. 
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defenders of the Bourbons, Lamennais became one of the period's most outspoken 
cnucs. He refused a cardinal's position, was repudiated by the Pope, and 
subsequently turned into a militant advocate of proletarian rights. 14 His journal 
L'Avenir, founded during the revolution of 1830, was a well-known protest voice 
against the bourgeois monarchy and all forms of state intervention and repression. 
Lamennais published a new version of the Anti-One, hoping that is rhetoric would 
engender popular dissent and terminate the terror and despotism that had dominated 
Europe in the preceding forty years. 
Lamennais' emotional and combative preface to the new publication of the Anti-
One signifies Romanticism at its peak. We are in world of turmoil, struggle and 
darkness, a world in which the subject heroically strives for freedom: 
You who have faith in the destiny of the human kind, summon up your courage, the 
future will be yours. You will be persecuted and tortured, but you will never be 
defeated. Each great cause requires great sacrifices to become triumphant. 15 
In the wake of this romantic passion for revolt, interest in the Anti-One surged. The 
same year, 1835, two more editions emerged and the following year Charles Teste, 
exiled from France for his subversive activities, published a version transcribed into 
modern and thus more widely accessible French. The Anti-One became increasingly 
prominent, especially in the context of protest movements that followed the 
December 1853 coup d'etat by Napoleon II. La Boetie's essay was reprinted 
numerous times, read in ever wider circles, and discussed in various forums, such as 
the prominent Journal des Debats. 16 By the 1860s the Anti-One had escaped from 
the shadows of Montaigne's protective Essais. Although still stripped of its 
rhetorical complexities, a more popular Anti-One was gradually able to lay the 
foundations for a tradition of dissent that espouses a strong notion of human agency. 
It is now my task to observe how this tradition spread beyond the boundaries of 
France. 
THE DEIFIED SELF AS ROMANTIC HERO, GOING 
INTERNATIONAL 
My first gaze at the internationalization of la Boetie's legacy is directed towards the 
American romantic Henry David Thoreau. Some have argued that his ideas were 
directly influenced by la Boe tie. 17 This claim is at best speculative. Thoreau's close 
14 
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friend, the poet Ralph Waldo Emerson, was certainly aware of la Boetie. The title of 
a poem and a notebook entry from early 1843 suggest that Emerson knew him, at 
least via a reading of Montaigne's Essais. 18 Thoreau's writings, however, are silent 
about the Anti-One, and so are most of his biographers.19 
With or without knowing the Anti-One, Thoreau rearticulated many of its key 
claims and then embedded them into a romantic world-view. His writings imply, like 
la Boe tie's, that any form of government rests upon popular consent, and if this 
consent is withdrawn, even the most authoritarian regime will crumble like a house 
of cards. Passive withdrawal, so called civil disobedience, is enough to trigger this 
active progress. Writing in protest against slavery and the war with Mexico, 
Thoreau argues in 1848: 
[I]f one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name, - if ten honest 
men only, - aye, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to 
hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in 
the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America ... A 
minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority 
then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to 
keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate 
which to choose. 20 
Thoreau's concept of withdrawing consent is embedded in a theory of power that 
could have come right out of the Anti-One. Yet, his main focus does not lie with the 
masses and their ability to overthrow a ruler. It is almost exclusively geared towards 
fighting for and protecting the autonomy of the individual. 
Thoreau exemplifies the crux of political Romanticism, a Self that is entirely 
autonomous and has priority over everything else. It cannot interfere with the 
exertion of human agency. This tendency to deify the individual has been interpreted 
in various ways. Carl Schmitt called it su bjectified occasionalism, a situation in 
which the romantic ego, embedding the final authority, relegates the world and 
everything else into a mere occasion. 21 Rene Girard, a structuralist literary critic, 
somewhat overstates the issue by talking of "romantic lies" - illusions that consider 
the subject as the center of everything and endow 'him' with quasi divine powers.22 
While Enlightenment thought had employed science and reason to restore certainty 
in the world, Romanticism anchored its world-view in a sovereign subject and an 
18 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ''Etienne de la Boece," in The Complete Works, Vol. IX (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1918), p. 82; The Journals and Miscellaneous Noteb<x)ks, Vol. IX, 1843-1847 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 28. 
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unbounded trust in the power of human agency. The overall quest, however, 
remained the same: to fill the vacuum that opened up after the death of God. 
Thoreau argues that the State may have superior physical strength, but it can 
never interfere with an individual's intellectual or moral senses. The State, "timid" 
and "half-witted," can inflict punishment upon one's body, but this strategy is of no 
match to a Thoreau who proclaims that "I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us 
see who is the strongest. "23 While reconstructing the night he spent in jail for 
refusing to pay taxes, Thoreau romanticizes his experience in every possible way. 
The thick walls of solid stone, the iron door and grating, indeed, the entire power of 
the State's repressive apparatus could not reach his ego at all - a foolishness to treat 
him as if he were mere flesh and bones. His mind uninfluenced by all these 
pressures, Thoreau did not for a moment feel confined by these thick walls - a great 
waste of stone and mortar they were. 24 
Awoke the romantic hero: the individual who rises to the occasion and 
challenges the repressive forces around 'him,' the one who "stands resolutely and 
incorruptly against decadence, evil and deceit, until they are exposed for what they 
are. "25 Although he spent no more than one single night behind bars, Thoreau 
presented his imprisonment as the ultimate assault against an immoral government. 
In a State that supports slavery, he hails, the prison is the only ground where a just 
'man' can live in freedom and honor. 26 From such a principled romantic perspective, 
earthly matters, even one's own life, are to be submitted to the more important fight 
against all institutions that repress individuality and free will. For romantics, nothing 
can touch the autonomous Self, not the prison, not the repressive State, not even the 
subtle power of societal customs. The romantic subject can rise above the corrupt 
society, 'he,, can escape and criticize its decadence from a standpoint of authentic 
individuality. Elements of Berkeley and idealism resonate in this position. Things, 
like stone walls and iron gates, only exist because they are perceived by our mind. 
Even if objects outside this mental sphere exist by themselves, they cannot have 
qualities of their own. Their appearance is constructed by and subjected to the 
individual's free will Nothing exists outside the mind. 
It is important to remember that the speculative idealism and the strong notion 
of human agency that is entailed in this deification of the Self was an important but 
not uncontested position within romantic thought. Other forms of Romanticism 
flourished at the same time. Consider, for example, the feminist Romanticism that 
evolved parallel to the canonical masculine one. This body of literature shared some 
of the above mentioned themes, such as the hostility towards authority, a sense of 
identification with the victim, or a focus on emotions and the construction of 
23 
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subjectivities.27 But feminine forms of Romanticism also differed in various crucial 
aspects. Most women writers, such as Mary Shelly, Jane Austen, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, or Dorothy Wordsworth did not pursue the search for boundless 
creative imagination or a visionary freedom beyond the confines of the state. 
Instead, they were concerned with the social constraints that had been imposed upon 
them. They employed the novel as a site of contestation, expressing the manner in 
which their female subjectivity was intertwined with and confined by concrete daily 
concerns, linked to such issues as family, community, or female bodies.28 This 
contrast is well reflected in the work of Margaret Fuller, Thoreau's contemporary 
and fellow Bostonian. Fuller clearly rejects the sense of autonomy and 
unboundedness that prevails in Thoreau's Romanticism. For her, the discursive 
prison walls are much thicker than they are for Thoreau. She draws attention to the 
social construction of femininity and masculinity, to the ways in which men are 
unable to think truly emancipatory thoughts because they are "under the slavery of 
habit. "29 Later parts of this thesis will return in detail to the themes opened up by 
Fuller. For the moment, however, I focus primarily on the dominant, masculine and 
activist heritage of Romanticism. This is not to suggest that this strain is more 
insightful or authentic than others, but to recognize that through its hegemonic status 
it has played a crucial role in shaping the formation of our contemporary . 
consc1ousnes s . 
The right to refuse allegiance to a government that engages in acts of tyranny is 
a theme that resonates not just in romantic, but also in liberal discourses. Nancy 
Rosenblum, for example, interprets Thoreau's Rom~nticism as a combination of 
heroic individualism and liberal democracy. She argues that Thoreau advances a 
libertarian agenda that constantly oscillates between a liberal concern for the public 
sphere and a radical romantic detachment from it. 30 There are indeed parallels 
between liberalism and the la Boetian tradition. The importance of the individual and 
a deep distrust towards government provides both of these strains of thought with an 
inherent anti-authoritarian core, at least in theory. But Thoreau also displays very 
strong anarchist traits. Disgusted with a State that endorses slavery and war, he 
wants to disengage altogether from this repressive institution, "withdraw and stand 
aloof from it effectually."31 His two year stay at Walden pond is, of course, the 
embodiment of this withdrawal, the classical Rousseauean return to nature, the 
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romantic search for what Olaf Hansen called the "essential paradoxes of selfhood. "32 
Implied in this withdrawal, and at times explicitly articulated, is a much deeper 
distrust towards the State, indeed, towards every societal organization that controls 
the individual and 'his' mind. For Thoreau injustice is a necessary product of the 
machinery of government. An individual cannot be free as long as 'he' operates 
within the confines of the State. In some of his more combative moments, Thoreau 
assumes a passionate anarchist stance, declares war against the State and portrays 
government as a demonic force, a monster, "a semi-human tiger or ox, stalking over 
the earth with its heart taken out and the top of its brain shot away. "33 It is this 
anarchist element that sucks Thoreau right into the vortex of la Boetie's legacy. 
There are, however, still several missing links between an individualistic 
anarchist revival of la Boetie and a theory of collective resistance. Romantic dissent 
focuses on the primacy of the perceiver and the poetization of political practice. 
This pushes romantics, at least according to the influential opinion of Carl Schmitt, 
towards a situation in which conflicts are not addressed, but deferred, subjectified, 
transplanted into a higher realm of aesthetic imagination. 34 One can argue with such 
an interpretation, and I shall do so later. What matters at this point, however, is that 
the anarchist romantic generally does not seek power, but despises and circumvents 
it. Thoreau engaged in the political struggle around slavery by withdrawing from the 
State that endorses this repressive practice. He returned to the woods, to Walden 
Pond, retreating into the ultimate source of the romantic world-view, the Self. This 
anarchist form of individualism was subversive on many accounts, but it lacked the 
element of immediate and direct social engagement. 
FROM ANARCHICAL INDIVIDUALISM TO A TRADITION OF 
POPULAR DISSENT 
Some of the later Romantics tried to add a radical and more direct political 
dimension to the already subversive Thoreauean foundations. They shifted the 
practice of withdrawing consent from detachment to engagement, and from individualism 
to collective action. With this move arose a coherent and powerful tradition of popular 
dissent and an equally powerful assertion of human agency. 
The more la Boetie' s legacy spread, the more it became intertwined with the 
emerging anarchist movement. By the end of the nineteenth century leading 
anarchist historians, such as Max Nettlau and Ernst Victor Zenker, portrayed la 
Boetie as an important intellectual precursor to the likes of Pierre Joseph Proudhon, 
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Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Max Stimer or Emma Goldman.35 One can, 
indeed, hear la Boetie's voice resonating in Stirner's claim that if the laborer acts 
upon the insight that 'his' power is 'his' property, the State simply crumbles.36 By 
the early twentieth century several anarchists started to draw directly upon la Boetie~ 
Gustav Landauer, one of the key figures in the German anarchist movement, 
constructed his central arguments around a discussion of the Anti-One. Bart de Ligt, 
a prominent Dutch anarcho-pacifist relied upon la Boetie, and so did Simon Weil in 
her unusual fusion of Anarchism, Marxism, Stoicism, and Christian mysticism. 37 
Weil, who was in many ways skeptical about the potential for social change, 
epitomized how the la Boetian legacy had acquired a new collective and practical 
dimension. The concept of popular dissent now contained clear revolutionary 
potential: "at certain moments in history a strong inspiration takes hold of the 
masses; then their breathing, their words, and their movements merge to the point 
that nothing can resist them."38 To understand how the practice of popular dissent 
achieved this new collective dimension, we need to reach further back and observe 
what precisely occurred when la Boetie' s intellectual legacy came of age at the 
intersection of the nineteenth and the twentieth century. 
el 
Various authors played a crucial role in transforming romantic individualism into 
a coherent tradition of popular dissent. I will focus primarily upon two of them, Leo 
Tolstoy and Mohandas Gandhi. Both operated within anarchist and neo-romantic 
frameworks. Both played a crucial role in bringing the la Boetian legacy to a world-
wide audience. Both were instrumental in transforming the concept of withdrawing 
consent into a mass phenomenon of far-reaching political significance. And, finally, 
both espouse a strong notion of human agency. 
Tolstoy draws directly and extensively upon la Boe tie's work. Violence can 
never be enough to keep a ruler in place. Domination over the populace, he claims, 
can only be sustained because people are being deceived, or because they sacrifice 
their freedom for small gains and benefits. To underline this point, Tolstoy inserts a 
long quote from the Anti-One, followed by commentaries that could have emanated 
straight out of a la Boetian cookbook: 
One would have thought that just the working people, who derive no kind of profit 
from the violence done them, would at last see through the deception in which they 
are entangled, and having seen the fraud, would free themselves from it in the 
35 Ernst Victor Zenker, Anarchism: A Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory (London: 
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38 Weil, "Meditation sur l'obeissance et la liberte," p. 131. 
The Romantic Radicalization of Political Protest 
simplest and easiest way: by ceasing to take part in the violence which can only be 
perpetrated upon them thanks to their participation in it. 39 
58 
La Boetie also plays a central role in Gandhi's thought, primarily via the influence of 
Tolstoy. Gandhi incessantly stressed how "deeply impressed" and "overwhelmed" 
he was by Tolstoy. Thoreau, likewise, was acknowledged as an important source.40 
Not surprisingly, Gandhi ended up with a distinctive la Boetian approach to popular 
dissent. He theorized from the perspective of the masses and viewed social 
dynamics through the eyes of the ruled, rather than the rulers. Gandhi too argued 
that power is dependent upon popular consent: 
I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single 
moment without the co-operation of the people, willing or forced, and if people 
suddenly withdraw their co-operation in every detail, the Government will come to a 
stand-still.41 
Various romantic voices resonate in Gandhi's and Tolstoy's reading of la Boetie. 
But neither of them is a romantic in the strict sense of the term. Romanticism as a 
self-conscious and coherent cultural movement disintegrated by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, some would even say it ended with the death of Hegel in 1831. 42 
Yet, romantic ideas endured far beyond the historical epoque that is associated with 
them. Tolstoy's prime medium of expression, the novel, embodies the romantic 
suspicion towards scientific objectivity. It celebrates diversity, life's emotional and 
individualistic features. Many of Gandhi's more subtle arguments are constructed 
around a frontal assault at the core of mainstream Western thought, the concept of 
instrumental rationality. For both Tolstoy and Gandhi opposition to rationalism 
amounted to a return of the sacred, a prominent romantic theme. Tolstoy could only 
overcome the decay of his time, nihilism, through an affirmation of Christian faith 
and morality.43 Likewise, Gandhi's political philosophy is rooted in a strong moral 
framework. All of his writings, he stresses, have a spiritual end.44 
The two most distinctly romantic elements in Tolstoy and Gandhi are the belief 
in an autonomous Self and the refusal to cooperate with a State that violates the 
dignity and rights of its subject. Both express a strong belief in an individualistic 
39 Leo Tolstoy, The Law of Violence and the Law of Love (London: Unicorn Press, 1959), pp. 38-
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form of human agency. Tolstoy was constantly drawn back and forth between 
engaging with society and renouncing it. Symptomatic for this are the final days of 
his life, when he decided, at the age of 82, to withdraw for good from society. He 
secretly left his family just to perish of pneumonia, a few days later, at the railway 
station of Astapovo: tragic and dramatic, the typical death of a romantic hero. The 
same romantic oscillation between social being and outcast is present in Gandhi's 
life. His activism and practice of self-reliance constantly subverted the power of the 
State. Indeed, Gandhi's very life, mythologized as it has become, represents the 
ideal autonomous subject: a skinny Indian lawyer who, transformed into a romantic 
hero, was able to defy the might of the entire British Empire. 
Gandhi's writings on human agency and dissent were primarily intended to 
promote immediate social change. The vortex of this approach was satyagraha, a 
term coined in 1906, in the early days of Gandhi's involvement with the struggle that 
Indian immigrant workers waged against the South African regime. Satyagraha 
encapsulates a great variety of methods, including strikes, demonstrations, refusal to 
serve the State, or non-payment of fines and taxes. In this political context, the 
romantic hero, the satyagrahi, does not simply withdraw to Walden pond. 'He' 
boldly abandons 'his' mundane life, is willing to "sacrifice his property and even his 
family", and "suffers unto death" to fight for justice and a better world.45 Satyagraha 
demands, Gandhi argues, total dedication from an activist. Sacrifice of the self is 
indispensable for a successful campaign of non-cooperation. Besides adhering to the 
principle of ahimsa, of nonviolence as an ethical principle, this practice demands 
from a satyagrahi to renounce all possessions, live in poverty, and take the vow of 
brachmacharya, of chastity. Gandhi's romantic hero must be willing to endure 
abuse, live in deprivation, fast as a sign of protest, or, as Thoreau had already 
advocated, freely submit to imprisonment: 
Our triumph consists in thousands being led to the prisons like lambs to the 
slaughter house. If the lambs of the world had been willingly led, they would have 
long ago saved themselves from the butcher's knife ... The greater our innocence, the 
greater our strength and the swifter our victory.46 
There are, in Gandhi's view, pragmatic political reasons for these rather extreme 
positions on personal sacrifice and self-reliance. A true satyagrahi could hardly be 
coopted or bribed by a government. 'He' is always ready to make any sacrifice 
necessary to push non-cooperation to its limits. Furthermore, a sustained effort of 
nonviolent resistance, conducted by self-sacrificing satyagrahis, has a profound 
psychological effect. It engages in a conversation with the consciousness of the 
45 Gandhi, Satyagraha, pp. 67, 314 
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opponent. It evokes pity, Gandhi claims, which may convert the opponent and lead 
'him' to accommodate the protesters. 
Before moving on to deal with the practical application of Gandhi's ideas, it is 
necessary to pause for a brief moment and draw attention to some of the contentious 
aspects of his positions. There is, for example, the masculinist dimension of his 
thought, which confirms the earlier mentioned recurrent gendered theme in canonical 
Romanticism. Many of the romantic images evoked by Gandhi, such as the male 
hero who boldly abandons his wife and children to fight for freedom and justice, are 
problematic. Such practices may uproot some forms of domination, but they also 
entrench patriarchal systems of exclusion. As a result, problems arise at the core of 
seemingly incontestable· sights, as for example with the link between pity and power, 
the crux of a satyagrahi's attempt to draw popular support for 'his' activism. A 
Nietzschean interpretation would rethink this moral celebration of self-denial and 
self-sacrifice. It was precisely in these apparently unegoistic actions that Nietzsche 
detected a will to power, a thirst for triumph, a desire to subjugate.47 
Notwithstanding these problematic aspects, the shift from radical individualism 
to collective action marked the beginning of a coherent tradition of popular dissent. 
The fact that authors of the stature of Tolstoy or Gandhi advocated this move was 
instrumental for its dissemination. Gandhi, in particular, added a truly global 
dimension to the theory and practice of popular dissent. He provided unprecedented 
political momentum to a notion of human agency that before existed primarily on a 
rhetorical level. His thoughts and deeds informed countless civil disobedience 
campaigns. Independently of whether or not we agree with the premises that 
underlie them, our perceptions of popular dissent have been influenced substantially 
by the ideas and practices that ensued from Gandhi's application of la Boetian 
rhetoric. 
THE PROBLEM WITH ACTIVIST CELEBRATIONS OF HUMAN 
AGENCY 
With the shift from radical individualism to collective action, the notion of human 
agency became intertwined with political activism. Far-reaching consequences arose 
from this fusion. 
Tolstoy lectured workers on exploitation, encouraged peasants to stop obeying 
their landlords, and advised conscripts to refuse military service - and all this against 
the backdrop of the la Boetian idea that suffering is caused by one's own 
enslavement, that if one desires it, one can be free. 48 Gandhi's entire life consisted of 
47 
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actIVISm. His political engagement began when he was a lawyer in South Africa. 
Appalled by various race related discriminations against Indian immigrants, Gandhi 
became increasingly active in acts of social non-cooperation. Between 1906 and 
1914 he led countless satyagrahi campaigns, including refusals of registration, 
strikes, protest marches, and fasts. Back in his native India, Gandhi and his 
increasingly numerous followers used the same political techniques to fight British 
colonial rule. Mass civil disobedience became a powerful tool in the struggle for 
independence. 
Gandhi's activism demonstrated the practical implications of withdrawing 
popular consent. He was able to establish the dialectical link between intellectuals 
and the masses that Gramsci so convincingly portrayed as the key to successful 
resistance.49 Representative for Gandhi's various campaigns of non-cooperation is 
the famous salt march of 1930. The production of salt, an indispensable product for 
every Indian, was a government monopoly and levied with exorbitant taxes. As a 
protest against this practice, Gandhi and some eighty fellow satyagrahis embarked 
upon a 240 mile walk to the Gujarat coast where they intended to extract their own 
salt from the sea. The immediate objective of this symbolic and carefully planned 
public defiance was the annulment of the salt tax. On a more fundamental level, the 
salt march was intended to undermine the legality of the colonial government as 
such. The satyagrahis tried to attract as much public attention as possible. They 
walked through many villages, where they paused, informed the people of their 
cause, and encouraged them to defy the law and manufacture their own salt. In 
some towns their appearance drew as many as 30,000 eager listeners. The 
satyagrahis also incited village headmen to resign and stop cooperating with the 
colonial authorities, an appeal that had considerable success. Although the British 
salt monopoly was never threatened, the salt march had a dramatic impact. It was 
the prelude of a powerful nation-wide campaign of mass civil disobedience. By mid-
1930, Judith Brown argues, civil disobedience posed a severe challenge to British 
colonial rule in India. 50 Knowledge of the Gandhian technique of resistance had 
spread and non-cooperation was practiced in every province. Throughout the one 
year long campaign an estimated 60,000 people were arrested and many more 
participated in one way or another in acts of non-cooperation, for example by 
boycotting foreign cloth.51 
The campaign that followed the salt march was one of the first cases of carefully 
planned and coordinated mass civil disobedience, a manifestation of massive popular 
dissent. Although the campaign did not uproot the British colonial empire, it 
demonstrated that the notion of withdrawing consent could no longer be dismissed 
49 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, tr. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New 
York: International Publishers, 1985/1929-1935), pp. 5-24, 334. 
50 
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p. 123. 
51 Ibid., p. 124. 
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as a mere utopian dream, an irrelevant rhetorical exercise. La Boetie had stepped 
out of his long shadow and entered the realm of practice - but with what 
consequences? 
To demonstrate the practical relevance of the la Boetian idea of popular dissent, 
Gandhi reduced complex rhetorical arguments to a few parsimonious propositions. 
This narrowing down of the concept of human agency occurred whenever activists 
appropriated the Anti-One to promote a particular political cause. It happened when 
radical Huguenots mutilated the Anti-One during the Reformation and when 
Lamennais plunged it, with his own combative preface, into the anarcho-socialist 
struggle of the mid-nineteenth century. Michel de Montaigne, as mentioned before, 
vehemently opposed this imprudent appropriation, and so did the famous literary 
critic C.A. Sainte-Beuve two centuries later. Writing in November 1853, he noted 
that in past and present times the Anti-One, a brilliant exercise in classical rhetoric, 
had always been misused by short-sighted trouble makers who transformed it into a 
"torch and firebrand. "52 
Notwithstanding Montaigne's and Sainte-Beuve's criticism, a reduction ., of 
rhetorical complexities to a few parsimonious propositions may have a number of 
distinct advantages, especially in the realm of political practice. A simple slogan, 
like "people power," "long live the revolution," or "we are the people" can provide a 
movement of popular dissent with a sense of unity and with the momentum 
necessary to unleash its potential of resistance. But this activist promotion of human 
agency is a double-edged sword. Gandhi's political engagement demonstrates why. 
His celebration of human agency led, paradoxically, to an annihilation of the subject. 
Much like some describe the changing nature of Romanticism in general,53 Gandhi's 
activism relocated human agency from rebellious individualism to an almost 
functionalist position that reduced the role of individuals to the logic of societal 
totality. During Gandhi's salt march, for example, it was always assumed that 
everyone would agree with the direction and desirability of the particular change that 
was intended. Minorities within the protesting population were irrelevant. All that 
mattered were the masses and the uniform function that was superimposed on often 
diversely motivated individuals. 
Neo-romanticism had moved full circle and returned to the determinism it 
initially reacted against. Gandhi's totalizing conception of human agency is a far cry 
from Thoreau's warning that "there is but little virtue in the action of masses of 
men."54 For Gandhi the protesting population is a coherent and homogeneous 
element which, like the subject in Hegel's philosophy of history, becomes conscious 
of itself and dialectically proceed to unify humanity. This approach implies that a 
52 
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great number of individuals can reach a consensus about what kind of action is 
desirable for what purpose. Some elements of Gandhi' thought suggest that he may 
have been aware of the dangers entailed in a totalizing approach to dissent. Faithful 
to his neo-romantic frame of reference, he acknowledges that there cannot be 
authentic knowledge, that everything "can be seen from no less than seven points of 
view, all of which are probably correct by themselves. "55 Indeed, his overarching 
focus on nonviolence is precisely an expression of this uncertainty, an admission that 
since truth cannot be known, nobody should possess the ultimate right to punish. 
But there is nevertheless truth in Gandhi's world. It is not factual in the Cartesian 
sense. It is spiritual, not "the relative truth of our perception, but the Absolute 
Truth, the Eternal Principle, that is God. "56 Discovering this truth requires arranging 
one's life such that one is striving incessantly for spiritual perfection. Activism is 
part of this endless quest, it is its essence, as the very meaning of the term satyagraha 
- truth force - suggests. 57 
Gandhi's fusion of religion, morality, and activism is highly problematic. Even 
on a purely personal level, the Gandhian notion of truth projects a strong image of 
moral righteousness. The romantic deified Self, speaking from a privileged and 
influential societal position, assumes that what is good for 'him' is necessarily also 
good for everyone else. Nietzsche would remind us that such a position mistakenly 
assumes that the highest values must have some origin of their own. Gandhi ignores 
that there is a will to truth, that there is value in truth, and that it is always the 
'moral' ones themselves who define the parameters of morality. He elevates one 
particular form of truth to the status of spirituality and by doing so excludes a 
multitude of other ideas and practices from reaching this moral sanctuary. A 
Nietzschean position would, instead, recognize untruth as a condition of life and 
explore issues of inclusion and exclusion by investigating the subjective origins of all 
moral values. 58 But this does not mean that Gandhi's theory and practice of dissent 
is irrelevant. Civil disobedience campaigns can undoubtedly promote spectacular 
social change. Yet, if they are embedded in a totalizing and moralizing framework, 
they fail to take issue with more entrenched forms of domination. Maybe Karl 
Mannheim was not too far off the mark when he claimed, somewhat dramatically, 
that all romantic thought has an inherent conservative core.59 
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SUMMARY 
This chapter has continued a genealogical inquiry into the framing of human agency 
during the modern period. The focus now rested on the constitution of the theory 
and practice of popular dissent from the end of the Renaissance to the nineteenth 
century. 
The humanist discourse that replaced the medieval world view clearly survived 
the death of Renaissance 'man.' Humanism, which placed the subject at the center 
of history, successfully dealt with various onslaughts - constantly changing 
appearance and focus, it gradually turned into the vortex of Western thought. 
The tradition of dissent that grew out of la Boetie' s work became entangled in 
these superseding humanist interpretations. After having achieved prominence in 
radical Huguenot circles during the Reformation, the Anti-One returned to the realm 
of anonymity. La Boetie's notion of human agency was overpowered by the 
scientific revolution that dominated the subsequent two centuries. The skeptical 
Humanism of the Renaissance gave way to an Enlightenment celebration of reason 
and science. While this secular objectivism ensured the final transition from the 
medieval to the modern world, it also annihilated the agent. Or so at least resonate 
some of the dominant intellectual trends of the period. In a universe that was 
perceived to function according to a set of predetermined and scientifically 
assessable principles, the notion of human agency became largely irrelevant. The 
world was still interpreted in a humanist way, but the central position that 'man' 
occupied was primarily one of rational observer, rather than -agent. 
Romanticism reacted against the rationalism and determinism of mainstream 
Enlightenment thought. It reintroduced the subject as agent by shifting the focus 
from the realm of detached objectivity to the one of emotion, passion and individual 
autonomy. Aesthetics became central. While the Enlightenment had grounded its 
world view in science and reason, Romanticism constructed its Archimedean point 
around an autonomous Self. This meant, above all, that history was again open to be 
shaped by human agency. The Anti-One reemerged in the wake of this discursive 
shift. Its popularity surged in the context of the labor unrest that dominated France 
in the 1830s. It became an object of scholarly attention, was reprinted numerous 
times and gradually spread beyond French national borders. 
Thoreau was among the ones who popularized many of the Anti-One's themes 
and embedded them in a romantic framework. Although his theory of power was 
virtually identical with the Anti-One's claim that any form of government depends 
upon popular consent, Thoreau's main focus rested with issues of individual 
autonomy rather than with the promotion of social change. He strove for the highest 
romantic aspiration, a Self that is autonomous and has priority over everything else. 
The embodiment of this canonical masculine version of Romanticism is the bold hero 
who successfully defies all forces around 'him' and withdraws altogether from the 
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State, which is perceived to be the main obstacle to freedom and self-fulfillment. 
This practice of anarchical individualism may have lacked an element of direct 
political engagement, but it provided a crucial theoretical stepping stone for the 
creation of a coherent tradition of popular dissent. 
Romantic Humanism achieved political momentum when Tolstoy and Gandhi 
rearticulated and implemented la Boe tie's and Thoreau's theoretical claims. They 
shifted foci from individual to collective action and from rejecting society to 
engaging with it. Human agency once more acquired a new dimension. Popular 
dissent became a mass phenomenon of far-reaching political significance. Gandhi in 
particular was instrumental in demonstrating the practical relevance of la Boetie' s 
rhetorical links between power and consent. There are many problematic aspects in 
Gandhi's activist approach to human agency. Yet, the world-wide attention he 
received not only helped to establish a coherent tradition of popular dissent, but also 
influenced considerably how we today perceive the interaction between domination 
and resistance. 
Chapter Three 
LATE MODERN LEGACIES 
OF 
POPULAR DISSENT 
How this world suffers from being crushed between the four walls of 
a book in order to become the world of men! If it is then placed in 
the hands of speculators and madmen who force it to advance faster 
than it should go, isn't this more than mere bad luck? Fighting -
come what may - against this doom with the help of its magic, 
opening up insatiable walks in the replacement-road's wing: this is 
the task of the Dawnbreakers. 
Rene Char, "Rougeur des Matinaux" 
tr. M. Worton 
The previous two chapters traced the modern idea of popular dissent back to its 
Renaissance origins and then observed its radicalization during the romantic period. 
The present chapter concludes my genealogical inquiry by analyzing how the legacy 
of this humanist tradition has evolved in the twentieth century. I examine how late 
modern notions of popular dissent have shaped and delineated our understanding of 
human agency. This delineation has far-reaching consequences, for our perceptions 
of what human agency is and how it functions determine to a considerable extent its 
practical applicability. 
The dancing shadows of La Boetie ' s quill remain central to my inquiry. I focus 
in particular on two contemporary manifestations of popular dissent that operate in 
the broad conceptual wake of the Anti-One. The first one - civil disobedience - is 
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associated with liberal ideas. The second - direct action - is embedded in anarchist 
and libertarian frameworks. These are, of course, not the only late modern practices 
of popular dissent. There are countless other forms of resistance that espouse 
different ideas about human agency and social change. My continuous focus on the 
la Boetian legacy is not to deny the existence of diversity. Rather, it is to use the 
advantage of a relatively unknown representation of dissent to draw attention to the 
emergence of more familiar contemporary narratives about human agency. 
Outlining the framing of the familiar through unfamiliar images entails, of 
course, a number of paradoxes. This is particularly the case with la Boe tie's 
intellectual legacy. By the early twentieth century this legacy had left the realm of 
obscurity. Through the writings and activism of Thoreau, Tolstoy and Gandhi the 
ideas first expressed in the Anti-One became diffused to large audiences and formed 
the theoretical vortex of an important tradition of dissent. One could now recognize 
the practical significance of la Boe tie's rhetorical claim that any form of rule is 
dependent upon popular consent and that even the most ruthless dictatorship 
crumbles if this consent is withdrawn. Paradoxical about this evolution is the fact 
that while the Anti-One's arguments were now discussed and applied on a glopal 
scale, the actual text that provided much of the initial intellectual momentum became 
blurred, effaced and all but vanished from the memory of most who either feared or 
thrived upon its ideas. A few rare authors still go back and read the original 
sixteenth century text, some are aware of it via references from secondary sources, 
but for most who maneuver within the context of its ideas, the Anti-One is at best an 
obscure essay from a far distant dark age. Drawing attention to this aspect is not to 
essentialize la Boetie's writings, but to point out that my task now is to navigate in 
this blurred context, to locate the shadows of the Anti-One, the spaces that are left 
by the disappearance of not only the author, but also of the text. 
The diffusion of la Boetian practices of dissent has not necessarily widened the 
scope of human agency. The intellectual legacy of the Anti-One became channeled 
into the discursive confines of late modern life. Much of this contemporary 
sensibility has ensued, to simplify matters, from the interaction between the romantic 
attachment to an autonomous Self and the Enlightenment's quest for certainty in an 
age of turmoil and constant flux. The resulting fusion of reason and free will 
squeezed the notion of human agency into a narrow, positivist view of the world. 
Grand theoretical approaches became one of the dominant intellectual efforts to 
understand contemporary dissent. But the positivist assumptions that lie at the heart 
of such approaches uphold and freeze one specific image of dissent to the detriment 
of others. They crush the world, in Rene Char's imagery, between 'four walls of a 
book in order to become the world of men.' To appreciate the far-reaching 
consequences that issue from this phenomenon, this chapter first grapples with the 
discursive foundations of late modern life, with the underlying assumptions we have 
inherited and which continuously shape the interactions between domination and 
resistance. The remaining sections scrutinize civil disobedience and direct action as 
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specific manifestations of contemporary popular dissent. Once this last genealogical 
task is fulfilled, I will embark on the Dawnbreakers' task of 'opening up insatiable 
walks in the replacement-road's wing,' - walks that lead towards alternative 
understandings of human agency and dissent. 
SUBSTITUTING GOD: MODERNITY AND THE QUEST FOR 
CERTAINTY 
What cognitive frameworks have we inherited from half a millennium of modern 
discursive practices? What are the underlying assumptions that frame the interaction 
between domination and resistance in the late twentieth century? What actually is 
modernity? A highly ambiguous concept. An elusive set of complexities that defy 
single meanings. 
Modernity has no clear beginning and end. While its roots reach back 
somewhere to the early days of Renaissance Humanism, scholars today are engaging 
in relentless disputes about whether we find ourselves in a late modern age or 
whether we have already taken the first steps into a beyond, some kind of 
postmodernity. I tend to side with the former. This entails consequences. The 
recognition that we have not yet transgressed modernity means that we cannot look 
at it from the outside. A self-critical look at modem discursive practices can never 
be detached from the eye of the viewer. It is more like a look in a mirror - an 
incomplete image of reflections and distortions, a mixture of vanity and self-doubt. 
But if we are to explore and stretch the dimensions of human agency in the late 
modern age we must nevertheless grapple with the contours of life reflected in the 
mirror, even if we know that they will always remain distorted images. 
Modernity is often defined in opposition to previous epoques. It is seen as a 
reaction, a discontinuity. It is portrayed, somewhat like Kant characterized the 
Enlightenment, as a way out, an "exit" from the traditionalism of the preceding 
feudal period. 1 The modem world is then juxtaposed to the values of the medieval 
and classical periods. Anthony Giddens is among many authors who build 
sophisticated discussions of modernity from an analysis of its discontinuities with 
pre-modern institutions and modes of behavior.2 Countless dynamics started to 
unfold during the modem period. They are linked to such features as 
industrialization, globalization and advances in technology and weapons of mass 
destruction. The State, with all its disciplinary practices, emerged as one of the 
dominant actors in this rapidly changing world. It is not my task here to search for a 
synthesis, a few parsimonious features that could reduce these complex dynamics to 
a common denominator. Such a task would be doomed to fail from the start. 
1 
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Instead of looking at modernity as a historical period or a set of institutions, I 
follow Foucault's advice and treat it primarily as an attitude, "a way of thinking and 
feeling", "a mode of relating to contemporary reality."3 Modernity, then, is the 
broad common theme that runs through a set of diverse discursive practices which, 
superseding and intersecting with each other, have come to constitute our 
contemporary consciousness. 
The dominant frame of late modern consciousness ensued to a considerable 
extent from the tension between Romanticism and the Enlightenment. What has 
been retained from the romantic ideal is the autonomy of the Self, the quest for 
independence and self-determination, the belief that the subject can shape history. 
This form of modern idealism was then supplemented with the scientific heritage of 
the Enlightenment, the desire to systematize, to search for rational foundations and 
certainty in a world of turmoil and constant flux . 
The romantic element of our contemporary consciousness is epitomized in 
Hegel He was, according to Habennas, the "first philosopher to develop a clear 
concept of modernity. ,,4 What makes modernity different in Hegel's view is its 
attempt at self-understanding, the desire to establish normativity out of itself rather 
than by way of borrowing from or rejecting the ideas of a surpassed epoch. The 
keystone of this process of self-grounding is the principle of subjectivity, which, at 
least in Habermas' reading of Hegel, is linked ~o a perception of freedom that 
recognizes an individual's autonomy and responsibility in the realms of action and 
reflection. 5 The Enlightenment's contribution was to provide this subjectivity 
oriented approach with stable and scientific foundations. Jean Baudelaire, in a 
much-cited passage, draws attention to the recurring quest for certainty in a world of 
turbulence and chaos. While describing modernity as "the transient, the fleeting, the 
contingent," Baudelaire points towards the constant attempts to discover underlying 
patterns behind these ephemeral features. He describes the recurring quest for 
essences as a desire to "extract the eternal out of the transient. ,,6 With the fusion of 
romantic idealism and Enlightenment rationalism, Humanism reached its peak, at 
least in theory. The subject now possesses both the privilege of free will and the 
capacity to assess 'his' environment in a detached and objective way. 
Within the modern attempt to fuse subjectivity and science, free will and reason, 
there is ample room for discussion and diversity, more than in any preceding period. 
Indeed, Hegel considers the right to criticism as one of modernity's key 
3 
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characteristics. 7 The breathing space necessary for criticism was provided by the 
emergence of a bourgeois public sphere in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. 
Such a public sphere, or civil society, is the reahn within which pluralistic interests 
and ideas compete with each other without being directly controlled by the Church 
or the State's coercive apparatus. 8 Within this space provided for public discussion, 
passionate debates are waged about all aspects of modern life. Virtually every 
opinion, every thought, every theory is attacked, refuted or at least submitted to 
intense and sustained scrutiny. The debate about human agency is one of these 
various sights of contestation. There are, as mentioned before, many narratives of 
modern dissent, accounts that tell different stories about human agency, resistance, 
emancipation and potentials for social change. 
However, while the waging of fierce intellectual debates emerged as a key 
feature of modernity, the range of these debates is not as boundless as it appears at 
first sight. William Connolly leads us right to the core of this paradoxical issue. He 
emphasizes that modern debates all have a distinctive character: "We think restlessly 
within familiar frameworks to avoid thought about how our thinking is framed. 
Perhaps this is the ground of modern thoughtlessness." 9 
The contours of this modern framing process have to a large extent been drawn 
by the recurring unwillingness to deal with the death of God. The refusal to accept 
the contingency of foundations has been a constant modern theme ever since la 
Boetie and his fellow Renaissance humanists disenchanted the world and placed 
'man' at its center. When the old theocentric world . crumbled, when the one and 
only commonly accepted point of reference vanished, the death of God became the 
' key dilemma around which modern debates were waged. Yet, instead of accepting 
the absence of stable foundations and dealing with the new burden of responsibility, 
many prominent modern approaches embarked upon desperate evasive attempts to 
find replacements for the fallen God. Connolly once more: 
Modem necessity is lcxlged in the earlier Christian demand to have a single, 
omnipotent Gcxl, in love with humanity, offering hope of salvation, and demanding 
universal obedience to his will. When that God is weakened, when the faith of 
individual believers must be intensified to compensate for the contraction of cultural 
space for a common faith, the advent of nihilism occurs. For now attempts to find a 
substitute for the common faith run into grave difficulties while the insistence that 
such a substitute must be found remains intact. 10 
The previous two genealogical chapters have pointed out how this quest for 
certainty took different shapes in various stages of the modern project. For 
7 Habermas, Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, p. 27. 
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Renaissance humanists it centered around a skeptical and rhetorical belief in human 
agency and the virtue of 'men.' During the Enlightenment it was trust in science and 
universal reason. For romantics it was the belief in a deified Self, and for Marxists, 
one could add, it consisted off aith in history's teleological dimension. 
This search for essences and certainty has remained one of the prominent themes 
in the twentieth century, a period haunted by rapid change, uncertainty and 
devastating global conflicts. The contemporary quest for a foundational authority 
manifests itself primarily in a desire to control, to take charge of the world. Max 
Weber famously described how attempts at rationalization resulted in the modem 
bureaucratic State. Other authors, such as Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, point out that 
modem discursive practices ground and legitimize themselves in reference to a grand 
narrative, a universalizing framework that aims at emancipating the individual by 
mastering the conditions of life. I I 
With the modem desire for control emerged the compulsion to systematize and 
categorize the world, such that all its various features can be understood and held 
scientifically accountable to one generally accepted frame of reference. Everything 
that does not fit into this frame is then treated as suspicious and dangerous: 
"Absolutely nothing ought to remain outside because the mere idea of outsideness is 
the actual source of fear."I 2 Or so at least argued Horkheimer and Adorno, 
somewhat polemically, almost half a century ago. Many of their claims are highly 
controversial. It is debatable whether, as they profess, the modem quest for order 
and the mythical belief in instrumental rationality was the very source for our relapse 
into world wars and barbarianism. I3 But many related critiques of modernity stand 
on firm ground. Less contestable, for instance, is that the very attempt to fight 
ambiguity, through ever more rigid classificatory schemes, can only increase 
ambiguity, for it creates more categories that relegate non-fitting aspects to the 
realm of otherness and suspicion.14 
Modernity is not the only bounded discourse. Every discourse has limits, 
revolves around a set of underlying assumptions, advances propositions that banish 
others to conceptual exiles. Neither can modernity be reduced to the recurring 
repression of ambiguity. Of course not. But the search for certainty and the desire 
to control are important and widely applied modern themes. Instead of theorizing 
them further I now examine some of their specific manifestations by analyzing two 
practices of popular dissent that operate in the broad wake of la Boetie's legacy. 
The first, civil disobedience, organizes its core around liberal inspirations. The 
11 Jean-Francois Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1979), pp. 7-9. 
12 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Auflkarung (Frankfurt: Fischer 
Taschenbuch, 1991/1944),p. 22. 
13 Ibid., p. 3. 
14 SeeZygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity, 1991), pp. 1-17. 
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second, direct action, is more associated with anarchist and libertarian tendencies. 
Both forms of dissent have been practiced extensively in diverse parts of the world 
and, as a result, left a lasting mark on contemporary perceptions of human agency. 
LIBERAL ORDER THROUGH CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
My earlier elaborations on Thoreau's Romanticism alluded to the ways in which la 
Boetie' s intellectual legacy intersected with nineteenth century liberalism. 
Government by consent is a key theme that runs through all stages of liberal thought. 
Contract theories, in both liberal and non-liberal forms, articulated by such authors 
as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Kant, derive the general principles of government 
from a founding agreement reached between ruler and ruled. In its Lockean version, 
contract theory stipulates that resistance to illegitimate rule, to one that is not based 
upon popular consent, becomes a fundamental liberal right. The principles of 
withdrawing consent thus seem well suited to provide liberalism with the tools 
necessary to resist tyranny in the form of both government and majority rule. 
Indeed, la Boetie's claims appear ideal for securing liberalism's prime objectives: to 
" fight whatever interferes with the exercise of personal freedom and to establish the 
political conditions under which life could be arranged such that "over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."15 
One of the most influential contemporary intersection between liberalism and the 
la Boetian legacy of popular dissent occurred in the work of the American 
philosopher John Rawls. In a major attempt to update liberal thought, he expanded 
its traditional agenda by including issues such as distributive justice. In doing so, 
Rawls shifted foci from utilitarian concerns to a neo-Kantean resurrection of contract 
theory. His Theory of Justice, which appeared in 1971, is widely considered to be 
the most significant philosophical contribution to the reworking of liberalism. 16 In 
the context of this rethinking, Rawls also articulated a theory of civil disobedience. 
Here too, Rawls' contribution is deemed path-breaking. Hugo Adam Bedau 
considers Theory of Justice "the most influential contemporary philosophical 
discussion on civil disobedience," a text which has, through its hegemonic position, 
framed much of the subsequent discussion on the subject. 17 And discussions about 
civil disobedience were abundant in the United States in the wake of rising racial 
tensions and domestic opposition to the Vietnam war. 
15 
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The links between Rawls' influential articulation of civil disobedience and the 
tradition of dissent that emerged in the wake of la Boe tie's rhetoric are visible but 
implicit. And they are, as I will demonstrate, problematic. But it is precisely these 
problematic linkages that open up fruitful possibilities to compare visions of human 
agency and scrutinize the potential and limits of late modern approaches to popular 
dissent. 
How does Rawls deal with dissent? What is human agency for hiin? Rawls 
defines civil disobedience as "a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act 
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or 
policies of the government."18 The most illuminating antecedent to Rawls' approach 
can be found not in Thoreau's concept of civil disobedience or the la Boetian legacy 
in general, but in ancient Greek philosophy. Directly relevant, although not 
explicitly acknowledged by Rawls, is the trial of Socrates, as reconstructed by Plato. 
Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth, of using his abilities to pervert their 
loyalties to the rulers. Faced with the charge that he "makes the weaker argument 
defeat the stronger, and teaches others to follow his example," Socrates pleaded 
innocence and refused to cease his practice, even if the court were to decide against 
him. 19 Adhering to his moral duty to resist what he perceived as unjust practices, he 
proclaimed that "I owe a greater obedience to God than to you; and so long as I 
draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practicing philosophy and 
exhorting you and elucidating the truth for everyone that I meet".20 The court 
sentenced Socrates to death. Against the urging of Crito, Socrates refused to escape 
and explicitly submitted himself to the judgment that was reached by the duly 
established authority. Socrates hence provided the precedent for a tradition of 
dissent that aims at resisting a specific authority, law, or policy that is considered 
unjust, while at the same time recognizing the rulemaking prerogative of the existing 
political system as legitimate and generally binding.21 
Rawls clearly operates in this Socratic tradition that accepts the existing system 
as the framework within which civil disobedience takes place. The target is a change 
in particular laws or policies, rather than an uprooting of the system as such. Rawls: 
[ A theory of civil disobedience] attempts to formulate the grounds upon which 
legitimate democratic authority may be dissented from in ways that while 
admittedly contrary to law nevertheless express a fidelity to law and appeal to the 
fundamental political principles of a democratic regime.22 
18 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Carn bridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 364. 
19 
Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, tr. H. Tredennick (London: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 46-47. 
20 Ibid., p. 61. 
21 
Ernest van den Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1972), pp. 7-8. 
22 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 385-6. 
Late Modern Legacies of Popular Dissent 74 
To do justice to Rawls, we need to consider briefly the context within which he 
articulates his approach to civil disobedience. Unlike la Boetie, Rawls is not 
concerned with resistance to authoritarian rule. His model of civil disobedience is 
applicable only in very specific circumstances, namely in a "nearly just society, one 
that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice 
nevertheless do occur. "23 He speaks of dissent only in the context of a democratic 
state in which citizens accept the overall legitimacy of the constitution. But Rawls is 
also more ambitious and tries to transcend the parameters of a specific societal 
context. In his reformulation of liberalism and social contract theory, he starts off 
from a hypothetical situation in which the members of a society agree, prior to 
entering this society, on the fundamental principles of justice that are to govern their 
subsequent interactions. A crucial aspect of this hypothetical original position is that 
no one knows 'his' particular place in society. Behind this so called veil of 
ignorance, free, equal and rational 'men' establish the fundamental principles that are 
to become the framework within which societal interactions are regulated.24 How 
hypothetical is this Rawlsean idea of justice as fairness? What are the limits of 
dissent within this arrangement among free 'men'? 
The injustice of a law does in itself not provide enough reason to engage in 
justified resistance. Rawls reminds the overenthusiastic activist that "when the basic 
structure of society is reasonably just, as estimated by what the current state of 
things allows, we are to recognize unjust laws as binding provided that they do not 
exceed certain limits of injustice. "25 Civil disobedience only becomes an option 
when violations of justice exceed these limits. It then is an act through which a 
minority appeals to a majority to reconsider a particular . issue within the limited 
context of an existing constitution and a commonly shared perception of rights and 
duties. 
Unpronounced questions abound in this approach to civil disobedience. When do 
violations of justice exceed the limits that legitimize acts of civil disobedience? Who 
is to judge? Why is it that in Rawls' hypothetical world, all the neutral and 
supposedly value-free individuals that negotiate behind the veil of ignorance are male 
gendered? And what precisely are these hypothetical and commonly shared 
assumptions that are to provide the framework within which claims expressed 
through civil disobedience are settled? Rawls' concept of justice as fairness is not 
quite as hypothetical as the veil of ignorance first suggests. He reveals his political 
agenda at various points. Civil disobedience, Rawls argues, becomes necessary 
when "the conditions of free cooperation are being violated" and its application 
expresses the fidelity to "the fundamental political principles of a democratic 
regime."26 
23 Ibid., p. 363. 
24 See Ibid., pp. 3-53. 
25 Ibid., p. 351. 
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Rawls' hypothetically derived and commonly shared assumptions are liberal 
assumptions. His facts are liberal facts. The boundaries of human agency he draws 
are liberal boundaries. Not even the veil of ignorance can cover the underlying 
political agenda of the original position. Two decades after the appearance of 
Theory of Justice, Rawls himself acknowledges its hidden political dimension. In 
recent writings on political liberalism, he readily admits that the ambiguity of his 
earlier text "is now removed and justice as fairness is presented from the outset as a 
political conception of justice. "27 
The practice of civil disobedience 1s intrinsically linked to this often 
unpronounced political agenda. But the liberal framework within which all these 
dynamics take place is in itself a sight of political contestation. Cracks are being 
spotted at various pillars of the liberal edifice. Susan Mend us discovers them in the 
limitations imposed on the important liberal concept of toleration,28 Isaiah Berlin in 
the often antagonistic relationship between passive and active liberty,29 and Noberto 
Bobbio in the problematic interaction between liberalism and democracy. 30 More 
radical critique is, of course, equally abundant. We know of Nietzsche's remark that 
liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are established, that, as a result, 
"there is nothing more wicked and harmful to freedom than liberal institutions."31 
Herbert Marcuse talked of the "comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic 
unfreedom [that] prevails in advanced industrial civilization."32 And Foucault went 
to great length in an attempt to demonstrate that on a subtle and silent level, liberal 
societies are more repressive than authoritarian ones/3 It is not my task here to 
weigh these often polemical accusations against the liberal ideas and practices that 
have given rise to them. Suspending a value judgment on the actual content of 
liberal thought, I merely want to point out that liberalism is a contested discourse 
and in constant need of legitimization. 
Much of the burgeoning literature that emerged parallel to and in the wake of 
Rawls' influential contribution to civil disobedience is part of a self-defensive 
creation of liberal legitimacy. The notion of human agency that is embedded in this 
tradition is clearly limited to the task of promoting change within a clearly delineated 
societal framework. Civil disobedience can undoubtedly resist some forms of 
domination. It may be powerful enough to destabilize or even bring down a 
27 
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government. But in the end civil disobedience is bound to entrench the larger liberal 
status quo. This implied task is clearly recognizable in the relevant literature. 
Michael Walzer, for example, describes civil disobedience as "a nonrevolutionary 
encounter with the state" which does not challenge the legitimacy of the existing 
order.34 For Hannah Arendt "the civil disobedient accepts, while the revolutionary 
rejects, the frame of established authority and the general legitimacy of the system of 
laws."35 
While giving the appearance of radical dissent, civil disobedience is a reformist 
practice that often strengthens the existing societal order. In being tolerated only as 
long as the liberal constitutional framework is not disputed, civil disobedience 
refuses to question the values of its own political foundations. In this sense, civil 
disobedience has lost most of the meaning that Thoreau's famous essay originally 
bestowed upon the term. This narrowing down of dissent also demonstrates that in a 
liberal-democratic context, granting and withdrawing popular consent only works in 
a very restricted way. The allocation of consent is usually given periodically to the 
legislative element of the state, leaving largely untouched its vast remaining 
components, such as the bureaucracy, the police, the army, and the more subtle 
discursive mechanisms that provide what Gramsci called hegemonic leadership. 
Likewise, the withdrawal of consent via civil disobedience is limited to a mere 
challenge of individual laws or policies that may not be compatible with the generally 
recognized leitmotifs of the existing legal system. The overwhelming rest of the 
State apparatus remains unchallenged by this liberal version of withdrawing consent. 
The image of human agency entailed in liberal civil disobedience incarnates the 
modem obsession with control, the desire for order, for certainty, for essences that 
provide a stable background against which moral norms can be established and 
idiosyncrasies of life can be assessed. The vacuum that occurred with the death of 
God is now filled by an unbounded trust in the liberal edifice and the universalizing 
narrative upon which it is based. Hence, all claims to social change have to be 
evaluated in relation to this new Archimedean point. The modern quest for certainty 
and stable foundations is still alive and has, if anything, intensified in the post-Cold 
War period. Francis Fukuyama's influential voice professes that now, with the 
demise not only of Fascism, but also of Communism, liberal democracy is once and 
for all the superior and universally recognized ideology. History came to an end, he 
hails, for there are no more fundamental contradictions that cannot be solved within 
the liberal framework. 36 One could easily take issue with Fukuyama's teleology or 
with his distorted use of Hegel. Yet, one must acknowledge that his polemical 
remarks express a widespread and powerful attitude within the Western world. If 
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liberalism has indeed emerged victorious from the Cold War, what precisely is it and 
how does it deal with popular dissent? 
With the slightest scratch beneath the surface, one discovers that Fukuyama' s 
new liberalism is less a political and economic doctrine that optimizes the sphere of 
individual freedom, but more a governmental practice that actively promotes and 
defends a very specific "form of life" to the detriment of other social practices. Or 
so claim an increasing number of scholars that conduct research, convincingly one 
should add, in the wake of Foucault's work on governmentality. 37 Liberalism, for 
them, is a method of discursive domination and active governmental intervention, 
designed to defend existing political practices ( constructed around such key values 
as individual autonomy and free market competition) against possible threats from 
subversive alternatives (stemming, for example, from perceptions of rights that are 
active, collective or linked to radical economic redistribution). 
The concept of civil disobedience is highly useful to uphold this modem practice 
of control, for its appearance of dissent provides the liberal system with more 
legitimacy. While it may challenge some laws, policies or even bring down a 
Q 
government, liberal civil disobedience does by definition not threaten to erode the 
foundations of the liberal order. But the illusion of radical dissent that it evokes 
gives the impression that a real challenge to the system was subsequently overcome 
by the superiority of the status quo. 
Dissent is tolerated in direct relation to a liberal society's capacity to absorb it. 
If a subversive idea poses a threat to the existing order, it is classified as Other and 
treated as irrelevant, dangerous or in need of being exterminated. This is the case, 
for example, when Fukuyama elevates liberalism to the one and only source of 
legitimacy and argues that "it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to 
people in Albania or Burkina Faso, for we are interested in what one could in some 
sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind. "38 There is only limited 
scope for dissent within such a presupposed universal frame of reference. Rawls' 
theory of civil disobedience was within this scope. Its was quickly elevated to a 
liberal piece of wisdom, for its controllable notion of dissent was compatible with 
generally accepted ideas of freedom and justice. But hostility· arises as soon as 
practices of dissent transgress existing levels of tolerance and start to challenge the 
foundations of the established political and social order. I now explore some of 
these more radical forms of resistance and their perceptions of human agency. 
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FRAMING RADICAL RESISTANCE: THE MODERNIZATION OF 
DIRECT ACTION 
At the same time as Rawls and others articulated liberal models of civil disobedience, 
more radical approaches to popular dissent came to the fore as well. I refer to them 
as direct action approaches. This term is problematic and not uniformly sanctioned. 
I use it nevertheless, primarily to draw a clear distinction from the above liberal 
methods of withdrawing consent. The concept of direct action dates back to 
Georges Sorel, who employed it in the context of revolutionary syndicalism during 
the early days of this century.39 After Sorel's death in 1922, the term was 
appropriated by the Italian fascist movement and then served to describe a whole 
range of violent revolutionary movements, on both the extreme right and the extreme 
left. Parallel to these violent practices, direct action also became embedded in 
nonviolent forms of activism. I am concerned only with this nonviolent tradition, 
which operates directly in the wake of la Boetie's legacy. 
In refusing to take the parameters of the existing legal system as given, direct 
action fundamentally assaults the legitimacy of the status quo. It is employed when 
the official channels for political action, such as elections, referenda, petitions or 
lobbying do not exist or are considered inadequate for the resolution of the conflict 
in question. Direct action empowers those who do not have access to these 
conventional forms of political influence. It opens up possibilities for social change 
that are absent within the context of the established legal system. April Carter 
illustrates the radical nature of direct action by underlining that it is waged not only 
to bring about reform within the established constitutional framework, but also to 
"repudiate the entire political system.',4° But how radical is direct action really? 
What are its conceptual assumptions? Where is its frame? I now explore these 
questions. To do so as thoroughly as possible, I turn back the clock once more and 
observe how the theory and practice of direct action came of age as it grew out of 
romantic notions of dissent. 
Gandhi's monumental influence provided much of the conceptual foundation for 
the literature on nonviolent direct action. The previous chapter analyzed how 
Gandhi transformed la Boetian rhetoric into a practice of popular dissent that 
contains direct political implications. Various authors built upon this insight and 
developed radical approaches to direct action. But what happened to Gandhian (and 
la Boetian) ideas in this process. What was taken on board? What was left out or 
added on? And how do these changes reflect perceptions of human agency? 
Gandhi's work was characterized by a profound distrust towards Western ideas and 
practices, including imperialism, market economics, scientific reasoning and 
instrumental rationality. He not only criticized Western culture or religion, but also 
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attacked the modem values upon which they are based. It is in the various processes 
of modernization that Gandhi detected, according to Partha Chatterjee, the prime 
reason for India's oppression and its submissive acceptance of voluntary servitude.41 
Gandhi's skeptical attitude was largely brushed aside as his ideas gave rise to a 
systematic theory of nonviolent direct action. Early interpretations of Gandhi's work 
perfectly illustrate how the modem obsession with control forced interpretations of 
popular dissent into modem discursive boundaries. Gandhi's anti-modem core and 
his romantic idealism were dropped in a quest to establish a grand theory of modem 
nonviolent resistance, a globally applicable assessment of human agency. With this 
move, nonviolence is no longer perceived as a way of life or an ethical imperative, 
but as a strategic and pragmatic practice of dissent, a policy option that can be 
pursued independently of how much people believe in its moral or spiritual value. 
Clarence Marsh Case and Richard B. Gregg, two Americans writing during the 
1920s and 1930s, played an important role in directing the Gandhian legacy on this 
modem course. A brief look at their work is necessary at this point. The writings of 
Case initiated the transformation of Gandhian strategy into a grand theory that aims 
at providing the sole objective measuring device with which one could assess, plan 
and predict a great variety of nonviolent forms of radical dissent. Case followed 
Gandhl in claiming that the persuasive power of direct action works by way of 
producing a change of mental attitude in the mind of those against whom the action 
is directed. 42 Case, however, adds an element of coercion to this position. He 
argues that the withdrawal of popular consent can force an opponent to act against 
'his' initial will or judgment. In a labor strike, for example, non nonviolent protest 
actions interfere with the dynamics between employer and worker. The subject 
against whom pressure is being exerted has basically two choices. 'He' can suffer 
the interruption of the productive activities caused by the strike or accommodate 
those who have withdrawn the supply of their labor. Either option is unappealing 
and the result of an act of coercion - not one that involves violence, but nevertheless 
an act of coercion. 43 
The concept of nonviolent coercion is already far removed from the romantic 
celebration of diversity and self-expression. It evokes, rather, the Enlightenment's 
quest for factual evidence and objectivity. Case ahnost literally restates la Boetie's 
core concept of voluntary servitude. But the argument is no longer a rhetorical 
defense of human agency. The assessment of popular dissent is now embedded in a 
search for objective, stable and universal foundations around which the turbulent late 
mcxl.em world can revolve: 
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One and the same principle underlies all these various manifestations [ the strike, the 
boycott, and non-cooperation], and that is the strategic recognition of the 
fundamental and indispensable importance of cooperation in every form and phase 
of associated life. More vital even than this is its recognition that this cooperation 
is necessarily more or less voluntary in every social situation and process, not 
excepting the grossest forms of exploitation, oppression, and tyranny. In the last 
analysis the victims always gild their own chains, even where they do not help to 
forge them.44 
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Richard B. Gregg built upon Case's work and further systematized the study and 
practice of Gandhian nonviolent resistance. He too considered the choice of 
nonviolent over violent methods of social change not so much a moral, but primarily 
a tactical and strategic matter, a decision for the more sound and efficient form of 
struggle. For this purpose Gregg appropriated the methods through which 
traditional German military tacticians, especially von Clausewitz and von 
Caemmerer, portray war as a constant process of reciprocal actions. Extending their 
line of thought Gregg emphasized the similarities between strategies of nonviolent 
resistance and strategies of war, namely, "to demoralize the opponent, to break his 
will, to destroy his confidence, enthusiasm and hope. ,,4s Nonviolent resistance is 
more effective than violence because it causes emotional and moral perturbations 
that trigger processes of social change. It is a manipulative activity, a psychological 
weapon that is based upon an understanding of balance and how to disturb this 
balance. If pursued in a determined, fearless and consistent way, nonviolent 
resistance employs the strength and weight of th~ opponent to disturb 'his' 
psychological balance. The opponent then loses the moral support that violent forms 
of resistance would render him, "he plunges forward, as it were, into a new world of 
values. ,,46 Gregg emphasized, as both Case and Gandhi did before him, that the 
success of this form of dissent depends largely on the ability to maintain a strict 
adherence to nonviolence. 47 
Much of the conceptual framework that informs present practices of direct 
action was established by the time Case and Gregg had systematized and modernized 
Gandhi's ideas. A few decades later, in the 1950s and 1960s, Martin Luther King 
further consolidated this from of popular dissent and once more demonstrated its 
practical relevance. King clearly operated within the la Boetian legacy. He drew 
upon the writings of Thoreau, Gandhi, Case and Gregg. They stamped an 
unmistakable mark upon King's approach. Not surprisingly, the concept of 
voluntary servitude is again the starting point. King claims that "he who passively 
accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who 
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accepts evil without protesting against it is really cooperating with it. ,,4s The refusal 
to cooperate, by contrast, unleashes forms of dissent that can break chains of 
domination. Direct action is able to succeed in this enterprise because it interferes 
with and paralyzes the very power structures against which it is directed.49 Elements 
of nonviolent coercion are clearly visible in King's approach to nonviolent dissent. 
Reads his famous ''Letter from Birmingham Jail," initially scribbled into the margins 
of an old newspaper: 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and such a tension that a 
community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. 
It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can n'' longer be ignored... We know 
through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; 
it must be demanded by the oppressed. 50 
King was, of course, best known for the practical application of his ideas. As a 
young Baptist minister in the southern part of the United States, he played a crucial 
role in what became famous as the Montgomery bus boycott. These events were 
triggered when, in 1955, a Black female passenger was arrested for having refused to 
vacate her seat in the front section of a local bus, a section reserved for whites. 
Henceforth, King and a number of other Black community leaders organized a 
boycott against the bus company. Although the immediate aim of the Montgomery 
boycott was to repeal segregationist seating arrangements on buses, it reached much 
further. King recalls that "I came to see that what we were really doing was 
withdrawing our cooperation from an evil system, rather than merely withdrawing 
our economic support form the bus company. "51 The success of the boycott was 
astonishing. For a whole year, 17 .500 Black Americans who previously relied on 
two daily bus rides, systematically boycotted all public transport. This sustained 
practice of non-cooperation attracted nation-wide attention. It did not uproot the 
existing political system or eradicate racial discrimination, but it led to an increased 
discussion of civil liberties and a Supreme Court decision that declared segregational 
seating on inter-state buses illegal. 
The spirit of King's activism was preserved and further systematized when, in 
the late 1960s, a burgeoning literature on direct action started to emerge. Numerous 
authors now pushed popular dissent beyond the boundaries of the liberal edifice 
within which civil disobedience took place. I have already mentioned April Carter's 
work on radical direct action. Howard Zinn, likewise, refused to accept the liberal 
system as the framework for action. Questioning whether the law has some intrinsic 
value on its own, he rejected the commonly held Socratic position that civil 
disobedients must submit to the punishment pronounced by the duly established 
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authority. 52 Joan Bundurant explored radical forms of dissent that deal with the 
what she considered a key weakness of liberal democratic thought, namely "the 
failure to provide techniques of action for those critical occasions when the 
machinery of democratic government no longer functions to resolve large-scale, 
overt conflict. "53 Other authors pushed the spatial boundaries of popular dissent. 
George Lakey, for example, paid attention to acts of non-cooperation that take place 
in transnational and non-Western contexts. Lakey also illustrated, once more, how 
the practice of direct action is built upon la Boe tie's concept of voluntary servitude. 
Freedom is never given, he argued. People must claim it themselves: "Mass civil 
disobedience, tax-refusal, boycott of elections, and draft resistance help people to 
unlearn their submissiveness. "54 
Numerous other authors pushed the boundaries of dissent in different directions. 
It is not my intention here to provide a coherent and complete account of the various 
approaches to direct action that emerged since the late 1960s. Such a synthesis 
would forcibly have to simplify a whole range of complex issues. Instead of 
brushing in such broad strokes, I scrutinize the workings and underlying assumptions 
of direct action by focusing, representatively, one of the most influential contributors 
to the subject: Gene Sharp. His work cannot speak for all approaches to direct 
action. But it represents some of the most basic features that characterize this 
practice of popular dissent and its ensuing image of human agency. 
THE FALLACIES OF A GRAND THEORY OF POPULAR 
DISSENT 
Gene Sharp's The Politics of Nonviolent Action, which appeared in 1973, has been 
highly influential in shaping the theory and practice of direct action. Particularly 
among activists, Sharp is recognized as "one of the most important theorists," even 
the "patron theorists."55 His theoretical contribution, however, is hardly innovative. 
There is nothing in Sharp's work that could not be derived from a reading of la 
Boetie, Thoreau, Tolstoy, Gandhi, Case and Gregg. Sharp deserves analytical 
attention not because of his alleged theoretical leadership, but because he has 
popularized the practice of direct action. His work was translated into more than a 
dozen languages. It has been largely used as a handbook that provides precise 
instructions about when and how to use what type or method of popular resistance. 
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Hence, a look at Sharp's approach is fruitful because it stands as an important 
testimony for how late modern practices of dissent reflect images of human agency. 
Disguised in an apparent anarchist rejection of authority, direct action expresses 
modernity's quest for certainty and control, the desire to ground our existence in an 
external source - if not in God, then in something else that could take over his 
stabilizing position. 
The romantic heritage permeates much of Sharp's work. One of his main targets 
is the determinism of structural and functional scholarship. He strongly opposes 
arguments that present power as given, static and self-perpetuating, as being vested 
in governments and derived from structural conditions or the exercise of physical 
threats and violence. Instead, he argues for a view from below, one that locates 
power in the people and in societal dynamics. In doing so, Sharp is among the few 
contemporary authors who still reaches back to the Anti-One. La Boetie is given the 
same importance as Machiavelli or the social contract theories of Rousseau and 
Hobbes. Yet, Sharp's reading of la Boetie is superficial and one-sided. He ignores 
most of la Boetie's subtle arguments about the engineering of popular consent. 
Instead, he singles out and explores fully the Anti-One's rhetorical claims about 
human agency and voluntary servitude: 
The most important single quality of any government, without which it would not 
exist, must be the obedience and submission of its subjects. Obedience is at the 
heart of political power.56 
The rulers of governments and political systems are not omnipotent, nor do they 
posses self-generating power. All dominating elites and rulers depend for their 
sources of power upon the cooperation of the population and of the institutions of 
the society they would rule. 57 
Sharp's next logical step is also taken from the Anti-One. He rehearses the 
argument that if consent is given by the people and necessary to rule, it can also be 
withdrawn. Hence, Sharp defines power as "the capacity to control the behavior of 
others" and locates its functioning in the dualistic interactions between ruler and 
ruled, between command and obedience. 58 
Human agency takes central stage. The romantic vision of a deified subject 
permeates Sharp's unbounded confidence in people's ability to recognize and defy 
domination: 
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Popular empowennent will enable people to revitalize freedom, to make it more 
durable and genuine. It will make it possible for them to end social oppression by 
direct poRular efforts which tum helpless victims into masters of their own 
destinies. 9 
84 
Sharp clearly leaps into what Adorno called subjectivism, an idealist position that 
endows the subject with an unlimited ability to shape the world. The concept of 
direct action leaves little or no room for dealing with the complex and far-reaching 
consequences that emerge from the interactive relationship between agency and 
structure or between subject and object. Even la Boetie' s hesitant acknowledgment 
of these links is obliterated. The resulting idealist celebration of human agency is not 
nearly as unbounded as it proclaims, at least not in Adorno' s opinion. For him the 
absolute subject that results from such an idealist position "cannot escape from its 
entanglement for the chains it attempts to break, those of domination, are at one with 
the principle of absolute subjectivity.',60 
Sharp, like many of his contemporaries, integrates a selective romantic notion of 
human agency with an equally selective Enlightenment form of rationalism. Most of 
the more complex elements of romantic thought are dropped, such as the speculative 
idealism and the irrationalism that Karl Mannheim considered key characteristics of 
Romanticism.61 Consequently, Gandhi's critique of instrumental rationality is 
replaced by practices of ordering and classifying. Factual evidence is gathered in an 
attempt to discover underlying patterns of dissent, to construct a scientific and 
globally applicable model of direct action. 
The prime objective now becomes the establishment of a grand theory of 
nonviolent resistance, a systematic model for the global assessment of popular 
dissent. Complex social dynamics are reduced to mere dualistic interactions between 
ruler and ruled. Parsimony replaces complexity in the attempt to discover a lowest 
common denominator that can provide a recognizable image of human agency. 
Thomas Schelling, when introducing Sharp's work, perfectly captures this theme, 
albeit without noticing its irony: 
The original idea was to subject the entire theory of nonviolent political action, 
together with a full history of its practice in all parts of the world since the time of 
Christ, to the same cool, detailed scrutiny that military strategy and tactics are 
supposed to invite. 62 
In Sharp's world, the foundations that disappeared with the death of God are now 
replaced not with trust in the liberal edifice, but with an equally strong confidence in 
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having discovered the essence of domination and resistance, the underlying and 
objective foundations that determine social dynamics. The metanarrative that Sharp 
builds from this position revolves around the premise, introduced by Case and 
Gregg, that nonviolent resistance is the most effective way of wielding power. It is a 
strategic form of combat just like war. It requires courage, discipline sacrifice. It 
involves the waging of battles. It is "a technique used to control, combat and 
destroy the opponent's power by nonviolent means of wielding power.',63 
In his ambition to develop a grand theory of popular dissent, Sharp engages in a 
typically modern attempt to repress ambiguity. He precisely defines how 
mechanisms of change operate and carefully lists almost two hundred different ways 
of waging nonviolent conflict. Neatly divided into three main categories, non-
cooperation, intervention and protest / persuasion, these methods of nonviolent 
action cover such diverse activities as speeches, marches, protest emigration, strikes, 
election boycotts, conscientious objections, refusals to pay taxes, hunger strikes, 
lockouts, walkouts, quickie walkouts, sit-downs, sit-ins, teach-ins, stand-ins, ride-
ins, wade-ins, mill-ins, stall-ins, speak-ins, sick-ins and pray-ins.64 Everything needs 
to have its proper place. Nothing ought to remain outside, for, as we have seen 
above, the mere idea of outsideness constitutes a source of ambivalence and fear. 
But the very act of classifying creates even more ambivalence by relegating 
everything that does not fit into the sphere of otherness. Zygmunt Bauman: 
Ambivalence may be fought only with a naming that is yet more exact, and classes 
that are yet more precisely defined: that is, with such operations as will set still 
tougher demands on the discreteness and transparency of the world and thus give 
yet more occasion for ambiguity. The struggle against ambivalence is, therefore, 
both self-destructive and self-propelling.65 
Why are these effects of classifying so problematic? Could one not simply 
engage in this ordering exercise with caution, knowing that there are clear limits to 
it, knowing that no category or typology will ever be exhaustive or definitive? Can 
one escape classificatory urges altogether? I certainly did not - having divided 
contemporary manifestations of popular dissent into liberal forms of civil 
disobedience and anarchist practices of direct action. The point is not to avoid all 
forms of classifying, but to be aware of the dangers that such practices entail. This 
requires, above all, sensitivity to the process of reification, the tendency to endow 
subjective mental concepts with objective, thing-like properties. Sharp fails to pay 
attention to this process. He imposes his classificatory schemes by embedding them 
in a grand theory of popular dissent. 
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Positivist assumptions underlie Sharp's project. This is why direct action, a 
seemingly radical anarchist practice of dissent, may in some aspects contribute to the 
reinforcement of the status quo. Positivism is, of course, an important tradition in 
Western social science. Its conceptual and etymological roots go back to the work 
of August Compte. Positivism culminated during the so-called behavioral 
revolution, which swept through North American academia during the 1950s and 
1960s. Assuming that the theories and concepts of the natural sciences could and 
should be applied with equal rigor in the social sciences, behavioralists argued that 
theoretical concepts are only relevant if they are operationably measurable, if they 
can be used in hypotheses that are testable against the hard evidence of empirical 
data. Although the heyday of behavioralism is over, the influence of positivism 
remains strong. 66 
Positivism is based on an ( anti- )philosophical stance that argues for a radical 
separation of subject and object and believes that the social scientist, as detached 
observer, can produce value-free knowledge. In Leszek Kolakowski's view, 
positivism rejects the distinction between "essence" and "phenomenon." Only that 
which is manifested in experience, which emerges from observing reality deserves 
the name knowledge. All other utterances have no cognitive and empirical merit, 
they are mere value statements, normative claims, unprovable speculations. 67 
Kolakowski then defines positivism in the broadest sense as "a collection of 
prohibitions concerning human knowledge, intended to confine the name of 
'knowledge' to those operations that are observable in the evolution of the modem 
sciences of nature. ,,6S 
A critique of positivist epistemologies is not to be equated with a dismissal of 
science as such. Scientific methods can be highly useful in many domains, including 
investigations of social dynamics and human behavior. But scientific knowledge is 
only one form of knowledge. Positivist approaches, whether they are based on 
scientific or non-scientific methods, insist that knowledge can be neutral and 
objective, that our comprehension of facts can be separated from our relationship 
with them. Yet, thinking expresses a will to truth, a desire to control and impose 
order upon random and idiosyncratic events. "To think," Adorno claims, "is to 
identify. ,,69 When we think we identify choices, privilege one interpretation over 
others, and, often without knowing it, exclude what does not fit into the way we 
want to see things. There is no escape from this, no possibility of extracting pure 
facts from observation. 
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The positivist separation of theory and practice, fact and value, necessarily 
produces a discourse that, in the name of value freedom, promotes particular values 
at the expense of others. 7° Challenging this order is difficult. Discourses live on and 
appear reasonable long after they have turned into contradictory and anachronistic 
relics. Positivist approaches, even if they examine practices of popular dissent, 
cannot address these problems. They cannot deal with subtle forms of domination 
that may be entailed in the existing discursive order. By accepting as stable the links 
between theory and practice, discourse and reality, positivist approaches to dissent 
are unable to explore a whole range of promising terrains of resistance. Instead, 
uncritical positivist references to something termed reality often strangle progressive 
thoughts that could initiate a long needed practical change. 71 
Sharp's treatment of direct action revolves around these problematic positivist 
assumptions. He, alongside many other contemporary writers who deal with popular 
dissent, assumes that the rational subject is capable of perceiving and evaluating 
reality independently of the discursive practices that provide him or her with the 
linguistic and conceptual means necessary for this process. Practices of popular 
dissent are observed in order to construct theoretical propositions about the 
relationship between ruler and ruled. The result of these inquiries is then presented 
in global and ahistoric terms - as a crowning achievement of human knowledge, as 
spectacular discoveries of underlying patterns that guide popular dissent in a variety 
of spatial and temporal settings. The ensuing grand theories are then revised, 
refined, complemented and reevaluated against the evidence presented by yet more 
observations of something termed reality. 
Sharp's influential contribution to direct action illustrates how radical 
contemporary practices of popular dissent can be as discursively bounded as the 
earlier examined liberal forms of civil disobedience. But the limits of direct action 
are not prescribed by the existing legal and political system. They are drawn by the 
uncritical acceptance of dominant discourses and the social practices they support. 
The image of human agency that these positivist approaches uphold becomes 
objectified. It is frozen in time and space. This recognition cannot but evoke a 
second set of questions: What specific image of dissent has been frozen in time and 
space? What are its features, its grins and grimaces? What does it show and what 
does it hide? How does it gaze at the world? How does the world gaze back? And 
what marks has this mutual gazing left on social practices? These are some of the 
puzzles with which I will grapple next. 
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SUMMARY 
The first three chapters of this thesis have analyzed the theory and practice of 
popular dissent. A genealogical inquiry outlined how the concept of human agency 
has been framed during the modern period, and how this framing has delineated 
contemporary understandings of human agency. 
I have pursued this task by way of narrating the development of a tradition of , 
dissent that emerged from a sixteenth century humanist text, Etienne de la Boetie's 
Anti-One. La Boetian ideas acquired political relevance as they were diffused by 
such authors as Thoreau, Tolstoy and Gandhi. But the tradition of dissent that 
issued in the wake of this evolution is, of course, not the only modern practice of 
popular resistance. The story about human agency that I have told here is only one 
among many, a diverse and disputed narrative of modern dissent. Analyzing its 
legacy, even if done carefully, cannot possibly reflect the extremely wide-ranging 
modern scholarship conducted on human agency and social change. Yet, the 
particular way in which la Boetie's intellectual legacy evolved can teach us much 
about the outer limits that modern discursive practices have imposed on the 
apparently limitless range of debates about human agency. 
Mainstream modern images of human agency tend to be bounded by a 
widespread unwillingness to accept the responsibilities that arose from what 
Nietzsche called the death of God, that is, the loss of certainty which had existed in a 
theocentric world before Renaissance humanists elevated 'man' to the measure of all 
things. Recurring attempts to find replacements for the fallen God, to discover 
essences that could provide a stable world-view, have severely limited contemporary 
perceptions of human agency. 
The present chapter has drawn attention to this framing of human agency by 
analyzing two practices of popular dissent, civil disobedience and direct action. 
Both are influential contemporary fonns of resistance that have demonstrated a 
powerful ability to promote social change. But both also turned out to be not nearly 
as radical and unbounded as they appeared at first sight. Behind the desire for 
change loomed the modern obsession with control. Civil disobedience is embedded 
in a liberal world-view. Its proponents explicitly accept the existing political and 
legal system as the framework for action. This clearly circumvents the range of 
dissent that civil disobedience can express. It may be able to promote reform in 
various domains, but it ultimately entrenches the liberal status quo. Direct action has 
a more radical conceptual core. By refusing to confine dissent to maneuverings 
within liberal democracies, direct action can seriously challenge not only practices of 
governance, but also existing political and legal structures. But there are frames to 
direct action too. Its limits are drawn not by the confinement to a certain social 
order, but by the epistemological assumptions in which this fonn of dissent is 
embedded. 
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Direct action epitomizes the still widespread and influential positivist framing of 
human agency. Grand theories of popular dissent have been established in a quest 
for certainty and systematic knowledge. Scholars have searched for underlying 
patterns that could explain once and for all the functioning of human agency in 
diverse historical and cultural settings. What has emerged from these efforts is a 
universalized narrative that upholds a specific image of dissent - an image that 
becomes frozen in time and space. I alleged that the consequences of this positivist 
repression of ambiguity are far-reaching. While uprooting some forms of repression, 
a radical practice of dissent that is embedded in a positivist epistemology entrenches 
a whole range of other, more subtle forms of domination. The next part of this 
thesis now substantiates this theoretical assertion by analyzing its practical 
consequences in a concrete and specific political context. 
PART TWO 
REFRAMING 
DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE 
Part one of this thesis analyzed the theory and practice of popular dissent. The 
purpose of this genealogical inquiry was to illustrate, through an example, how 
modern understandings of human agency have been framed. I argued that dominant 
approaches to popular dissent are characterized by a recurring inability to come to 
terms with the death of God. Among the most noteworthy contemporary 
manifestations of this refusal to accept the contingent character of foundations are 
grand theories of dissent, approaches that search for ahistoric and universal patterns 
of social change. 
Part two fulfills a transitional function. It reframes the above concepts of dissent 
to prepare the ground for the third and last part, which articulates an alternative 
notion of human agency by exploring discursive terrains of dissent. Two parallel 
shifts are necessary to prepare this task. The first one is of a methodological and 
epistemological nature. It entails moving away from grand theories towards an 
approach that recognizes the contingency of foundations, that deals with, rather than 
avoids, the death of God. The second shift is of a focal nature and suggest that the 
most potent expressions of human agency are not located in spectacular acts of 
dissent, such as mass demonstrations, but in the slow transformation of values that 
precedes them. Chapters four to six will deal with various aspects required to carry 
out these two parallel shifts. At this point it is necessary to draw attention to only 
one of these aspects. At its most basic level, dealing with the death of God means 
that one can no longer theorize dissent in ahistoric and universal terms. Meaningful 
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answers to question of social change can only be gained in a specific historical and 
cultural context. 
The East German revolution serves as an anchoring device for my theoretical 
reframing of domination and resistance. The popular protests that toppled the 
authoritarian regime undoubtedly constitute a turning point in European history. For 
many the crumbling of the notorious Berlin Wall in November 1989 signified the end 
of the Cold War. 1 My inquiry into this important historical episode does not uphold 
one correct interpretation. Rather, I engage in various rereadings that explore the 
complex and often fragmented aspects of the events in question. Neither is my 
analysis in any way meant to be exhaustive or authoritative. I leave such ambitious 
endeavors up to experts in German politics - a status to which I lay no claim. My 
explorations are meant, above all, as a theoretical engagement with human agency 
through a rethinking and reframing of dissent, power and social change. 
1 
For example, David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 




CONCEPTIONS OF POWER 
Great, glowing vault 
with the 
outward- and away-
burrowing black-constellation swann: 
into the silicified forehead of a ram 
I bum this image, between 
the horns, therein, 
in the singing of the coils, the 





The world is gone, I have to carry you . 
D 
Paul Celan, "Grosse, gliihende Wolbung" 
tr. P. Joris 
How to understand popular dissent, the power unleashed by protesting masses, the 
buildup of rage, resentment, passion and might, spilling into the streets, this 
'outward- and away-burrowing black-constellation swarm'? How to problematize 
this prevalent image of human agency - an image of heroic rebellion, burnt between 
the horns of our dissident drive, into the forehead of late modem consciousness? 
How to listen to the more subtle singing of the coils, the spiraling entanglement of 
domination and resistance? 
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The present chapter grapples with these intricate questions by dealing with the 
issue that lies at the center of human agency, the concept of power. I begin by 
exploring questions of power and dissent through two readings of the East German 
case. The first one focuses on a key feature of the revolution of 1989, the massive 
acts of popular dissent that led to the downfall of the communist regime. These 
events represent one of the most common perceptions of contemporary human 
agency, an image of protesting masses that is, indeed, burnt into the forehead of late 
modern consciousness. The la Boetian tradition, which I analyzed in the previous 
part, deals precisely with such practices of dissent. It explains their functioning 
through a parsimonious theory of power that revolves around the assumption that 
any form of rule is ultimately dependent upon popular consent. Since this consent 
can be withdrawn, it is argued, massive efforts of popular resistance can topple even 
the most ruthless dictatorship. 
A second reading of the East German revolution problematizes this 
parsimonious and essentialist understanding of power relations. My analysis 
suggests that power relations are far too complex to be assessed by a grand 
theoretical model that revolves around a universalized understanding of the 
interaction between rulers and ruled. The situation in East Germany, I suggest, can 
be understood more adequately through Michel Foucault's approach to power. 
There is no essence to power. It is neither stable nor can it be assessed with a grand 
theoretical model. Power, Foucault argues, is a complex and constantly changing 
relational force that depends largely on its interaction with the production and 
diffusion of knowledge. Drawing on this Foucaultean position I then introduce what 
will become the theoretical core of all subsequent chapters: a concept of power and 
dissent that relies on an understanding of discursive practices. 
IMAGES OF DISSENT BURNT INTO LATE MODERN 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
The scenes of common citizens walking through the Berlin Wall represent a common 
image of dissent, an image of protesting masses, of thousands of people taldng to the 
street and rising against the dark forces of a repressive regime. In the case of East 
Germany, the success of such resistance was spectacular by any measure. Within a 
few weeks of popular rage, Erich Honecker's notorious regime fell apart, a 
seemingly invincible iron fortress suddenly lay in ruins. Of course, one could have 
anticipated some form of social change once the Soviet Union, East Germany's key 
ally and protector, started to embark on an internal reform process. But nobody was 
prepared for the force and momentum that developed in the streets of East Germany 
during the autumn of 1989. 
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The present section scrutinizes the revolutionary events from the perspective of 
mass protest movements. How important were they? What form of power did they 
unleash? What image of human agency did they embody? 
Popular dissent undoubtedly played an important role in triggering radical 
processes of social change. Jurgen Habermas, for example, notes that "the presence 
of large masses gathering in squares and mobilizing on the streets managed, 
astonishingly, to disempower a regime that was armed to the teeth."1 But 
Habermas, and many others, emphasize that the force of street demonstration must 
be seen in its reinforcing combination with the impact created by the increasing 
number of East Germans that were leaving for the West. Albert 0. Hirschmann, 
who termed this two protest forms "voice" and "exit," argues that their common 
force gradually eroded the foundations of the existing regime.2 A brief elucidation:3 
The practice of exit, of people leaving East Germany despite the government's 
desperate attempt to uphold the iron curtain and enforce a closed border policy, 
occurred primarily through two channels. Starting in August 1989, East German 
citizens used the extraterritorial status of diplomatic missions in the communist bloc 
to claim refugee status. Soon, the West German representations in East Berlin, 
Prague, Budapest and Warsaw had to be closed because they were overcrowded 
with thousands of East Germans determined to leave their country. An agreement 
between Berlin and Bonn at the end of September allowed for a transport of these 
refugees by special train - via East German territory - to the West. When news of 
1 Jurgen Habermas, "The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for new Thinking on the Left," in 
New Left Review, No. 183, 1990, p. 7. 
2 Albert 0. Hirschmann, ''Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic," in World 
Politics, No. 45, January 1993, pp. 173-202. 
3 Needless to say, the interaction of domination and resistance in East Germany is a highly complex 
issue that I cannot possibly represent adequately in this short summary. For analyses that focus on 
the country's entire life-span see Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-
1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and John C. Topey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and 
Dissent: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995). Countless German language material has appeared about the revolution of 1989, as, for 
example, Hannes Bahnnann and Christoph Links, Wir sind das Volle: Die DDR zwischen 7. Oktober 
und 17. Dezember 1989 (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1990); Barbel Bohley et al., 40 Jahre DDR .. und die 
Burger melden sich zu Wort (Frankfurt am Main: Btichergilde Gutenberg, 1989); R Deppe, H. Dubiel 
and U. R&iel, Demokratischer Umbruch in Osteuropa (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991); Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Betrachtungen tiber die Revolution in Europa (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1990); Gert-Joachim GlaeBner, Der schwierige Weg zur Demokratie: Varn Ende der DDR zur 
Deutschen Einheit (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991); Christiane Lemke, Die Ursachen des 
Umbruchs 1989 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991); K. Low (ed), Ursachen und Verlauf der 
deutschen Revolution von 1989 (Berlin: Duncker & Hum blot, 1991); Marlies Menge, "Ohne uns Hiuft 
nichts mehr": Die Revolution in der DDR (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990). For analyses in 
English see, for example, Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution of 1989 (London: 
Granta I Penguin, 1990); Sigrid Meuschel, "Revolution in the German Democratic Republic," in 
Critical Sociology, Vol. 17/3, Fall 1990, pp. 17-34; Karl-Dieter Opp et al., Origins of a 
Spontaneous Revolution: East Germany, 1989 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1995); and the special issue of New Gennan Critique, No. 64, winter 1994. 
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this evacuation spread, the regime desperately tried to prevent its citizens from 
jumping on the so called refugee trains that were leaving for Prague and other 
destinations: However, in a matter of days, the diplomatic representations were 
packed anew and special trains brought again 7,600 refugees to West Germany. 
While these spectacular occupation-evacuation procedures attracted a lot of media 
attention and robbed the regime of that little bit of legitimacy it had left, the 
numerically most damaging emigration occurred as a result of Budapest's gradual 
dismantling of the 'iron curtain'. On 11 September, Hungary unilaterally decided to 
open its borders to Austria. Within three days, 15,000 East Germans walked 
through the iron curtain and then settled in West Germany. This was only the 
beginning of the exit wave. Illegal border-crossings, for which several East Germans 
had been shot during the preceding decades, became a mass movement by the fall of 
1989.4 
Meanwhile, opposition activities within East Germany became more organized. 
Between July and September, various illegal grassroots opposition movements 
emerged, such as Neues Forum, Demokratischer Autbruch and Demokratie Jetzt. 
Popular demonstrations now appeared at various places. For example, each 
Monday, after the traditional Protestant service at Leipzig's Nikolaikirche, people 
gathered outside the church to demand reforms. Their number continually increased 
week after week. On 2 October, 25,000 of them were violently dispersed by the 
police. 
During the celebration of East Germany's fortieth anniversary, on 7 October, 
Erich Honecker made one last attempt to redress the balance. But his categorical 
refusal to acknowledge the need for change only increased the pressure from below. 
Street protests became a normal feature in virtually every city in the country. The 
Monday demonstration in Leipzig was by now a weekly event of mass protest; 
70,000 people participated on 9 October and 120,000 a week later. Meanwhile, 
thousands of East Germans kept leaving their country every day. The young age of 
the emigrants and the resulting loss of future leadership and labor potential 
constituted an almost insurmountable obstacle for the regime's attempt to impose 
order. The human drain created chaotic situations throughout the country. Many 
spheres, such as industry, the service sector, public transportation and hospitals 
either totally collapsed or functioned only with great difficulty. Exit had torn holes 
in the East German society, to the extent that even the anachronistic leadership could 
no longer ignore the volatility of the situation. In a series of highly unusual public 
declarations, the government acknowledged the threat that exit constituted for the 
socialist order. On 12 October, the Politburo avowed on the front page of the 
official party organ that "socialism needs everybody, ... we cannot remain indifferent 
if people break away from our East Germany."5 
4 
For statistical details on the exit wave see Thomas Ammer, "Stichwort: Flucht aus der DDR," in 
Deutschland-Archiv, No. 22, November 1989, p. 1207; and Hartmut Wendt, "Die deutsch-
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The continuously increasing pressure from below triggered a power struggle 
within the Politburo. On 18 October, Honecker, the long time autocrat, and two of 
his closest and oldest allies, Gunter Mittag and Joachim Hermann, were forced to 
resign. Yet, the new government, headed by another long-time Honecker confidant, 
Egon Krenz, could not calm the situation with the announced reforms. Too little, 
too late was the general consensus in the population. Demonstrations became again 
more frequent and dramatically increased in size. Calls for more democracy, free 
elections and mobility rights could be heard all over East Germany. 'We are the 
people' echoed day after day, hundreds of thousands of times, through the streets of 
Leipzig, Dresden, East Berlin, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Potsdam and may other cities. 
Leipzig alone witnessed several demonstrations attended by more than 200,000 
people. On 4 November, over a million people took to the streets in East Berlin. 
The day after, an almost equal number of protesters gathered in Leipzig. 
Meanwhile, the lack of man- and women-power that resulted from the exodus, 
which continued at a rate of about 10,000 East Germans a day, further paralyzed the 
country. Personal accounts, published later by high-ranking party officials, reveal 
how decisive these migrations were in triggering processes of social change. Two 
key figures of the Politburo, Egon Krenz, president at the time, and Gilnter 
Schabowski, spokesperson for the government, acknowledge that mass emigration 
had a tremendous impact on them and other leading figures involved in the decision-
making process. Members of the government believed that they could under no 
circumstances survive extended mass emigration, that exit created a situation against 
which the regime was absolutely helpless. 6 
Soon, the mounting pressure claimed its next victims. More key figures were 
forced to 'retire,' including Margot Honecker, Harry Tisch, Kurt Hager and Erich 
Mielke. On 7 November the entire government resigned. The day after, the 
Politburo followed suit. Then, on 9 November 1989, came the beginning of the end, 
the coup de grace to old order: Schabowski, in his capacity as spokesperson, 
declared that effective immediately, all East German citizens were free to travel 
abroad without prior permission from state authorities. The same night, sensational 
pictures were seen all over the world: thousands of people climbing over, 
dismantling and simply walking through the meanwhile anachronistic Berlin Wall in 
front of puzzled and helpless East German guards. In the days to come, hundreds 
of thousands of East Germans took a glimpse at the West, a possibility that had been 
inconceivable to them for decades. 
From then on it took little time for what remained of the authoritarian regime to 
vanish into the annals of European history. Emigration increased even more and 
demonstrations did not cease until all remnants of the old order were gone. Placing 
6 
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Hans Modrow, a reform-oriented communist, at the head the government did not 
postpone the fall. In December, Egon Krenz resigned from all his functions. Under 
his successor, Gregor Gysi, the Communist Party virtually disintegrated. On 16 
March 1990, the first free parliamentary elections took place in East Germany. The 
Christian Democratic Union, an ally of the West German conservative ruling party, 
achieved a spectacular victory. 
Every demand the people had taken to the streets in the fall of 1989 was met by 
the spring of 1990. Within half a year utopia had turned into reality. One of the 
most repressive regimes of central and eastern Europe had crumbled like a house of 
cards under the pressure from below. 
PROBING CONSENT BASED CONCEPTIONS OF POWER 
The image of human agency that these sensational events evoke are not only 
reflective of the media infused late modern consciousness. They are also part of a 
much deeper entrenched modern perception of political resistance, of revolutionary 
masses overthrowing their tyrannical rulers. Marxist activism has substantially 
contributed to the prevalence of this image. And so have other traditions, including 
the one that originated in la Boetie' s notion of voluntary servitude. Its intellectual 
legacy has given rise to grand theories of dissent that revolve around the assumption 
that power is dependent upon popular consent. The withdrawal of this consent, 
through practices of resistance as the above voice and exit, can allegedly topple even 
the most ruthless forms of oppression. 
Consent oriented understandings of power have left a lasting mark on ideas and 
social practices. Barry Hindess, for instance, divides modern conceptions of power 
into two main approaches. One focuses on the capacity to act. The other 
understands power not only as a capacity, but also as a right to act, "with both right 
and capacity being seen as to rest on the consent of those over whom the power is 
exercised. "7 The la Boetian model clearly epitomizes this latter view, a view that has 
been, according to Hindess, "at the center of Western political and social thought 
throughout the modern period. "8 
But are consent based models of power really adequate for understanding a 
revolutionary event like the collapse of authoritarianism in East Germany? Can a 
grand theory of dissent capture such a complex set of events and the processes of 
social change that issued from it? 
I engage with these questions by comparing and contrasting the la Boetian, 
consent oriented conception of power, with the writings of Michel Foucault, who is 
7 
Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 1. 
8 Ibid, p. 10. 
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arguably one of the most influential contemporary voices on the subject of power. 
This comparison is, of course, unable to provide an overview of the complex debates 
that have been waged about power during the last decades. But such is not my task 
here. The specifically focused comparison I am about to undertake is merely 
intended to highlight some of the issues that are at stake in articulating links between 
power, dissent and human agency. 
La Boetie and Foucault rely on a similar relational view of power. The la 
Boetian notion of withdrawing popular consent is based on the premise that power 
dynamics operate in the interactive relationship between ruler and ruled. If people 
draw upon this power source they can fundamentally alter existing political 
structures and practices. Thus, by engaging in street demonstration and protest 
migration, as East Germans did, common citizens directly interfere with power 
relations. Foucault shares some of these theoretical assumptions. He defines the 
exercise of power, somewhat like la Boetie, as "a mode of action upon the actions of 
others," which indicates that his object of analysis is not power itself, but power 
relations.9 Foucault does not deny that institutions are crucial embodiments of 
power. Indeed, they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. 
Yet, the fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is 
always located outside institutions, deeply entrenched within the social nexus. 
Hence, instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must 
analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations. 10 
The shared concern with how power functions relationally leads Foucault and la 
Boetie away from what most modern theorists have constituted as the key 
(structural) focus of power analyses, the State. From a relational perspective, the 
State is only one among many sites of power, a superstructural site that operates 
primarily on the grounds of other, already existing power networks. I I Foucauh and 
la Boetie also diverge from the common tendency to define power primarily as a 
negative, restraining and repressive force. Both imbue power with an important 
positive and enabling component. In the la Boetian tradition, it is the ability to 
overcome domination through the withdrawal of popular consent. With Foucault 
things are more complicated. His earlier so called archeological phase clearly 
privileges systemic and discursive restraints over the individual's capacity to employ 
power for emancipatory objectives. 12 His later work, however, revolves around an 
more positive core, one that sees power not just as a negative and repressive force, 
9 
Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Henneneutics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 219, 221. 
10 
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11 
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but at least as much as something enabling, an opportunity, an instrument of 
· 13 resistance. 
This is where similarities between Foucault and the la Boetian tradition end. 
Foucault may well rely on a relational and enabling view of power, he may even 
endorse the la Boetian claim that "power stems from below."14 But differences 
between the two approaches to power are clear and profound. Foucault strongly 
opposes global and ahistoric models of power relations that focus on dualistic 
interactions between oppressor and oppressed: 
[T]here is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at 
the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix - no such duality 
extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the 
very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the manifold 
relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of 
production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-
ranging effects of cleavages that run through the social body as whole. 15 
Foucault clearly rejects the positivist and essentialist assumptions around which 
grand theories of dissent revolve. By characterizing power not as an interaction 
between ruler and ruled, but as a complex, stratified, interwoven and multi-
dimensional phenomenon, he undermines the most fundamental theoretical 
foundation of the entire la Boetian tradition of dissent. In particular, he dismantles 
the notion of voluntary servitude, the parsimonious claim that any form of 
government, no matter how ruthless and oppressive, is dependent upon popular 
consent. Foucault argues that consent may well serve to. sustain power, so may 
violence. Yet, neither consent nor violence form the basic nature of power. ''The 
crucial problem of power," for Foucault, "is not that of voluntary servitude, ... but 
the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. "16 Power does not 
work directly from people to people in a consent-oriented manner. It is a complex 
strategic situation, far too complex and idiosyncratic to be assessed through a grand 
theory, yet alone a parsimonious one. Power relations are always part of a social 
network. They need to be assessed in their unique spatio-temporal setting. 
PROBING THE CONTEXT OF WITHDRAWING CONSENT 
Is Foucault's hostility towards essentialist conceptions of power warranted? With 
this question in mind I now engage in a second reading of the East German 
13 
Michel Foucault, La Volonte de Savoir, Volume 1 of L'Histoire de la Sexualite (Paris: Edition 
Gallimard, 1976), p. 133. 
14 Ib'd _J_., p. 124. 
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16 
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revolution. This time I try to locate some of the unique, multiple and overlapping 
power relations that Foucault so extensively theorized. 
Power relations at the international level undoubtedly played a crucial role in the 
East German revolution. Social dynamics within East Germany during the late 
1980s were intrinsically linked to Cold Wa.r politics and the overall crisis of the 
Soviet-led a11iance system. Indeed, many analysts a.rgue that changes in Moscow's 
foreign policy constituted an important, if not the key factor in the German 
revolution of 1989.17 The survival of Honecker's authoritarian regime was directly 
linked to its incorporation into the internationalized structures of Cold War politics. 
East Germany's importance for the Soviet-led alliance system was a crucial 
component of domestic power relations. This remained so as long as the 
international system was dominated by ideological schism and a bipola.r power 
structure. However, the situation radically changed in the mid-1980s, when Mikhail 
Gorbachev started to restructure Soviet foreign policy. His principle of "new 
thinking" now recognized explicitly that each nation has the right to determine its 
own policies. 18 This meant that the East German regime could no longer count on 
Moscow's financial and military support for the suppression of domestic popular 
resistance. The gradual decay of the Soviet Union and the resulting dissolution of 
the Cold War system fundamentally altered power relationships within East 
Germany. These factors permitted domestic social dynamics to take a course that 
was far less circumscribed by Soviet geopolitical and ideological interest. 
lntranational dynamics constituted another sphere in which complex and 
stratified power relationships operated much like Foucault's theoretical model 
suggests. The ethnic bonds and fierce ideological competition between the two 
politically distinct German States intrinsically and interactively linked their political 
and social dynamics. Many aspects of resistance in East Germany must be 
understood in the context of such intra-German dynamics. For example, the massive 
emigration waves would not have been able to emerge without West Germany's 
economic attraction and its constitutionally entrenched policy of granting citizenship 
to East German refugees. Ulrich Beck appropriately captures this intranational 
power dimension by pointing out that "Poland minus communism is still Poland. But 
East Germany minus communism is the Federal Republic of Germany. "19 
The domestic level displays the most complex picture of power relationships. 
An account of the struggle for control over the Politburo and its implication for the 
fall of East Germany could alone fill volumes. For instance, the regime's 
17 
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commanding structure of the 1980s could be considered tripartite, consisting of 
Erich Honecker, Giinter Mittag and Erich Mielke. Yet, Honecker had occupied the 
key role for such a long time that the system's functioning was to a considerable 
extent dependent upon his personality, on what Max Weber once called a 
charismatic source of power. Thus, when Honecker fell seriously ill in 1989, the 
Politburo was paralyzed and unable to respond to the mounting pressure from the 
population. 
Domestic power relationships were also conditioned by the system of privileges 
in which East Germany's authoritarian commanding structure was embedded. 
Privileges were not only available to the members of the Politburo, who had access 
to a great array of Western consumer goods and lived in well equipped and secluded 
'fortresses', first in Pankow and, from 1960 on, in Wandlitz, north of Berlin. Rather, 
the reward principle reached a much greater circle of citizens. For example, the 
notorious Stasi, the Ministry of State Security, employed a range of methods to draw 
people into the machinery of the oppressive state system. It is estimated that 
approximately 10% of the population worked in one way or another for this 
institution that functioned as an omnipresent surveillance system. 20 These 
informants, combined with the nomenclatura, the police, the army, fire-fighters, 
justices, teachers, post-office employees and all their families and friends and many 
more, comprised a substantial web of people who were in some manner intertwined 
with the ruling apparatus. Informants were paid according to the usefulness of the 
material they provided. Non-cooperation with the authorities, by contrast, could 
easily result in highly consequential financial, political and other disadvantages for 
the respective individuals and their families. This system of reward and punishment 
existed at all societal levels and in all geographical areas of the country. It created 
various systems and sub-systems of power relations that helped to sustain an 
authoritarian societal structure. This is why some analysts, such as Artur Meier, 
portray the collapse of the East German regime primarily as the obsolescence of a 
system of positive and negative privileges.21 
One could easily argue with this or that aspect of the above interpretations of 
social dynamics in East Germany. One could elaborate on them or draw attention to 
a range of other spheres where power dynamics operated. To engage with the 
details of these debates is besides the objective of this thesis and better left to 
specialists in German politics. My task is the task of a political theorist who 
20 
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scrutinizes the concept of human agency - and from this vantage-point the message 
is clear: power relations and power structures that influenced the collapse of the East 
German regime were far too complex to be assessed through a parsimonious and 
global theoretical framework. 
Foucault's notion of power is more adequate than la Boetie's to understand the 
complexities of the East German situation. Power relations operate in multiple 
terrains and can be assessed meaningfully only in a specific historical and cultural 
setting. No grand theory can ever capture the essence of power relations. My brief 
rereading of the various contexts within which the revolutionary events of 1989 were 
embedded confinns Foucault's claim that power, capitalized or not, concentrated or 
diffused, does not exist at a universal level.22 But this is not to say that power as 
such does not exist. 
Foucault explicitly operates within the Nietzschean premise that nothing exists 
outside power, that "there cannot be a society without power relations."23 There 
will always be forms of domination and attempts to break free from them. ''To 
demand of strength," Nietzsche says, "that it should not express itself as strength, 
that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to thrown down, a desire to 
become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as 
to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. "24 Despite this 
omnipresence of relations of domination and resistance - or, rather, because of it -, 
one cannot speak of power and human agency in global and ahistoric terms. A 
theory of power, Foucault argues convincingly, cannot provide the basis for 
analytical work, for it assumes a prior objectification of the very power dynamics the 
theory is trying to assess.25 
TOWARDS A DISCURSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF POWER 
RELATIONS 
Since a systematic theory cannot capture the intricate functioning of power, one 
must explore different ways of understanding the frameworks within which 
domination, resistance and social change take place. One must search for more 
subtle foundations that could, maybe, provide momentary ground for understanding 
human agency. But how is one to embark upon this intricate task? In my journey I 
continue to rely, at least for the moment, on Foucault's guidance. He approaches 
power by adding an extra step to understanding it. Power, he argues, is not simply 
22 
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the relationship between individuals or groups, a type of force that one person exerts 
on another. It works in a more intricate, more indirect way: 
[W]hat defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not 
act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action 
upon an actio~ on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future ... [T]he exercise of power .. .is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon 
possible actions. 26 
Power is a complex strategic situation, something that shapes and frames the 
boundaries within which actions can be carried out. Such a definition inevitably 
raises a number of questions. What mediates the exercise of power? What is the 
space that lies between actions, this mesh of social forces through which actions 
frame the actions of others? One mediating factor is the relationship between power 
and knowledge. Foucault, drawing once more on Nietzsche, argues that knowledge 
and power are intrinsically linked. There are no power relations which do not 
constitute corresponding fields of knowledge. And there are no forms of knowledge 
that do not presupposes and at the same time constitute relations of power.27 
Power is not a stable and steady force, something that exists on its own. There 
is no essence to power, for its exercise is dependent upon forms of knowledge that 
imbue certain actions with power. This is to say that the manner in which we view 
and frame power also influences how it functions in practice. 
"It is within discourse," Foucault claims, "that power and knowledge articulate 
each other."28 Discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. 
They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and 
rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, 
organized and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion in 
which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status while others are 
condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules about statements most 
people recognize as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false. Which utterances 
are remembered as important, which disappear without a trace from collective 
societal memories? Which propositions from previous periods or foreign culture are 
retained, imported, valued, which are forgotten or neglected? It is within discursive 
practices that such arbitrary boundaries are drawn and o bjectivized. 29 Although 
these boundaries change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a 
certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, 
texts or social practices. 
26 Ibid., p. 220. 
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Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist 
independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of 
discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing which we have 
acquired over time. Nietzsche: 
That mountain here! That cloud there! What is 'real' in that? Subtract the 
phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you can! If 
you can forget your descent, your past, your training - all of your humanity and 
animality. There is no 'reality' for us - not for you either, my sober friends ... 30 
Nietzsche's point, of course, is not that mountains and clouds do not exist as such. 
To claim such would be absurd. Mountains and clouds exist no matter what we 
think about them. And so do more tangible social practices. But they are not 'real' 
by some objective standard. Their appearance, meaning and significance is part of 
human experiences, part of a specific way of life. A Nietzschean position 
emphasizes that discourses render social practices intelligible and rational - and by 
doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. Systems of 
domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect 
of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for "all things that 
live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason 
thereby becomes improbable." 31 
Discourses are more than just masking agents. They provide us with 
frameworks to view the world, and by doing so influence its course. Discourses 
express ways of life that actively shape social practices. But more is needed to 
demonstrate how the concept of discourse can be of use to illuminate concrete social 
phenomenon, such as the interaction between domination and resistance in East 
Germany. More is needed to draw a link between discourse and dissent. More is 
needed to outline a positive notion of human agency that is not based on stable 
foundations. This section has merely located the terrains that are to be explored. It 
is now up to the following chapters to introduce, step by step, the arguments and 
evidence necessary to develop and sustain a discursive approach to power, dissent 
and human agency. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter started to prepare the ground for the articulation of a more subtle, 
alternative conception of human agency. The focus has been with rethinking power, 
an issue that is central to an adequate understanding of human agency as capacity to 
act and promote social change. 
30 
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A theoretical engagement with Michel Foucault and a rereading of the events in 
East Germany have led me to argue that power dynamics are far too complicated to 
be assessed through a parsimonious grand theory. The idea, espoused by the la 
Boetian tradition of dissent, that power is located in the interactive relationship 
between ruler and ruled, proved too simplistic to assess the complex events that 
toppled the authoritarian regime in 1989. Power penetrates various societal aspects, 
to the point that no theory can ever capture the stratified, interwoven and diffused 
manner in which it operates in practice. 
Acknowledging the complexities of power is not unproblematic for a 
rearticulation of human agency. Many commentators have criticized Foucault for 
putting us in a situation in which we can do nothing but express bewilderment at an 
overwhelming world around us - a world in which the potential for human agency no 
longer seems to exist. Nancy Hartsock, for example, criticizes such a Foucaultean 
world as one in which systems move, not people, in which the subject becomes 
obliterated or reduced to an impotent passive object. She claims that in defining 
power as omnipresent, as ever expanding and penetrating all aspects of society, 
Foucault has made it very difficult to locate domination. 32 Resistance, then, becomes 
virtually impossible. 
But Foucault can be read in more than just one way. His later work, in 
particular, offers ground for more optimistic interpretations. Indeed, Foucault 
explicitly points out that acknowledging the omnipresence of power is not to say that 
it is a fatality which cannot be overcome.33 "Where there is power," he says, "there 
is resistance. "34 Paul Patton, extending this line of thought, convincingly argues that 
Foucault can be read in ways that "offer a surrogate for hope. "35 By distinguishing 
between power, power over and domination, Patton shows that Foucault espouses a 
conception of human being. Even though this conception is "thin," it can "be filled 
out in a manner which explains both resistance to domination and the possibility of 
transforming existing economies of power. "36 
I follow Patton's positive reading of Foucault and argue that one can accept the 
inevitability of power and still articulate a concept of human agency, even develop 
concrete strategies of resistance. The present chapter has taken the first step in this 
direction by proposing a shift away from grand theories of popular dissent towards a 
discursive understanding of power. This shift is not meant to replace concrete 
practices of resistance, but to supplement them with a more subtle understanding of 
the effects that they produce. Power, from this perspective, is not something fixed 
32 
Nancy Hartsock, ''Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?", in Linda J. Nicholson (ed), 
Feminism/Postmodemism (New York: Routledge, 1990), esp. pp. 168-170. 
33 
Foucault, ''The Subject and Power," p. 223. 
34 
Foucault, La Volonte de Savoir, p. 125. 
35 
Paul Patton, ''Foucault's Subject of Power," in Political Science Newsletter, Vol. 6, 1994, pp. 61. 
36 Ib'd _!_., p. 66 
From Essentialist to Discursive Conceptions of Power 106 
and stable, but a complex and constantly changing relational situation that is 
intrinsically linked to the production and diffusion of knowledge. 
Accepting that there is no essence to power requires coming to terms with the 
death of God. In a world that no longer revolves around stable foundations, human 
beings must take responsibility for their own thoughts and actions. We must 
recognize the contingent character of foundations, the absence of an overarching 
world-view that unifies humanity, provides certainty and stability. 'The world is 
gone, I have to carry you,' Celan said at the beginning of this chapter. The prospect 
is frightening, to say the least. Nietzsche already knew how daring a task it is, 
having to affirm from denial, having to create out of negation: "Who can feel with 
me what it means to feel with every shred of one's being that the weight of all things 
must be defined anew?"37 The following chapters engage in such a Nietzschean 
rethinking, but in a much less ambitious way. I do not aspire to define anew the 
weight of human agency. Far from such a presumptuous ambition be my task. I 
merely attempt to ground an understanding of human agency in nothingness. 
37 
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First Interlude 
CONFRONTING INCOMMENSURABILITY 
[The problem] is precise! y this gesture of totalized reasoning, which 
subsumes, or pretends to be able to subsume, everything into one 
concept, one theory, one position. The resulting philosophical 
'master discourse' then turns into an intellectual domination by the 
Same, the One - a form of domination in which there is no room for 
the views of the Other, the Heterogeneous. 
6 
Elisabeth List, Die Prasenz des Anderen 
Before embarking on more rereadings of the East German revolution it is necessary 
to pause for a moment and reflect upon some of the central theoretical dilemmas that 
have arisen with my reframing of domination and resistance. What precisely is 
entailed in accepting the death of God? What does it mean to take over, rather than 
deflect responsibility? If one abandons the desire to understand the world in its 
totality, how can one deal with the ensuing proliferation of diverse and often 
incommensurable positions? Can we still articulate dissent, can we assert any kind of 
normative claim, without relying on stable foundations? Can we retain hope for 
articulating a viable but non-essentialist concept of human agency? And how can 
Foucaultean notions of power and discourse possibly offer help? Are they not, as 
some suggest, merely faddish concepts, destined to wax and wane with fleeting 
intellectual trends of the postmodern and poststructural kind? 
This Interlude grapples with some of these dilemmas by engaging with the 
literature on postmodernism. I do so not to provide a coherent account of this 
complex body of knowledge, but to underline the need to embrace difference and 
confront incommensurability. I do so to argue that accepting the contingent 
character of foundations does not necessarily result in a nihilist void, a relativist 
abyss that renders dissent or critique impossible. Indeed, any approach that fails to 
take postmodern epistemological warnings seriously runs the risk of reifying systems 
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of exclusion by imposing inevitable cultural prejudices upon an idiosyncratic mesh of 
social phenomena. 
Only by confronting incommensurability, by accepting its epistemological and 
methodological consequences, can one adequately work through the complex and 
often paradoxical aspects of domination and resistance in the late modern age. 
Searching for this difficult path is, I argue, our best hope for retaining a viable notion 
of human agency. 
POSTMODERNISM, OR LIFE AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD 
Accepting the death of God is necessary for an adequate understanding of human 
agency as capacity to act and promote social change. Prevalent approaches to 
popular dissent have, by and large, failed to take this crucial step. They have often 
engaged in ahistoric and universal endeavors to discover recurring patterns of social 
change. Such grand theories of dissent, I argued in previous chapters, sustain 
practices of domination. They lead to what Adorno called "identity thinking," a 
practice of reflection that ignores the desire for control and the will to power 
entailed in all thought forms. They subsume the particular under the general, force 
subjective and idiosyncratic identities into one unitary system of thought, one 
universal point of reference, one truth that silences all others.1 
A postmodern position embraces difference and emphasizes that an 
understanding of human agency and dissent need not, and must not, resort to a 
universal and essentialist standpoint. Indeed, Foucault links the very notion of an 
emancipatory politics to an acceptance of difference and ensuing attempts to explore 
possibilities of transformation.2 But what precisely does a postmodern position 
entail besides the acceptance of difference? 
The postmodern has become a stretched, widely used and highly controversial 
term. It first achieved prominence in literary criticism and architecture, but 
eventually spread into virtually all realms, penetrating such fields as architecture, art, 
music, sociology, geography and philosophy. What the postmodern actually means 
is highly disputed and dependent on links with equally ambiguous concepts, such as 
modernism and modernity. The increasing sense of confusion in the proliferation of 
the postmodern leads Gianni Vattimo to note that this term is so omnipresent and 
faddish that it has become almost obligatory to distance oneself from it.3 But 
Vattimo nevertheless holds on. He, alongside such diverse authors as Jean-Fran~ois 
1 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992/1966), pp. 15-86. 
2 
Michel Foucault, ''Politics and the Study of Discourse," in G. Burchell et.al. (eds), The Foucault 
Effect Studies in Govemmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 70. 
3 
Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, tr. D. Webb (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), p. 1. 
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Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, David Harvey and Fredric Jameson, view the postmodern 
as both a changing attitude and a fundamentally novel historical condition. They 
focus on cultural transformations that have taken place in the Western world and 
assume, as Andreas Huyssen summarizes, that we are witnessing "a noticeable shift 
in sensibility, practices and discourse formations which distinguishes a postmodern 
set of assumptions, experiences and propositions from that of a preceding period. ,,4 
Such shifts are recognized in various features, including the rapid evolution and 
spread of mass media, computers and other communicative features, which have 
created a "transparent society" (Vattimo ), an "ecstasy of communication" 
(Baudrillard) and fundamentally rearranged the relationship between time and space 
(Harvey); a post-industrial phase whose main feature is knowledge production 
(Lyotard); new technologies, the fragmentation of the subject, and the advance of a 
consumer democracy which, even from a Marxist perspective, provided late 
capitalism with an inherently new cultural logic (Jameson). 
I argue for a more limited usage of the term postmodern, one that draws a clear 
distinction between postmodernism ( an attitude, an approach to studying social 
phenomenon) and postmodernity (a new historical epoque).5 I adopt elements of the 
former position but reject the latter as premature. This is not to say that the above 
mentioned so-called postmodern phenomena do not exist. Indeed, I will deal with 
them in detail. Yet, I do not see enough evidence to suggest that these features have 
ushered in a fundamentally new historical period, one that has superseded modernity 
and deserves the label 'post.' In this sense I concur with authors like Paul de Man 
and Michel Foucault, for whom modernity is already such a vague and dubious 
historical term, that postmodernity becomes nothing but a ·parody of the notion of 
modernity.6 Even Lyotard, in a departure from earlier terminology, now prefers to 
"rewrite modernity." The very concept of postmodernity, he points out, represents 
an effort in historical periodization, an obsession with ordering that is typically 
modern.7 
4 
Andreas Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern." in New German Critique, Vol. 33, 1984, p. 8. Jean 
Baudrillard, Simulations, tr. P. Foss, P. Patton and P. Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983) 
and "The Ecstasy of Communication," tr. J. Johnston in Hal Foster (ed), Postmodern Culture 
(London: Pluto Press, 1985); Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism," in New Left Review, No. 146, 1984; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989); Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1979). 
5 
For elaborations of this distinction see Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: 
Routledge, 1989); and Barry Smart, Postmodemity (London: Routledge, 1993). 
6 
Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 
120; Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," tr. C. Hubert in P. Rabinow (ed), The 
Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 248-9; Foucault in Smart, Postmodemity, 
p. 5. 
7 
Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, ''Rewriting Modernity," in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, tr. G. 
Bennington and R. Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991/1988), pp. 24-35. 
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The term postmodernism is a more useful analytical tool than postmodernity for 
it does not imply the end of a historical epoque called modernity, but merely draws 
attention to the need for rethinking the concepts and categories through which this 
epoque has been constituted. For this purpose I accept the aspects of Lyotard's 
work that differentiate between the modern and the postmodern by defining the 
former as any science that legitimates itself in reference to a grand narrative, while 
employing the latter term to express an incredulity towards this totalizing form of 
knowledge. 8 The refusal to orient oneself in relation to one 'master discourse' 
applies, of course, to all aspects of life. Umberto Eco, for instance, defines the 
postmodern, analogous to the argument I presented in chapter four, as "the 
orientation of anyone who has learned the lessons of Foucault, i.e., that power is not 
something unitary that exists outside us. "9 Vattimo' s postmodernism rejects the idea 
of a single, unilinear notion of history, one that progresses towards an end, a telos. 
He considers history as "images of the past projected from different points of 
view."1° Conceptualizing the postmodern along these lines of celebrating difference, 
Wolfgang Welsch argues, goes beyond merely rejecting and superseding modernity. 
It is a transition into a true form of plurality that includes past epoques and modern 
ideas. 11 
I embrace postmodernism only as an epistemological and methodological 
position (to which subsequent chapters will add an ontological dimension). This 
position revolves around the issue of what knowledge is, how it is constructed, and 
how it relates to language and power. Epistemology here is not, as it was in pre-
Kantean philosophy, a privileged form of insight into the human mind. The 
postmodern notion of episteme rejects the existence of truth beyond power, a 
privileged site of knowledge. It draws attention to the constituted and multiple 
dimensions of social practices. Postmodernists search for solutions outside the 
teleological and rational imperatives of Enlightenment notions of universal 
emancipation. Given the acceptance of epistemological fragmentation, it is almost 
self-evident that this search is characterized more by diversity than by a single and 
coherent set of positions and assumptions about life. 
If there is a unifying point in postmodernism then it is precisely the acceptance of 
difference, the refusal to uphold one position as the correct and desirable one. "The 
postmodern begins," Welsch says, "where totality ends."12 Its vision is the vision of 
plurality, a positive attempt to secure and explore multiple dimensions of the 
processes that legitimize and ground social practices. Once the end of totalitarian 
8 
Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne, p. 7. 
9 
Eco cited in Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, p. 3. 
10 
Vattimo, The Transparent Society, p. 3. 
11 
Wolfgang Welsch, "Postmoderne: Genealogie und Bedeutung eines umstrittenen Begriffes," in P. 
Kemper (ed), Postmcxleme oder der Kampf um die Zukunft (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch, 
1988), pp. 31-2. 
12 
Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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thought is accepted, it becomes, of course, very difficult to talk about the 
postmodern without descending into cliches or doing grave injustice to individual 
authors who explore various terrains of difference. Jane Flax recognized this 
difficulty and admits that by speaking about postmodernism one already runs "the 
risk of violating some of its central values - heterogeneity, multiplicity, and 
difference."13 With this sense of terminological caution in mind, I engage in 
epistemological and methodological issues deemed postmodern, but do so by and 
large without relying upon this stretched and abused term. 
The actual term postmodernism may vanish together with current intellectual 
fads. The substantial issues that it brought to the forefront, however, are here to 
stay. They underline, and this is particularly relevant for my attempt to rethink 
human agency, the need to take on board Nietzsche's advice and deal with, rather 
than deflect the death of God. The central importance of this task explains why 
friend and foe of postmodernism generally recognize Nietzsche as the conceptual 
turning point from the modern to the postmodern. 14 Ever since the Renaissance, 
when the certainty of the theocentric order gave way to a less secure humanist world 
view, many key authors have searched for alternative foundations to anchor their 
understanding of the world. They include the early humanist elevation of 'man' to 
the measure of all things, the Enlightenment trust in reason and science, the 
Romantic deification of the Self, and the contemporary combination of the latter two 
into a positivist understanding of social change that focuses on grand theoretical 
models of dissent. Such modern compulsions to anchor the world in stable 
foundations is not only futile, but also dangerous, for its reifying elements impose 
one image of reality to the detriment of others . · 
Instead of continuously trying to fill the void left by the fallen God, I argue for a 
methodological approach that no longer searches for alternative Archimedean 
foundations. The complex and increasingly intertwined social dynamics of late 
modem life require more than ever that one accepts ambiguities and deals with the 
inevitably contingent character of foundations. One must try to approach issues of 
human agency and social change by relying on various forms of insight and levels of 
analysis even if they are incommensurable and contradict each other's internal logic. 
Often such differences only appear as contradictions because we have not yet come 
to terms with the death of God, because we still strive for a universal standard of 
reference that is supposed to subsume all the various aspects of life under a single 
totalizing standpoint.15 
13 
Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the 
Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 188. 
14 
As friend: Welsch, ''Postmoderne," p. 12. As foe: Jurgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs 
derModerne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 104-129. 
15 
Adorno, Negative Dialektik, pp. 17-18. 
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Confronting incommensurability is often equated with a faU into a nihilist abyss. 
Not so. Welsch convincingly argues that a celebration of difference neither lacks 
potentials for resistance nor degenerates into some form of relativism. Rather, 
postmodern dissent is an active, positive and powerful way of safeguarding plurality, 
of resisting uniformity and totalitarian tendencies in such diverse realms as language, 
technology, aesthetics and politics. 16 But the practical relevance of such a 
postmodern approach to power, dissent and human agency is far easier asserted than 
demonstrated. The latter task, daunting as it may be, is what I will tackle next. 
16 
Wolfgang Welsch, "Fur eine postmoderne Asthetik des Widerstands," in Asthetisches Denken 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993), p. 166. 
Chapter Five 
OF 'MEN,' 'WOMEN' 
AND 
DISCURSIVE DOMINATION 
As her tutor you have the duty to keep her in ignorance. 
Tom Stoppard, Arcadia 
Grand theories of popular dissent cannot capture the intricate functioning of power 
relations. So demonstrated my reading of the East German revolution in chapter 
four. Power can be assessed adequately only in the context of concrete historical 
and geographical circumstances. It must be understood in discursive terms. But 
what happens if one ignores these complex, constituted and constantly shifting 
aspects of power, if one continues to rely on grand theories and refuses to accept the 
death of God, the contingent character of foundations? Resulting essentialist and 
positivist approaches, I claimed, uphold a specific image of dissent, one that 
becomes frozen in time and space - an image that forecloses alternative views and 
thereby runs the risk of entrenching some fonns of domination. 
The present chapter sustains these claims by demonstrating how prevalent 
images and practices of popular dissent are often unable to deal with subtle 
discursive forms of domination. In doing so I take one more step in the shift away 
from grand theories towards an articulation of human agency that is not anchored in 
stable foundations, but revolves around a discursive understanding of power. This is 
no easy task, for the power contained in discourses is slippery and difficult to detect. 
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Discursive forms of domination rarely appear as what they are. Only seldom, if ever, 
William Connolly notes, "does a policy of repression or marginalization simply 
present itself as such. "1 Indeed, it is precisely this ability to mask and normalize 
domination that makes discursive systems of exclusion more powerful and lasting 
than their overt counterparts, like military regimes or dictatorships. 
I illustrate the power contained in discourses by examining the interaction 
between popular dissent and patriarchy, discursively embedded identity constructs 
which support gender hierarchies. For this purpose I scrutinize the prevalent image 
of popular dissent as epitomized by the la Boetian tradition. My research reveals a 
strong and consistent masculinist trait at the core of the theory and practice of 
popular dissent. Embedded in an essentialist notion of human agency, this gendered 
core accounts for the fact that for all its spectacular opposition to dictatorships, the 
la Boetian tradition has had little success in uprooting discursive forms of 
domination. Indeed, it further strenghtened a model of dissent based on the image of 
a male revolutionary riding into he sunset of freedom while ignoring and even 
entrenching the patriarchal social order that makes this heroic fight possible. 
A rereading of the East German situation, this time from a gender sensitive 
perspective, serves to scrutinize the practical consequences that issue from this 
masculinist image of dissent. How were women affected by the spectacular and 
heroic revolution of 1989? What has changed for them as a social group? Are they 
better or worse off in unified Germany than before? Were they able to exert human 
agency during this important transition period? What do the answers to these 
questions entail for our understanding of power and dissent? 
PROBLEMATIZING SEX AND GENDER 
Before probing the theory and practice of popular dissent for gender specific traits, it 
is necessary to draw attention to the problematic aspects of this task. Feminist 
theory is a highly complex body of literature. There are heated debates about the 
meaning and significance of such concepts as 'gender,' 'sex,' 'masculinity,' and 
'femininity.' Indeed, the very terms 'men' and 'women' - seemingly incontestable 
and unproblematic categories - are being scrutinized from various angles. 
Consider the concept of patriarchy, which Kathy Ferguson loosely defines as "a 
set of institutions and practices that asserts and enforces the power of men as a 
group over women as a group. "2 These institutions and practices are not stable or 
rooted in some essence. They are always in a state of flux. The functioning of 
1 William E. Connolly, Identity\ Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 159. 
2 
Kathy Ferguson, The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 185. 
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patriarchy constantly changes, for it is itself a discursive construct and, as Jean 
Elshtain points out, dependent upon a reinforcing ideology that penetrates all levels 
of society. 3 This discursive order renders natural and rational the specific 
characteristics and role assignments that have been attributed to people designated as 
men and women. But outside this order there are no compelling reasons to link, for 
example, people with male bodies and masculine values or people with female bodies 
and feminine values. These links and the corresponding social division of labor are 
not biologically conditioned. They are discursively assigned and only appear natural 
because they are embedded in a regime of truth. Even in the context of these narrow 
role assignments, people have fragmented and hyphenated identities. These mobile 
subjectivities, as Ferguson calls them, are ambiguous and unstable. They move 
across and along axes of power which are themselves in motion.4 
One could draw attention to a whole range of consequences that arise from the 
subjectivity, fluidity and constituted nature of gendered role assignments. 5 Such is 
not my task, at least not in this chapter. My main interest lies in observing the 
relatively consistent overall discursive regime within which men and women interact 
as social groups. This means that I pay less attention to the subjective and 
constantly shifting criteria by which people are identified as belonging to either of 
these groups. Rosi Braidotti advances convincing arguments in favor of such an 
approach by scrutinizing the interaction between sex (a biological category) and 
gender (a performative norm, a social practice). Too much focus on the discursive 
construct of gender, Braidotti believes, detracts from more imminent political 
problems, such as masculine domination and structurally asymmetrical power 
relationships between men and women. Instead of theorizing gender, Braidotti 
proposes to focus on "sexual difference.',6 This is, of course, not unproblematic. 
Judith Butler strongly criticizes a sexual difference approach for its alleged 
essentialist understanding of gender relations, its uncritical acceptance of the 
categories 'men' and 'women.' She argues that sexual difference is always marked 
and formed by discursive practices. It is nonnative, a subtle form of power, a 
3 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Women (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 
p. 215. 
4 Ferguson, The Man Question, p. 154. 
5 See, for example, Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary 
Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1991); Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds), Feminists 
Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992); Christine Di Stefano, Configurations of 
Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991); Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the 
Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and Linda J. Nicholson (ed), 
Feminism/Postmodemism (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
6 See Rosi Braidotti, with Judith Butler, "Feminism by Any Other Name," in Differences: A Journal 
of Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 6.2+3, 1994, pp. 27-61; and "The Politics of Ontological 
Difference," in T. Brennan (ed), Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 89-105. 
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Foucaultean "regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs. "7 Braidotti 
counters. She tries to valorize sexual difference in an attempt to oppose what she 
believes is a hasty dismissal of this concept "in the name of a polemical form of 'anti-
essentialism,' or of a utopian longing for a position 'beyond gender. "'8 Indeed, 
Braidotti even claims that the very attempt to distinguish between sex and gender re-
essentializes sex, for it reduces women's oppression to either materialism or 
language, nature or culture, body or mind.9 
Much of the heated debate between essentialist and discursive approaches to 
relations between the sexes is a vicissitude of the English language. Or so at least 
believes Braidotti.10 The English language allows for a clear terminological 
distinction between sex and gender. This linguistic situation forces people to 
position themselves on either side of these artificially drawn boundaries. But sex and 
gender are not mutually exclusive categories, they are intrinsically linked with each 
other. In many non-English contexts, Braidotti claims, a discussion of gender makes 
no epistemological or political sense, for their are no linguistic tools to distinguish 
this concept from sex.11 
The German word Geschlecht is a case in point. It denotes both sex and gender. 
By defining sexuality in both biological and discursive manners, this term 
semantically recognizes that the boundaries between them are fluid and artificial. 
This sets the stage for very different forms of feminist theorizing. Consider the 
intensive discussions that were triggered by translations of Butler's work into 
German.12 Due to the broad meaning of the word Geschlecht, the actual English 
terms sex and gender were often used to capture some of Butler's complex 
arguments. The ensuing discussions, to simplify things a bit, led to a radical 
deconstruction of the very concept Geschlecht. 13 Many German feminists express 
strong reservations about the resulting tendency to emphasize the performativity and 
discursive construction not only of gender, but also of sex. They point towards the 
idealistic dangers of such a position and reassert, much like Braidotti does, the need 
to theorize the linguistic, social and political dimensions that are entailed in issues of 
sexual difference. 14 Similar trends are visible in France too. Luce Irigaray, for 
7 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (New York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 1. 
8 Braidotti, "Feminism by Any Other Name," p. 48 
9 Ibid., pp. 46-7. 
10 Ibid., pp. 37-8. 
11 Ibid., p. 38. 
12 Most notably Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter (Frankfurt a.M., 1991), tr. of 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
13 Christina Thiirmer-Rohr, ''Zur Dekonstruktion der Kategorie Geschlecht," in FRAZ: Frauezitig, 
1995 No. 1, pp. 22-25. 
14 See, for example, Frigga Haug, "Anmerkung zur Diskussion um die Kategorie 'Geschlecht, "' in 
Das Argument, No. 202, Vol. 35/6, Nov/Dec 1993, p. 899-900; Hilde Landweer and Mechthild 
Rumpf, "Einleitung" to Kritik der Kategorie 'Geschlecht', special issue of Feministische Studien, 
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example, stresses that the human species is divided into two sexes which assure 
production and reproduction. Hence, she claims, equality must be attained not 
through a process of gender neutralization, but through an acceptance of difference -
anything else would be disastrous for humanity. 15 
I follow, at least at this point, a sexual difference approach. I leave aside for 
now some of the complexities entailed in the conceptual tension between sex and 
gender. This means that I focus less on how women and men are differently 
constituted in different historical periods. Instead, I examine how, in the context of 
these constantly changing identity constructs, patriarchy has remained a relatively 
constant and discursively entrenched social and political practice. Only after having 
established the broad boundaries of these discursive consistencies will I enter 
ontological issues and theorize the possibilities of resistance that emerge from the 
constituted and fragmented nature of the subject. 
THE MASCULINIST DIMENSIONS OF POPULAR DISSENT 
I begin my portrayal of the discursive continuities of patriarchal power by 
scrutinizing the dominant image of popular dissent. A rereading of the la Boetian 
tradition of dissent serves as an illustrative example. If one scrutinizes this body of 
knowledge and its related political practices syste_matically from a gender sensitive 
perspective, one discovers a striking consistency in masculinist positions, a 
consistency that often degenerates into unrestrained misogyny. There are hardly any 
exceptions to this rule. Gendered values prevailed with virtually all of the well-
known men who have devoted their lives to the struggle against political oppression. 
Many of their thoughts and self-sacrificing deeds were characterized by either 
ignorance of or contempt for the system of exclusion in which women are confined. 
The theory and practice of popular dissent has revolved around gendered 
assumptions ever since its early Renaissance days. La Boetie uses the term 
"effeminate" to describe the cowardly behavior of voluntary servitude, situations 
where people do not have the courage to stand up and request their natural right to 
freedom. The heroic battle for freedom, by contrast, is portrayed in strong 
masculine terms. 16 The assumption of this text is, clearly, that men and women are 
meant to fulfill fundamentally different societal roles. This is, of course, not only 
entirely compatible with prevailing practices at the time, but also characteristic of 
modernity in general. La Boetie 's approach perfectly illustrates what Jean Elshtain, 
Vol. II, Nov. 1993, No. 2, pp. 3-9; Christina Thurmer-Rohr, "Denken der Differenz: Feminismus 
und Postmodeme," in beitrage zur feministischen theorie und praxis, Vol. 18, No. 39, 1995, pp. 87-
97. 
15 Luce Irigaray, Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), pp. 10-11. 
16 Etienne de la Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, ed. P. Bonnefon in Oeuvres Completes 
(Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1967/1552), esp. pp. 5-6, 16, 22, 65. 
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in a study on war, identified as a key discursive construct from Antiquity to today: 
the societal division into "just warriors" (male fighters / protectors) and "beautiful 
souls" (female victims / noncombatants). 17 In la Boetie's world, Renaissance men, 
newly unchained from the deified universal order, heroically venture out into the 
turbulent political realm to fight tyrants of all kind. Women, by contrast, are passive 
onlookers to this unfolding drama. They represent "home and hearth and the humble 
verities of everyday life. "18 
How to reconcile this stark gendered perspective with la Boe tie's rhetorical and 
radically egalitarian claim that all people are born with an equal right to freedom, 
that nature has created us all in likeness?19 In light of this apparent contradiction one 
is inclined to inquire immediately about the meaning of the term 'the people.' Who 
enjoys the status of a subject? Who can exert human agency? Only those individuals 
who are being designated as 'men'? The specter of this question did not vanish with 
la Boetie's death. Instead, it has hovered ever since as a large but largely ignored 
dark cloud above the theory and practice of popular dissent. 
Gendered aspects of popular dissent intensified when la Boetie's legacy came of 
age during the romantic period. Chapter two already drew attention to the strong 
masculinist values entailed in the deification of the Self and the heroic quest for 
boundless freedom beyond the confines of the State. A glimpse beyond romantic 
writings, into the private lives and opinions of its protagonists, clearly affirms this 
interpretation. Henry David Thoreau's much celebrated romantic retreat to Walden 
Pond, at the age of twenty-eight, may have expressed·, as one commentator puts it, 
"pride of domestic independence with its connotation of full manhood. "20 Little does 
it matter that this escape from the claws of women and motherly comfort was 
primarily symbolic, for Walden Pond, situated in walking distance from Thoreau's 
home in Concord, was hardly beyond the limits of the civilized world. Thoreau's 
writings give equally strong clues about his gendered views on society. For instance, 
when describing how he lost all his remaining respect for the State, he compares this 
allegedly timid, pitiful and half-witted ins ti tu tion to "a lone woman with her silver 
spoons. "21 The gendered social division between 'just warriors' and 'beautiful souls' 
remains untouched by Thoreau. 
Leon Tolstoy further entrenched the masculinist dimensions of popular dissent. 
While his novels feature a number of sophisticated women characters - such as Anna 
Karenina -, his political writings clarify what he really thinks about "the nonsense 
called women's rights." Women, for him, are inferior to men. They fulfill the 
17 
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
1s Ib'd ... __l_, p. Xlll. 
19 
La Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, pp. 16-7. 
20 
Robert Milder, Reimagining Thoreau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 52. 
21 
Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," in Walden and Civil Disobedience (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1966/1848), p. 236. 
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function of a breeding stock.22 Not surprisingly, Tolstoy has no hesitation in 
storming off to sites of masculine social struggles, to the heroic battle field of 
romantic idealism, while leaving his family behind in poverty. His wife Sofia hardly 
perceived this form of dissent as an advancement of freedom and justice. Her diaries 
shed a different light on her husband's self-sacrificing devotion to peace and 
nonviolence. Many entries, written over decades, testify to his fundamentally 
abusive behavior. They display her anger about being reduced to an 
underappreciated care-taker, mother and secretary.23 
Romanticism may have resurrected the concept of human agency from an 
Enlightenment obsession with reason and science. But this resurrection continuously 
refused to extend the capacity of human agency to women. A glimmer of hope for a 
more inclusive approach to popular dissent emerged when Gandhi started to 
popularize the practice of civil disobedience. He strongly criticized the common 
practice of calling women the weaker sex. "If by strength is meant moral power," he 
claims, "then women are immeasurably man's superior." They have greater 
intuition, courage and powers of endurance. "If nonviolence is the law of our being, 
the future is with women. "24 Elshtain sees in this Gandhian rhetoric a challenge to 
masculine representations, a calling into question of male identity as warriors and 
protectors. She finds support for this position in the disproportionately high 
representation of women in pacifist movements.25 
My gender focused reading of Gandhi and popular dissent is less optimistic. It 
reveals that his seemingly progressive rhetoric was not matched by his. actions, not 
even by many of his other writings. Gandhi's famous civil disobedience campaign 
against colonial rule in India was by and large a male affair. There was not a single 
women among the eighty satyagrahi that participated in the important salt march of 
1930. Women assumed a more vocal role during the ensuing nation-wide campaign 
of nonviolent resistance.26 This increasing prominence of women satyagrahis may 
have shaken the foundations of British Colonial rule, but it did in no way challenge 
the more deeply entrenched patriarchal systems of exclusion. Indeed, Gandhi's 
personal behavior, like Tolstoy's, embodies the conventional masculinist image of a 
hero who embraces the vow of chastity and is willing to "sacrifice his property and 
even his family" to fight for justice and a better world27 - a continuously unchallenged 
male-dominated world that is. 
22 Tolstoy, cited in A.N. Wilson, Tolstoy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), p. 365. See also 
Tolstoy's "Letter to N.N. Strakov, 19 March 1870," in I Cannot Be Silent: Writings on Politics, Art 
and Religion (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1989), pp. 40-2. 
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While these behavioral traits are indicative of larger discursive trends, the most 
consequential masculinist dimensions of popular dissent operate not at a personal, 
but at a conceptual level. The underlying patriarchal values of the theory and 
practice of popular dissent are most deeply rooted at a conceptual level, particularly 
with the key concept of voluntary servitude, the idea that any form of rule, even the 
most despotic one, is ultimately dependent upon consent. Chapter four already 
revealed multifarious problems entailed in consent oriented approaches to power. 
Feminist theorists strongly criticized this body of theory as well, particularly for its 
inability to recognize and deal with obvious gender biases. Carole Pateman's work 
has been particularly path-breaking in this regard. 
Pateman draws attention to various reasons why even within the institutions of a 
liberal democratic state, genuine consent is hardly the ground upon which social 
dynamics, and especially gender relations, are operating. In the context of a 
discursively entrenched patriarchal social order, women are not constituted as full-
fledged members of civil society. The discursive construction of sexual difference, 
of what it means to be a man or a women, is such that the position of women in c1vil 
society is not based on consent, but, rather, on an exchange of obedience for 
protection.28 Other feminists, such as Nancy Hirschmann, reiterate that voluntarist 
perceptions of obligation reflect a deeply embedded societal gender bias that actually 
denies women the opportunity to give (or withdraw) consent.29 Because many 
obligations women have are not voluntary, consent oriented perceptions of social 
dynamics further entrench the patriarchal status quo. This gender-biased social order 
will remain intact, Hirschmann argues, as long as the underlying structures of 
obligation remain embedded in masculinist world views. 30 Judith Butler equally 
opposes voluntarist notions of obligation, although her postmodern approach is in 
many ways in confrontation with Hirschmann 's standpoint position. Butler claims 
the power emerging from gender perfonnativity must be understood in the context 
of regulatory sexual regimes, a context within which it is impossible to presuppose a 
"choosing subject."31 
These feminist arguments, despite their internal disagreements, commonly point 
towards the problematic aspects of linking power and consent. And the 
contemporary theory and practice of popular dissent is a prime manifestation of this 
problematic masculinist link. Implied in this approach to dissent is an acceptance of 
asymmetrical power relations between the sexes. Women cannot simply follow 
28 
This is, of course, a grossly simplified representation of Pateman 's arguments. See in particular 
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30 Ibid., p. 1229. 
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Tolstoy's and Gandhi's lead, 1eave their children and everything else behind to then 
ride heroically into the sunset of freedom. Withdrawing consent does not work as 
easily for women. In most situations, mass protest is not an option for them because 
the modern patriarchal order has assigned radically different social tasks and 
responsibilities to women than to men. The suggestion that servitude is voluntary 
and that any system of domination would crumble immediately if only its subjects 
would withdraw consent, fails to understand complexities of the discursive system of 
domination in which women are confined. Kate McGuiness argues convincingly that 
Gene Sharp's consent based theory of power fails to assess adequately the power 
dynamics that are operative in gender relations. Basing her analysis on Pateman' s 
critique of contract theory, McGuiness shows that Sharp's notion of popular dissent 
cannot offer a way of resisting deeply entrenched patriarchal forms of oppression.32 
How can a tradition of dissent that is so intensively concerned with fighting 
oppression overlook an oppressive system such as patriarchy? How could this 
neglect permeate the work of authors as diverse as la Boetie, Thoreau, Tolstoy and 
Gandhi - authors who are known for their selfless fight against tyranny, their total 
dedication to the cause of nonviolence and social justice? What does this neglect tell 
us about understandings of domination and resistance? 
WRITING HIS-STORY: THE POWER OF FRAMING THE PAST 
The inability to see beyond masculinist images of the world is, of course, not unique 
to the theory and practice of popular dissent, but characteristic of modernity in 
general. Patriarchy is a widespread, consistent and deeply entrenched discursive 
practice. 
To pursue my main purpose of demonstrating the subtle power contained in 
patriarchal discursive practices it is necessary to take a step back and observe forms 
of repression that are less obvious than those targeted by the prevalent theory and 
practice of popular dissent. Overt forms of domination, such as the long-standing 
male control of politics, are undoubtedly important aspects of patriarchy. Yet, the 
most entrenched systems of exclusion operate on more subtle discursive levels, 
beyond what is usually seen or known. 
Discursive forms of domination are powerful precisely because they do not 
operate at manifest levels, but penetrate spheres of life which are usually considered 
objective and value free. Consider the links between patriarchy and science. The 
myth of detached scientific knowledge has been criticized for long. Nietzsche, for 
example, detected a will to power in science, an arbitrary attempt to control nature, 
to impose order and stability upon a chaotic world. The objective of science, then, 
32 
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"is not 'to know', but to schematize, - to impose upon chaos as much regularity and 
form as our practical needs require. "33 Feminist theorists focus more specifically on 
the ways in which the Enlightenment idea of epistemological objectivism -
knowledge independent of a subject - is often intrinsically linked with an 
androcentric world view.34 Donna Haraway, for example, analyses the scholarship 
on primatology and shows how scientific discourses interweave fact and fiction. 
Looking at such aspects as research design or data interpretation, she strongly 
suggests that this interweaving produces clear Western and sexualized values.35 
A comparable discursive system of exclusion is at work in the writing of history. 
Historical events cannot be represented in an objective and value free way. History 
is a narrative, a story about a particular vision of the past, one that selects, weights 
and displays events that are deemed memorable from perspectives that are deemed 
correct. ''History is a construct," Margaret Atwood's fictional characters tell us 
convincingly. "Any point of entry is possible and all choices are arbitrary. "36 But 
this is not to say that every story about the past is equally relevant, that there is no 
basis upon which to look at events and epoques gone. What must be acknowledged, 
however, is that power relations interfere with the writing of history, that the 
narrator cannot be erased from the narration. Recognizing this Nietzschean will to 
power makes the writing of history a political act. Milan Kundera's fictional world 
perfectly illustrates why this is the case: 
People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It's not true. The 
future is an apathetic void, of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to 
irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only reason 
people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. 37 
Turning things around once more, one could remark that to be master of the past is 
to have the power to control the present and shape the future. Modern 
historiography has demonstrated that this is the case not only in Kundera's fiction, 
but also in political practice. 
Modern history, scrutinized from a gender sensitive perspective, is primarily a 
story of men narrated by men. Things past are presented, selected and ordered 
according to criteria that men considered worthwhile to be remembered. Women 
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1968), p. 278, § 515. 
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and Elisabeth List, Die Pr~senz des Anderen: Theorie und Geschlechterpolitik (Frankfurt: 
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36 Margaret Atwood, The Robber Bride (London: Virago Press, 1994), p. 4. 
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and their views are largely absent from this account. They are marginalized at best, 
obliterated at worst. "Women have no history," Huguette Bouchardeau says.38 
How does discursive power precisely come into play in this gendered 
representation of the past? Why does it allow for control of the present and 
influence over the future? What consequences, besides filtering our knowledge of 
the past, are entailed in women's obliteration from history? A masculinist perception 
of history annihilates agency for women. It imposes a patriarchal vision upon social 
dynamics and then objectifies this form of domination. Gayatri Spivak is one of 
many authors who point towards the grave consequences of historiographical 
systems of exclusion. Looking at colonial and post-colonial contexts, she argues 
that despite female participation in insurgency movements, the annihilation of 
women's voices from the representation of things past has lead to insurmountable 
practices of subjugation: "Both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject 
of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. "39 
Spivak is, of course, particularly known for concluding that the subaltern can neither 
speak nor be represented. This is a harsh and rather pessimistic claim, which I 
debate in later chapters, when I deal with practices of resistance that address 
discursive forms of domination. At this point, however, I am concerned with 
preparing the ground for this task by scrutinizing discursively entrenched patriarchal 
power relations. 
The power of discursive practices becomes most apparent when one observes 
development patterns over a long time-span. Gerda Lerner examines how patriarchy 
functioned and evolved throughout the Middle Ages and modernity. She argues 
convincingly that grave consequences arose from men's ability to frame history, to 
define what is a political issue and what is not.40 Men had access to education. They 
wrote history, transmitted knowledge and built upon their insight, generation after 
generation. Because women were often denied access to education, they were also 
deprived of passing on their knowledge to subsequent generations of women. In 
making this claim, Lerner implicitly refutes Simone de Beauvoir's position that 
women's powerlessness is to be explained by the passive role that they have fulfilled 
historically.41 Lerner, by contrast, argues that there was no lack of outspoken 
women who advanced insightful critiques of patriarchy. She draws attention to 
Hildegard von Bingen and Christine de Pizan who, writing in the twelfth and 
fifteenth century respectively, advanced powerful feminist criticisms of biblical 
texts.42 But this critique was largely in vain. As a result of their marginalization 
38 Huguette Bouchardeau, Pas d'histoire les femmes (Paris: Syros, 1977). 
39 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds), 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 287. 
40 
Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness: From the Middle Ages to Eighteen-
seventy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 10. 
41 
Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxieme Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1976/1949). 
42 
Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, pp. 138-166. 
Of 'Men,' 'Women' and Discursive Domination 124 
from religious and philosophical thought, critical authors like von Bingen and de 
Pizan could, in the long run, neither influence patriarchal practices nor further the 
creation of a feminist consciousness. Traces of their work were largely erased by the 
overwhelming mass of masculine historiographers. 
Women never knew what other women before them wrote. As opposed to men, 
they could not build upon previous knowledge, but had to invest their time, energy 
and talent simply to reinvent the same insight century after century. The importance 
of this point warrants quoting Lerner at length: 
Men created written history and benefited from the transmittal of knowledge from 
one generation to the other, so that each great thinker could stand "on the shoulders 
of giants," thereby advancing thought over that of previous generations with 
maximum efficiency. Women were denied knowledge of their history, and thus 
each woman had to argue as though no women before her had ever thought or 
written. Women had to use their energy to reinvent the wheel, over and over again, 
generation after generation. Men argued with the giants that preceded them; women 
argued against the oppressive weight of millennia of patriarchal thought, which 
denied them authority, even humanity, and when they had to argue they argued with 
the "great men" of the past, deprived of the empowerment, strength and knowledge 
women of the past could have offered them.43 
Although men and women are hardly the stable sites of identity and meaning that 
Lerner's analysis implies, the insight she advances opens up various opportunities to 
theorize the interaction between domination and resistance. As my last step of 
illustrating the power contained in discursive forms of domination, I now redirect 
Lerner's long-range view on more contemporary events and illustrate how practices 
of popular dissent, if they are embedded in masculinist visions of the world, are 
unable to recognize, yet alone struggle against the functioning of a deeply 
entrenched patriarchal social order. 
A word of caution is warranted before I use Lerner's historical insight as a 
stepping stone to my next task, a more focused scrutiny of the links among 
discourse, dissent and social change. Because Lerner feels compelled to anchor her 
arguments in an essentialist standpoint, she enters a highly contentious theoretical 
terrain. She claims that because women have theorized from a marginalized position 
and derived knowledge from essential social interactions, rather than books, the 
knowledge that they acquired was "more nearly correct and adequate than was the 
knowledge of men.',44 Such standpoint positions rely on the problematic belief that 
there is authentic insight and that feminist scholarship requires a resort to essences 
and universals to anchor an argument. The emancipatory practices that emerge from 
the search for authenticity may well lead to a repositioning of some actors (they may, 
for example, bring more women from the outside to the inside), but they entrench at 
the same time the underlying systems of domination that prevents a truly inclusive 
43 Ibid., p. 166. 
44 Ibid., p. 11. 
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politics. As Braidotti puts it, "the point is to overcome the dialectics of domination, 
not to turn the previous slaves into new masters ... Just slotting women in, without 
changing the rules of the game, would indeed be a mere reification of existing social 
conditions of inequality.',45 Lerner's historical argument must thus be taken on 
board with a sense of epistemological caution. 
PROGRESS AS REGRESS: WOMEN AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
An act seemingly as simple as writing history proved to be one of the most powerful 
discursive weapons to defend patriarchy and prevent women from organizing 
collectively against it. To look at how this system of domination persists despite the 
occurrence of radical social change on other fronts, one needs to observe how major 
historical events affect women and men differently. Valuable lessons for 
understanding dissent and human agency can be derived from such a scrutiny. 
Various feminists who dealt with discursively entrenched and concealed forms of 
domination have argued that historical periods which are usually considered 
liberating and progressive often had the opposite effect on women. Joan Kelly-
Gadol was one of the first authors to question conventional methods of periodization 
by drawing attention to women's historical experiences. Her analysis focuses on the 
Renaissance, which, as I outlined in chapter one, is usually credited with having 
ushered in modernity and liberated humanity from the darkness of the Middle Ages. 
But despite the rhetoric of utopianism and radical egalitarianism, of which la 
Boetie' s work is representative, this period influenced the lives of men and women in 
fundamentally different ways. By scrutinizing changing forms of courtly love, Kelly-
Gadol shows that while men were able to explore new horizons, women as a group, 
especially among higher urban classes, experienced a sharp reduction of social and 
personal options.46 
It would, of course, be too simplistic to equate all 'progressive' historical 
epoques with an automatic regression for women. Things are more complex. But 
there is enough evidence to demonstrate that courtly love during the Italian 
Renaissance is by far no exception. The Enlightenment's attempt to liberate the 
human mind from superstition worsened in some ways the situation for women. The 
French revolution, for example, may have brought more fraternity for bourgeois 
men, but it certainly did not entail more liberty and equality for women. The 
subsequent Napoleonic code of civil law only fortified the subjugation of women in 
the realms of marriage, sexual behavior and education.47 Similar dynamics occurred 
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in 1848, when women actively participated in the uprising against the re-established 
monarchy just to witness afterwards how the introduction of universal male suffrage 
further entrenched gender-related discriminations in the spheres of political and 
social rights. 48 
I now engage in one more rereading of the East German revolution in an attempt 
to scrutinize this feminist skepticism about the progressive nature of conventionally 
recognized processes of social change. Was the much heralded German Wende, this 
turning point from the Cold War to a new world order, really as revolutionary as 
proclaimed? What were its medium-term effects? Were they beneficial for women? 
There was no lack of outspoken critique about the transition from the revolution 
of 1989 to the unification of Germany on 3 October 1990. Prominent intellectuals, 
usually situated left of center, were critical about the push towards unity. Many East 
German intellectuals and dissidents, such as Barbel Bohley, Christa Wolf, Stefan 
Heym and Volker Braun, but also influential Western figures of the likes of Jiirgen 
Habermas, Giinter Grass and Wolf Biermann, critiqued the legal and political 
framework as well as the hasty implementation of unification. 49 What could have 
been a chance to build a more just and democratic Germany, they argued, ended in a 
complete subordination to capricious market-oriented incentives. Unification did not 
result from a mutual agreement between two equal and sovereign states. Rather, it 
was a total submission of East Germany's fate to the will (and currency) of West 
Germany. In this sense, the negotiations and constitutional arrangement that led to 
German unity are much better characterized by the term AnschluB ( annexation) than 
Wiedervereinigung (reunification). Unified Germany is exclusively built upon the 
West German political and constitutional structure, including its name, currency, 
federal system legal norms, diplomatic corps and military personnel. 
One could elaborate in detail on these and other "nonnative deficits of 
unification," as Habermas calls them. 50 Some of these deficits would surely have 
been difficult to avoid given the acute pressure and the complex situation that existed 
at the time of the collapse of the East German regime. Many authors point out, for 
example, that the East German dissident intellectuals who searched for a third way, a 
middle ground between communism and capitalism, above all spoke for themselves 
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and were out of touch with what the population desired at the time. 51 The viability 
of various radical alternatives to immediate unification could be discussed at length. 
But what seems more telling, at least from my present gender sensitive rereading of 
the events, is that most of these early critiques of unification were by and large 
embedded in masculinist visions of what a good society should look like. Many of 
the most vehement critics, including Grass and Biermann, failed to consider gender 
related questions as a central issue of their attempt to expose the undersides of 
unified Germany. 
As the euphoria of 1989 gradually calmed down, an increasing number of 
authors demanded that attention be paid to issues related to women. This 
continuously growing body of literature, which scrutinizes unification from various 
feminist perspectives, is undoubtedly among the most revealing and compelling 
contributions to the rethinking of contemporary German politics. The tone is, by and 
large, one of disillusionment. The expectation that the onset of radical social change 
would also improve the position of women in society clearly did not materialize. 
Less than two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Jutta Gysi and Gunnar Winkler 
noted that much of the optimism and hope had evaporated. 52 Indeed, in many 
respects the situation for women in the eastern part of Germany had worsened, 
rather than improved. A rudimentary sketch: 
The early stages of the unification process we~e already indicative of the gender 
specific evolution that was to follow. Women played an active and prominent role in 
the protest movements during the fall of 1989. But when, in December, the slogans 
at demonstrations started to shift from "we are the people·" to "we are a people," 
masculinist elements intensified together with this re-emerging form of German 
nationalism. A case in point are the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig, which 
turned into a key symbol of popular resistance against the regime. Dorothy 
Rosenberg noted that the atmosphere at these demonstrations became increasingly 
male, aggressive and nationalistic. Female demonstrators gradually withdrew after 
women had been booed off the speakers' platform week after week. 53 Similar 
processes of alienation occurred during the so called round table discussions, which 
emerged all over East Germany. Round tables were meant to provide an 
opportunity for various groups to be heard and to exert influence on the reform 
process. Kathrin Rohnstock, a representative of the feminist group Lila Offensive, 
speaks with great disillusionment about her participation in the central round table in 
Berlin. She particularly resented the masculinist tone of the discussions: Very little 
reflection and problematization; authoritarian and intimidating leadership; emphasis 
51 
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on unemotional formulation of strategic objectives. The effect of this discussion 
style did not lead to the a politics of inclusion, Rohnstock felt, but was suffocating 
and marginalizing for women. 54 
The acute time pressure caused by the sudden collapse of the East German 
regime and the fact that men and masculine values dominated the hasty 
implementation of unification set the stage for a problematic gendered entry into 
post-Cold War social politics. Issues related to women were overshadowed by 
other, seemingly more urgent tasks that needed to be faced. These tasks were, 
indeed, gargantuan. The East German industry had all but collapsed. Its 
infrastructure, particularly the railway and telephone systems, required a fundamental 
reconstruction. The rapid amalgamation of two states made out of entirely different 
political, ideological, economic, legal, administrative and school systems (not to 
speak of behavior patterns, values and expectations) proved to be far more difficult 
than anticipated by the political leadership. The effects on social stability were 
devastating. Among the indicators of rising tension in the eastern part of Germany 
were dramatic increases in the number and intensity of frauds, real estate and 
currency speculation, bank robberies, neo-fascist youth gangs, racist violence, drug 
consumption, suicides and road accidents. 
While the social consequences of this overnight transition from central planning 
to a market oriented economy affected the entire population in the eastern part of 
Germany, women suffered disproportionally. A case in point is the unemployment 
rate, which soared after unification. In March of 1991 ~ 55 percent of all unemployed 
were women. The following year this figure was as high as 68 percent, in some 
areas even 77 percent. Some women were unusually hard hit. Unemployment 
among women over fifty-five, for example, was three times higher than for men of 
the same age.55 Others particularly affected were single mothers and academics. In 
1995, 48 percent of all young mothers were unemployed, compared with 12% 
percent 1991.56 Women were also the main losers of the process that restructured 
East German academia. They were not only the first ones to lose their positions, but 
also the last ones to be taken into account for re-employment. Consider the 
Humboldt University in Berlin. Of fifty-four newly advertised professorships, only 
four were given to women. Before unification, a total of fifteen women occupied 
tenured positions of this rank. 57 Similar trends became visible in politics too. The 
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number of female representatives in the parliament, for example, decreased from 
32.2 percent under the East German regime to 20.5 percent in unified Germany.58 
The increasing exclusion of women from political leadership and the workplace 
is neither an exception nor a coincidental by-product of unification. These examples 
are part of a larger trend that signifies a structural and discursive entrenchment of 
patriarchy. A brief look at shifting legal frameworks illustrates the practical 
dimensions of this phenomenon. Under the East German system women were 
closely integrated into the work force. Just before the revolution of 1989, as much 
as 91 percent of working-age women were either in training or pursued an 
occupation outside the home. This is an unusually high number, especially when 
compared to the figure of 54% in West Germany.59 The right to work for women 
was guaranteed by the East German constitution and the government actively aimed 
at providing the structural conditions necessary for the exercise of this right. A 
whole range of institutional arrangements, including extended pregnancy leave and 
state-subsidized day care centers in virtually every city, provided women with the 
chance to pursue activities beyond the traditional duties of mothers and housewives. 
Wide-ranging reproductive rights existed. A woman had the exclusive authority to 
decide (and the possibility to implement) the determination of a pregnancy during the 
first twelve weeks. 60 Many of these and other rights granted to women disappeared 
with the absorption of East Germany into the constitutional structure of West 
Germany. Reproductive rights were sharply reduced. The new legal arrangements 
in unified Germany stopped short of an outright ban on abortion only because of the 
stern resistance by the oppositional Social Democrats. 61 A large number of day care 
centers were dismantled and the remaining ones often became too expensive for 
average women to afford. 62 
To draw attention to the sharp deterioration of the position of women after 
unification is not to glorify the old East German order. It was not only authoritarian, 
but also politically and economically bankrupt, beyond any hope for repair. Even the 
most vehement feminist critics accept that the East Germany society was strongly 
influenced by traditional patriarchal values. Despite the officially promulgated 
principle of equality between the sexes, conventional gender stereotypes and 
discriminatory practices towards women remained deeply rooted. A gendered 
division of labor prevailed and leadership styles in all domains were strongly 
masculinist in character. The higher one moved up the echelons of the East German 
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hierarchy, the lower was the presence of women. Only very few of them occupied 
influential societal positions. 63 
The clash between two different gendered systems of exclusion, the East and 
West German, mutually reinforced existing biases and led to what many feminists 
believe is a qualitative change in the patriarchal system of domination. 64 Central to 
this shift is the reemergence of a market oriented economy and a strong civil society 
characterized by masculinist principles and clearly set apart from the private realm. 
This division, Peggy Watson stresses, is strongly gendered for it is reinforced by a 
revival of neo-conservative values that place increasing emphasis on the family and 
the household as the backbone of society. The resulting distribution of rights and 
duties in the social order is highly consequential: men occupy the powerful central 
roles in the public sphere while women are relegated back to the private sphere, the 
family. 65 Various subtle and not so subtle means, such as fiscal and educational 
policies or the dismantling of day care facilities, ensure the success of this neo-
conservative patriarchal system of exclusion. 
The separation between private and public spheres and the relegation of women 
to the latter is, of course, a deeply entrenched patriarchal tradition that has been 
analyzed in detail by many feminist critics. Carol Pateman's above mentioned work 
recognizes in this separation the transition from traditional paternal forms of 
patriarchy to a new, specifically modem and fraternal version of the same gendered 
system of exclusion. 66 In this sense, the re-establishment of a masculinist civil 
society in the eastern part of Germany is nothing but one more step in the 
continuation of a long and consistent discursive practice of domination. The fact 
that the historic revolution of 1989 ushered in spectacular processes of social change 
on numerous other fronts cannot compensate for the lost opportunity to address this 
patriarchal form of domination. Whether or not other emerging benefits for women 
will outweigh these setbacks in the long run remains to be seen. At this point a 
gender sensitive reading of the East German revolution reveals, above all, the 
striking power of patriarchal discursive practices to mask and protect their 
corresponding systems of domination. 
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SUMMARY 
Discursively entrenched power relations cannot simply be toppled by mass 
demonstrations or other methods of withdrawing consent. The present chapter has 
focused on patriarchy to illustrate this point and to underline the ensuing need to 
reframe understandings of domination and resistance. 
If a form of resistance, and the image of human agency that it projects, is too 
deeply embedded in the existing discursive order, it is likely to entrench 
corresponding systems of exclusion. The la Boetian theory and practice of popular 
dissent exemplifies this point. Many of its protagonists have contributed to a 
strengthening of a revolutionary model that is based on the image of a male hero 
riding into the sunset of freedom while ignoring and even entrenching the patriarchal 
social order which makes this fight possible. The prevalence of this masculinist 
image of dissent by and large deprived women of subject status. It framed social 
practices such that men alone could exert human agency while women were abjected 
to a mental and material space that Judith Butler describes as the '"unlivable' and 
'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those 
who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the 
'unlivable' is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject.',67 
A re-reading of the East German revolution has illustrated my argument about 
the power of patriarchal discursive practices. Spectacular popular protests against 
the authoritarian regime, coupled with other factors, triggered processes of 
fundamental social change. Yet, a closer look reveals that practices of domination 
did not crumble equally on all fronts. While authoritarian communism has given way 
to more accountable forms of rule, patriarchal systems of exclusion have persisted. 
Indeed, in many areas, such as employment, political representation and reproductive 
rights, women in the eastern part of Germany are worse off today than prior to the 
revolution of 1989. The re-emergence of a strong civil society further entrenched a 
gender specific system of exclusion that identifies men with the public and women 
with the private sphere. 
On a theoretical level, this chapter has underlined the need to approach 
questions of power and human agency from a discursive perspective. The deeply 
entrenched nature of discursive power and the resulting normalization of practices of 
exclusion draw clear limits to what can be achieved through conventional forms of 
dissent. The power of discourse forces our minds into submission even when we 
think we are resisting all forms of external encroachments. 
A recognition that power and discourse are intrinsically linked still leaves us far 
short of reaching a non-esssentialist concept of human agency. A discursive 
approach may well be able to reveal forms of domination, but can it also locate 
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resistance, can it actively account for the occurrence of social change? Is it possible 
to propose a discursive understanding of power without obliterating the subject or 
having to abandon the notion of human agency altogether? If power penetrates all 
aspects of society and is to be seen primarily in a discursive light, can one still carve 
out terrains of dissent? The next chapter responds to these puzzling questions in the 
affirmative by demonstrating that a discursive understanding of power can not only 
explain the persistence of domination, but also account for historical discontinuities. 
Chapter Six 
OF GREAT EVENTS 
AND 
WHAT MAKES THEM GREAT 
Believe me, friend Hellishnoise: the greatest events - they are not 
our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new 
noise, but around the inventors of new values dqes the world revolve; 
it revolves inaudibly. 
Admit it! Whenever your noise and smoke were gone, very little 
had happened. What does it matter if a town became a mummy and 
a statue lies in the mud? And this word I shall add for those who 
overthrow statues: nothing is more foolish than casting salt into the 
sea and statues into the mud. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra 
tr. W. Kaufmann 
More than a century after Nietzsche put these words into Zarathustra's mouth, 
during the summer of 1883 in Sils Maria, overthrowers not far from this Swiss 
mountain village still believe they have changed the world by hurling statues into the 
mud. Of course, the East German revolution of 1989 was spectacular. One of the 
most authoritarian regimes of East-Central Europe crumbled as people took to the 
streets. The scenes of common citizens climbing over and dismantling the Berlin 
Wall could not have been a more sensational, more symbolic termination of the Cold 
War. They provided perfect snap-shot pictures that satisfied the short attention span 
of world wide television audiences. The corresponding sound bite, 'we are the 
people,' still resonates throughout Europe. But were these spectacular acts the 
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decisive factors that caused social change? Was the overthrowing of communist 
statues really the key to it all? 
The present chapter reads the East German revolution from a perspective that 
focuses not on the demolition of morbid political foundations, but on the slow 
transformation of values that preceded the heroic acts of dissent. A shift away from 
great events entails scrutinizing less spectacular daily influences that shape people's 
lives. Theorizing these largely inaudible forces from a discursive perspective is, I 
argue, a way of actively accounting for the occurrence of social change. 
The main theoretical task of this chapter is to facilitate a discursive 
understanding of power that not only explains, as the previous chapter did, the 
continuity of domination, but also accounts for practices of dissent and their 
influence on processes of societal transformation. Such is, of course, an unduly 
ambitious task. For now I merely locate the broad grounds where such 
transformations take place. In doing so I build a stepping stone for the third and last 
part of this thesis, which articulates a non-essentialist notion of human agency by 
exploring alternative, discourse oriented terrains of dissent. 
I employ Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony to scrutinize the slow 
transformation of values that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. A focus on the 
discursive struggle for hegemony explains how processes of social change are 
unleashed when a world-view hostile to the prevalent social order has come to be 
accepted as legitimate and moral by most of the population. Gramsci is well suited 
to supplement the earlier presented Foucaultean approach. Such a combination of 
perspectives can overcome the difficulties of locating power, which may counter 
pessimistic readings of Foucault that run the risk of annihilating the concept of 
human agency. But a fusion of Gramsci and Foucault is not unproblematic. The 
former pays attention to broad hegemonic practices, while the latter, at least in his 
more postmcxiem moments, focuses on aspects of difference and fragmentation. 
The key to understanding complex social dynamics in the late modem world lies 
precisely in working through such paradoxes, in relying upon various forms of 
insights even if they are at times incommensurable. With this sense of fragmentation 
in mind, the present chapter demonstrates how a discursive approach may facilitate a 
broad understanding of processes of social change. Later chapters then embark on a 
more finely attuned analysis that theorizes possibilities for dissent that arise from the 
thin and fragmented nature of discursive dynamics. 
TRANSFORMING VALUES AND NURTURING DISSENT IN 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
I begin by supplementing Foucault's notion of discourse with Gramsci' s attempt to 
theorize the formation of hegemonies. Such a reinforcement is highly useful, I 
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believe, and its logic needs to be articulated briefly before I can scrutinize the 
practical dimensions of social change in East Germany. 
Antonio Gramsci's approach implies that a movement of popular dissent can 
only be victorious and establish a new and stable order if the classes or social groups 
that conduct the revolutionary struggle enjoy widespread popular support and 
dominate the institutions of civil society before attempting to seize state power. 
Without having first won this so called "war of position" and achieved hegemonic 
leadership throughout civil society, a dissident movement is likely to be crushed by 
the repressive state apparatus. In other words, such a movement has a chance of 
exerting agency only when its ideological alternative to the established order has 
infiltrated most societal levels and is considered moral and legitimate by a substantial 
part of the population. 1 
Much of Gramsci's work revolves around the concept of hegemony, the 
prevalence of a dominant world view which extends throughout all aspects of a 
society and encompasses such issues as ideology, morality, culture, language and 
power. The dissemination of this world view occurs through subtle and hidden 
mechanisms which conceal and support the dominance of one social group over 
others. In this sense, hegemony is a cultural practice before it becomes political 
leadership. 
A focus on the formation of hegemonies can facilitate understanding of the 
dynamics behind historical discontinuities and the long processes that lead up to 
them. Hegemony bears a number of similarities with Foucault's notion of a systems 
of exclusion, a subconsciously and discursively diffused set of fundamental 
assumptions which determines, at a particular time and place, what is right and 
wrong, moral and immoral, good and evil, true and untrue. 2 Indeed, Gramsci' s focus 
on hegemony and social struggle can supplement Foucault's discursive 
understanding of power in a way that would provide evidence against a pessimistic 
reading of this approach. Power and discourse would not, as some fear, be 
everywhere and thus nowhere. 3 By theorizing the formation of hegemonies and their 
conditioning of social struggle, a Gramscian addition to Foucault's unmasking of 
power can provide further hints about how relations of domination may be uprooted. 
This entails, however, a shift of foci from domineering aspects of discursive practices 
1 The majority of Gramsci's ideas are contained in notebooks and letters that he wrote between his 
confinement (1928) and death (1937) in prisons of Fascist Italy. See Antonio Gramsci, Prison 
Notebooks, tr. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1985/1971). For 
discussions of his work see Robert Bocock, Hegemony (Sussex: Ellis Horwood, 1986); Jospeh V. 
Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1981) and Anne Showstack Sassoon. 
Gramsci's Politics (London: Hutchinson, 1980). 
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to the subaltern, from whose perspective the concept of hegemony facilitates 
understanding of the conditions under which revolutionary societal segments can 
successfully exert human agency and promote social change. 
While Gramsci permits a positive reading of Foucault, Foucault can add 
important dimensions to Gramsci' s understanding of social dynamics, in particular to 
his attempt at embedding the concept of hegemony in the interaction between civil 
society and the state. The previous chapter has drawn attention to the problematic 
masculinist aspects of civil society, to the way in which a separation from the private 
sphere entrenches a gendered division of labor that confines women to home and 
hearth. A Foucaultean emphasis on discursive practices does not draw a separating 
line between the family and the public sphere, but, instead, stresses that power 
relations penetrate virtually all aspects of life. Such an understanding of power 
recognizes an important feminist concern, namely the need for analytical tools that 
do not reify the masculinist borders drawn between the public and private spheres.4 
With this Foucaultean sense of discourse in mind I now explore the practical 
relevance of Gramsci's crucial distinction between the state and civil society. Due, 
in part, to censorship rules during his imprisonment, Gramsci used a range of 
different terminologies to theorize this distinction. I brush over some of these 
complexities5 and portray the state simply as the sphere of coercion that contains such 
elements as the police, the anny, the secret service and the bureaucracy. These are the 
means of domination and repression at the disposal of the ruling group. Civil society is 
the sphere where contrasting opinions compete for hegemonic status; in short, the 
aspects of a society that escape the direct control of the state's coercive elements. 
Gramsci's own words clarify the functions of this distinction: 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the 
one that can be called 'civil society,' that is the ensemble of organisms commonly 
called 'private,' and that of 'political society' or 'the State.' The two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant 
group exercises throughout society, and on the other hand to that of 'direct 
domination' or rule exercised through the State and the juridical government 6 
Although the sphere of coercion, embodied in the State, plays an important role in 
influencing the pace of social change, it is primarily within civil society that 
hegemony emerges out of conflicting and competing ideas. Thus, when examining 
the stability of a particular social order, a Gramscian analysis not only focuses on a 
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ruling group's means of domination and coercion, but also on the degree of popular 
support that the regime acquires through its domination of the non-coercive sphere. 
The boundaries between the state and civil society are always in flux. 
Depending upon the level of direct government control, such institutions as trade 
unions, the media, religious organizations, schools and universities may either belong 
to the regime's propaganda and repression apparatus or be part of the pluralistic 
struggle for hegemony within civil society. The ways in which the boundaries 
between the state and civil society are drawn is of crucial importance in 
understanding processes of social change. Before a resistance movement against an 
authoritarian regime can merge and organize its activities, at least some aspects of 
civil society must be defended successfully against the encroachment by the state 
apparatus. 
The struggle to carve out a public sphere within an otherwise state dominated 
and suffocating authoritarian system is one of the features that may explain the 
underlying dynamics behind the East Gennan revolution of 1989. The regime tried 
everything possible to annihilate civil society. East German leaders, from Ulbricht to 
Honecker, knew that a certain breathing space from the state is necessary for the 
emergence of regime critical opinions and their organized expression in the form of 
massive popular dissent. Acknowledges Gtinter Schabowski, the former 
spokesperson of the government: "Repression alone cannot hold together a State. 
Even Honecker strove to be popular. "7 This is why the regime not only employed 
methods of direct control, coercion and intimidation to ensure its survival, but also 
attempted to erase the public sphere. School curricula and virtually all domestic 
sources of information (newspapers, journals, radio, television) were under direct 
and harsh control of the state apparatus. The bourgeois public sphere was officially 
declared obsolete, and its role was taken over by what Peter Uwe Hohendahl 
appropriately called a Parteioffentlichkeit, a public sphere of the Party. Form and 
content of the discussions in this public space were carefully circumscribed by the 
Communist Party, whose role was to serve as a mediating (read controlling) agent 
between the state and the mass of citizens.8 
Despite sustained efforts, the East Gennan regime was unable to annihilate civil 
society. The regime's efforts were undermined in part by the carving out of a civil 
society in an otherwise authoritarian system. Gennan social scientists refer to this 
sphere as an Ersatzoffentlichkeit, a replacement for the suppressed public sphere. 
Various spaces provided opportunities for dissent to emerge, spread and prepare 
itself for the battle against the oppressive state. The Protestant church, being the 
only East German mass organization that was not directly subordinated to the state, 
provided such a forum for organized dissident activities. Its newspapers were not as 
harshly censored as the 'normal' media, its photocopying-machines were at the 
7 Gunter Schabowski, Das Politbtiro: Ende eines Mythos (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1990), p. 173. 
8 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, "Recasting the Public Sphere," in October 73, Summer 1995, p. 45. 
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disposal of regime-critical writers, and its ministers and representatives were always 
among the most outspoken critics of the system. When the state attempted to 
undermine this limited autonomy, the church was usually determined to defend itself. 
Not surprisingly, most grassroots protest movements initially emerged out of church 
circles. 
One of the church's most influential activities consisted in providing platforms 
for regular critical discussions and for the expression of popular dissent. For 
instance, ever since 1983, each Monday evening at five a clock, young Christians 
met for a peace prayer in Leipzig's Nikolaikirche. Initially, this gathering was 
intended to draw attention to the absurdity of the nuclear arms race. Then it turned 
into a forum where frustrations about restricted mobility rights were articulated. 
Starting in the spring of 1989, as I noted earlier, the Monday prayers were regularly 
followed by public protests against the regime. The number of participating citizens 
continuously grew and by the autumn of that year the Monday demonstrations in 
Leipzig became a highly symbolic, influential and quasi-institutionalized event of 
mass dissent.9 
The fact that this crucial breathing space from encroachment by the state was 
provided by the Protestant church has nothing to do with its religious or political 
aspirations, but is primarily the result of the unusual degree of autonomy that it 
enjoyed in an otherwise suffocating totalitarian state. The church - and a few other, 
less prominent forums - facilitated the carving out of a quasi civil society, an 
Ersatzoffentlichkeit. Within this arduously defended public space, contrasting 
opinions competed without being directly confined to the dogmatism of the prevalent 
state ideology. 
But the creation of a public sphere, or an ersatz for it, does not by itself prepare 
the ground for successful outburst of popular dissent. To understand the forces 
behind social change, we must also examine the struggle for hegemony within civil 
society. We must observe whether or not a government or, alternatively, an 
opposition movement is able to gain popular support for the particular vision of 
society that it espouses. 
HEGEMONIES, COUNTER-HEGEMONIES, SOCIAL CHANGE 
The East German regime enjoyed various degrees of popular support during its 
existence. But its ability to exert hegemonic leadership decreased year after year. 
Besides being delegitimized by repressive practices and disastrous economic policies, 
9 
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a number of more subtle factors undermined the ruling group's attempt to impose its 
ideology through domination and indoctrination. I now examine briefly how a 
regime hostile world view gradually became hegemonic and how this transformation 
of values prepared the ground for the successful revolution of 1989. 
One of the most noteworthy influences on the transformation of values in East 
Germany was the regime's inability to keep 'subversive' ideological influences from 
reaching its population. East Germany's porous borders to the West assured the 
constant mental presence of an ideology, an economic system and a way of living 
that was fundamentally opposed to the official ideological discourse employed by the 
ruling group to justify its dominance. Ever since Ostpolitik replaced the West 
German Hallstein doctrine, mail exchange between East Germany and the outside 
world was permitted and 'capitalist' newspapers and magazines were relatively easily 
available. With the establishment of the Grundlagenvertrag. the basic treaty between 
the two German states signed in 1972, cross-border visits became a normal feature. 10 
An additional and particularly consequential external influence on the struggle 
for hegemony in East Germany must be ascribed to the constant presence of outside 
audio and visual media sources. Western radio broadcasts had always been available 
throughout East Germany and since the 1970s about 90% of the population was able 
to regularly tune in to West Gennan television. 11 Egon Krenz, Honecker's successor, 
confinned in retrospect that the availability of Western media sources had a strong 
influence on East German citizens. 12 The image that these media programs projected 
rendered the East German population alert to the enormous economic gap that 
separated them from their Western European neighbors. Given the long-term 
deprivation of consumer items, the incentives that an awareness of the West German 
materialistic society provided for East German citizens could only lead to a strong 
and widespread dissatisfaction with the present regime. The widely available 
Western media sources not only deprived East Germany's harsh domestic censorship 
practices of all their purpose, but also imbued them with a counter-productive effect. 
Since Western television devoted regular attention to exposing the underside of 
Communist life in East Germany (corruption, bureaucratic despotism, pollution etc.), 
the official East German propaganda appeared even farther removed from 'reality' 
and thus increased the population's distrust of the ruling group. One cannot better 
express this phenomenon than in the words of Karl Eduard von Schnitzler, the 
protagonist commentator of East Germany's legendary 'counter-propaganda' 
television series Der Schwarze Kanal: 
10 Fer details see Eckehard Jesse, "Die innerdeutschen Beziehungen under der christlich-liberalen 
Regierung," in E. Jesse (ed), Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
(Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1985), esp. pp. 435-436. 
11 
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12 Egon Krenz, Wenn Mauem Fallen (Wien: Paul Neff Verlag, 1990), p. 90. 
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One who thinks that it would not be of any harm to listen to antidemocratic 
television and radio programs or to read Western newspapers, opens his ear to the 
deadly enemy.13 
140 
Even the infiltration of seemingly apolitical ideas and practices influenced the 
struggle for hegemony. Among these rapidly spreading features of West European 
culture, all of them officially denounced by the government as expressions of 
capitalist decadence and ideological weapons of the bourgeoisie, were phenomena 
such as rock, beat, and punk music, Franz Kafka and Marcel Proust novels, or, even 
'worse', literary traditions of an existentialist, avantgardist or poststructuralist 
nature. 14 These postmodern cultural expressions questioned some of the most 
fundamental tenets of the modern East German political discourse, especially the 
(Marxist) historicist belief in linear evolution and confidence in liberation through 
rational, scientific and bureaucratic planning. 
As a result of the infiltration and dissemination of 'subversive' values and the 
regime's inability to counter them, a discourse which was antithetical to the 
prevalent communist ideology became hegemonic, i.e. was accepted as legitimate 
and moral by most people. This new hegemony clearly pointed towards the desire 
and need for some form of social change, and in this sense it was a crucial 
precondition for the successful revolution against the regime. The spectacular force 
of popular dissent unfolded during what could be called a window of opportunity in 
1989. In a few months, a great variety of domestic and external circumstances came 
together and permitted mass protest movements to tear down the old despotic 
structures. Yet, what facilitated processes of social change was not the spectacular 
revolutionary act of 1989, but the slow discursive struggle for hegemony that 
preceded it. Various German scholars have already emphasized this point. Cristiane 
Lemke, for example, believes that the crumbling of the Berlin Wall resulted from the 
continuously increasing gap between the official political culture ( the one determined 
by the state) and the dominant political culture (the one prevailing in the heads of 
people ). 15 Sigrid Meuschel advances similar propositions when examining changing 
levels of legitimacy that the communist regime enjoyed.16 
A few qualifying remarks about a focus on the slow transformation of values is 
necessary before I problematize one more dimension of this approach to social 
13 Karl Eduard von Schnitzler, quoted in Holzweissig, Massenmedien in der DDR, p. 62. 
14 See Susanne Binas and Peter Zocher, "Eigentlich habe ich Hunger, eigentlich hab ich 's satt ... ," in R 
Blanke and R Erd (eds), DDR - Ein Staat vergeht (Frankfurt: Fischer Tagebuch, 1990), pp. 52-60; and 
Gunter Erbe, ''Modeme, A vantgarde und Postmoderne: Zur neueren Rezeption in der 
Literaturwi~schaft der DDR," in M. Gerber (ed), Stuclies in GDR Culture and Society. Vol 6 (Lanham, 
MD.: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 157-172. 
15 
Christiane Lemke, Die Ursachen des Umbruchs 1989: Politische Sozialisation in der ehemaligen DDR 
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16 Sigrid Meuschel, ''Wandel durch Auflehnung: Thesen zum Verfall bi.irokratischer Herrschaft in der 
DDR," in R Deppe, H. Dubiel and U. Rodel (eds), Demokratischer Umbruch in Osteuropa 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 26-47 
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change. Discursive transformations were, of course, not the only factors responsible 
for the spectacular collapse of the Berlin Wall. No monocausal explanation can ever 
do justice to such a complex set of events. I have already pointed out, for example, 
that the Soviet alliance system needed to become morbid enough for domestic forces 
of dissent to express themselves independently of externally imposed geopolitical 
restraints. Neither does my emphasis on the infiltration of 'subversive' ideas into 
East Germany suggest that processes of social change were merely influenced by 
changes in the external environment. Such a position would amount to the very 
structural and discursive determinism that annihilates the possibility of retaining a 
notion of human agency. 
Many East Germans did, at various levels and in various forms, actively 
influence the transformation of societal values. Some authors focus on the role 
intellectuals played in this process. David Bathrick, for example, argues that the 
activities of the literary intelligentsia contributed to the peaceful occurrence of social 
change in East Germany. 17 He demonstrates how several generations of writers and 
public intellectuals, from the early reform oriented novelists and playwrights to the 
more radical Prenzlauer Berg poets of the 1980s, broke taboos, challenged the 
official legitimization discourse and were able to carve out dialogical spaces within a 
suffocating public realm. Others give less credit to the leading literary figures, who 
are often dismissed as mere Staatsdichter, poets whose prime function was, 
allegedly, to represent the official party position. Some analysts thus focus more on 
how everyday forms of resistance gradually undermined the East German system of 
domination. Jeffrey Kopstein, for instance, pays attention to the influence of 
workers' resistance on the stability of the communist regime. 18 
It is not my intention here to theorize such forms of dissent - a task I will tackle 
in detail throughout the third part of this thesis. At this point my objective is merely 
to identify the broad spaces within which these manifestations of human agency take 
place. And these spaces are the ones in which power is created by the slow 
transformation of societal values. 
TIME, SPACE AND SPEED IN A SHRUNKEN WORLD 
One more important issue needs to be addressed before I can start to theorize 
discursive terrains of dissent and their potential for engendering human agency. The 
concept of civil society can only serve as an adequate analytical base for such an 
endeavor if it is not artificially sealed off from other realms. I have already 
mentioned the dangers entailed in reifying the boundaries between public and private 
17 
David Bathrick, The Powers of Speech: The Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 2. 
18 
Jeffrey Kopstein, "Chipping Away at the State: Workers' Resistance and the Demise of East 
Germany," in World Politics, Vol. 48, April 1996, pp. 391-423. 
Of Great Events and What Makes Them Great 142 
spheres. In a similar vein, the concept of civil society must not entrench an artificial 
separation between domestic and international spheres. It is, indeed, precisely 
through an engagement with the transformation of values in the spaces between the 
domestic and the international that human agency may be exerted most successfully 
in the late modern age. 
I end this chapter with a brief theoretical excursus that draws attention to the 
importance of discursive struggles in these expanding in-between-spaces. For this 
purpose I first introduce some of the ideas espoused by two French authors, Paul 
Virilio and Jean Baudrillard. Both have written provocative and often controversial 
texts about various effects of globalization, particularly the rapidly changing nature 
and impact of mass media and means of communication. They show how these 
transformations have rearranged the relationship between time and space, and thus 
fundamentally altered contemporary social dynamics. I embrace some of the 
arguments Virilio and Baudrillard advance, but reject the overall conclusions that 
they draw from them. 
Virilio points out that the contraction of distances has become a strategic reality. 
The corresponding negation of space carries with it incalculable economic and 
political consequences.19 He claims that we are currently witnessing a revolution in 
global relations, comparable to the fundamental impact of changing mass 
transportation in the nineteenth century and means of telecommunication in the 
twentieth. We are undergoing a sea change in social dynamics. This change 
revolves around the use and regulation of speed. Speed is the relationship between 
various phenomena, notably space and time. Space has become annihilated, Virilio 
claims, and time has taken over as the criterion around which global dynamics 
revolve. The instantaneous character of communication and mass media have 
annihilated duration and locality. The "now" of the emission is privileged to the 
detriment of the "here," the space where things take place.20 What matters are no 
longer the three spatial dimensions of height, depth, and width, but above all a fourth 
one, time. Or, rather, what matters is the present, for our notion of "real time" has 
been transformed into a universal fetish, a situation in which local and chronological 
time has given way to world time, to speed, which regulates our political, social and 
economic interactions.21 
Various consequences arise from this. Virilio predicts that the globe will no 
longer primarily be divided spatially into North and South, but temporally into two 
forms of speed, absolute and relative. The "haves" and "have-nots" are then sorted 
out between those who live in the hyperreal shrunken world of instant 
communication, cyberdynamics, and electronic money transactions - and those, more 
disadvantaged than ever, who live in the real space of local villages, cut off from the 
19 Paul Virilio, Vitesse et Politigue (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977), p. 131. 
20 
Paul Virilio, La Vitesse de Liberation (Paris: Galilee, 1995), pp. 21-34. 
21 Ibid., pp. 23, 89. 
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temporal forces that drive politics and economics. 22 Virilio also believes -that the 
prevalence of speed has led to the disappearance of consciousness in the form of 
direct perceptions of our existence. Cinematography and televised images, for 
example, are only technically transmitted optical illusions, and not the 
representations of 'reality' they are often taken to be.23 It is in this domain that 
Baudrillard talces up the argument and pushes it a step further. 
For Baudrillard the present world is hyperreal, a model of something real that 
has no origin in reality. The distinctions between reality and virtuality, political 
practice and simulation are blurred to the extent that they are no longer recognizable. 
Indeed, these distinctions have been effaced altogether, Baudrillard claims, owing 
mostly to the impact of mass media. Our media culture has annihilated reality in 
stages, such that in the end its simulating image "bears no relation to any reality 
whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum. "24 Television, the unproblematic 
transmission of the hyperreal, has conditioned our mind such that we have lost the 
ability to penetrate beneath the manifest levels of surface. It has changed 
fundamentally social dynamics in the late twentieth century, where politics has 
disappeared in a void and is reduced to a useless trace that only operates on the level 
of ~ :ity, somewhere between our mental television screens and public opinion 
polls. · 
It is not my intention to endorse all of Virilio's and Baudrillard's pos1t1ons. 
Many of their arguments are problematic, even though they draw attention to 
important contemporary phenomena. For instance, their analyses deal primarily with 
aspects of Western culture. Although this culture has spread throughout the globe, 
an undifferentiated universal assessment of its dynamics suppresses important local 
differences. It fails to appreciate the fragmentations and contradictions that arise 
precisely as a reaction against processes of homogenization. Problematic as well is 
the claim, especially pronounced in Baudrillard, that current cultural trends have 
robbed us of the ability to appreciate reality. Many authors have criticized this 
position as a form of metaphysical idealism, a naive desire to return to some pre-
mass media authenticity.26 There cannot be unmediated access to reality, authentic 
awareness of our existence. Representations of the 'real,' even before the advent of 
mass media, were inevitably intertwined with social images embedded in language. 
The advent of speed has not fundamentally changed, but only intensified this aspect 
of social dynamics. 
22 Jean-Baptiste Marongiu, "Exces de Vitesse," in Liberation, 21.9.1995, p. xi. 
23 Paul Virilio, Esthetigue de la Disparition (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1989/1980), pp. 56-7, 117. 
24 Jean Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra," in Simulations, tr. P. Foss, P. Patton, P. 
Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 11. 
25 Baudrillard, 'The Ecstasy of Communication ," tr. J. Johnston in Hal Foster (ed), Postmodern 
Culture (London: Pluto Press, 1985); pp. 126-134; "Les ilotes et les elites", in Liberation, 4 Sept 
1995, p. 4. 
26 Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodemism, pp. 33-4; John Docker, Postmodernism and Popular 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 104-108. 
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What does the changing relationship between time and space entail for the 
notion of human agency? The issue is, indeed, a difficult one. Do human actions 
still matter in a world where the exchange of virtual capital through computerized 
networks plunges the global economy, at random so its seems, into up and down 
spirals that sweep across traditional boundaries of identity and sovereignty? And 
even if we suppose that actions matter, can we understand them at a time when 
political and social consciousness gushes out of five-second sound-bites and 
corresponding hyper-real images that flicker over our television screens? 
Virilio and Baudrillard are highly pessimistic about the prospects of 
understanding human agency in the late modern world. One of the main themes in 
Virilio's latest book revolves around the environmental pollution of not only our 
atmosphere and hydrosphere, but also of our planet's time-space relationship. This 
"dromospheric pollution," he claims, eludes all democratic controls and will soon 
precipitate a yet unknown fatal event, "the accident of all accidents, or, in other 
words, the [global] circulation of the generalized accident. "27 Baudrillard' s 
apocalyptic vision looks slightly different. For him, human agency has been 
annihilated because the link between "realities" and "referents" no longer exist. And 
since we have no more reality, theory can no longer dissent against it. 28 The task of 
the theorists is then reduced to revealing the elusive nature of contemporary life. 
While accepting the rapidly changing nature of the late modern world, my own 
approach explicitly retains notions of dissent and human agency. I locate them, as 
mentioned above, in the slow transformation of societal values. Such an argument, I 
believe, can be sustained by acknowledging the phenomena that Virilio and 
Baudrillard analyze while rejecting the overall conclusions they have reached. A 
brief engagement with the following passage from Virilio 's latest book helps to 
outline the contours of such a position: 
1be question no longer is one that opposes the global in relation to the local, or the 
transitional in relation to the national. It is, above all, the question of this sudden 
temporal commutation which blurs not only the inside and the outside, the 
boundaries of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, its 
history. All this occurs to the sole benefit of a real moment (un instant reel) whose 
dynamic ultimately escapes all influence.29 
Yes, the blurring of distinctions between global and local, transnational and 
national, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today. If 
'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation, as 
Virilio and Baudrillard claim, then dynamics of dissent do not primarily, or at least 
27 
Virilio, La Vitesse de Liberation, pp. 90 and 35, 47, 83-4, 98-9. 
28 .. • Or so at least interpret Smart, Postmodernity, pp. 122-3; and Wolfgang Welsch, Asthetisches 
Denken (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993), pp. 208-11. 
29 
Virilio, La Vitesse de Liberation, p. 31. 
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not only, take place in their immediate spatial environment, as for example in the 
streets of East Berlin, Dresden and Leipzig. Dissent operates as least as much in the 
virtuality of speed, the instanteneity of globalized communication. 
This phenomenon, however, does not annihilate possibilities of engaging in acts 
of dissent that interfere with the gradual transformation of societal values over 'real 
time.' Virilio, I suggest, mistakenly claims that the blurring of the inside and the 
outside, the before and the after, has left a void that in turn was filled to the sole 
benefit of a 'real moment' which eludes all outside influences. Speed may well have 
erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalized instantaneousness. Yet, 
hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a 
discursive struggle over 'real time.' Independently of how instantaneous, distorted 
and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus 
lead to a slow transformation of values. To accept speed, then, is not to render 'real 
time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal 
spheres within which values are constantly formed and reformed. 
The prevalence of speed in the late modern age provides increasing opportunities 
to interfere with the processes through which values are slowly transformed. Acts of 
dissent now have the potential to transcends their immediate spatial context and 
enter discursive domains beyond national boundaries. This is to say that the 
boundaries of discursive struggle have widened - and so have, consequently, the 
possible terrains of dissent where human agency can be exerted. But more is needed 
to articulate and sustain such an argument. One must specify, for example, which 
forms of dissent most successfully engage discursive struggles in the late modern 
age, and how ensuing manifestations of human agency can best be understood. 
SUMMARY 
While the previous chapter explained why great revolutionary events do not always 
uproot discursive systems of domination, this chapter suggested that discursive 
dynamics are among the driving forces behind great events. Both of these arguments 
entail that commonly perceived instances of popular dissent, like mass 
demonstrations, are much less influential in triggering social change than their 
spectacular appearance suggests. The events that deserve our analytical attention 
are not the moments when overthrowers hurl statues into the mud. 
Key historical events are more elusive, more inaudible in their appearance. They 
evolve around the slow transformation of societal values. . Foucault: 
Of Great Events and What Makes Them Great 
An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the 
reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a 
vocabulary turned against those who once used it, a feeble domination that poisons 
itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked "other."30 
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In an attempt to comprehend processes through which this 'masked other' 
precipitates social change, I supplemented Foucault's approach to power with 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Another re-reading of the East German case has 
served to illustrate the practical usefulness of such a theoretical fusion. My objective 
was to capture at least some of the inaudible forces that facilitated the revolutionary 
events of 1989. I suggested that the collapse of the Berlin Wall can best be 
understood by focusing on the slow transformation of values that preceded the more 
overt and spectacular acts of rebellion. Expressed in Gramscian terms, a resistance 
movement can only exert agency and establish a new and stable order if the classes 
or social groups that conduct the revolutionary struggle enjoy widespread popular 
support before attempting to seize state power. Without having first won this so-
called 'war of position,' and achieved hegemonic leadership within civil society, 
dissident voices will most likely be silenced by the repressive state apparatus. 
While appreciating the discursive dimension of social change, it is important not 
to separate civil society from spheres that lie beyond it. I emphasized that it is 
precisely in the spaces between the domestic and the international that some of the 
most important discursive dynamics take place. Influential technological and 
communicative innovations have led to an increasing annihilation of space by time, to 
the blurring of conventional boundaries of sovereignty and identity. This 'shrinking' 
of the globe has increased not only the range of discursive struggles, but also the 
potential opportunities of exerting human agency. 
I have now located the broad terrains where discursive struggles take place, that 
is, the terrains in which power is created by the slow transformation of societal 
values. My next task is to comprehend how precisely practices of dissent that 
operate in these terrains can exert human agency and engender processes of social 
change. Can these largely inaudible forms of human agency actually be theorized? 
Or are they simply too complex, too subtle, too elusive to be understood by the 
human mind? 
30 
Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," tr. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon, in The 
Foucault Reader, ed. P. Rabinow (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984/1971), p. 88. 
PART THREE 
DISCURSIVE 
TERRAINS OF DISSENT 
Part two of this thesis reframed conventional understandings of dissent. No less is 
required if we are to retain the possibility of theorizing human agency in the 
turbulent late modem age. Prevalent grand theoretical approaches that focus on 
heroic revolutionary events are unable to deal with subtle, discursively entrenched 
forms of domination. I proposed two parallel shifts to prepare the ground for a more 
attuned understanding of the interaction between domination and resistance. From a 
methodological point of view, I moved away from grand theories of dissent towards 
a discursive understanding of power. In a related topical reorientation, I suggested 
that processes of social change can be assessed more adequately by focusing not on 
great events, but on the slow transformation of values that precedes them. 
The third and final part of this thesis explores discursive terrains of dissent that 
become visible through this reframing of domination and resistance. I locate the 
most promising forms of dissent in seemingly mundane daily acts of resistance that 
slowly transform societal values. Theorizing such discursive dissent, I argue, is our 
best hope for retaining a viable and non-essentialist notion of human agency. It 
requires an approach that relies on various forms and levels of insight but is 
1 nevertheless precise about where discursive dissent occurs and how it can be 
understood. Such precision is particularly warranted because discourse and dissent 
are, at least at first sight, two rather contradictory terms. Discourses are generally 
perceived to be so overarching and deeply entrenched that they annihilate all 
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possibilities for dissent. Not so, I argue. Despite their power, discourses are 
fragmented, unstable, thin at times. An exploration of these weaknesses can 
gradually transform discursive practices such that they lead to processes of social 
change. 
To demonstrate the practical relevance of this assertion I focus on some of the 
most potent and representative everyday forms of resistance, those related to our 
daily practices of speaking and writing. After an engagement with the philosophy of 
language I return to German politics, but this time to the immediate post-War 
period. A close look at the poetry of Paul Celan and its impact on social dynamics 
illustrates the potential for human agency that is contained in discursive dissent 
Chapter Seven 
MAPPING RESISTANCE: 
DISCOURSE, ONTOLOGY, DISSENT 
What Nietzsche calls Entstehungsherd [the place of emergence] .. .is 
not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of the weak, 
but precisely this scene where they are displayed superimposed or 
face-to-face. It is nothing but the space that divides them, the void 
through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches. 
Foucault, "Nietzsche, la Genalogie, l 'Histoire" 
tr. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon 
I have already identified the broad terrain where discursive dissent takes place: the 
slow transformation of societal values. I now proceed to the task of theorizing more 
specifically how discursive dissent functions and how it engenders human agency. 
For this purpose I move away from considering discourses as overarching monolithic 
forces that dominate all aspects of our lives. Without denying their power, indeed, 
by drawing upon it, I pay attention to the fissures in them, theorize their 
fragmentation, their thinness. By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a 
sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible. 
I locate the dynamics through which discursive dissent operates in the 
(Nietzschean) void between the strong and the weak, between dominant and 
marginalized discourses. The power that lingers in this void is best understood by 
shifting foci from epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that one must 
observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence 
its shifting boundaries. Individuals have fragmented and hyphenated identities. By 
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tapping into these multiple dimensions of Being, I argue, individuals can take the 
first step in resisting some aspects of discursive domination. I theorize this 
transformative potential of Being and then illustrate its functioning by drawing 
attention to ensuing everyday forms of resistance. Later chapters will then remove 
more layers of abstraction and demonstrate more specifically the practical relevance 
of such discursive forms of dissent and the possibilities for human agency that they 
open up in the late modern age. 
THE LINGERING POWER OF DISCURSIVE VOIDS 
What does Foucault, in his reading of Nietzsche, discover when he draws attention 
to the void between the energy of the strong and the reaction of the weak? Why is 
this space so important? How can it explain processes through which discursive 
dissent engenders human agency? Foucault identifies this void as the place where 
power relations are usurped. It hosts the entry of forces, their eruption, "the leap 
from the wings to central stage. "1 The discursive void contains, in short, the key to 
understanding historical discontinuities. 
D 
But how are we to understand a void? How are we to appreciate the dynamics 
that evolve within it, the ways in which it plays out the forces that linger on all of its 
multiple points of entry and exit? The first step in this direction entails a departure 
from the deeply entrenched Western practice of viewing the world in dualistic terms. 
Much of modern thought has revolved around the juxtaposition of antagonistic 
bipolar opposites, such as rational/non-rational, good/evil, just/unjust, chaos/order 
or, precisely, strong/weak. One side of the paring is considered to be analytically 
and conceptually separate from the other. The relationship between them generally 
expresses the superiority, dominance or desirability of one entity (such as 
strong/order) over the other (such as weak/chaos). The crucial spaces between 
them, the gray and indefinable voids, remain unexplored. Departing from this long 
tradition would, by contrast, emphasize the complementariness of opposites and the 
overlapping relationships between them. Since one side of the pairing (such as 
order) can only exist by virtue of its opposite (such as chaos), both form an 
inseparable and interdependent unit.2 
Non-dualistic conceptualizing recognizes that social dynamics cannot be 
understood by juxtaposing dominant and marginalized discourses. Discourses 
1 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," tr. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon in P. Rabinow 
(ed), The Foucault Reader (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984/1971), p. 84. 
2 Opposition to dualistic conceptualizing was a main theme in ancient Chinese Philosophy, 
particularly among Taoists, and has become prominent in contemporary Western thought Derrida's 
deconstruction. See Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, tr. D.C. Lau (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); 
Chuang Tzu, Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters, tr. A.C. Graham (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 
1986); and A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. P. Kamuf (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), esp. pp. 259-76. 
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overlap, influence each other, and are in a constant state of flux. And so are their 
multiple relationships with political practice. A dominant discourse usually 
incorporates elements of discursive practices that are squeezed into the margins. 
The influence of these exiled discourses, in tum, may increase to the point of their 
becoming dominant. The dividing lines between discourses always changes and may 
be blurred to the point that one needs to accept, as Foucault does, that multiple 
discursive elements interact at various strategic levels.3 What deserves our attention 
then is the discursive void, the space where these multiple and overlapping 
discourses clash, where silent and sometimes not so silent arguments are exchanged, 
where boundaries are redrawn constantly. 
The second step in appreciating the discursive void requires, I argue, a break 
with some aspects of Foucault's thought. I am still in agreement with his claim that 
the confrontations in the discursive void do not take place among equals, that, 
indeed, the only drama staged there is an endlessly repeated play of domination.4 
Yet, I believe that resistance to these plays of domination is an equally constant 
theme. Foucault, of course, would not necessarily disagree for he argues that 
"wherever there is power, there is resistance. "5 He is simply less optimistic about 
the chances of precisely locating and directing these forms of resistance. He may 
also, at least according to some commentators, deny that these forms of resistance 
actually contain transformative capacities. 6 These are the aspects where I find myself 
disagreeing with Foucault's pessimistic reading of Nietzsche, most notably with the 
argument that because the dynamic in the space between the strong and the weak 
takes place in an interstice, a "non-place" where adversaries do not meet directly, no 
one is responsible for its outcome. 7 Such an interpretation can easily lead to a 
fatalistic interpretation that annihilates alto get her the concept of human agency - an 
interpretation which I suggest is not compelling and does not necessarily arise from 
most of Foucault's remaining arguments. 
If power and domination are so omnipresent, so invincible, how could anything 
every change? If, as Foucault suggest, there is no conversation, no common 
language, not even a visible discursive meeting between the inside and the outside, 
the center and the margin, how could one explain all those challenges from below, 
the moments when people walk through walls, take to the street and shake, 
successfully or not, the foundations of the established order? 
3 Michel Foucault, La Volante de Savoir, Vol. I of Histoire de la Sexualite (Paris: Gallimard, 
1976), p. 133. 
4 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," pp. 84-5. 
5 
Foucault, La Volante de Savoir, p. 125. See also ''The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom," tr. J.D. Gauthier, in J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen, The Final Foucault (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1988), esp. pp. 11-3. 
6 
Nancy Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?", in Linda J. Nicholson (ed), 
Feminism/Postmodemism (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 167. 
7 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 85. 
Mapping Resistance: Discourse, Ontology, Dissent 152 
Hegemonies are not invincible. There are fissures, there are cracks, there are 
weak spots: windows of opportunity that lead to transformative pathways. The 
question is how to locate, theorize and explore them. 
James Scott has taken a decisive step in this direction by deconstructing the 
notion of hegemony. I will follow his logic, at least up to a point, to illustrate the 
dynamic that occurs in the discursive void. Central to Scott's argument about the 
interaction between domination and resistance is the separation he draws between 
what he calls the "public transcript" and the "hidden transcript." The public 
transcript is, at least at first sight, comparable to what one I referred to as hegemony 
in the previous chapter. It is that which is visible in public of the interaction between 
subordinates and those who hold power, in short, the self-portrait of the dominant 
social group. 8 By controlling the public transcript, elites can establish an official 
ideological narrative that depicts how they want subordinates to see them. But this 
is not the whole story, Scott insists. Beside this hegemonic public conduct there is 
"a backstage discourse consisting of what cannot be spoken in the face of power. "9 
The hidden transcript is where these "offstage" opinions are revealed. Elites have 
their hidden transcripts, the gestures and words which, for example, reveal the 
contradictions of the public transcript or shed light on its instrumental and 
exploitative dimensions. But subordinates have hidden transcripts as well. Once 
they escape the eyes of power holders, they too engage in "offstage" gesturing and 
talking that contradict the public transcript. These forms of speech are, of course, 
produced for a different audience and under very. different circumstances than the 
public discourse. Scott illustrates where and how the hidden transcript renders 
possible a critique of power behind the back of domination: . 
Here, offstage, where subordinates may gather outside the intimidating gaze of 
power, a sharply dissonant political culture is possible. Slaves in the relative safety 
of their quarters can speak the words of anger, revenge, self-assertion that they 
must normally choke back when in the presence of the masters and mistresses.10 
The disguised practices of dissent that develop in these anonymous spaces will 
receive attention later in this chapter. At this point is more important to note that 
Scott grants subordinates more cognitive autonomy than most theorists of hegemony 
do. For him, the powerless are well aware of their situation, but accept the status 
quo for strategic reasons. In one of his early studies on exploitation and peasant 
politics in South East Asia, Scott demonstrates, for example, that peasants, confined 
by basic problems of subsistence, often reject outright rebellion and deliberately 
chose risk-averse strategies to minimize the probability of disaster. I I The powerless 
8 
James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), pp. 2, 18. 
9 lb'd .. 1 , p. Xll. 
10 
Ibid, p. 18. See also pp. xii and 1-69. 
11 
James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 
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thus have good reasons for keeping up a public appearance that suggests 
acquiescence with the public transcript. 
Scott's suggestion that subordinates, driven by self-interest, deliberately 
reinforce hegemonic appearances amounts to a major critique of the (neo )Marxist 
concepts of false consciousness and hegemony. Indeed, he engages directly with 
some of Gramsci's ideas. Scott is particularly critical of what he calls the thick 
theory of hegemony. He dismisses as untenable the argument that a dominant 
ideology is so powerful in concealing its logic of oppression that it persuades 
subordinate groups to espouse uncritically the values that explain and justify their 
own subordination.12 Thick hegemony suggests that manufactured consent in the 
form of false consciousness sustains systems of domination and social dynamics in 
general. This position, Scott argues, gravely misjudges the ability of subordinates to 
learn from their daily material experiences, which allows them to penetrate and 
demystify the dominant ideology. He has more sympathies for a thin theory of 
hegemony and false consciousness. From this theoretical perspective, resignation is 
the key factor and consent is achieved without necessarily changing the values of 
subordinates. This is to say that hegemony does not alter people's minds, it only 
delineates the realistic from the unrealistic, the possible from the impossible by 
convincing subordinate groups that certain elements of the given social order are 
simply inevitable. Hence, some of the aspirations that the powerless have are 
relegated to the realm of idle dreams, of wishful thinking. 13 
Scott's analysis implies, much like Foucault's reading of Nietzsche, that it is 
important to focus not only on the actions of the strong or the reactions of the weak, 
but also on the space between them. Scott does not talk directly of a void, but his 
description of social dynamics renders supports for such a concept. For example, he 
considers the boundaries between the public and the hidden transcripts not a solid 
wall, but a "zone of constant struggle between dominant and subordinate." By 
observing the "dialectic of disguise and surveillance" that unfolds in this space, he 
argues, one can understand better cultural patterns of domination and 
subordination.14 
I follow Scott's arguments against hegemony only up to a certain point. I 
believe his theorizing of hidden transcripts constitutes an important step in locating 
contradictions and possibilities for dissent that would be missed by focusing solely 
on hegemony and discursive practices. But I disagree with his entire dismantling of 
the concept of hegemony. Yes, subordinates are much more aware of their situation 
than their often accommodating public behavior suggests, than, indeed, the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony suggests. Yes, discursive domination does not 
12 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 72. 
13 
Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 74, and 70-107; Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Fonns of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 304-50. 
14 
Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, pp. 4, 14. 
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crush everything in sight. The powerless often deliberately reinforce hegemonic 
appearances for reasons of strategy or simple self-preservation. But this is not to say 
that their insight into a situation is authentic, that they enjoy some form of pre- or 
extra-discursive knowledge. Even while strategically maintaining a public posture of 
consent against their better judgment, subordinates do not derive this 'chosen' 
attitude from a position of authenticity. They, like anybody else, live in a community 
whose language, social practices and customs set limits to the thinking process. 
They too are part of a discursive order, one that provides the conceptual tools 
through which 'reality' makes sense. They too are confined by the edges of 
discursive practices, even if these practices are more subtle than an undifferentiated 
concept of hegemony suggests. Hidden transcripts revolve around their own 
hegemonies, discursive orders that may be markedly different from the public 
transcript, but nevertheless play a crucial role in influencing social dynamics that 
unfold in the void between the strong and the weak. Ignoring the restraining and 
enabling elements that are entailed in these crucial discursive factors is to miss out on 
what may well be the most potent forms of dissent, those that operate through a 
transformation of discursive practices. 
Rather than dismantling the concept of discursive power, my approach attempts 
to reinforce it by theorizing how cracks, contradictions and weaknesses in 
hegemonic orders can be exploited such that the transformative potential that is 
contained in them can be employed to exert human agency and promote social 
change. While continuously relying on Foucault's and Scott's opposing arguments, 
my position is situated somewhere between the two. This is to say that I maneuver 
back and forth between an (early) Foucaultean emphasis on discourse, which runs 
the risk of annihilating human agency, and Scott's trust in the ability of subordinates 
to cut through the fog of hegemony, which may border on idealism and hinder an 
adequate understanding of discursive forms of domination and dissent. 
HOW BEING IS ALWAYS ALREADY THAT WHICH IT IS NOT 
A shift of foci from epistemological to ontological concerns is necessary to explore 
the transfonnative potentials that are contained in the discursive void. The main 
focus then no longer lies with how knowledge is always mediated by discourse, but 
how, at the level of Being, the subject may or may not be able to escape the confines 
of this discursive order. 
A discussion on Being is, of course, impossible without an engagement with 
Martin Heidegger. Yet, Heidegger is problematic. His writings are dense, by no 
means easy to digest. They range anywhere from brilliant arguments to appalling 
political remarks. There are the (in)famous fascist overtones of his inaugural address 
as rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933, the subsequent one year of open 
cooperation with the Nazi regime, and his unwillingness to discuss the issue even 
long after the fall of the Third Reich. Yet, few would dispute the status of 
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Heidegger's philosophical writings as one of the most insightful and influential 
contributions of this century. I am in agreement here with such commentators as 
Fred Dallmayr, John Caputo or Leslie Thiele, who vehemently criticize Heidegger's 
political position while drawing heavily on his theoretical writings to advance such 
projects as a critical ontology or a conception of justice and obligation. The main 
premise of these and many other like-minded approaches is that one can separate the 
useful, non-ideological aspects of Heidegger's though from his fascist comments,15 
that one can discover a politics in Heidegger that is at odds with the one he 
personally championed,16 that one can "read Heidegger against Heidegger."17 It is 
not my intention here to engage with the details of this debate, either in its political 
or philosophical dimensions. I follow Heidegger's ontology only as long as it is 
necessary to provide the minimal groundwork for my task of articulating a discursive 
approach to dissent and human agency. 
The question of the meaning of Being, Heidegger argues, is the most universal 
but also the most empty of questions. 18 There is no possibility of reaching a 
definitive answer to it. Indeed, it is not simply that these answers always remain 
elusive, but that the very concept of Being lacks an authentic dimensibn, 
independently of whether or not it is apprehensible through intellectual means. 
Heidegger's later writings make clear what was only implied in Being and Time, 
namely that Being (Sein) must be differentiated from that-which-is (das Seiende), 
things around us which can be correlated to situations within our world (no matter 
how socially constituted these correlations are). Being, by contrast, is "that through 
which things are" and can thus not be "defined or explicated or situated within the 
world."19 Expressed in the language I used above, Being constitutes and is always 
already constituted by and through discourse. Since we can perceive the world only 
through the filtering lenses of discourse, we cannot determine a notion of Being as 
that-which-is, independently of how this 'that' and this 'is' have been imbued with 
arbitrary meaning. Yet, precisely because Being is so elusive, so inexhaustible, so 
empty, it opens up extremely rich ground for thought. But how can I, with my 
limited tasks of theorizing discursive dissent and articulating a viable notion of 
human agency, derive useful insights from this Heideggerean ontological puzzle 
without getting lost in the unbounded vastness of Being? 
15 Fred Dallmayr, Between Freiburg and Frankfurt: Toward a Critical Ontology (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1991) and The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993). 
16 
Leslie Paul Thiele, Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 9. 
17 
John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contribution to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference 
to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 227. 
18 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. D.F. Krell in Basic Writings (New York: HarperCollins, 
1993/1927), pp. 42-44, 86. 
19 
L.M. Vail, Heidegger and Ontological Difference (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1972), p. 3. 
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Heidegger's concept of Dasein constitutes a good starting point. Dasein is 
derived literally from a combination of the German words ''Das-sein," the that-it-is 
of a being, its existence, as opposed to its essence, the what-it-is (Was-sein) of a 
thing or person. 20 Dasein thus is the specific and concrete existence of a being as 
incorporated into a cultural setting and constituted through interactions with people 
and things in this world. It has always a temporal character, it expresses the 
relationship between Being and time. Heidegger argues that Dasein derives its 
meaning in temporality, that it is only through time that Dasein can understand 
Being, that, indeed, "the meaning of Being of that being we call Dasein proves to be 
temporality."21 David Krell captures this rather complex connection between Being 
and time in a few succinct lines: 
Dasein involves itself in all kinds of projects and plans for the future. In a sense it 
is always ahead of itself. At the same time it must come to terms with certain 
matters over which it has no control, elements that loom behind it, as it were, 
appurtenances of the past out of which Dasein is projected or "thrown." Dasein has 
a history. More, it is its own past. 22 
It is already clear from this short summary that in theorizing the links between Being 
and time Heidegger departs fundamentally from conventional notions of time and 
temporality. He no longer considers time as distinguishing the different regions of 
Being (such as past, present, future) and opposing that with "atemporal" things like 
spatial or numerical relationships.23 Temporality, for Heidegger, does not just mean 
being in time. For him Being itself can only become visible in its temporal character, 
which entails that atemporal and supratemporal phenomenon are also temporal with 
respect to their Being.24 
Understanding Being through its temporality thus means that the past is not an 
epoque gone, but an integral part of the present of Being. In this sense, Dasein is 
always historical. Expressed in discursive language, one cannot separate who one is 
from how one grew up, from the education, the custom, the language and a whole 
set of other experiences and impressions that shaped our Being over time. Dasein is 
always circumscribed by the presence of these past discursive elements. Moreover, 
Dasein not only regulates what it transmits from the past, but also conceals this very 
process of regulation. This, in turn, means that all actions of subjects and, indeed, 
the very notion of human agency, are always delineated by the boundaries of this 
temporal dimension of Being. 
20 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 48 (footnote by the editor of the English language edition). 
21 Ibid., p. 60. 
22 
David Farrell Krell, ''The Question of Being," general introduction to Heidegger, Basic Writings, 
p. 22. 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 61. 
24 Ibid., pp. 61-2. 
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But the inevitable presence of its past is only one aspect of the temporal 
dimension of Being. Discourses do not overwhelm the subject entirely. Dasein also 
contains the future and all its various possibilities. In view of Heidegger's 
unconventional notion of time, this potential is not something that may or may not 
materialize. It is already contained in the very temporality of Being. Dasein, then, is 
always already that which it is not. It is not a stable and permanent aspect of Being, 
it is in constant transformation, it is always in the process of becoming something 
else than what it is. It is a process that is linked to such aspects as dialogue, 
consciousness and self-reflection: 
Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is 
ontically distinguished by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its 
very Being. Thus it is constitutive of the Being of Dasein to have, in its very Being, 
a relation of Being to this Being. And this in tum means that Dasein understands 
itself in its Being in some way and with some explicitn~s. It is proper to this being 
that it be disclosed to itself with and throT its Being. Understanding of Being is 
itself a determination of Being of Dasein. 
The point, then, is not only that Dasein's awareness of Being influences the 
constitution of its own nature, as I pointed out in the introductory chapter, but also 
that Being already embodies the transformative potential of Dasein to be something 
else than what it is. Dasein, Heidegger points out, always understands itself "in 
terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be . itself. "26 It is up to the task of 
thinking to explore the range of these options that are contained in the double-edged 
character of Being. Self-reflection has the potential, at least up to a certain point, to 
cut through the fog of conventional temporality and thus · undermine the forms of 
concealment by which Being resists the possibility of being something else than what 
it is. 
My own, more limited task, entails searching for ways through which this 
tranformative potential of Dasein' s relation to Being permit us to conceptualize 
discursive dissent and thus salvage a notion of human agency. For this purpose it is 
necessary to transport Heidegger's theorizing from the level of abstraction to the 
level of practice, to the politics of dailiness. Heidegger's failure to draw such a link 
has frustrated many of his most prominent interpreters. Thus, authors who rely 
heavily upon Heidegger, such as Derrida, Levinas or Lyotard, chose not to travel the 
abstract road of Being, but instead theorize concrete instances of obligation and 
responsibility that arise out of specific situations.27 
How are we to bring the theoretical discussion of dissent and human agency to 
the level of practice without loosing the benefit of Heidegger's more abstract insights 
25 
Ibid., pp. 53-4. 
26 Ibid., p. 54. 
27 
John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 
210. 
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into the question of Being? I believe that recent post-positivist feminist literature 
leads us in the right direction. Hardly any feminist reaches so blindly into abstraction 
that s/he looses sight of the more immanent political task of addressing the concrete 
circumstances within which women's lives are confined. Those who venture into 
metatheoretical spaces, and many do so successfully, often feel the need, unlike 
Heidegger, to justify their approach and draw attention to its direct political and 
ethical relevance.28 Before theorizing the differences between Heidegger and 
feminist authors, first a few remarks on important similarities. They are not 
explicitly laid out. While one finds abundant references to psychoanalytical 
perspectives on the subject, especially via Freud, Jung, Lacan, and Zizek, 
Heidegger's name is astonishingly absent from feminist debates. Only a few isolated 
authors, such as Luce Irigaray and Gayatri Spivak, theorize Being through more than 
just fleeting and symbolic footnotes to Heidegger. Yet, while his name is largely 
effaced, many of Heidegger's ideas are omnipresent in feminist literature. This is the 
case not only of his ontology, but also of his work on such topics as 
identity/difference, language, otherness, concealment, or Destruktion (handed down, 
via post-structuralism, as deconstruction). The presence of these insights, however, 
is (ironically) concealed and mediated via Heidegger's more 'sanitized' and 'de-
Germanized' contemporary French interpreters, such as Derrida, Foucault, Levinas 
or Deleuze. 
But where precisely linger these Heideggerean residues in feminist theory? 
Where is his emptiest of all concepts, this Being that is not authentic and cannot even 
be grasped? The refusal to freeze and objectivize ·the subject, to transport the 
positivist discourse of science into the ontological realm is also a key rallying point in 
postmodern feminism. I have already drawn attention to Judith Butler's view that 
the subject is nothing but a Foucaultean regulatory practice, a normative rule that 
governs and upholds culturally constructed gender identities. 29 She thus rejects the 
notion of an authentic female identity, an essence that crystallizes when one digs 
deep enough. Instead, she analyzes the process by which subjects are constituted as 
essences, to then explore the possibilities that emerge from their multiplicities. 
Others argue along the same lines. Trinh Minh-ha believes that there is no 
permanent essence of wo/man, that, indeed, "women can never be defined. "3° Kathy 
Ferguson eschews the search for an "essential reality to which our representations 
correspond."31 These assumptions about Being's elusiveness are probably best 
captured in Donna Haraway' s metaphor of women as cyborgs. A cyborg is a hybrid 
of machine and organism, something that lies between social reality and fiction. In 
today's mythic and high-technological age, she argues, we all live as chimeras, we 
28 
For example, Kathy Ferguson, The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. ix-xi. 
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are all cyborgs, a "condensed image of both imagination and material reality." The 
cyborg, then, is "our ontology; it gives us our politics. "32 Opposing positions of 
biological determinism, Haraway talces another implied Heideggerean leap: 
There is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds women. There is not 
even such a state as 'being' female, itself a highly complex category constructed in 
contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, or 
class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historical 
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and 
capitalism. 33 
Being, in this interpretation, is not only evasive and constructed, but, much like 
Heidegger argues, it actually is not. It happens. Being is a constant process of 
renewal. Moving along the same slippery lines, Butler considers gender not as a 
noun or a static cultural marker but, rather, as an activity, an incessant action of 
some sort, something that one becomes but can never be. 34 
While working within these and other Heideggerean concepts, most feminist 
authors are reluctant to elevate the question of Being to a purely abstract level. 
Those who deal directly with Heidegger deplore that his concept of ontological 
difference does not include sexual difference, that he fails to pose the "sexual 
question." Braidotti, for example, reads Heidegger via Derrida's interpretation and 
criticizes both of them for placing the emergence of the subject beyond sexual 
difference. Such a conceptual notion of Being above and beyond sexuality, she 
argues, makes the mistake of reducing sexual difference to a derived given that is not 
constitutive of the subject.35 Spivak, while taking a similar overall stance, sees the 
issue in more complex terms. By examining Derrida's reading of Heidegger's 
interpretation of the concept-metaphor 'women' in Nietzsche, Spivak points out that 
Derrida places the question of sexual difference at a pre-ontological level. Hence, 
Derrida too is perceived as joining the anti-abstraction choir by viewing Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche as "being idling off shore ever since it missed the women in the 
aff abulation of truth. "36 
Those feminists who grapple with the question of Being without dealing with 
Heideggerean dilemmas of abstraction focus (ironically, again) on Heideggerean 
themes of identity and difference. 37 Yet, the main focus of these authors lies not so 
32 
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much, or at least not only, with differences between men and women, not even with 
dilferences among women. Strategies of resistance are carved out by exploring 
dilferences within women. The terms fractured or hyphenated identities are most 
commonly used to convey the theoretical starting point for this unusual and 
innovative approach to difference. Being, here too, is a very complex issue. 
Braidotti speaks for many feminists when she argues that the synthesizing power of 
the term "I" is nothing but a grammatical necessity, a theoretical fiction that holds 
together the collection of differing layers, the integrated fragments of the very-
receding horizon of my identity. "38 Women (and men) have multiple, fractured, and 
ambivalent subjectivities that move back and forth between such terrains of identity 
as class, race, gender, nationality, language and sexual preference. Women's 
identity, then, is not reducible to an essence, but situated fluidly among such lines as, 
for instance, Afro-American-socialist-English-speaking-recently-divorced-factory-
worker-women or Hispanic-lesbian-college-educated-abroad-in-Northern-Europe-
residing-women. The combinations, of course, are endless. 
What is the potential for resistance contained in these hyphenated identities? 
How can they lead to expressions of human agency? Some of the above feminist 
authors claim convincingly that a strategic use of hyphenated identities opens up 
chances for undermining the regulatory norms established by these very identities. 
They permit the subject to escape the suffocating impact of hegemonies, seek out its 
cracks and weaknesses, and explore the enabling potential that lingers in what I 
called the discursive void. 
Ferguson employs the term "mobile subjectivities" to capture the possibilities 
that arise from moving back and forth among a whole range of hyphenated identities 
and its corresponding mental resting places. This process not only entails traveling 
across and along axes of power, domination and resistance, but also destabilizes the 
regulatory norms that have been constructed through the delineation of these 
identities.39 By being aware of the arbitrariness and excluding tendencies embedded 
in identity constructions, such as class, race or gender, subjects become empowered 
and can take part in daily processes that slowly but constantly redraw the political 
boundaries of identities. Haraway makes a similar point through a slightly different 
terminology that relies upon her cyborg metaphor. She talks of "situated 
knowledges," of how moving back and forth between various subjectivities can open 
up multiple visions. The point is, Haraway emphasizes, not to ground one's 
knowledge in stable standpoints, but to explore visions of change that unfold 
through multidimensional, shifting and always eluding hyphens of identity.40 
38 Rosi Braidotti, "The Politics of Ontological Difference," in Brennan, Between Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, p. 93. See also Ferguson, The Man Question, pp. 153-183; Haraway, Simians. 
Cyborgs, and Women, pp. 155-161; Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 163-196; and Trinh, Woman, Native, Other, pp. 95-6. 
39 Ferguson, The Man Question, pp. 158-63. 
40 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs. and Women, pp. 183-201. 
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The potential for change embedded in these visions of Being are as potent as the 
ones advocated by Heidegger. But their potential does not lie primarily in the 
temporal aspects of Being, future possibilities that are already contained in the 
existential self-aware of Dasein. It is captured by drawing attention to the multiple 
dimensions of Being that exist simultaneously. Potential for human agency is then 
contained in the subversive transgression of boundaries, a process that is facilitated 
by an awareness of the flexibility contained in hyphenated identities. However, these 
two seemingly disparate visions of Being also display important parallels. 
Either in temporal or simultaneous dimensions, Being is always already that 
which it is not. In both visions, discursive domination is a crucial force to be 
reckoned with. But it is not the end of the story. There are ways of eluding 
discourse. There are glimmers of hope. There are fractured visions of human 
agency. 
NETWORKS OF ANTI-DISCIPLINE / EVERYDAY FORMS OF 
RESISTANCE 
To get closer to my objective of theorizing the practical dimensions of discursive 
dissent it is necessary to remove one more layer of abstraction. For this purpose I 
am shifting foci again, this time from ontological to tactical issues, from mobile 
subjectivities to the tactics through which they turn into vehicles of dissent. I must 
now enter the level of everydayness, the sphere of Alltaglichkeit that Heidegger 
theorized only in abstract terms. With this step I return, full circle so to speak, to the 
Nietzschean argument I presented in the previous chapter, namely that our attention 
should be focused less on great historical events, and more on the seemingly 
insignificant slow transformation of values that precede them. 
There are many ways of searching for practices of dissent and aspects of human 
agency hidden in the dailiness of life. I consider Michel de Certeau' s approach one 
of the most productive conceptual entry points to explore everyday forms of 
resistance. De Certeau 's objective is to refute the widespread assumption that 
common people are passive onlookers, guided by the disciplinary force of established 
rules. He attempts to demonstrate that seemingly mundane daily practices are not 
simply background activities, not even mere forms of resistance, but, indeed, an 
integral part of socio-cultural production. 
De Certeau clearly detects human agency in everyday life. For him, normal 
people are not simply faceless consumers, they are "[u]nrecognized producers, poets 
of their own affairs, trailblazers in the jungles of functionalist rationality. ,,4i De 
41 
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Certeau 's theoretical stance demonstrates why. Influenced by Wittgenstein and 
Bourdieu, he makes uses of Foucault's research by turning it upside down, 
somewhat similar to what Marx did to Hegel. De Certeau strongly opposes 
Foucault's notion of a panoptical discourse, one that sees and controls everything. 
He considers unwise spending one's entire energy analyzing the multitude of 
minuscule techniques that discipline the subject and paralyze her/him in a web of 
micro-level power relations. Such an approach, de Certeau argues, unduly privileges 
the productive apparatus. Instead, he proposes an anti-Foucaultean path to 
understanding domination and resistance: 
If it is true that the grid of "discipline" is everywhere becoming clearer and more 
extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society resists being 
reduced to it, what popular procedures (also "minuscule" and quotidian) manipulate 
the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them, and 
finally, what "ways of operating" form the counterpart, on the consumer's (or 
"dominee's''?) side, of the mute processes that organize the establishment of 
socioeconomic order. 42 
These 'ways of operating,' de Certeau argues, are the practices by which people 
can re-appropriate the space controlled through the existing discursive order. It is 
not my intention here to provide an exhaustive account of everyday forms of 
resistance that take place in these "networks of anti-discipline," as de Certeau calls 
them.43 Such a task would be doomed from the ~tart, for the range of daily acts of 
dissent is unlimited. I simply illustrate the persuasive aspects of de Certeau' s 
argument via a few examples, leaving it to chapters eight and nine to analyze in detail 
more specific everyday forms of resistance, those related to speaking and writing. 
De Certeau focuses primarily on the uses of space in Western consumer 
societies, on how everyday practices like walking, shopping, dwelling or cooking 
become arts of manipulation that intervene with the prevalent discursive order. 
Other authors locate daily practices of subversion in different spheres of life. James 
Scott has dealt in detail with everyday forms of peasant resistance. For him too, the 
big events are not peasant rebellions or revolutions. They occur rarely anyway. 
What deserves our attention, he argues, is the constant everyday struggle between 
the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, taxes, rents and the like from 
them. 44 Through extensive, detailed and highly compelling research Scott 
demonstrates the prevalence of low-profile forms of resistance. These are the 
critiques spoken behind the back of power, the utterances that make up the earlier 
mentioned hidden transcript. Although such critique is never spoken openly, it 
nevertheless is in the open. Indeed, this form of critique is almost omnipresent in 
folk culture, disguised in such practices as rumors, gossip, jokes, tales or songs. 
They are the vehicles of the powerless by which they "insinuate a critique of power 
42 
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while hiding behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings of their 
conduct.',45 We find a perfect example of such a practice in Margaret Atwood's 
fictional, but all too real authoritarian word: 
1bere is something powerful in the whispering of obscenities about those in power. 
1bere's something delightful about it, something naughty, secretive, forbidden, 
thrilling. It's like a spell, of sorts. It deflates them, reduces them to the common 
denominator where they can be dealt with. In the paint of the washroom cubicle 
someone unknoMl had scratched: Aunt Lydia sucks. It was like a flag waved from 
a hilltop in rebellion.46 
The context of Atwood's narrative does not matter for the purpose of my theoretical 
reflections. The scene of an obscenity anonymously scribbled into a bathroom wall is 
enough to evoke the subversive aspects of this act. Anonymity provided the security 
necessary to scream out what cannot even be whispered in the face of the 
oppressors. There is a clear target, but no visible author, no agitator that could be 
prosecuted. The audience is potentially limitless. Scott insists that such a politics of 
hidden dissent, of disguise and anonymity, is neither empty posturing nor a substitute 
for real resistance. It is resistance of the most effective kind, for these subversive 
gestures eventually insinuate themselves, in disguised form, into the public discourse. 
They lead to a slow transformation of values, they nurture and give meaning to 
subsequent, more overt forms of resistance or rebellion. They may bring upon an 
explosive political situation during which the cordon sanitare between the hidden and 
public transcripts is torn apart.47 
Everyday forms of resistance are, of course, not new. Indeed, one of the most 
famous illustrations of such dissent dates back to sixteenth century France, to the 
Renaissance author Fran~ois Rabelais. His very personality illustrates how he 
escaped aspects of discursive orders by navigating back and forth between various 
hyphenated identities: Franciscan monk, humanist, doctor of medicine and, in the 
function that interests us here, writer of grotesque and satirical stories. His five 
books on the adventures of Gargantua and his son Pantagruel are episodes of 
carnival, laughter, mockery and fantastical imagination. They include, for example, a 
chapter on how his father realized "Gargantua's marvelous intelligence by his 
invention of an Arse-wipe" or how Pantagruel visited the regions of the moon, how 
he fought against the devils, set five chambers of hell on fire, sacked the great black 
hall, threw Proserpine into the flames, and broke four of Lucifer's teeth, also one 
horn on his rump ... together with a thousand other little jests, all of them true.48 
45 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. xiii, 19, 136-182. 
46 Margaret Atwood, The Handmajd's Tale (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), p. 234. 
47 Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance, pp. 19-20, 183-227. 
48 
Frany0is Rabelrus, The ffistories of Gargantua and Pantagruel, tr. J.M. Cohen (Pengujn Books, 
1%6), p. 277, 66-69. 
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In his influential analysis of Rabelais' writings, Mikhail Bakhtin draws attention to 
the revolutionary potential hidden in these seemingly merely humorous stories. 
Indeed, Rabelais demonstrates that contrary to the position of la Boetie, his 
contemporary and fellow humanist, resistance does not need to be confined to heroic 
acts of mass dissent. 
The popular culture of laugher was deeply subversive, for it opposed, even 
ridiculed, the seriousness and hypocrisy of the official feudal culture. It mocked the 
clergy and rigid Christian rituals. In this sense, Bakhtin stresses, laughter was 
freedom because it "celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and 
from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, 
privileges, norms, and prohibitions. ,,49 This suspension and, in a more general sense, 
the language of the market place and of carnival, created possibilities for uninhibited 
speech. It carved out a space where, in late twentieth century talk, those 
unpronounceable public-toilet-wall-scribblings could be screamed out into the 
streets. 
Laughter opened up, at least for a short moment, a glimpse at utopian freedom, 
a life beyond the heavy Christian mythology of death and eternal punishment in the 
form of Hell after death. Laughter, Bakhtin argues, purifies from dogmatism and 
pedantry, from fear and intimidation. It shatters the belief that life has a single 
meaning.50 In this sense, laughter, in both practice and writing, creates mobile 
subjectivities and situated knowledges. Carnival becomes a revolutionary act, one 
that slowly transforms values and norms, one that enters political spheres. Rabelais 
satire, blessed with immediate popular success and equally swift condemnation from 
the leading clergy, rendered support for an emerging Humanist movement and 
contributed to the eventual death of God, the gradual decay of an unchallenged 
theocentric weltanschauung. 
Despite engendering powerful and hidden mechanisms of change, everyday 
forms of resistance are not unproblematic. Like more open forms of dissent, they 
are certainly not immune from entrenching discursive forms of domination. Here 
too, the work of Rabelais is illustrative. For all his subversive carnevalesque 
writings, his views on women undoubtedly supported existing patriarchal practices. 
Consider the following famous passage in book one, when Rabelais describes 
Gargantua's arrival in Paris and his annoyed reaction to the curious crowd that 
surrounded him. The passage epitomizes both the subversive aspects of Rabelais' 
grotesque satire and his refusal to grant women even the status of subjecthood: 
49 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, tr. H. Iswolsky (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968), p. 10. 
50 Ibid, p. 123. 
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Then, with a smile, he [Gargantua] undid his magnificent codpiece and, bringing 
out his john-thomas, pissed on them so fiercely that he drowned two hundred and 
sixty thousand, four hundred and eighteen persons, not counting women and small 
children. 51 
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Bakhtin misses entirely the discursive consequences that arise from Rabelais' 
treatment of women as faceless objects. Instead, he analyzes enthusiastically the 
various metaphorical aspects of scenes like the tossing of excrement, drenching in 
urine or, in general, Rabelais' repeated focus on "images of the material bodily lower 
stratum." Bakhtin draws links to circles of birth, life, and death, fertility and 
renewal, but never even touches upon the issue of gender relations and related 
systems of exclusion. 52 He never asks who laughs about whom in Rabelais' world. 
He never notices that only men laugh about masculine themes, like the drenching in 
urine. Women, by contrast, often refuse to ridicule themselves and "view the 
laughter of others as an instrument of control over them. "53 This neglect has not, of 
course, prevented feminists and others from drawing upon many of Bakhtin' s key 
insights. Indeed, some consider his later work on dialogism, the ability to reach 
towards the Other through the potential of dialogue, as "central to feminist practice 
because it invites new possibilities for activism and change."54 
The list of everyday forms of resistance could go on endlessly. One could find 
them in all epoques, places and aspects of life. They are, for example, hidden in the 
seemingly homogenizing and suffocating forces of popular culture, such as 
television, where some detect, much like Rabelais did half a millennium before, 
carnevalesque challenges to the narrow and single representation of reason in the 
pubic sphere. 55 On a more organized level, one can find everyday forms of 
resistance in the numerous and continuously spreading new social movements, 
pressure groups and other loose organizations that do not challenge the prevailing 
political system as such, but contribute to a slow and constant transformation of 
values by focusing on the need to rethink specific issue areas. They are in some 
51 Rabelais, The Histories of Gargantua and Pantagruel, p. 74. 
52 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, pp. 147-152, 368-436. 
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Marriage Bed," in Speculum: A Journal in Medieval Studies, Vol. 68, No 2, April 1993, p. 361. 
See also, for example, Deborah Jacobs, "Critical Imperialism and Renaissance Drama: The Case of 
The Roaring Girl," in D.M. Bauer and S.J. McKinstry (eds), Feminism. Bakhtin. and the Dialogic 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 73-84; and Mary Russo "Female 
Grotesques: Carnival and Theory," in T. de Laurentis (ed), Feminist Studies / Critical Studies 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 213-229. 
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sense the quintessential aspect of postmodern politics, of local resistance to 
metanarrative impositions.56 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has mapped out the theoretical terrain in which discursive dissent talces 
place. I began by deconstructing the concept of hegemony. Discourses are not 
invincible monolithic forces that subsume everything in reach. Despite their power 
to frame social practices, a discursively entrenched hegemonic order can be 
fragmented and thin at times. To excavate the possibilities for dissent that linger in 
these cracks, I suggested a shift of foci from epistemological to ontological issues. 
Scrutinizing the level of Being reveals how individuals can escape aspects of 
hegemony. Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, always contains the potential 
to become something else than what it is. By shifting back and forth between 
hyphenated identities, an individual can travel across various discursive fields of 
power and gain the critical insight necessary to engage in subversive behaviors. 
Practices of dissent that issue from such mobile subjectivities operate most 
effectively at the level of dailiness. Through a range of seemingly mundane acts of 
resistance, people can gradually transform societal values and thus promote powerful 
processes of social change. I have drawn attention to a few everyday forms of 
resistance. But their type and form, as well as the terrains in which they operate, are 
unlimited. Instead of getting entangled in these boundless fields of inquiry, I will 
examine in detail a specific everyday form of resistance. But before embarking on 
this task it is necessary to pause briefly, recapitulate my discursive understanding of 
dissent, and assess to what extent the insights gained from such a position can 
facilitate the articulation of a viable and non-essentialist concept of human agency. 
56 
Or so at least claims Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodemism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 10-12. 
Second Interlude 
TOWARDS 
A DISCURSIVE NOTION OF HUMAN AGENCY 
The kind of critique we need is one that can free it of its illusory 
pretension to define the totality of our lives as agents, without 
attempting the futile and ultimately self-destructing task of rejecting 
it altogether. 
Charles Taylor, Language and Human Agency 
The task of finding and articulating such a critical position on human agency towered 
over the entrance to this thesis and has never ceased to be its main puzzle, a 
cyclically reoccurring dilemma, the issue with which each chapter had to struggle. 
Where is this fine line between essentialism and relativism, between suffocating in the 
narrow grip of totalizing knowledge claims and blindly roaming in a nihilistic world 
of absences? How to walk along this narrow path without taldng a fatal step, either 
to the left or to the right, into a bottomless epistemological pit? How to deal with 
the death of God, to make a clear break with positivist and grand theoretical 
approaches, without either abandoning the concept of human agency or falling back 
into a new form of essentialism? 
I have now arrived at the point of my research where I can pause for a moment 
and provide some answers to these difficult questions. The lessons I have so far 
learnt from rethinking domination and resistance suggest, I argue, that it is possible 
to articulate a positive and non-essentialist concept of human agency. Such a 
concept cannot be based on a parsimonious proposition, a one-sentence statement 
that captures something like an authentic nature of human agency. There is no 
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essence to human agency, no core that can be brought down to a lowest common 
denominator, that will crystallize one day in a long sought after magic formula. The 
point is, rather, to recognize the complexities that are involved in a formulation of 
human agency and to work through them, rather than against them. 
Accepting the elusive nature of human agency, I ground its articulation in a 
specification of what Michel de Certeau called "operational schemes. "1 As opposed 
to a systematic theory, an understanding of operational scheme recognizes that 
human agency should be assessed in its fluidity and its constituted dimensions. 
Rather than trying to determine what human agency is, such an approach maps the 
contours within which human agency is carried out. These contours, I suggest, are 
best understood through three crucial and closely interconnected terms: discourse, 
tactic, temporality. I explain their importance by recapitulating some of my research 
results and arguments. Equipped with the ensuing conceptual map, I then embark on 
the last two chapters, whose main task is to illustrate the practical relevance of my 
arguments by analyzing manifestations of human agency in a specific form of 
discursive dissent. 
DISCOURSE, TACTIC, TEMPORALITY 
Discourse is the first and most important concept with which I approach the task of 
articulating a non-essentialist notion of human agency. I have argued that a shift 
from grand theories of dissent towards a discursive understanding of power is 
necessary to reach a more adequate understanding of domination and resistance. A 
discursive approach is not only able to deal better with deeply entrenched systems of 
exclusion, but also minimizes the danger of reification, of imposing one's own 
subjective vision upon a series of far more complex social events. Instead of 
focusing on ahistorical theories of power, a discursive approach investigates ways in 
which social dynamics have been imbued with meaning and how, in turn, this process 
of rendering rational and meaningful circumscribes the boundaries within witch the 
interaction between domination and resistance talces place. 
While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination, a discursive 
approach may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the 
capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by impenetrable discursive 
forces. The result of such a position is as totalitarian as is an uncritical belief in 
grand theoretical models of dissent. Yet, a discursive approach does not necessarily 
have to end up in a pessimistic cul de sac. Discourses are not as overarching as 
some analysts suggest. They contain fissures and cracks, wealc point which open up 
chances to turn discursive dynamics against themselves. The previous chapter has 
outlined this position in detail. A brief rehearsal - even at the risk of appearing 
1 Michel de Certeau, Arts de Faire, Vol. I of L'Invention du Ouotidien (Paris: Gallimard, 
1990/1980), p. 51. 
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slightly repetitive - is necessary here to draw a link between this position and a non-
essentialist conceptualization of human agency: 
Cracks and weaknesses in discourses can be seen best by shifting foci from 
epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that in addition to analyzing 
how discourses mold and control our thinking process, we must scrutinize how 
individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the 
prevalent discursive order. Being is always a product of discourse. But Being also 
is becoming. It contains future potential, it is always already that which it is not. 
Being has multiple dimensions. 
Hyphenated identities permit a person to shift viewpoints constantly, to move 
back and forth between various ways of constituting oneself. Resulting methods of 
mental deplacement, of situating know ledge, open up possibilities for thinking 
beyond the narrow confines of the established discursive order. This thinking space 
provides the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of identity which control the 
parameters of actions available to an individual. Exploring this thinking space 
already is action, Heidegger claims, for "thinking acts insofar as it thinks." Such 
action, he continues, is "the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it 
concerns the relation of Being to man."2 But how is one to understand processes 
through which critical thinking breaks through the fog of discourse and gives rise to 
specific and identifiable expressions of human agency? 
The concept of tactic offers the opportunity to take a decisive step towards 
exploring the practical dimensions Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, 
without losing the abstract insight provided by Heidegger. The sphere of dailiness is 
where such practical theorizing is most effective. Entering this ubiquitous sphere 
compels us to one more shift, away from contemplating the becoming of Being 
towards investigating specific ways in which individuals employ their mobile 
subjectivities to escape discursive forms of domination. The focus now rests on 
everyday forms of resistance, seemingly mundane daily practices by which people 
constantly shape and reshape their environment. One can find such forms of 
resistance in acts like speaking, writing, laughing, gossiping, singing, dwelling, 
shopping or cooking. It is in these spheres that societal values are gradually 
transformed, preparing the ground for more open manifestations of dissent. 
A major problem in assessing human agency through everyday forms of 
resistance lies in the impossibility of drawing a direct link between action and 
outcome. Discursive dissent operates tactically, rather than strategically. In a 
strategic form of dissent, agent and target can be separated and the attempt is usually 
made to articulate a causal relationship between them. An identifiable agent ( as a 
protest march) exerts influence on an identifiable target (as a change in policy 
2 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," tr. D.F. Krell in Basic Writings (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1993/1927), p. 217. 
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desired by the march.) A non-essentialist understanding of human agency cannot 
rely on such strategic and causal assumptions. To recognize why such extreme 
caution is warranted, we may want to consult Nietzsche, who convincingly argued 
that the duality of cause and effect as we commonly perceive it does not exist. What 
there is, instead, is a continuum of complex factors from which we arbitrarily isolate 
a few pieces and fit them neatly into the image we had already made ourselves of the 
world.3 
The link between action and outcome in discursive forms of dissent is diffused, 
subtle and impossible to articulate through a causal formula. As opposed to strategic 
action, de Certeau emphasizes, tactical forms of resistance have no clearly specified 
target, no visible place to exert influence on. There is no direct causal relationship 
between the subject of will and the exterior circumstances at which this will is 
directed. Tactical actions, de Certeau claims, cannot be autonomous from their 
target. They always insinuates themselves into the Other, without seizing it entirely, 
but yet without being able to keep their distance.4 Take the rather mundane example 
of a critical and environmentally aware consumer in an industrialized society who, 
against hegemonic practices of production and consumption, refuses to buy milk that 
is bottled in non-reusable glass. Alone this shopper does not stand a chance of 
exerting human agency in the traditional sense. But if a substantial part of the 
population engages in similar daily acts of protest producers will eventually be 
compelled to adjust to changed market conditions. But where is the agent and the 
causal relationship in this form of protest? One cannot pick out a particular shopper 
who epitomizes this tactical and collective act of dissent. Consumers may also have 
a whole range of reasons for refusing to buy milk in non-reusable glass bottles. They 
may, for example, have environmental related concerns, oppose commercial dairy 
farmers, or be vegetarian/ vegan. Moreover, where is the target of this tactical form 
of dissent? Is it the supermarket? The retailer? The producer of glass bottles? The 
farmer who delivers milk? Government authorities who fail to impose sufficient 
environmental standards? Fellow shoppers who still buy milk bottled in non-reusable 
glass? Or even the society as a whole, of which the said shopper is as much part as 
anybcxly else? 
A tactic does not have the possibility of perceiving its adversary in a space that is 
distinct, visible and objectifiable. Indeed, the space of tactic is always the space of 
the Other.5 This is to say that a tactical form of dissent, like shopping, cannot keep 
its distance from the object of the action. It always operates in the terrain of the 
opponent. Tactical actions leave their assigned places, enter a world that is too big 
to be their own but also too tightly woven to escape from. Because tactic does not 
have a specific target and cannot separate between the I and the Other, it can never 
3 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Fr5hliche Wissenschaft (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1982/1882), §§ 110-2, 
pp. 127-131. 
4 De Certeau, Arts de Faire, p. xlvi. 
5 Ibid., pp. 60-1. 
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conquer something, it can never keep what it wins. Tactic must always seize the 
moment and explore cracks that open up. It must constantly manipulate its 
environment in order to create opportunities for social change. 6 
It is through the concept of temporality that we can appreciate the impact of 
discursive dissent, the ways in which tactical actions leave their assigned places and 
unleash transformative potential by entering the non-place space of the Other. The 
causality entailed in a discursive notion of human agency, as far as one can speak of 
causality in this diffused context, is always mediated through time. But temporality 
is a slippery concept, an experience that is, according to Gaston Bachelard, never 
pure.7 There is Heidegger's convincing notion of time as the simultaneous presence 
of both past and future in Dasein. While accepting entirely Heidegger's critique of 
attempts that artificially freeze Being in its present, I also rely upon a more linear 
notion of time. 
The temporal aspect of a discursive notion of human agency escapes spatial 
delineation because it is linear only insofar as it focuses on how the becoming of 
Being reaches from an ontological back to an epistemological sphere by influencing, 
over time, the construction and reconstruction of discursive practices. A return to 
de Certeau helps to clarify this issue. He demonstrates how anonymous tactical 
forms of dissent move along "indeterminate trajectories" that defy the spatial logic 
established by the organizing procedures of a particular system. The term trajectory 
evokes a temporal movement through space, but one that focuses on the diachronic 
succession of points, rather than the figure that these points establish on a 
supposedly synchronic and achronic space. The latter view, de Certeau stresses, 
would make the mistake of reducing a "temporal articulation of places into a spatial 
sequence of points. ,,8 
A discursive notion of human agency, by contrast, does not rely upon a view of 
actions as a succession of events in space. The above mentioned refusal to buy milk 
bottled in non-reusable glass is a tactical protest action that is not bound by spatial 
dynamics. Such and countless other tactical forms of dissent not only lack a 
localized target, they also escape the spatial controlling mechanisms of established 
political and economic boundaries. Their temporal movement thus occurs in a more 
diffused manner. Tactical dissent moves along an indeterminate trajectory because it 
promotes a slow transformation of values whose effects transgress places and 
become visible and effective only by maturation over time. 
Having introduced - through notions of discourse, tactic and temporality - the 
conceptual tools for a discursive understanding of human agency, I now move to the 
last task of my thesis, which aims at demonstrating how a specific everyday form of 
6 Ibid., pp. xlvi-ii, 61. 
7 Gaston Bachelard, La Dialectigue de la Duree (Paris, PUF, 1989/1950), p. 113. 
8 De Certeau, Arts de Faire, pp. 58-9. 
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resistance works in practice. For this purpose I move again back and forth between 
abstraction and dai1iness, theory and practice, epistemology and ontology, 
domination and resistance. I begin by scrutinizing forces of domination and 
resistance entailed in one of our most daily activities, speaking and writing. From 
the general terrain of language I move into more specific potentials for dissent 
entailed in the practice of writing. Finally I focus on one specific writing style, 




AT THE EDGE OF LANGUAGE GAMES 
.. . We who would see beyond seeing 
see only language, that burning field . 
Charles Wright, Chickamauga 
Language is one of the most fundamental aspects of human life. It is everywhere. 
We speak, Heidegger stresses, when we are awake and when we are asleep, even 
when we do not utter a single word. We speak when we listen, read or silently 
pursue an occupation. We are always speaking because we cannot think without 
language, because "language is the house of Being," the home within which we 
dwell.1 
Languages are never neutral. They embody particular values and ideas, social 
practices, a whole way of life. They are an integral part of politics and power 
relations. Languages impose sets of assumptions on us, frame our thoughts so subtly 
that we are mostly unaware of the systems of exclusion that are being entrenched 
through this process. But a language is not just a form of domination that engulfs 
the speaker in a web of discursive constraints, it is also one of the most important 
terrains of dissent. It is a form of action, the place where possibilities for social 
change emerge, where values are slowly transformed, where individuals carve out 
1 See Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Stuttgart: Verlag Gunter Neske, 1959), p. 11; 
Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), p. 510; "Letter 
on Humanism," tr. D.F. Krell in Basic Writings (New York: HarperCollins, 1993/1977), p. 217. 
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thinking space and engage in everyday forms of resistance. In short, language 
epitomizes the potential and limits of discursive dissent. 
This chapter provides the theoretical groundwork necessary to conceptualize the 
links between language and human agency, so that the subsequent, final chapter can 
scrutinize in detail the practical relevance of a specific, language based everyday 
form of resistance. I begin by engaging with themes that are central to the 
philosophy of language. Rather than trying to present this complex body of 
knowledge in a coherent way, I focus on two authors who are of particular 
importance for my attempt to theorize discursive dissent, Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein. They embody an approach that perceives language not as a way of 
representing the world, but as an activity, a way of life. The consequences of such a 
position are far-reaching. 
Language appears no longer as a mere medium of communication. It is the very 
site where social struggles are carried out. This is to say that practices of dissent 
cannot be separated from critique of language. To demonstrate what is at stake in 
coming to terms with this aspect of social life, I focus on everyday forms of 
resistance entailed in the practice of writing, understood not in its narrow sense as a 
mere act of inscribing signs, but as everything which makes this act possible - in 
short, language itself. 
THE METAPHORICAL STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE AS 
SOCIAL PRACTICE 
It would be far beyond the scope of this chapter to provide even a highly condensed 
summary of the major writings on the philosophy of language. Ruminations on this 
subject go as far back as ancient Greek philosophy. More recently, differences have 
been particularly pronounced between an Anglo-Saxon tradition, which focuses on 
the logical clarification of linguistic statements, and a continental approach that pays 
more attention to the socially embedded dimensions of language, to its function of 
providing meaning and embedding forms of life. I will engage only with the latter 
tradition. But even within this more restricted domain, I cannot possibly do justice 
to the complexities of the debates that are being waged. My objective is limited to 
outlining a few central assumptions about the functioning of language which are 
crucial to my articulation of discursive forms of dissent and their ability to exert 
human agency. 
Nietzsche played an important role in the debate about language, for he opened 
up the possibility of connecting philosophical tasks with radical reflections on 
language.2 Language, he argues, can never provide us with pure, unmediated 
knowledge of the world. Thinking can at best grasp imperfect perceptions of things 
2 
Or so claims Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 316. 
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because a word is nothing but an image of a nerve stimulus expressed in sounds. It 
functions, to simplify Nietzsche's argument, as follows: a person's intuitional 
perception creates an image, then a word, then patterns of words, and finally entire 
linguistic and cultural systems. Each step in this chain of metaphors entails 
interpretations and distortions of various kinds. When we look at things around us, 
Nietzsche illustrates, we think we know something objective about them, something of 
"the thing in itself." But all we have are metaphors, which can never capture an essence 
because they express the relationship between people and things. 3 Language systems 
are built upon sets of prejudices that are expressed via metaphors, selectively filtered 
images of objects and phenomena that surround us. We thus live in conceptual 
'prisons' that permit us to take only very narrow and sporadic glimpses at the 
outside world, glimpses that must entail, by definition, fundamental errors of 
. d 4 JU gment. 
But there is more to the problem of language than its imperfections as a medium 
of expression. Languages embody the relationship between people and their 
environment. They are part of a larger discursive struggle over meaning and 
interpretation, an integral element of politics. We are often not aware of this 
function of language. The process of forgetting that we have been conditioned by 
linguistically entrenched values largely camouflages the systems of exclusion that are 
operative in all speech forms. We become accustomed to our distorting metaphors 
until we "lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all."5 Tracy Strong underlines the 
importance of this point by drawing attention to aspects of Nietzsche's thought that 
perceive language as human practice, as a way of constructing the world and then 
erasing the traces of this construction. 6 Nietzsche's own words illustrate best how 
central the links between language and social practices are. Without using the actual 
term reification (Verdinglichung), he provides an astonishing account of his 
dynamics, of the processes through which values embedded in language turn into 
objectivized things that appear as if they had always been there: 
This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize that what tlrings are 
called is incomparably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, 
and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a tlring, what it counts for -
originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over tlrings like a dress and 
altogether foreign to their nature and even to their skin - all this grows from 
generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually 
grows to be part of the tlring and turns into its very body. What at first was 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ober Warheit und Liige im aussermoralischen Sinn," in 
Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften, ed. J. Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968/1873), esp. pp. 
100-1. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenrote: Gedanken iiber die moralischen Vorurteile (Frankfurt: Insel 
Taschenbuch, 1983/1881), p. 100, § 117. See also Die frohliche Wissenschaft (Frankfurt: Insel 
Taschenbuch, 1982/1882), §§ 57-8, 110-2, 354-5, pp. 83-4, 127-31, 235-40. 
5 Nietzsche, "Uber Warheit und Liige," p. 103. 
6 Tracy B. Strong, "Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche's Critique of Epistemology," in M.J. 
Shapiro (ed), Language and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 81-107. 
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appearance becom~ in the end, almost invariably, the ~sence and is effective as 
such.7 
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With this recognition Nietzsche moved language from the margins to the center of 
philosophy. The function of words is no longer neutral, linked to the search for truth 
or even adequate expression. There cannot be authentic knowledge of the world, 
knowledge that is not in one way or another linked to the values of the perceiver and 
the language through which s/he gives meaning to social practices. With Nietzsche, 
language, truth and politics become intrinsically linked. One of his most frequently 
cited passages: 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and 
anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have been 
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after 
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about 
which one has forgotten that this is what they are ... 8 
The importance of Nietzsche's position on language becomes clearer when 
placed in comparison with Wittgenstein's approach. While Nietzsche made language 
a philosophical and political issue, Wittgenstein turned philosophy and politics into 
the study of language. A brief elucidation of the differences between his earlier and 
later work, both highly influential in shaping contemporary philosophical discussions, 
underlines the importance of approaching language as social practice, rather than a 
mere representation of them. Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein believed that we can 
never reach something like an authentic bottom of things. We carµiot advance 
fundamental propositions because the boundaries set by language prevent us from 
asking further, more profound questions.9 His early work was concerned with 
delineating what can be said about the world and what cannot be said. For that 
purpose he intended to correct the shortcomings of ordinary language and search for 
more clear and logical forms of expression. This is how he presented the task of his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 
The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the 
method of formulating th~e problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of 
our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What 
can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one 
must be silent. 10 
7 Nietzsche, Die fr5hliche Wissenschaft, p. 84, § 58, tr. W. Kaufmann in The Gay Science (New York: 
Vintage Bcrlcs, 1974), pp. 121-2. 
8 Nietzsche, "Ober Warheit und Lilge," p. 102, tr. W. Kaufmann as "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense, " in The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 1982/1954 ), pp. 46-7. 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932, ed. D. Lee (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1980/1931), p. 34. 
10 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 
1990/1922), p. 27. 
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From this perspective the main task of philosophy is "the logical clarification of 
thoughts. "11 The assumption behind this search for clarity is that language 
represents the world to us, that a proposition is a "picture of reality," "a model of 
reality as we imagine it."12 In a radical turnaround three decades later, Wittgenstein 
considered his earlier work on language seriously flawed and embarked on an 
entirely different path. 
The position of the later Wittgenstein, which largely informs my approach to 
formulating a discursive and linguistic approach to dissent, abandons the search for a 
perfectly logical language and returns words from their metaphysical use back to the 
context of everyday life. 13 He considers futile the attempt to clarify or reveal a 
hidden logic underlying the relationship between words and reality, for the very 
process of naming can only be carried out in the context of rules that are operative 
within an established language. These rules of naming are not embedded in a form 
of logic, but in social interactions. They are part of an ensemble of human practices 
from which an author cannot escape. Wittgenstein starts his journey towards this 
perspective by outlining the problems entailed in Augustine's approach to language, 
which focuses on substantives and draws a direct link between words and the objects 
they refer to. The word "red apple," for example, signifies a fruit labeled as apple 
and displaying the color characteristic commonly defined as red. This practice of 
naming may work in the case of nouns, such as 'apple,' 'table' or chair,' where one 
can point towards an object that corresponds to the word. But the issue becomes 
problematic with more tangible nouns, or with verbs, pronouns, prepositions and 
other grammatical subtleties. For instance, one cannot point towards 'morality,' 
'thinking,' 'whether,' 'but' or 'of.' These words have no referent. They express 
such intangible factors as activities, functions, feelings, opinions, relationality. In 
short, they do not correspond to some object in the real world. They are part of a 
social convention, of shared linguistic rules that embody a particular approach to 
1.:.c: 14 llle. 
For the later Wittgenstein language is no longer a picture of the world. The 
speaking of a language "is part of an activity, or a form of life."15 This does not 
mean, however, that there is no life outside language. David Pears explains that the 
position of later Wittgenstein 
is not that our view of the world owes nothing to its nature. That would be absurd. 
Wittgenstein's point is only that, if we try to explain our view of the world by 
saying something about its nature, what we say will necessarily belong to our view 
11 Ibid., p. 77, § 4.112. 
12 Ibid., p. 63, § 4.01. 
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, in Werkausgabe Band I, (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1993/1952), p. 300, § 116. 
14 Ibid., pp. 237-44, §§ 1-15. 
15 Ibid., p. 250, § 23. 
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of it. We have no independent standpoint from which to assess the relation between 
our usual standpoint and the world.16 
178 
From this perspective, one does not try to grasp the meaning and representational 
aspects of words, but instead pays attention to their function, to the "workings of 
our language."17 Wittgenstein uses the term "language game" to draw attention to 
the ways in which languages are part of culturally specific forms of life. There are 
countless language games that come and go. He · mentions such examples as giving 
orders and obeying them, translating from one language to another, or asking, 
thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 18 Language games, Henry Leroy Finch claims, 
are the absolute starting point in Wittgenstein's thought, but they can neither be 
explained nor justified. They precede experience and perception. An attempt to 
explain a language game would already be another language game, presupposing 
what it is supposed to explain. Hence, noting a language game is not noting a social 
fact, but an "agreed-upon activity. "19 
An approach that perceives language as human activity, rather than a way of 
categorizing phenomena, opens a whole range of opportunities to study the 
relationship between language and human agency. Hanna Pitkin, for instance, shows 
how our understanding of action may be enriched by asking no longer what action is 
or how it functions, but how we talk about it, how language games guide the 
implementation of this particular aspect of practice. Language thus becomes action 
itself because "we use language not merely to talk about action, but to act - to carry 
on actions, to teach actions, to plan or produce actions, to assess actions done and 
redress any ways in which they have gone wrong."20 
With Wittgenstein language is revealed as one of the most central aspects of our 
lives. Philosophy of language, viewed from the perspective of his later writings as 
the analysis and description of language in its everyday use, is no longer just a branch 
of philosophy. It is philosophy itself. Many, of course, dispute this claim. Yet, 
there is hardly any philosopher who does not acknowledge to have made "the 
linguistic turn," the admission that knowledge of the world is always pre-interpreted 
by the language we employ to assess and express it.21 It is not my task here enter 
into the details of this complex philosophical debate. 
16 David Pears, The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Vol. 1 
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1987), p. 12. 
17 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, p. 298, § 109. 
18 Ibid., p. 150, § 23. 
19 Henry Leroy Finch, Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities 
Press, 1977), pp. 74-5. 
20 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for 
Social and Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 164. 
21 For a selection of essays that represent various ways of dealing with the consequences of this 
recognition see K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy (eds) After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987). 
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I am primarily interested in scrutinizing the extent to which a Wittgensteinean 
view of language as a way of life opens up possibilities for exploring practices of 
dissent and manifestations of human agency that are hidden in daily acts of speaking 
and writing. Can one take the linguistic turn and still retain some notion of human 
agency? 
From a Wittgensteinean perspective we cannot think about dissent or human 
agency outside language, indeed, we cannot act human agency outside language. 
And if the difficulty in philosophy is, as he emphasizes, "to say no more than we 
know,"22 we must seriously reflect about what we could possible know and say 
about human agency. I have taken a relatively cautious approach to this question, 
rejecting that agency can be understood in teleological, causal or intentional terms. 
But by relying on the intertwinement of discourse, tactic and temporality, I showed 
that there are alternative ways of conceptualizing human agency. The remaining 
sections of this chapter outline the potential and limits of this approach with regard 
to discursive dissent expressed through practices of writing. 
CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE AS AN EVERYDAY FORM OF 
RESISTANCE 
How can a Wittgensteinean understanding of lan·guage contribute to an approach 
that tries to theorize the potential for human agency entailed in engagements with 
discursive struggles? How are languages and discourses linked? They overlap in 
many ways, but are by no means the same. For Mikhail Bakhtin discourse is 
"language in its concrete living totality. "23 His working definition offers a good 
starting point to explore the similarities between language and discourse. 
Differences shall surf ace a bit later. 
Discourse and language are forms of concealment that offer opportunities to 
reveal. They are forms of domination that offer opportunities to resist and 
transform. These practices of concealing and revealing must be examined in their 
cyclical existence. Without paying attention to the domineering aspects of language 
one cannot understand its potential for resistance. For many authors the subjugating 
power of language is overwhelming. Theodor Adorno, for example, claims that even 
before dealing with specific speech contents, languages mold a thought such that it 
gets drawn into subordination even where it appears to resist this tendency.24 
22 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical 
Investigations' (New York: Harper Torchbooks 1964), p. 45. 
23 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, tr. C. Emerson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 181. 
24 Theodor W. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 6 (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1973/1964), p. 416. 
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Roland Barthes goes even further in his notorious remarks during the inaugural 
lecture at the College de France. For him, freedom can exist only outside language. 
But languages have no exterior. Moreover, a language imposes, and in this sense it 
is "neither reactionary nor progressive, it is simply fascist, for fascism does not 
prevent speech, it forces speech. "25 Barthes' claim, largely dismissed as polemics, 
has the merit of reminding us that there is always an aspect of subjugation in the use 
of languages, no matter how objective, neutral, and open they may appear. There 
are many ways of exploring the authoritarian dimensions of language. Parallel to my 
examination, in chapter five, of how discursive factors serve as a crucial source of 
power for patriarchy, one could investigate the practical consequences that arise 
from corresponding linguistic systems of exclusion. This is not my task here. A 
short demonstrative example must suffice to prepare a more detailed scrutiny of the 
intricate links among language, discourse and human agency. 
The subjugating power of language has been well documented in feminist 
literature. The work of Dale Spender brings us immediately to the core of the 
debate, and this despite the fact that by today most feminists consider her position 
simplistic and largely outdated. Spender argues that language, as part of a larger 
process of social construction, has been a crucial factor in controlling meaning and 
delineating social possibilities. The English language, she claims, is man made and 
largely under male control. This, in turn, has constructed language and thought 
patterns that define the male as norm and the female as deviant. Spender reinforces 
her point by showing how the introduction and legitimization of 'man' and 'he' as 
terms to denote both male and female "was the result ·of a deliberate policy and was 
consciously intended to promote the primacy of the male as a category."26 Indeed, 
virtually all the writers I examined in chapters one to three, from la Boetie all the 
way to Gene Sharp, rely on a sexist usage of nouns and pronouns. This linguistic 
practice of exclusion is so deeply entrenched that it remains prevalent even among 
those who investigate the very dynamics of language. Consider how Georges 
Mounin, a prominent linguist, ridicules the manner in which philosophers like 
Ricoeur, Derrida or Deleuze simplify linguistic theory. Mounin goes on to correct 
their flaws and demonstrates the complexity of the interaction between language and 
thought, all while referring consistently to philosophers as 'he' (il) and 'man' 
(hommes).27 Hilary Putnam, a leading analytical philosopher, acknowledges the 
Wittgensteinean argument that all knowledge relies upon rules which are themselves 
normative. He claims that there is no difference between the male and the female 
mind for "today everybody knows ... that all men (hommes) are equal."28 These 
widespread practices illustrate why despite the (more or less) official elimination of 
25 Roland Barthes, Lecon Inaugurale de la Chaire de Semiologie Litteraire du College de France 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), pp. 14-5. 
26 Dale Spender, Man Made Language (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985/1980), p. 150. 
27 Georges Mounin, Linguistigue et Philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1975). 
28 Hilary Putnam, "Entretien" in Le Monde, 22.10.1995, p. 13. 
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sexism in the social science community, misogynist attitudes, deeply entrenched in 
language and discourse, remain as prevalent as ever.29 
But the issue of linguistic domination is not quite as straightforward as Spender 
suggests. While some language reform is clearly necessary to provide the 
preconditions for less asymmetrical gender relations, some feminists point out that it 
is not clear whether women have no control over language because they lack social 
power, or whether they must control language before they can gain social power.30 
Others, like Luce Irigaray, argue that instead of desexualizing language entirely, 
which would be fateful, one must tune it such that gender relations can be re-
balanced in the domain of society and culture.31 This would entail, for example, 
retaining grammatical possibilities for women to situate themselves as female agents, 
while preferring the usage of gender-neutral terms like 'people' or 's/he' over 'man' 
and 'he.' But even this suggestion plays down some of the complexities and may run 
the risk of falling back into a logical positivist position. The puzzle can never be 
solved, or even understood, at a purely terminological level. From the perspective of 
the later Wittgenstein, there is no logical and authentic relationship between the 
meaning of term 'man' and masculine values or patriarchy. 'Man' is only what we 
make out of the term. The main problem is a language game in which the term 
'men' embodies social practices that assign masculine values priority and keep men 
as a group dominant over women as a group. 
While analyses of language provide us with many important clues about 
domination, they also run the same risks as discursive approaches. µl11guage can 
become an authoritarian concept that crushes everything under its weight, much like 
a pessimistic reading of Foucault may lead, as outlined earlier, to an annihilation of 
human agency. Consider these takes on language: Benjamin Lee Whorf, in his path-
breaking study of Hopi conceptualizations of time and space, object and subject, 
argues that the individual is utterly unaware of the power of language to construct 
his/her consciousness and "constrained completely within its unbreakable bonds. "32 
In Heidegger's later writings, aspects of which I shall employ a bit later, language 
takes priority to the point that the subject disappears almost entirely, for "man acts 
as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains 
the master of man."33 While undoubtedly drawing attention to important subjugating 
elements of language, such approaches run the risk leading to statist, not to say 
defeatist, models of the interaction between language and social practices. They 
29 Elisabeth List, Die Prtisenz des Anderen: Theorie and Geschlechterpolitik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1993), p. 8, 
30 Mary Crawford, Talking Difference: On Gender and Language (London: Sage, 1995), p. 7; 
Deborah Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
31 
Luce Irigaray, Je. Tu. Nous: Pour une Culture de la Difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), pp. 35-7. 
32 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1974/1956) 
p. 256. 
33 
Martin Heidegger, " ... Poetically Man Dwells ... ," in Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. A. Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971/1951), p. 215. 
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reflect in some way the conservative dimensions of the later Wittgenstein, the focus 
on immanent rather than transcendent critique, on the priority of understanding the 
"here and now" over attempts to innovate or expand. 34 
How can one turn language from a system of exclusion to a practice of 
inclusion, from a method of domination to an instrument of resistance? The starting 
point lies, I argue, with what is aptly called Sprachkritik in German. Literally 
translated as "critique of language," Sprachkritik is, at least according to the linguist 
Fritz Mauthner, "the most important task (Geschaft) of thinking humanity." The 
poet Paul Valery probably captured its objective best when claiming that "the secret 
of well founded thinking is based on suspicion towards language. "35 If challenges to 
practices of domination and attempts to open up thinking space are to avoid being 
absorbed by the dominant discourse, then they must engage in a struggle with 
conventionally recognized linguistic practices, or at least with the manner in which 
these practices have been constituted. The form of speaking and writing becomes as 
important as their content. Dissent cannot be separated from critique of language, 
for it remains ineffective as long as it does not interfere with the ways in which 
linguistic systems of exclusion constitute and objectivize social practices. ., 
But can a language so easily be appropriated as a tool of dissent against its own 
subjugating power? Is it enough, as Nietzsche suggests, to "create new names, 
estimations and probabilities to create eventually new 'things. '"36 Of course not, and 
Nietzsche is well aware of the difficulties entailed in critique of language. 
One can never be free within language, one can never break free from language. 
The point is, rather, to acknowledge that one cannot function as an authentic 
perceiver or agent, that the spaces for action opened up by critique are still 
circumscribed by the larger boundaries of linguistic structures. Moreover, critique of 
language must be careful not be trapped in an idealism that suggests the world exists 
only because it is perceived by our mind, that objects outside this mental sphere have 
no qualities of their own. Such a working assumption would go astray in a futile 
search for the perfect language and, by doing so, fall back into the logical positivism 
from which the later Wittgenstein so carefully tried to escape. 
Because there is no direct and logical correspondence between words and 
meaning, between a name and a thing, a spear-heading into unexplored linguistic 
terrains can only be socially meaningful if it stretches the rules of existing language 
games while never losing sight of the ways in which these language games constitute 
and are constituted by concrete forms of life. Mikhail Bakhtin emphasizes how 
34 
David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983),pp. 160-184. 
35 
Mauthner and Valery cited in Hans-Martin Gauger, "Sprachkritik," in Deutsche Akademie fiir 
Sprache und Dichtung. Jahrbuch 1991, pp. 23-24. 
36 
Nietzsche, Die frohliche Wissenschaft, p. 84, § 58. 
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important it is to embed critique of language in the specific contexts within which 
languages and social practices operate hand in hand: 
Stylistics must be based not only, and even not as much, on linguistics as on 
metalinguistics, which studies the world not in a system of language and not in a 
"text" excised from dialogic interaction, but precisely within the sphere of dialogic 
interaction itself, that is, in that sphere where discourse lives an authentic life.37 
The point, then, is to avoid lifting words out of their social and dialogical context 
while, at the same time, exploring to the utmost the unstable and transformative 
nature of languages. The point is to articulate resistance at the edge of language 
games. This is best done, I argue, by interfering with the ways in which languages 
constitute sites of political practice, sites where realities are formed, reformed, 
legitimized and objectivized. 
I focus on the practice of writing in my attempt to explore possible 
manifestations of human agency entailed in critique of language. But is writing not 
an elitist activity, something that is restricted to those few literates who have the 
money and time to devote themselves to the written word? Do not speaking and 
listening constitute the essence of language, as Wittgenstein suggested? Derrida 
demonstrates well why this is not necessarily the case. Consider his engagement 
with Saussure's influential theory of linguistics. For Saussure, the study of the 
abstract concept of language (le langage) can roughly be divided into two subject 
eras, la parole, which are individually spoken or written utterances, and la langue, 
the particular socialized language-system that establishes the codes and conventions 
by which these individual messages can be realized. 38 Derrida points out that the 
term la parole, literally translated as speech, gives clear precedence to voice, hearing, 
sound and breath. This Saussurean position constitutes writing as a simple 
supplement to the spoken word, as an activity that consists merely of derivative 
functions.39 Derrida vehemently rejects as ethnocentric the Western practice of 
logocentrism, the study of language based on phonetics, on the spoken word, the 
logos. He even goes as far as claiming that writing, defined in a broad sense, came 
before speech. Once we free ourselves from the artificially constructed link between 
writing and a phonetic alphabet, we recognize writing in inscriptions of any kind, 
such as in the pictographic, the ideographic or the hieroglyphic.40 It is important, 
though, to recognize that Derrida's preoccupation with the creation of texts, while 
departing from the Wittgensteinean (or Saussurean) focus on speech practices, still 
occurs within a similar perception of langage as a way of life, rather than a 
representation of the world. 
37 
Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p. 202. 
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Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 135-143. 
Resistance at the Edge of Language Games 184 
In demonstrating how writing can function as a form of discursive dissent I rely 
on only two of Derrida's provocative claims, but I grant both of them crucial 
importance. First, he shows that the written word exceeds in some ways the spoken 
one.41 Speech may be more elusive than writing for it can be erased, refuted, it is not 
engraved once and for all. But face-to-face speech is often severely constrained by 
the necessity to reinforce hegemonic appearances, to restrain one's criticism in the 
face of power. The process of writing, by contrast, is removed from the immediacy 
and performative pressure of face-to-face speech. Thus, writing creates enough 
distance from the eye of power to facilitate critique and nurture the confidence to 
express it. Second, and more importantly, Derrida convincingly argues that writing 
designates "not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic and ideographic 
inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible. ,,42 Writing thus stands for 
everything that enables it, in short, language itself. Scrutinizing the forms of dissent 
that are hidden in practices of writing has relevance beyond this immediate realm, for 
it represents the potential for resistance contained in language per se. 
WRITING DISSENT I: DISENCHANTING THE CONCEPT 
There are unlimited possibilities to engage in dissent through the practice of writing. 
It is not my intention here to provide anything that resembles a coherent summary. 
Rather, I focus on the work of Theodor Adorno to demonstrate that there are 
aspects of human agency hidden in the written word and in language in general. I 
have chosen Adorno, and especially his reading of Nietzsche, because he epitomizes 
both the strengths and dangers of writing dissent. 
Adorno's approach to language emerges out of opposition to what he calls 
identity thinking. ''To think," he claims, "is to identify. ,,43 It is a process through 
which we try to understand the bewildering world that surrounds us. Thinking is part of 
a desire to controi to establish order, to identify choices. There is no escape from the 
subjective dimension of thought, no possibility of extracting pure facts from observation. 
Thinking cannot be done without language. And language, of course, has always already 
established a preconceived conceptual order prior to what thinldng is trying to 
understand. 44 Language draws us into submission even where we think we have escaped 
this tendency. Identity thinldng, Adorno points out, is the form of thinldng that ignores 
these unavoidable restraints and embarks on a fatal search for essences by extracting the 
general out of the particular and forcing unique things into an artificial unitary system of 
thought. Yet, while much of Adorno' s writings is concerned with demonstrating the 
reifying dangers of identity thinldng, his position on language is not nearly as pessimistic 
41 Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 8-9. 
42 Ibid., p. 9. 
43 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992/1966), p. 17. 
44 Ibid., p. 15. 
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as many analysts suggest. Among these pessimistic interpreters is Stephen Bronner, 
who speaks for many when critiquing Adorno' s methodological radicalism as 
"dialectics at a standstill." This approach, he claims lacks positive foundations 
because it enters a cul de sac and degenerates into a methodological critique 
"incapable of either specifying the conditions needing transformation or positing an 
alternative form of institutional organization.45 Others, like Terry Eagleton, are 
equally opposed to Adamo's elusive theorizing, but they acknowledge that there are 
two sides to him, a "defeatist" one that retreats "from the nightmare of history into 
the aesthetic," and a more positive, "for whom the aesthetic offers a paradigm, rather 
than a displacement of emancipatory political thought.',46 It is Adamo's latter side 
that primarily interests me here. 
Thinking, Adorno claims, is not only obeying the power of language and discourse. 
Thinking also contains critical potential, for it is in itself already a process of negating, of 
resisting what is forced upon it.47 Stretching the boundaries of language games, 
engaging in Sprachkritik, is the key to realizing this potential. It permits us to break 
loose from the claws of the established order and to venture beyond the givenness of 
life. Adamo's conceptual starting point for this journey is negative dialectics, the 
refusal to subsume the particular under the general. This entails creating thinking 
space without succumbing to the temptation of searching for a Hegelean synthesis, a 
new totalizing and exclusionary system of thought that would drift us back into the 
dangerous waters of identity thinking. Negative dialectics is the constant awareness 
of non-identity. It refuses to rely upon a preconceived standpoint, rescues and 
develops what does not fit into prevailing totalizing practices or what may emerge as 
a potential alternative to them. 48 Adorno tries to open up such thinking spaces by a 
critique of language that entails a radical departure from both the traditional usage of 
concepts and the style in which they are presented. Clear potential for human 
agency, I argue, arises from this practice. 
To talk and write we need concepts to express our ideas. Yet, concepts can 
never entirely capture the objects that they are trying to describe. A concept is 
always a violation, an imposition of static subjectivity upon complex, interconnected 
and continuously changing phenomena. A concept is of part of a language game and 
fulfills a variety of functions that are constantly shifting. It cannot be captured by an 
ahistoric assertion of a link between the concept and that which it represents, 
between the sign and that which it signifies. Nietzsche pointed out that "all concepts 
that semiotically subsume entire processes defy definition. Only that which has no 
45 Stephen Eric Bronner, Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 
197-8. 
46 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 360. 
47 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 28. 
48 Ibid., p. 15 and ''Einleitung zum Positivismusstreit," in Soziologische Schriften I, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Vol. 8 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972/1969), pp. 292-295. 
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history can be clefined.',49 Adorno illustrates the problem of conceptualizing by 
showing that the judgment that one is free depends on the concept of freedom. But 
this concept is both less and more than the object or subject it refers to.50 It is less 
because it cannot adequately assess the complexities of the individual's expectations 
and the contexts within which s/he seeks freedom. It is more because it imposes a 
particular interpretation of freedom upon and beyond the conditions for freedom 
sought after by the individual. Thus, Adorno argues that "the concept of freedom 
always lags behind itself. As soon as it is applied empirically it ceases to be what it 
claims it is. "51 Here too we hear the echo of Nietzsche, who already claimed that 
liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are established, that, as a result 
"there is nothing more wicked and harmful to freedom than liberal institutions."52 
Acknowledging and dealing with the political dimension of concepts is essential 
in articulating a discursive notion of dissent and human agency. But how can one 
employ concepts such that they do not delineate our thinking space but, instead, turn 
into tools of dissent? One can appropriate and open up the meaning of existing 
concepts. The political relevance of this practice was amply demonstrated by 
German and English speaking gay/lesbian activists, who, over decades, have 
managed to transform the terms "schwul" and "queer" from derogative and 
discriminatory expressions to positively imbued assertions of identity that create 
possibilities for more inclusive ways of thinking and acting. 53 In almost diametrically 
opposed terrains we find the Australian poet Les Murray, trying to reshape and de-
vilify the term 'redneck. '54 During the East German revolution we witnessed how 
citizens turned the expression 'we are the people' from a dogmatic governmental 
claim to legitimacy into a slogan that condensed all the resentments against this claim 
and, indeed, into a highly effective battle cry that contributed substantially to the 
downfall of the authoritarian regime. One can, of course, also try to create new 
concepts in order to avoid the pitfalls of existing ones and open up spaces to think. 
But the belief that new words can usher in an immediate emancipatory politics 
amounts to a linguistic idealism that has been criticized extensively by many who 
probe the links between language and politics. 55 Even new concepts, no matter how 
well chosen and inclusive they are, will never be sufficient, will never do justice to 
the object they are trying to capture. 
49 Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral (Frankfurt: Insel Taschenbuch, 1991/1977), pp. 71-2. See 
also "Ober Warheit und Luge," pp. 101-2. 
50 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 153. 
51 Ibid., p. 154. 
52 Nietzsche, CWtzen-Dfimmerung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969/1889), p. 133. 
53 See, for example, Lisa Duggan, "Making it Perfectly Queer," in Socialist Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 
pp. 11-31; and Steven Epstein, "A Queer Encounter: Sociology and the Study of Sexuality," in 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No 2, July 1994, pp. 188-202. 
54 
Les Murray, Subhuman Redneck Poems (Potts Point, NSW: Duffy & Snellgrove, 1996). 
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For example, Sigrid Weigel, Die Stimme der Medusa: Schreibweisen in der Gegenwartsliteratur 
von Frauen (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1989), pp. 104-5. 
Resistance at the Edge of Language Games 187 
Knowing the dangers of exclusion and reification inherent in any form of 
conceptualizing does not release us from the need to employ concepts in order to 
express our thoughts. What, then, is the point? Adorno claims we must not turn the 
necessity to operate with concepts into the virtue of assigning them priority.56 
The daring task is to open up with concepts what does not fit into concepts, to 
resist the distorting power of reification and return the conceptual to the non-
conceptual. This disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of critical 
philosophy, it impedes the concept from developing its own dynamics and thus from 
becoming an absolute in itself. 57 The first step towards disenchanting the concept is 
simply refusing to define it monologically. Concepts should achieve meaning only 
gradually, in relation to each other. Adorno even goes as far as intentionally using 
the same concept in different ways in order to liberate it from the narrow definition 
that language itself had already imposed upon it. 58 That contradictions could arise 
out of this practice does not bother Adorno. Indeed, he considers them essential. 
One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary _ and the discontinuous. 
Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior 
universal standard of reference. What is different appears as divergent, dissonant, 
and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalizing standpoint, 
which we must avoid if we are to escape the reifying dangers of identity thinking.59 
Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity is not found 
by evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be preferred over artificially 
constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus Adorno 
advocates writing in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always 
could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, any place. 60 Here too we hear the 
advice of Nietzsche, who recommends that one should approach deep problems like 
taking a cold bath, "quickly into them and quickly out again. ,,6t The belief that one 
does not reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those 
who fear cold water. But Nietzsche's bath has already catapulted us into the vortex 
of the next linguistic terrain of resistance, the question of style. 
56 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, p. 23. 
57 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, pp. 23-5, 156-8; "Der Essay als Form," in Noten zur Literatur, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 11 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974/1958), pp. 9-33. 
58 Adorno, "Der Essay als Fonn," pp. 19-20. 
59 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, pp. 17-18. 
60 Adorno, "Der Essay als Fonn," pp. 24-5. 
61 Nietzsche, Die fr5hliche Wissenschaft, p. 278, § 381. 
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WRITING DISSENT II: THOUGHTS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF 
STYLE 
Conventional wisdom holds that good writing is concise, clear, and to the point. 
Many activists stress how important ease in communication is for purposes of 
organizing popular resistance. Gramsci emphasized time and again the crucial 
importance of bridging the communicative gap between intellectuals and the working 
class. Philosophy, he argued, is not a strange or difficult thing, not something that is 
confined to the activities of specialists. 62 The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire argued 
along the same line. For him questions of language and human agency are directly 
linked. They are essential in the attempt to unveil the dehumanized world of 
oppression, to transform the dispossessed into responsible subject that can enter and 
forge historical processes. 63 If an intellectual speaks in a language that is not attuned 
to the concrete situation of the people s/he is trying to reach, then the talk is nothing 
but alienated and alienating rhetoric. 64 The ones who are devoted to liberation but 
unable to communicate with the people only impose a monologue, the very 
instrument of domination and domestication from which the people have to liberate 
themselves in order the make the transition from object to subject.65 Thus, the 
intellectual's task is not to preach to the people, but to listen to them, to enter into a 
dialogue and open up space for the people to think and act themselves. To facilitate 
this process, the intellectual must trust in the oppressed and their ability to reason. 
S/he must understand the day-to-day conditions that frame the language of the 
people. Only words that have meaning in this context contain a potential for change. 
All other words are not true words, they are deprived of the dimension of action, 
their transformative power.66 
But is the link between language and human agency as unproblematic as Freire 
suggests? Is clear language all that is needed to express dissent? Or is not clear 
language only clear because we have acquired fluency in it over the years, because 
we have rehearsed it time and again as part of a system of shared meanings that 
channels our thinking into particular directions? Do we not appreciate clarity only 
because we have already been drawn into a language game that is integral to the 
discursive practices of domination that silently frame and subjugate our mind? 
Adorno certainly thinks so. For him standard modes of communication are 
inadequate to express a critical thought. He even goes as far as arguing that clear 
language is domination. It imposes closure. Even if critical, an argument presented 
in a straightforward writing style can, at best, articulate an alternative position and 
62 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, tr. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New York: International 
Publishers, 1985/1971), pp. 323, 347-7. 
63 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, tr. M.B. Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1983/1970), 
pp. 20. 40. 
64 Ibid.,, p. 85. 
65 Ibid., pp. 47-52. 
66 Ibid., pp. 28, 38-9, 42, 53, 75-7, 85-6. 
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replace one orthodoxy with another one. It is unable to open up thinking space. If a 
reader is to break free from the subtle repression that the dominant discourse 
disguises through its linguistic practices, s/he has to struggle with a text, grapple for 
the meaning of words, and be torn away, painfully, from a deeply entrenched form of 
communicative subjugation. If a reader is to come to terms with her/his own 
prejudices, a text must challenge, puzzle, shake, uproot, disturb, even frustrate and 
torment her/him. 
"Slack and sleeping senses must be addressed with thunder and heavenly 
fireworks. ,,6? So preaches Zarathustra and so believes Adorno, who defies all 
Cartesean methodological rules and rejects as dangerous the proposition that one 
ought to move from the simple to the complex and that one must demonstrate clearly 
and explicitly each step that leads to the articulation of a particular idea. 68 He 
justifies this unusual position with the argument that the true value of a thought is 
measured according to its distance from the continuities of orthodox know ledge. 
This is to say that the closer a thought gets to the generally accepted standards of 
writing and representing, the more it loses its dialectical and antithetical function. 
Adorno thus attempts to open up thinking space by writing in an unusual style, 
unusual in word choice, concept usage, syntax, sentence flow and many other 
aspects.69 Style is at the core of Adorno's thought. It leads him to a position where, 
expressed in Eagleton' s ironically disapproving voice, every sentence is "forced to 
work overtime; each phrase must become a little masterpiece or miracle of dialectics, 
fixing a thought in the second before it disappears into its own contradictions."70 
It is not my intention to endorse all aspects of Adorno' s provocative and 
controversial position on language. The difficulty of his style severely limits 
possibilities for the expression of dissent and human agency. As long as a critical 
text is only accessible to a small circle of intellectuals who invest the time to decipher 
it, solve its puzzles and explore its contradictions, critical knowledge will continue to 
reside in the margins, hegemonies will remain unchallenged, and practices of 
dominating will persist. Adorno also comes dangerously close to a linguistic 
idealism or a heroic avant-garde elitism. By freeing himself radically from the 
totalizing forces of identity thinking, he paradoxically runs the danger of falling back 
into the positivist pitfalls from whence he is so desperately trying to escape, for his 
position on style implies, much like the one espoused by the early Wittgenstein, that 
ordinary language is insufficient, in need of correction. 
67 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. W. Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 205. 
68 Adorno, "Der Essay als Form," pp. 22-5. 
69 
Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschadigten Leben (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1980/1951), pp. 88-9; Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, pp. 440-2. For discussions of the crucial 
importance that Adorno grants to the question of style see Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: 
An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (London: MacMillan, 1978), pp. 11-26. 
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The point is not to search for a more prefect representation of reality, but to 
acknowledge that language games are an integral part of politics. Peter Burger 
illustrates the centrality of this problem when comparing Adorno' s and Lukacs' 
approach to aesthetics. Adorno advocates avant-gardiste art in a radical form that 
rejects all false reconciliation with what exists. Lukacs, by contrast, opposes such a 
form of dissent, for it remains too abstract, void of historical perspective, and thus 
unable to promote social change.71 My approach to writing dissent talces some 
elements of the Adornean position but has overall much more parallels with Lukacs' 
rejection of an avant-garde search for radical and authentic expression. Words, even 
if they dissolve into their own contradictions, can never be more than what we malce 
out of them. One can never guess how a word functions, Wittgenstein claims. One 
must first examine how it is used and then learn from it.72 
Any attempt to assert human agency through a critique of language that reaches 
beyond the ways in which words are embedded in their social and dialogical 
contexts, is in danger of ending up in a cul de sac. Adorno runs this danger when he 
searches for utopia in avant-garde aesthetics and relegates resistance to art and its 
hidden "it should be otherwise."73 This is the defeatist side of Adorno, which 
deplores that truth can never be plausible or directly communicable to everyone 
because each communicative step distorts and falsifies. 74 While I reject Adorno' s 
futile search for perfect expression and his resulting retreat into a pessimistic form of 
aesthetics, I accept the importance of the issue that feeds his dilemma, namely the 
recognition that writing styles, and language in general, are intrinsically linked to 
politics. 
71 Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, tr. M. Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), p. 88. 
72 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, p. 387, § 340. 
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Writing styles are issues of substance, sights of contestation. Critique of society 
cannot be separated from critique of language. The form of writing is as important 
as its content. Indeed, form is content. 
Any approach that attempts to exert human agency against the encroachment of 
thought by dominant discursive practices must grapple with this issue. This does not 
mean that a writing style necessarily needs to be difficult. The key is to write within 
the communicative restraints of existing language games while at the same time 
pushing their boundaries. To recognize this necessity is to do away with the myth 
that dissent can be articulated best by relying merely on a clear writing style. 
Michael Shapiro is among the authors who have most convincingly argued - and 
demonstrated - that resorting to this "old epistemology of 'clarity"' fails to recognize 
and deal with practices of domination that are embedded in language. 75 He draws 
attention to the importance of style, to how literary forms of writing, that is those 
who are self-conscious about their own figural practices, constitute important 
politicizing practices: 
Literary discourse ... is hyper-politicizing. By producing alternative forms of 
thought in language, it makes a political point. By virtue of its departures from 
linguistic normality, it points to the way that institutions hold individuals within a 
linguistic web. But it goes beyond this demonstration. It deforms image to show 
how accepted models of the real are productions of grammatical and rhetorical 
constructions, and it forms antagonistic imagery that provides sites for resistance to 
domination. 76 
There are, of course, many literary styles that have the potential to serve as 
discursive forms of dissent. Before focusing in detail on one of them, poetry, I 
illustrate, via a few examples, the range of possibilities for exploring the crucial links 
between form and substance, writing and dissent, literature and politics. 
I have already mentioned Nietzsche's and Adorno's preference for writing in 
fragments to avoid practices of domination that emerge from totalizing 
representations of the world. This substantive dimension of style is why many 
authors consider Nietzsche's resort to aphorisms as one of the most important 
contributions of his work. Just as Eagleton describes Adorno's language as 
"rammed up against silence where the reader has no sooner registered the one-
sidedness of some proposition than the opposite is immediately proposed, "77 one 
never finds Nietzsche engaging in concealment by upholding the correctness of a 
viewpoint without drawing attention to its contradictions, to the voices that linger in 
its shadows. This is why many prominent commentators, from Thomas Mann to 
75 Michael J. Shapiro, ''Literary Production as Political Practice," in Language and Politics, p. 230. 
See also his Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
76 Ibid., p. 239. 
77 Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 342. 
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Giorgio Colli, argue that to take Nietzsche literally is to be lost, for "he said 
everything, and the opposite of everything. "78 
The key to Nietzsche does not lie in his viewpoints, but in the style through 
which he opened up thinking space, celebrated diversity, and came to terms with the 
death of God. His thought is inseparable from his particular writing style. There 
are, of course, many other authors who relied upon aphorisms to push the 
boundaries of writing. Wittgenstein, for example, recognized the dangers of welding 
his ideas into an artificial whole, of forcing them against their will into an unbroken 
chain of coherent sequences. The best he could do, Wittgenstein claimed, would 
always remain philosophical remarks, fragments that defy the logic of a totality.79 
Paul de Man faced similar difficulties when dealing with a historical analysis of 
Romanticism. The stylistic conclusion he gained warrant citation: 
I feel myself compelled to repeated frustration in a persistent attempt to write as if a 
dialectical summation were possible beyond the breaks and interruptions that the 
readings disclose. The apparent resignation to aphorisms and parataxis is often an 
attempt to recuperate at the level of style what is lost at the level of history. By ,. 
stating the inevitability of fragmentation in a mcxle that is itself fragmented, one 
restores the aesthetic unity of manner and substance that may well be what is in 
question in the historical study of romanticism. 80 
The essay is a comparable stylistic form of dissent that may serve to engender 
human agency. It defies totalizing forms of representation by refusing to rely on 
methodological procedures that pretend to lead towards an authoritative form of 
knowledge. Montaigne was one of the earliest authors who employed the form of 
the essay to express his skeptical Humanism. Other well known representatives are 
the early Frankfurt School writers, in particular Lukacs, Benjamin and Adorno. 
An essay must fulfill a number of strict requirements, or so at least argues 
Adorno, who considers this genre as "the critical form par excellence."81 An essay is 
explicitly anti-authoritarian insofar as it recognizes no first principles, no standpoint 
outside itself. It negates everything that is systematic, that drifts towards a totalizing 
claim. To acknowledge that there are no transcending forms of knowledge is to 
accept the historical dimension of truth contents, it is to abandon the illusion of 
thought breaking out of culture into nature, of the subject piercing through layers of 
masking facades towards some sort of objectivity. 82 The consequences of such a 
78 Thomas Mann and Giorgio Colli, cited in Volker Gerhard. "Philosophie als Schicksal," 
postscript to Nietzsche's Jenseits von Gut und Bose (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1988/1886), p. 236. 
See also David B. Allison (ed), The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990/1985). 
79 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, p. 231. 
80 
Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. ix. 
81 Adorno, "Der Essay als Form," p. 27. 
82 Ibid., pp. 10, 19. 
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recognition are, of course, often branded as relativism. Adorno counters by arguing 
that the essay intends to free thought from its arbitrariness precisely by accepting 
arbitrariness into the essay's own procedures, instead of masking it as spontaneity. 83 
The result, then, is a form of writing much like de Man described the aphoristic style. 
The essay makes its hostility towards totalizing thought an integral part of its 
existence by revolving emphatically around the form of its presentation. Breaking 
free from conventionally recognized procedures, the essay begins where it wants to 
begin, discusses what it wants to discuss, ends where it feels itself completed, rather 
than where there is nothing left to say.84 
The novel is another literary form that contains possibilities for discursive 
dissent. There is room for diversity in the novel, a genre that is, like aphorisms and 
the essay, freed from the compulsion to present only one totalizing viewpoint. 
Lukacs, for example, points out that in the novel a totality can only exist in abstract 
terms. The relatively independent and unconnected parts of a novel endow it with an 
unfinished form, one that is always in the process of becoming. 85 Indeed, it is 
precisely with this insight into style that the later Lukacs defines the essence of 
praxis as "annulling that indifference of form towards content. "86 Mikhail Bakhtin 
argues along the same lines and considers the novel as an anarchic, insubordinate 
genre, a site of popular resistance against the hegemony of official and centralized 
authority. Here too style is considered not an innocent or neutral aesthetic 
dimension, but a political expression, an "epistemic choice. "87 Bakhtin deals 
specifically with Dostoevsky and the so-called polyphonic novel, a genre of writing 
that refuses to submit everything to a single objective narrative, a unifying authorial 
position and instead permits a "plurality of independent and umerged voices and 
consciousnessses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices."88 
The application of these subversive stylistic devises is, of course, unlimited. We 
find many 19th century women writers, like Mary Shelly, Jane Austen, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, or Dorothy Wordsworth, who employed the novel to subvert the 
dominant romantic discourse that celebrated a masculinist search for freedom beyond 
the dailiness of life. Their style did not imitate the voice of the male Romantic hero, 
but expressed their political struggle against oppression, articulated the concrete 
83 Ibid., p. 27. 
84 Ibid., pp. 10, 26. 
85 Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel, tr. A. Bostock (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971/1920), 
pp. 70-83. 
86 
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, tr. T. Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1971), p. 126. See also J.M. Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukacs, Marxism and the 
Dialectics of Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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daily frustrations of being pushed to the societal margins. 89 We know of 
contemporary African novelists, like Gabriel Okara, Chinua Achebe, Yvonne Vera or 
Ayi Kwei Annah, who "decolonize" the English language in an attempt to break free 
from the repressing forces of imperialism. This entails, as for example in the case of 
Annah, deliberately handling directions and time not through European concepts, 
but via localized terms like "the falling" and "the rising" (instead of west and east) or 
"seasons" and "moons" (instead of years and months).90 This simple example of 
stylistic dissent illustrates that the boundaries of language can be pushed without 
relying upon a difficult and obscure Adornean writing style. Franz Kafka's main 
novels, The Trial and The Castle, as well as many of his short-stories, are all written 
in very simple and direct German. Yet, Kafka's metaphorical story telling pierced 
through linguistic domination with such ease that he managed to advance one of the 
most powerful critiques of the modem condition. 
The resort to dialogues is another, more direct way of accepting fragmentation 
and resisting impositions from monological thought forms. Theater is the most 
explicit expression of this genre. It is not surprising that Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone 
de Beauvoir, Berthold Brecht, Helene Cixous and many other prominent social 
critics engaged in this form of stylistic dissent. Tom Stoppard claims to write plays 
because dialogue is the most respectable way of contradicting himself.91 But the 
notion of dialogue goes further than the theater. Many authors search for stylistic 
ways of articulating thoughts such that they do not silence other voices, but co-exist 
and interact with them. I have already mentioned Bakhtin's dialogism, a theory of 
knowledge and language that avoids the excluding tendencies of monological 
thought forms. Bakhtin accepts the existence of multiple meanings, draws 
connections between differences, and searches for possibilities to establish 
conceptual and linguistic dialogues among competing ideas, values, speech forms, 
texts, validity claims and the like. 92 Jurgen Habermas attempts to theorize the 
preconditions for ideal speech situations. Communication, in this case, should be as 
unrestrained as possible, such that "claims to truth and rightness can be discursively 
redeemed, "93 albeit, one should add, through a rationalism and universalism that is 
violently opposed to Bakhtin's and Adorno's anti-systemic thinking. We also know 
of feminists, like Christine Sylvester, who employ a method of empathetic 
89 Anne K. Mellor, Romanticism and Gender (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 9. For an account of 
more contemporary strategies of resistance in women's literature see, for example, Weigel, Die 
Stimme der Medusa. 
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cooperation, which aims at opening up questions of gender by a "process of 
positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears, and 
agendas of those one is unaccustomed to heeding when building social theory."94 
SUMMARY 
Disenchanted concepts, aphorisms, the essay, the novel, satire and dialogue are only 
examples of stylistic devices that can be employed to seek dialogue and 
transformation, to escape the encroaching grip of a totality and subvert practices of 
domination. There is no correct style, no language that solves the problem of 
representation and related practices of exclusion. 
An author who tries to exert human agency by engaging in linguistic dissent 
must defy the language of the dominant discourse in order not to get drawn into its 
powerful vortex. But s/he must also articulate alternative thoughts such that they 
are accessible enough to constitute viable tools to open up dialogical interactions. 
This can, of course, only be achieved if alternative knowledge can break out of 
intellectual obscurity, if it can reach and change the minds of most people. However, 
a text that breaks with established practices of communication to escape their 
discursive power has, by definition, great difficulties in doing this. Hence, writing is, 
as Roland Barthes claims, always a compromise between memory and freedom, 
between, on the one hand, being constrained by the long history of words, by the 
power of language to penetrate every single aspect of ·our writing, and, on the other 
hand, affirming one's freedom by an act of writing that is not just communication or 
expression, but a leap beyond the narrow confines of existing language games. 95 
Nietzsche was already well aware of this inevitable dilemma. Zarathustra is 
constantly tom back and forth between engaging with people and withdrawing from 
them. The masses fail to comprehend his attempts to defy herd instincts and 
problematize the unproblematic. "They do not understand me; I am not the mouth 
for these ears", he hails. "Must one smash their ears before they learn to listen with 
their eyes?"96 At times he appears without hope: "what matters a time that "has not 
time" for Zarathustra? ... why do I speak where nobody has my ears? It is still an 
hour too early for me here. "97 Succumbing to the power of language, Zarathustra 
returns to the mountains, withdraws in the solitude of his cave. But thoughts of 
engaging with humanity never leave him. He repeatedly climbs down from his cave 
to the depths of life, regains hope that monological discourses will give way to 
94 Christine Sylvester, ''Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR," in Millennium, Vol. 
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dialogue, that the herds will understand him one day: "But their hour will come! 
And mine will come too! Hourly they are becoming smaller, poorer, more sterile -
poor herbs! poor soil! and soon they shall stand there like dry grass and prairie - and 
verily, weary of themselves and languish even more than for water - for fire. "98 
No dissenting writer can hope to incinerate immediately the dry grass of 
orthodox linguistic prairies. Discourses live on and appear reasonable long after 
their premises have turned into anachronistic relics. More inclusive ways of thinking 
and acting cannot surface overnight. There are no quick solutions, no new 
paradigms or miraculous political settlements that one could hope for. 
Discursive forms of resistance do not engender human agency in an immediate 
and direct way. Writing dissent is a long process, saturated with obstacles and 
contradictions. It operates, as I outlined in the Interlude preceding this chapter, 
through tactical and temporal transformations of discursive practices. Zarathustra 
knew that too. It is in our daily practices of speaking, of forgetting and 
remembering that slow transformative potentials are hidden. Not around the 
inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world 
revolve; it revolves inaudibly."99 But the inaudible character of these transformative 
potentials does not make them any less real. 
The systems of domination and the possibilities for dissent that are embedded in 
language are as real as the practices of Realpolitik. They effect the daily lives of 
people as much as so-called 'real-world issues.' Language, in both speech and 
writing, is politics disguised. It contains powerful potential for human agency. With 
this recognition emerges a new kind of activist, situated, as Barthes notes, "half-way 
between militant and writer," taking from the former the commitment to act and 
from the latter the knowledge that the process of writing constitutes such an act. 100 
My task now is to remove one more layer of abstraction and demonstrate the 
practical dimension of writing dissent by analyzing how a specific stylistic form of 
resistance, usually thought to be the most esoteric of all - poetry -, can engender 
human agency in a concrete political setting. 
98 Ibid, p. 284. 
99 Ibid, p. 243. 





To be a poet in a destitute time means: to attend, singing, to the trace 
of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the world's 
night utters the holy. 
Martin Heidegger, "W ozu Dichter?" 
tr. A. Hofstadter 
Truth vanished once one came to terms with the death of God, once one accepted 
the impossibility of understanding the world in its totality, once one lay to rest the 
search for Archimedean foundations, be they theological, scientific, or moral. "No 
god any longer gathers men and things unto himself," Heidegger observes with a 
slight tone of regret. 1 People have lost the ability to grasp, taste, apprehend, even 
imagine the location of the holy source of knowledge. Truth fell into a bottomless 
pit. But the fugitive gods still linger around the holy source and provide us with 
hints about its location - hints full of ambiguities and contradictions. Poetry, 
Heidegger claims, is the instrument that comes closest to apprehending these hints. 
1 Martin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" in Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. A. Hofstadter (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971/1936), p. 91. 
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It is the voice that senses the trace of the fugitive gods, stays on their tracks, and 
shows to its kindred mortals "the way toward the turning. "2 
Poetry as the preeminent discursive terrain of dissent, the ultimate sphere of 
revealing? No. Poetry cannot leap beyond language games. To elevate poetry on a 
golden pedestal that towers over other forms of writing and speaking is highly 
problematic. One then simply engages in one more futile and dangerous attempt to 
resurrect the fallen God. 
Poetry is neither pure nor innocent. A poem can be as much part of a linguistic 
system of domination as any other genre. Consider how poetry was employed by 
many authoritarian regimes in eastern Europe to legitimize forms of domination. 
Poets were often mere spokespeople for the government, singing countless lyrical 
hymns to the greatness of autocratic political leaders and their statist five-year plans. 
These hymns turned many dissidents away from poetry. Their memory is one of 
"lyrical blindness," of a time when "the poet reigned along with the executioner." 
They speak of the darkest side of lyrics, of "a gulag that has poems plastering its 
outside walls and people dancing before them."3 Heidegger's own political behavior, 
of course, was not beyond scrutiny either. Thrown into a destitute time, he tried to 
attend to the trace of the fugitive gods and utter the holy, but ended up singing 
heartily to the rhythm of Nazi military tunes. 
What, then, is the point of illustrating an inquiry into discursive dissent with an 
excursus on poetry? Why, indeed, preoccupy oneself with a form of speaking and 
writing whose impact remains confined, in most cases, to a very small literary 
audience? And even if poetry is indeed able serve as an instrument to exert human 
agency, how can one possibly assess the processes by which it transforms social 
practices? These difficult questions beg for complex answers. I do not claim to 
have found them all, nor do I believe that all can be found, at least not in an absolute 
and definitive way. 
I focus my attempt to elucidate the links between language and human agency 
on the German-Jewish poet Paul Celan. Situated in the immediate post-war period, 
Celan's work reflects a larger societal struggle with the problematic burden of recent 
German history. Celan epitomizes the search for words and integrity in a destitute 
time, the effort to disassociate the German language from its Nazi past, so that it 
becomes possible to speak once more, critically, dialogically, humanely. Pragmatic 
and didactic reasons have guided my decision to focus on Celan. I could as well 
have illustrated my points by returning to the political context I scrutinized in part 
two of this thesis. Yet, a thorough analysis of how poetry and literature transformed 
societal values in East Germany cannot be conducted in a chapter-length expose, at 
2 Ibid., p. 94. See also L.M. Vail, "Revealing and Concealing," in Heidegger and Ontological 
Difference (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972), pp. 25-46. 
3 Milan Kundera, Testaments Betrayed, tr. L. Asher (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 157. 
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least not without being forced to confine oneself to sweeping assertions and 
meaningless cliches. David Bathrick' s recent study on this topic convincingly 
demonstrates the complexities - as well as the crucial role played by - linguistic 
dissent in East Germany.4 
An analysis of Paul Celan' s poetry allows for a more focused investigation into 
the role that discursive dissent plays in social struggles. Celan illustrates, almost 
perfectly, the potential and limits of exerting human agency through critique of 
language. I demonstrate the range of this potential from two different perspectives. 
At one level I observe the impact of Celan's poems, particularly his early ones, on 
societal dynamics in post-war Germany. I am not pretending to establish a definitive 
and positive assertion of human agency from these observations. A longer and more 
thorough study may be able tackle some aspects of this difficult task more 
successfully. I merely draw attention to the important role that literature plays in the 
evolution of discursive struggles. At a second, more abstract level, I illustrate the 
workings of discursive dissent by focusing on the actual functioning of Celan' s 
poetry. The evidence provided there is primarily theoretical, that is, I show through 
what processes critique of language can break through aspects of the existing 
discursive order. By closely reading and examining passages of two specific poems I 
demonstrate how a deliberate stretching, even violating, of linguistic conventions can 
open up spaces to think and act. 
It is primarily at this abstract and theoretical level that an analysis of poetry gains 
relevance beyond the relatively narrow and often elitist social circle within which the 
poetic imagination holds sway. Because of its self-conscious engagement with the 
links between form and substance, poetry serves as a model that depicts the general 
process of stretching the boundaries of language games. What one can learn from 
observing poetic subversions of linguistically entrenched forms of domination can 
facilitate understanding, at least to some extend, of how dissent functions in more 
mundane, daily acts of speaking and writing, which, by definition, mostly elude the 
eyes and ears of intellectual observers. 
COME SEE THE BLOOD IN THE STREETS: PRELIMINARY 
REMARKS ABOUT POETIC DISSENT 
Before dealing in detail with Celan' s poetry it is necessary to address a number of 
preliminary questions about the poetic imagination - questions that deal with what 
poetry actually is, how one can talk about it and, indeed, why it matters all. 
What distinguishes poetic expressions from other forms of speaking and writing? 
There are no clear-cut answers. Attempts to define poetry are as vague as they are 
4 
David Bathrick, The Powers of Speech: The Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
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divergent. In its broadest meaning, the poetic refers to literature in general. For 
Paul Valery, for example, poetics is not simply the study of the aesthetic rules 
concerning poetry, but a preoccupation with all forms of composition in which 
language is means and substance at the same time. 5 This working definition is the 
broad starting point for Tzvetan Todorov, Julia Kristeva and many others who deal 
with the poetic. 6 Implied in this approach, and at times explicitly articulated, are 
many ideas of Russian formalists. We recognize, for example, the influential voice of 
Roman Jakobson, who, like Valery, refuses either to reduce the poetic function to 
poetry or limit poetry to the poetic function. 7 What matters is whether or not the 
poetic function becomes dominant in a literary work. This is the case if a word 
possesses its own weight and value, if it is perceived as a word, and not simply as a 
substitute for an object. 8 
The question of style, then, is central to the poetic imagination. Valery further 
clarifies this point by contrasting the role of form in poetry and prose. He argues 
that prose works in a direct line, it takes the path of least resistance. Form is not 
preserved within prose, but disappears as soon as it has fulfilled its purpose. Once 
you have understood the content of my speech, Valery illustrates, the form of my 
speech becomes meaningless, it vanishes from your memory. The form of the poem, 
by contrast, does not vanish after its usage. It is an integral part of speech, designed 
to rise from its ashes.9 
Any definition of poetry that tries to be more specific than drawing attention to 
the importance of form runs the risk of undermining the very power that poetry may 
be able to unleash. The boundaries that separate poetry from other forms of writing 
are always in flux. Indeed, it is precisely this fluidity, the refusal to accept what is, 
that sets poetry apart. A poem is a conscious transgression of existing linguistic 
conventions, a protest against an established language game and the systems of 
exclusion that are embedded in it. In this sense poetry sets itself apart from prose 
because it negates, not by chance or as a side effect, but because it cannot do 
otherwise, because this is what poetry is all about.10 
If form is indeed the essence of poetry, then the problem arises of how to talk 
about it. Because style is what sets poetry apart from other forms of writing, one 
5 Paul Valery, Variete V (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 291. 
6 Tzvetan Todorov, Poetigue, vol. 2 of Qu'est-ce gue le structuralism? (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1968), pp. 15-28; Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984). 
7 
Roman Jakobson, Essais de linguistigue general (Paris: Minuit, 1963), p. 218. 
8 
Roman Jakobson, "Qu'est-ce que la poesie," in Huit questions de poetigue, tr. M. Derrida (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1977/1933), p. 46. 
9 Paul Valery, "Propos sur la Poesie," cited in Jean-Louis Joubert, La Poesie (Paris: Armand Colin, 
1988), p . 53. 
10 Ulrich Schodlbauer, "Die Modernitatsfalle der Lyrik," in Merkur, No 551, vol. 49, No 2, Feb 
1995, p. 174. 
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cannot simply translate the meaning of poetry into prose, explain its significance in a 
language familiar to our daily forms of verbal interaction. How can poetics, the study 
of poetry, possibly do justice to its object of inquiry? To speak of a poem, Heidegger 
warns, is to judge from the outside what a poem is. No position, no insight can ever 
justify such a presumptuous approach. 11 This is why Celan, when asked to explain 
the meaning of his poems, often replied: "Read! Just keep reading. Understanding 
comes of itself. "12 The point, then, is not to drown poetry in an ocean of 
explanatory prose, but to let a poem speak, to accept its authority and listen to the 
stylistic method of dissent that operates at its core. Consequently, I will frequently 
rely upon direct citations of poems and weave my analysis of dissent around them. 
But the problem of speaking about poetry cannot be solved simply by means of 
quotation. 
No poem can ever represent or even illustrate what poetry is all about. Because 
the poem strives for openness it refuses to speak for a totality. Because the poem 
searches for cracks in hegemonies, voices that have gone unnoticed, it is an instant 
of subversive particularity. Paul Celan explains in one of his rare excursions from 
poetry into poetics: "But I am speaking of poetry that does not exist! The absolute 
poem - no, it certainly does not exist, it cannot exist! 13 Heidegger, likewise, explains 
that "no single poem, not even all of them taken together, can tell everything."14 
Poetry deals with the particular, but it is not primarily about this or that argument, 
this or that idea. It is about searching for a language that provides us with different 
eyes, different ways of perceiving what we already know, it is about unsettling, 
making strange that which is familiar, about opening up thinking space . and creating 
possibilities to act in more inclusive ways. No isolated citation ever does justice to 
this objective. Only an extended reading of poetry can succeed in stretching the 
boundaries of our minds. 
What are we left with if poetry cannot be explained in prose and if there is no 
absolute poem either, one that could represent and illuminate the power of poetry? 
We must attempt the impossible task of speaking about the unspeakable. Heidegger 
has some ideas about how to tackle this difficult puzzle. For him, a poem 
surrounded by the noise of unpoetic language is like a bell hanging freely outside. 
Even the slightest snowfall would throw it out of tune. Each comment to a poem, he 
frets, may well do nothing but cast snow unto the bell. But because there is no 
absolute poem we must still look for a way to talk about poetry, a way that swirls up 
as little snow as possible. What we must aim for, Heidegger suggests, is a form of 
11 Martin Heidegger, Erlauterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), p. 
182. 
12 Celan cited in Israel Chalfen, Paul Celan: A Biography of His Youth, tr. M. Bleyleben (New 
York: Persea Books, 1991/1979), p. xi. 
13 Paul Celan, "Der Meridian," in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986/1958), 
p. 199. 
14 Heidegger, "Die Sprache im Gedicht," in Unterwegs zur Sprache (Stuttgart, Verlag Gtinter 
Neske, 1959/1953), pp. 37-8. 
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comment that renders itself obsolete once it is spoken; a form of comment that 
explains but then defers authority back to the poem. 15 To search for this formless 
form is the methodological challenge of this chapter. 
One more preliminary issue needs to be raised before I can begin to ring the bells 
of poetic dissent. It is, in many ways, the most crucial issue: does poetry really 
matter? How could it possibly constitute a meaningful and influential practice of 
discursive dissent? Is poetry not a mere entrance key to the society of high culture, a 
pleasant distraction for those who have the leisure to pursue it, for those whose 
privileged education has rendered the obscure style of poems accessible? Is poetry 
not simply an ode to the beauty of life as viewed from the sheltered living rooms of 
the upper classes? Not so, argues many a poet. 
Poetry is for everyone, it deals with the dailiness of life, its good and bad sides. 
This is why Pablo Neruda believes we should look for poetry that is "steeped in 
sweat and in smoke, smelling of lilies and urine. "16 His poetry not only speaks of 
love and beauty, but is also permeated with a profound concern for social justice, for 
the impurity of the human condition. Neruda in Residencia en la tierra, one ofhls 
early collections that gives voice to his experiences with the Spanish civil war and 
the murder of a fellow poet: 
Would you know why his poems 
never mention the soil or the leaves, 
the gigantic volcanoes of the country that bore him? 
Come see the blood in the streets, 
come see 
the blocxl in the streets, 
come see the blood 
in the streets! 17 
The fact that poets are concerned with political issues - and Neruda is certainly no 
exception - does not immediately render poetry politically relevant. Poetry needs to 
be read and understood as well. It must change the way people think. But who still 
reads poetry today? In the time of the early Greeks, for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 
and many others, poetry and philosophy were inseparable. As recently as the 
nineteenth century, when romantics searched for new ways of self-expression, poetry 
played a central role in Western thought and, indeed, in everyday activities of many 
people. These times are clearly gone. Poetry today lingers at the margins of 
societies. With poetry removed from the center of human activity, our time has 
become destitute because, as Heidegger notes, "it lacks the unconcealedness of the 
15 Heidegger, Erlauterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung, p. 194. 
16 
Pablo Neruda, "Toward an Impure Poetry" in Pablo Neruda: Five Decades, tr. B. Belitt (New 
York: Grove Press, 1974), p. 57. 
17 Neruda, "A Few Things Explained" in Pablo Neruda, p. 57. 
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nature of pain, death, and love."18 Our time may, indeed, be destitute because the 
languages of economic rationalism and mass media entertainment have taken over 
our minds, established the frameworks of collective thinking patterns. Are we 
simply to throw up our hands in despair? No. 
Poetry still contains powerful potential to resist the delineation of thought and 
action. This chapter is in some ways a pledge to resurrect poetry in a destitute time, 
to bring back stylistic dissent into the dailiness of our lives. But my approach to 
poetry is more than a mere longing for utopia, an argument for stretching thinking 
space. Poetry has not died out entirely. Some of its subversive elements remain 
alive, as my analysis will show. Despite being restricted in its circle of influence, 
poetry remains a practice of dissent that can engage discursive struggle. Maybe even 
more importantly, the process through which poetry stretches language games 
provide valuable lessons that can be useful for understanding the workings and 
impact of m_ore mundane, daily acts of speaking and writing. 
BLACK MILK OF DAYBREAK: SEARCHING FOR THINKING 
SPACE AFTER AUSCHWITZ 
I use the work of Paul Celan to illustrate the functioning and practical relevance of 
poetry as a method of discursive dissent, as a way of engendering human agency. 
Born in Bukovina in 1920, Celan became one of the most influential German 
language poets of the postwar period. Although he spent most of his adult life in 
Paris, Celan' s poetry is marked most by his experience of living the second World 
War, as a Jew, under Soviet and then German occupation. He first managed to 
avoid arrest and then survived the later part of the war in a labor camp in Southern 
Moldavia. Both of his parents, however, died in German concentration camps. 19 
Celan's entire work deals in some ways with the processes through which one can 
come to terms with such a disaster, with how one can pierce through the silence of 
language and speak once more. 
Every single German word in the immediate post-War period was drenched in 
blood. Every word carried the crushing weight of the Holocaust. Language was not 
just an innocent bystander to the horrors of Nazism. Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler 
did not just happen to speak German. According to George Steiner "Nazism found 
in the [German] language precisely what it needed to give voice to its savagery." 
How could a simple word like 'spritzen,' Steiner illustrates, ever recover from 
"having signified for millions the 'spurting' of Jewish blood from knife points?"20 
18 Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" p. 97. 
19 For biographical accounts see Chalfen, Paul Celan and John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, 
Survivor, Jew (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 
20 Georg Steiner, "The Hollow Miracle," in Language and Silence (New York: Penguin, 1967), pp. 
140-3. 
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Dennis Schmidt considers this recognition from a wider perspective and argues, 
convincingly, that no language can ever speak without marking its relation to both 
history and culture, without evoking the memory of what it has spoken or of the 
anticipation it has permitted.21 
How is it possible to speak again in the language of the butchers without being 
immediately sucked into its tainted linguistic vortex? Celan' s poetry is a direct 
engagement with this highly political linguistic dilemma. For him, the German 
language "had no words to express what happened." Language, he stresses, "had to 
walk through its own loss of answers, through its terrible silence, through the 
thousand darknesses of deathbringing speech:"22 
Should, 
should a man, 
should a man come into the world, today, with 
the shining beard of the 
patriarchs: he could, 
if he spoke of this 
time,he 
could 
only babble and babble, 
over, over 
againagain. 23 
The point of Celan' s poetry, then, is not to search for harmony and beauty, but 
simply to speak and live again, to lift the burdensome weig4t from some of the most 
tainted words, to create space for a more inclusive and humane politics. We thus see 
him shaking the German language, exploring the power of form, rattling at some of 
the links between words and meanings that are considered unproblematic, beyond 
reproach, beyond questioning. Some suggest that this is to "dissolve that which is 
irreparable .... , to erase the dark image of horror and shame."24 But this erasure is 
only an erasure of hegemonic historiography and of the destructive feeling of 
revenge. It does not aim at erasing history altogether. The crucial issue, indeed, is 
one of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. of coming to terms with history, of dealing with 
the horror of the past and finding more inclusive ways of looking at what happened. 
Poetry, then, fulfills the task of a critical memory, it assures a presence beyond death 
21 Schmidt, "Black Milk and Blue: Celan and Heidegger on Pain and Language," in A. Fioretos 
(ed), Word Traces: Readings of Paul Celan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
p. 117. See also Martine Broda, "Paul Celan, la politique d'un poete apres Auschwitz," in J. 
Ranciere (ed), La Politigue des Poetes (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992), pp. 215-227. 
22 Paul Celan, "Ansprache anlasslich der Entgegennahme des Literaturpreises der Freien 
Hansestadt Bremen," in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. III, pp. 185-6. 
23 Paul Celan, ''Tiibingen, Janner," in Die Niemandsrose, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, p. 226, tr. M. 
Hamburger in Poems of Paul Celan (New York: Persea Books, 1988/1972), p. 177. 
24 Gerard Vincent, Sous le soleil noir du temps: Trakl, Mandelstam, Celan (Lausanne: Editions 
l'age d'homme, 1991), p. 113. See also Alan Udoff, "On Poetic Dwelling: Situating Celan and the 
Holocaust," in Fioretos, Word Traces, pp. 320-351. 
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and beyond the current, historically delineated moment. 25 It remembers in the name 
of those who cannot remember, for, in Celan's words, "No one/ bears witness for 
the / witness. "26 
By expressing the stories and voices that have drowned in the hegemony of 
dominant language games, Celan engages in critique of language as I introduced the 
term in the previous chapter. His poetic rethinking of the Holocaust is an expression 
of human agency, an everyday form of resistance that slowly transforms political 
practices by engaging with the construction and reconstruction of societal values. 
But Celan' s poems are clearly not limited to this historically specific task. They also 
address the very dilemma of how to speak about something for which there are no 
words, how to give voice to those who have been silenced. 
Hence, my analysis of Celan' s poems deals not only with the state of the German 
language in the post-War period, but also with the larger issues that are at stake in 
the practice of linguistic dissent. One could, for example, apply the same type of 
logic and examine aspects of exclusion and inclusion in contemporary English: How 
to speak in a language that has structurally excluded women, the Other, anybody and 
anything that cannot be identified with the speaking subject? How to speak in a 
language that has historically evolved from the center of the world, first from the 
British Colonial Empire, then from the vantage point of American hegemony, and 
now as the new lingua franca of international political, economic and cultural 
interactions? How to express those silenced voices, those worlds that lie beyond the 
linguistic zone of exclusion that the global dominanc~ of English has established? 
How to decenter the center through the language of the center? Celan' s poetry 
shows us a way of dealing with these important and difficult issues, with how, as 
Heidegger puts it, "the mortal ones can learn, once more, how to live in language."27 
I demonstrate the practical dimensions entailed in critique of language by 
focusing on two of Celan's best known poems, 'Deathfugue' and 'Stretto.' My task 
is not primarily one of interpretation, for both of these rather long poems have 
already received widespread attention. They are, indeed, among the most 
25 Durs Grtinbein, ''Zu Kieseln gehartet: Uber das lyrische Sprechen," in Neue Zurcher Zeitung. 30 
September 1995, p. 50. See also Jacques Derrida, "Shibboleth for Paul Celan," tr. J. Wilner, in 
Fioretos, Word Traces, pp. 3-72. 
26 Celan, "Aschenglorie," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 72, 
27 Heidegger, "Die Sprache im Gedicht," p. 38. The relationship between Celan and Heidegger 
was, for obvious reasons, complex and highly problematic. Heidegger preoccupied himself 
intensely with Celan 's poetry. Celan, in turn, was strongly influenced by Heidegger's writings on 
poetry. Celan's most important poetological text, "Der Meridian," may not refer directly to 
Heidegger. His name, however, is "written .. .in invisible ink throughout and across the text." 
(Veronique M Foti, Heidegger and the Poets. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1992, p. 99). One of 
Celan 's best known poems, ''Todtnauberg," expresses the hope that Heidegger may, after all, break 
his stubborn silence about the Holocaust. The poem talks about "a hope, today, / of a thinking 
man's I coming/ word/ in the heart, ... " Celan, "Todtnauberg," tr. M. Hamburger, Poems of Paul 
Celan, p. 293, 28. 
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interpreted and translated contemporary poems. Rather, I select a few passages 
from them to demonstrate, via the text and its interpretations, the potential for 
human agency entailed in poetic dissent. Needless to say, this truncation does 
violence to the structure, the rhythm and, indeed, to the very essence of these poems. 
Thus, my more limited task of demonstrating aspects of dissent entailed in those 
poems cannot replace the process of reading them closely. 
'Deathfugue,' composed in the mid 1940s, is the poem that won Celan 
immediate and widespread recognition when it was published in 1952. It is also his 
most direct, explicit and accessible way of dealing with the Holocaust. The 
following opening stanza establishes the themes that then interchangeably reoccur in 
rhythmic form through the remaining parts of the poem: 
Black milk of daybreak we drink it at sundown 
we drink it at noon in the morning we drink it at night 
we drink it and we drink it 
we dig a grave in the breezes there one lies unconfined 
A man lives in the house he plays with the serpents he writes 
he writes when dusk falls to Germany your golden hair 
Margarete 
he writes it and steps out of doors and the stars are flashing he 
whistles his pack out 
he whistles his Jews out in earth has them dig for a grave 
he commands us strike up for the dance ... 28 
There are many different interpretations of this poem. For Jerry Glenn ~oeathfugue' 
is a relatively realistic description of a concentration camp, narrated through the 
polyphonic voices of its victims. Concrete images, like a Nazi official (the man in 
the house who 'whistles his Jews'), take turn with more indirect, but still easily 
recognizable accounts of events (like 'he commands us strike up for the dance,' 
which, allegedly, alludes to the actual existence of orchestras in some camps).29 
Michel Hamburger interprets the poem as a release of Celan' s personal anguish 
through a "distancing imagery and musical structure" that seems altogether 
incompatible, at least at first sight, with an event as atrocious as the Holocaust. But 
thinking space emerges precisely by contrasting the celebration of beauty with the 
commemoration of destruction. 30 
Celan' s critics warned that this "aestheticizing" of the death camps would only 
help to turn the Holocaust into a form of art. Representative for this position is 
Theodor Adorno' s notorious assertion that it is impossible to write poetry after 
28 Celan, ''Todesfuge," in Mohn und Gedachtnis, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, p. 41, tr. Hamburger 
as "Death Fugue," in Poems of Paul Celan, p. 61. 
29 Jerry Glenn, Paul Celan (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1973), pp. 69-70. 
30 Hamburger, "Introduction" to Poems of Paul Celan, p. 22. 
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Auschwitz, that even the attempt to do so would be barbaric.31 Many disagree, then 
and now. John Caputo, for example, argues that even though 'Deathfugue' 
embodies the paradox of being beautiful, it does not bestow beauty or meaning upon 
the Holocaust. It is simply a gesture of morning that fulfills the above mentioned 
poetic function of memory, of recording a disaster in the heart.32 It is a linguistic 
gesture of morning whose rhythmical structure and visual image was unique enough 
to leave a lasting mark on a collective societal consciousness. Celan, in this sense, 
has demonstrated that poetry goes on after Auschwitz, with or without the 
permission of Adorno and other philosophers or literary critics. Poetry simply 
happens, not as logos, not as meaning, but, as in the case of 'Deathfugue,' as a 
method of letting the disaster stand out, as a wail, a cry in the midst of silence, a 
lament in a void of meaning. 33 
But what is so special about the poetic form of mourning, of recording a 
disaster? What sets the polyphonic play of 'Deathfugue' apart from comparable 
prose accounts of the Holocaust? More than any other form of writing, poetry 
revolves around the usage of tropes: words that are bestowed with a temporary 
meaning which differs from their common signfication. Besides metonyms and 
synecdoches, metaphors are the most common and most important tropes in poetry. 
Having command of them, Aristotle already believed, is by far the greatest thing, 
"the mark of a genius."34 
Metaphors transfer the common meaning of a word into a form of signification 
that only achieves meaning by way of a mental effort. 'Black milk of daybreak' is the 
first and one of the most central metaphors of 'Deathfugue.' Mille is feminine. It 
stands for life, birth, youth, nourishment. It is hope, the good life. In the mythology 
of the Old Testament, milk is the symbol of clarity, fertility and purity.35 But Celan 
talks of black milk, an obvious oxymoron. The blackening of the milk alludes, some 
suggest, to the clouds of smoke that emerge from the crematories. Together with 
the man in the house who 'plays with the serpents,' this metaphor signifies alienation 
and evil. 36 Black, then, is death, the annihilation of the milk's comfort and 
nourishment. 'Daybreak' refers to the dawn of each day in the camp, the ever-
recurring swallowing of black milk, the suffering, the lack of hope. The German 
word for daybreak (Friihe) also stands for early, as in early times. Thus, 'black milk 
of daybreak' can also be a metaphor for "the entire history of Jewish suffering; from 
31 
Thecxlor W. Adorno, Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt; Suhrkamp, 1955), p. 
31. 
32 
John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant 
Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 183. 
33 Ibid., pp. 181-2. 
34 
Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry. tr. S.H. Butcher (New York: The Library of Liberal Art, 1948), 
XXII, p. 31. 
35 
Wolfgang Menzel, "Celan's Gedicht 'Todesfuge,"' cited in Glenn, Paul Celan, p. 72. 
36 Glenn, Paul Celan, p. 70. 
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the days of Babylonian captivity to the Nazi death camps. "37 These are, of course, 
not the only possible interpretations of the opening metaphor of 'Deathfugue.' 
Tropes cannot be narrowed down to a clearly delineated interpretation. They refuse 
single meanings, defy our temptation of squeezing a truth content out of verbal 
statements. 
Metaphors ask the reader to identify a semantic link between the common 
meaning of a word and its trope. By exploring the tension between identity and 
difference, metaphors turn into discursive strategies that provide us with new ways 
of looking at the world. A metaphor then becomes, according to Paul Ricoeur, "the 
rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have 
to redescribe reality. "38 Metaphors are used in all practices of writing and speaking. 
Indeed, the previous chapter emphasized, via Nietzsche, that language itself is a way 
of producing reality through an infinite series of metaphors. Even texts deemed to 
rely on neutral and non-metaphorical language rely on tropes to present their 
positions. 39 
What sets poetry apart from most other forms of writing is its self-consciousness 
about the usage of tropes. Instead of masking them as non-figurative speech, poetry 
makes tropes an integral part of its stylistic effort to stretch the boundaries of 
language games. Some even argue that metaphors in poetry are qualitatively 
different from the ones employed in prose. Michael Oakeshott, for example, claims 
that words in a poem are no longer simply signs for other images. As opposed to 
prose, where the metaphor always remains a symbol because it merely makes use of 
natural or conventional correspondences, the language of poetry works differently. 
Here, metaphors become poetic images themselves. They do not explore "reality." 
They have no settled value that corresponds to some conventional or natural point of 
reference.40 But Oakeshott has led us into a difficult terrain ahead of schedule. We 
can only venture safely onto this slippery surface with the security that a prior closer 
reading of Celan' s poetry provides. 
Elements of style and rhythm reinforce and intensify the power of tropes in 
'Deathfugue.' Compare the above cited opening stanza with the following final 
lines: 
37 L.L. Duroche, "Paul Celan's 'Todesfuge,"' in Glenn, Paul Celan, pp. 73-4. 
38 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, tr. R. Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1977/1975), p. 7. 
39 See Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," in M.J. Shapiro (ed), Language and Politics 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 195-214. 
40 Michael Oakeshott, ''The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind," in Rationalism in 
Politics and other Essays (London: Methuen & Co, 1962), p. 235. 
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Black milk of daybreak we drink you at night 
we drink you at noon death is a master from Germany 
we drink you at sundown and in the morning we drink and we 
drink you 
death is a master from Germany his eyes are blue 
he strikes you with leaden bullets his aim is true 
a man lives in the house your golden hair Margarete 
he sets his pack on to us he grants us a grave in the air 
he plays with the serpents and daydreams death is a master from 
Germany 
your golden hair Margarete 
your ashen hair Shulamith41 
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The opening of the poem indicates the relentless recurrence of suffering through the 
drinking of black milk, mornings, afternoons, evenings, nights. The above passage 
shows how this circle is itself repeated again and again, in different forms, 
throughout the entire poem. Its monotony and lack of punctuation evoke the 
drudgery of life in a concentration camp, the resignation of the masses of Jews who 
are silently condemned to death.42 But 'Deathfugue' does not just repeat, it alters 
and intensifies the repetitions at the same time. Black milk is now no longer referred 
to in the third person ('we drink it') but in the second one ('we drink you'), thus 
increasing the sense of despair which permeates the poem. In the second passage the 
refrain-like metaphor of drinking black milk is also abruptly interrupted by the phrase 
'death is a master from Germany.' This sudden intrusion into the polyphonic play of 
the victims, which remains a key feature until the poem's end, reveals the increasing 
proximity of the victims to the oppressor and to death itself .. 43 Despair is at its peak, 
and the only way out, the only form of freedom left is to escape the tortured mortal 
body and search for 'the breezes [ w ]here one lies unconfined,' to be granted a 'grave 
in the air.' The final lines of the poem then slow down, enter a state of transition, a 
trance where evil and suffering blur into daydreams, until, at last, death emerges 
from the victims' final words. The only task left is to give Sulamith, covered with 
ash, the last word and the silence after, the power of "holding unto what Nazism 
tried to erase: a rooted identity.',44 
THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSING THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF 
POETIC DISSENT 
How is one to assess the political influence of a poem like 'Deathfugue,' the extent 
to which it may have engendered a slow transformation of societal values? 
41 Celan, "Todesfuge," p. 42, tr. Hamburger p. 63. 
42 Clarise Samuels, Holocaust Visions: Surrealism and Existentialism in the Poetry of Paul Celan 
(Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993), p. 101. 
43 Glenn, Paul Celan, pp. 75-6. 
44 John Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 41. 
The Politics of Apolitical Poetry 210 
There are no direct ways of assessing discursive dissent, for its impact on social 
dynamics is mediated through tactical and temporal processes. I have already 
outlined, especially in the Second Interlude, why there is no 'hard evidence' that can 
provide positive and unconditional support for a specific hypothesis about the 
working of poetic dissent. 
A poem like 'Deathfugue' does not directly cause particular events, it does not 
visualize an opponent in space and time. A linguistic expression of dissent works in 
tactical manners, that is, it insinuates itself into its target - the population at large -
without taking it over, but also without being separated from it. Even the agent 
becomes gradually blurred. Celan may well have written 'Deathfugue,' but its effect 
cannot be reduced to its author or even to the poem itself. Those who have read the 
poem, those whose constitution of the Holocaust memory has been reshaped by 
Celan' s polyphony, may have passed bits of altered knowledge on to other people. 
' Furthermore, Celan was, of course, not the only one who struggled with linguistic 
silences of the Nazi period and its aftermath. Countless other poets, novelists and 
playwrights have done so too. And there are even more agents, common men and 
women, faceless and innumerable, whose daily acts of speaking and writing have 
subverted the remnants of a linguistically sanctioned form of domination. 
Discursive forms of dissent will always remain elusive. But this does not render 
ensuing manifestations of human agency less potent or real. Neither does this 
recognition invalidate efforts to assess the role of language in promoting processes 
of social change. It does, however, call for a more subtle and sensitive approach to 
the question of evidence. 
In the case of 'Deathfugue,' convincing evidence for its impact on social 
dynamics can be found on countless fronts. The prominence of this poem 
contributed to Celan' s reputation as one of the leading German language poets of the 
post-war period. When 'Deathfugue' appeared in the early 1950s, literary critics 
generally embraced it, as Hans Egon Holthusen did in the influential journal Merkur, 
as "one of the most splendid Zeitgedichte (period poems) we have.',45 The influence 
of 'Deathfugue' soon spread beyond the narrow circle of intellectuals who 
preoccupy themselves with poetics. Several generations of German high school 
children have learned 'Deathfugue' by heart. It has been anthologized countless 
times and today, half a century after the flowing of black milk, 'Deathfugue' 
represents an important critical memory of the Nazi period. 
The tropes of 'Deathfugue' still stand as significant and widely-used cultural 
markers that signify the necessity for a continuous critical engagement with 
Germany's past. Metaphors, such as 'death is a master from Germany' or 'your 
45 
Hans Egon Holthusen, in Merkur, 1954, as cited by Agnes Korner Domandi, Modern German 
Literature (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1972), p. 150. 
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ashen hair Shulamith' have served, for example, as titles for several anthologies and 
a recent prominent Holocaust television documentary.46 Each episode of this six-
hour series, broadcasted in April and May 1990, begins with a "full-screen image of 
Celan' s face, then pans over death camps and monuments as his voice is heard 
reciting [Deathfugue] in its entirety. ,,47 Many other examples illustrate how the 
German public has, as John Felstiner underlines, absorbed 'Deathfugue' as a virtual 
institution. Its polyphony was recited in the German parliament in 1988, on the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Kristallnacht. Several composers rendered 
Celan' s poem into vocal and instrumental combinations. By 1991, there were more 
than 100 musical compositions of Celan's texts. A Jewish dance group performed 
'Deathfugue' in their repertory and several lines invoking Margarete and Shulamith 
appeared on paintings by Anselm Kiefer.48 
For Felstiner the prolonged impact of 'Deathfugue' on German society and 
politics cannot be overestimated. It is one of these rare poems, he believes, that 
upsets assumptions and forces new choices: 
This astonishing piece of writing has drawn more passionate attention than any 
other poem from the war. What looms largest is its public career since 1952, when 
it came out in Germany. The Guemica of postwar European literature, 
"Todesfuge" has become a historical agent, accumulating its own biography ... [N]o 
lyric has exposed the exigencies of its time so radically as this one, whose speakers 
- Jewish prisoners tyrannized by a camp commandant - start off with the words 
"Black milk of daybreak we drink it at [sundown]." 49 
Felstiner's claims are rather bold, but not unrealistic. Others agree and point 
towards the key role Celan played in post-War discussions about the possibilities and 
impossibilities of contemporary poetry to deal with an event like the Holocaust. 50 
Even the pessimistic Adorno had to revise his earlier position and admit, although 
with several decades delay, that his hasty dismissal of poetry "may have been 
wrong." He even went as far as crediting Celan with writing poetry that achieves the 
near impossible: to resist the tendency of language to reify itself. 51 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of Celan' s influence on German social and 
political dynamics, it remains difficult to determine how exactly 'Deathfugue' may 
have expressed manifestations of human agency. Celan' s poetry is no heroic 
46 Dieter Lamping (ed), Dein Aschenes Haar Sulamith: Dichtung iiber den Holocaust (Miinchen: 
Piper, 1992); Berndt Jentzsch (ed), Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland: Deportation und 
Vernichtung in poetichen Zeugnissen (Milnchen, 1979). 
47 Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 330. 
48 Ibid, pp. 288. 
49 
Ibid., pp. 26-7, 34, 70-1, 118, and "Introduction" to Chalfen, Paul Celan, p. xxvii. 
50 
Monika Schmitz-Emans, "Paul Celan," in H. Steinecke (ed), Deutsche Dichter des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1994), p. 648. 
51 
Adorno cited in Dennis J. Schmidt, "Black Milk and Blue," p. 120. 
The Politics of Apolitical Poetry 212 
outburst of revolutionary energy, no act through which an autonomous subject, a 
clearly defined agent, single-handedly changed the course of history. Celan was part 
of a post-Holocaust discursive order, an order which was reflected in his poetry. 
And in his attempt to break through the linguistic and political boundaries of this 
order, Celan was far from alone. He was one of many poets - Nelly Sachs, Primo 
Levy, and Ingeborg Bachmann, amongst others, come to mind - who have cut 
through the fog of the Nazi legacy to created concrete possibilities for a more 
inclusive and empathetic German politics. 
Aspects of human agency projected through a poem like "Deathfugue" can be 
conceptualized through the extensive body of knowledge that has emerged from 
attempts to understand the role of literature in social and political affairs. There are 
various treatises, Hans Magnus Enzensberger' s is the most prominent among them, 
which deal with how post-war German poetry has revealed forms of domination that 
had been normalized through language. 52 And there are even more extensive 
inquiries into the links between literature and Holocaust themes. Much of this 
literature is based on the premise, expressed in detail throughout the previous 
chapter, that social reality is decisively shaped through the manner in which if is 
represented through language. From this viewpoint, "Holocaust fact and Holocaust 
fiction are Siamese twins, joined at birth and severed at their peril."53 Such a 
recognition is not meant to deny or diminish the brutal reality of the Holocaust. It is 
meant, as many commentators point out, as a form of political engagement, a plea 
for social transformation that can emerge from altering the route through which we 
approach a disaster of the magnitude of the Holocaust.54 
A path-breaking study by James Young demonstrates convincingly how a poem 
like 'Deathfugue' shapes political practices. Young analyzes the construction of 
memory, meaning and understanding in Holocaust narratives. He emphasizes, as do 
the above authors, that the truth of the Holocaust does not lie beyond the ways we 
understand, interpret and write its history. The events of the Holocaust are, in this 
sense, "shaped post factum in their narration. 55 Young pays particular attention to 
the role of tropes in this process. Because the Holocaust cannot be know outside 
the figurative dimension of language, one must look for its political meaning within 
52 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Poesie und Politik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1963). See also 
Wolfgang Kuttenkeuler (ed), Poesie und Politik: Zur Situation der Literatur in Deutschland 
(Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1973) and the special issues of Text + Kritik on Politische 
Lyrilc. Vol. 9/9a, June 1973 and October 1984. 
53 Lawrence L. Langer, Art from the Ashes: A Holocaust Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p. 11. 
54 Lamping, Dein Asch en es Haar Sulamith, p. 276; Langer, Art from the Ashes, p. 3 and The 
Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 1-30; 
Udoff, "On Poetic Dwelling," p. 324; Hans Schiltz, Juden in der Deutschen Literatur (Milnchen: 
Piper, 1992), pp. 312-3; Randolph L. Braham (ed), Reflections of the Holocaust in Art und 
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. v-vii. 
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James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of 
Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 1, 5. 
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the domain of tropes. This is why questions of metaphor, he stresses, have 
consequences that go far beyond literary texts. 56 The behaviors of Holocaust 
perpetuators and victims, as well as our reactions to them, depend on the tropes 
available to deal with the issues in question. Young points out, for instance, how the 
long-standing and linguistically entrenched tradition of anti-Semitism may have 
blinded much of the world to the actual gravity of the events, and therefore left many 
unprepared to face the Nazi threat.57 Metaphor becomes political and masks politics 
when, for instance, German soldiers "who poured quicklime down the sewers in 
Warsaw to kill Jews in the uprising could write home that they were busy 
"liquidating vermin. "58 These examples show how collective imaginations can be 
subjugated by metaphor. But the very same figurative dimension of language also 
offers liberating potential. 
By engaging with the metaphorical aspect of language and the ideational 
character of interpretation, authors of critical texts about the Holocaust can shape 
the course of future actions. The manner in which we linguistically constitute the 
past, influences our understanding of the present and shapes our choices for the 
future. This is why Young locates the most explicit potential for literature to 
transform social practices in the recognition that "particular kinds of know ledge lead 
to particular kinds of actions."59 
In the specific case of post-war German politics, the consequences of engaging 
with language and interpretation could have led in two basic directions, one moving 
back towards the events of the Holocaust, and another one moving out of them into 
a world that is understood in light of this human disaster.60 Celan's metaphorical 
reworking of the Nazi legacy through the polyphonies of 'Deathfugue' evokes one 
of the reasons why German politics has embarked on the latter route, or at least in its 
general direction. 
GIVE IT THE SHADE: ADVENTURES AT THE EDGE OF 
LANGUAGE GAMES 
Just when 'Deathfugue' became a major linguistic and political symbol for coming to 
terms with the Holocaust, Celan started to turn against his famous early poem. He 
considered it too explicit, too directly linked with the physicality of the events. By 
the time Celan received the prestigious Georg Buchner Preis, in 1960, the style of his 
writings had changed. His language grew more and more sparse. He deconstructed 
words into their syllables or created new words, especially compound words. 
56 Ibid, pp. 83-93. 
57 Ibid., p. 92. 
58 Ibid., p. 93. 
59 Ibid., pp. 84, 191-2 
60 Ibid., p. 93. 
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By stretching the boundaries of the German language further, Celan hoped to 
rewrite 'Deathfugue' in an even more convincing, more inclusive manner. This new, 
more radical phase in Celan' s poetry contains great transformative potential, but it is 
also plagued by equally great difficulties and dangers. It illustrates the dilemmas 
entailed in embarking on adventures at the edge of language games. The immediate 
reaction of the German literary establishment to Celan' s later poetry is revealing. 
Most critics considered his language as difficult, irrational, alienating and hermetic. 
His poetic message was perceived as cut off from reality and thus socially 
irrelevant. 61 His later poems were portrayed as outdated, not in tune with rising lyric 
traditions that attempt to speak in a language accessible to everyone. 62 One 
commentator, for instance, notes that many of Celan' s poems are so strange that 
their meaning can be accessible only to readers who share the authors linguistic 
assumptions. This is, he explains, because Celan no longer operates in a language 
that deals with things, but in a meta-language, that is, a language that deals with 
language itself. 63 Notwithstanding the immediate dismissal of literary critics, it was 
the very difficulty and complexity of these poems that accounted for the emergence 
of an immense body of secondary literature after Celan's suicide in 1970. 
The poem "Stretto," written in the spring of 1958, is generally considered to be 
one of Celan's most demanding poems. It is also regarded as his most successful 
attempt at rewriting the form and content of 'Deathfugue.' Like his other later 
poems, 'Stretto' has so far been too difficult to have an impact on social and political 
dynamics in Germany. But this remarkable poem nevertheless offers valuable insight 
into the workings of discursive dissent. It highlights the difficulties, and maybe the 
future potential, of working at the edge of language games. It provides theoretical 
insight into the functioning of linguistic dissent, insight that is useful far beyond the 
specific, difficult and highly intellectualized tropes of ·' Stretto,' insight that may even 
shed light on the dynamics entailed in more mundane, everyday acts of speaking and 
writing. It is thus with this more widely perceived objective of probing the potential 
and dangers of discursive dissent that I now engage in a close reading of 'Stretto.' 
The opening lines of 'Stretto' reveal immediately that Celan' s treatment of the 
Holocaust now takes on a very different, much more abstract form than in 
'Deathfugue': 
61 Friedrich Kroll, "Anverwandlung der 'Klassischen Modeme, "' in L. Fischer (ed), Literatur in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1967 (Miinchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1986), pp. 258-9. 
62 Hermann Schlosser, "SubjektivitlH und Autobiographie," in K. Briegleb and S. Weigel (eds), 
Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968 (Miinchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992), pp. 406-7. 
63 Harald Weinrich cited in Karl Krolow, "Lyrik," in D. Lattmann (ed), Die Literatur der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Zurich: Kindler Verlag, 1973), pp. 443-4. 
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* 
Driven into the 
terrain with the unmistakable track: 
grass, written asunder. The stones, white, 
with the shadows of grassblades: 
Do not read any more - look! 
Do not look any more - go! 
Go, your hour 
has no sisters, you are -
are at home. A wheel, slow, 
rolls out of itself, the spokes 
climb, 
climb on a blackish field, the night 
needs no stars, nowhere 
does anyone ask after you. 
* 
Nowhere 
does anyone ask after you - ... 64 
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A detailed and influential interpretation of this poem by Peter Szondi brings us 
directly to the central issue. The first two lines inevitably raise a number of 
questions. What is meant by the terrain, the unmistakable track? Where are the 
answers? They are elusive, missing altogether. And this is Celan's main point. 
What matters at the beginning of 'Stretto,' according to Szondi, is not the possible 
meaning of the words employed, but precisely the fact that this meaning is open, that 
the reader is led into a context that s/he does not know, or, more precisely, is not 
supposed to know.65 The reader is driven into an unknown terrain in which s/he is 
responsible for constituting the context of meaning. This participatory structure 
renders impossible any separation between the one who reads and that which is read. 
In other words, the reading subject merges with the subject of the poem that is 
read.66 
64 Celan, "Engfiihrung," in Sprachgitter, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, pp. 197-8, tr. M. Hamburger 
as ''The Straightening," in Poems of Paul Celan, p. 137. The German title of this poem, 
"Engfiihrung" is difficult to translate adequately into English. Engfiihrung is a musical term, 
equivalent to the Italian stretto (which I retained as title) that refers to aspects of the compositions 
of fugues. It captures the complex musical structure of the poem and draws attention to the 
importance of repetitions, movements, plays of polyphony, transitions from voice to voice. But 
Engfiihrung also has the more common meaning of "narrowing down" (as in Hamburger's 
translation of the title as ''The Straightening"). In this sense it may refer to the search for a path, 
an opening of language that leads through the collective memory so narrowed down by Nazi death 
camps. 
65 Peter Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefiihrt: Versuch ilber die Verstandlichkeit des modernen 
Gedichts," in Celan-Studien (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 48. 
66 Ibid., p. 49. 
The Politics of Apolitical Poetry 216 
The tropes of 'Stretto' are more complex and difficult to grasp than those of 
'Deathfugue.' The terrain one is driven into suggests a landscape, but not an 
ordinary one. It is a landscape in which grass is 'written asunder.' It is thus not a 
landscape of human dwelling, but a terrain of the trace, a written landscape, a text in 
which the grass blades turn into letters. 67 This textuality, we are told, casts shadows 
unto white stones. Are they gravestones? Grass, the symbol of vegetation, turned 
into a rigid and arid terrain? Green deadened into white stone, slipped into the dark 
and forgotten parts of our collective memories? Some surely think so.68 But the 
text is less clear. Various tropes suggest that one is led into an ambiguous terrain 
that gradually reveals itself as a place of shadows, of silence, of mourning. We are in 
an hour that has not more sisters, in the last hour, the hour of death. And we are 
told not to read any more, but to look. And, indeed, not to look any more, but to 
go. To go where? Into the text. 
Szondi emphasizes, once more, that we have entered a landscape of textuality 
that is not an object of reading, but that which is read itself. The reader thus stands 
not outside, but is driven into the textual terrain. This is to say that the poem is no 
longer mimesis, no longer a representation of something beyond itself. The word 
becomes a mimesis of itself because the text refuses to stand in the service of some 
external reality. The poem constructs and develops its own reality. A reality which, 
of course, always remains poetic reality.69 
With this move from mimesis to poetic reality Celan follows a path that has been 
carved out well by preceding poets. Novalis and German Romanticis_m in general 
bestowed poetry and painting with a sense of autonomy. The French tradition then 
intensified this tendency. Baudelaire warned that poetry must under no 
circumstances ally itself with science or morality, for "it has no other objective than 
itself; it cannot have another objective."70 The decisive turning point away from a 
perception of poetic language as representation is, however, usually associated with 
Stephan Mallarme. He argued, in a famous letter to the painter Edgar Degas, that 
"one does not make a poem with ideas, but with words."71 This is to say that a poet 
should not search for motives exterior to words. Mallarme's voice still resonates 
strongly a century later. Literary critics like Barthes draw attention to the "closed 
nature" of poetry, which encapsulates both the function and structure of language. 72 
Sartre talks of poets as those who "consider words as things and not as signs. "73 
67 
Concurring on this interpretation are Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefiihrt," p. 50 and Foti, 
Heidegger and the Poets, p. 86. 
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69 Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefiihrt," pp. 51-2. 
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(Paris: Seghers, 1964), p. 144. 
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72 Barthes, Le degree zero, p. 34. 
73 
Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? tr. B. Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, 
p. 12 
The Politics of Apolitical Poetry 217 
Heidegger goes even further and tries to "bring language as language to language."74 
Celan follows this trend but only up to a certain point. He agrees that a poem 
"speaks always only in its own, very own matter." Indeed, he wants to "think 
Mallarme systematically through to the end. "75 This led Celan away from the 
realistic and prosaic language that characterized the approach of many contemporary 
poet critics of Nazism, like Kurt Tucholsky or Berthold Brecht. 
But Celan refuses to go beyond the poem, to engage directly with concrete and 
daily political issues. Instead of positioning himself on either side of black and white, 
he reaches for gray-zones, openness, unpredictability and thinking space. While 
searching for silenced voices, Celan warns, in his poem "Sprich auch du," that this 
search must not simply replace one orthodoxy with another one: 
Speak, you also, 
speak as the last, 
have your say 
Speak -
But keep yes and no unsplit. 
And give your say this meaning: 
give it the shade. 
Give it shade enough, 
give it as much 
as you know has been dealt out between 
midnight and midday and midnight .. 76 
,, 
Here too, Celan walks on a well used path, a path that explores the complexities and 
gray-shades of life without having to come down on either side of the black-and-
white divide that runs through most political debates. Many poets write poetry for 
its own sake, for the sake of art and nothing else. Two of the most influential 
contemporary poets, Seamus Heaney and Joseph Brodsky, stress again and again 
that poetry should refuse to serve political or moral objectives. Such political 
requirements, they argue, would debase language and thus lower the "plane of 
regard" from which we can gain a chance of looking at ourselves critically.77 
But does the refusal to go beyond the poem mean that poets live in their own 
world, a world that is not relevant to our daily lives? Does this refusal annihilate 
possibilities of exerting human agency through discursive dissent? Not at all. 
74 Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 242. 
75 Celan, "Der Meridian," pp. 193, 197. 
76 Paul Celan, "Sprich auch du," in Von Schwelle zu Schwelle, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, p. 135, 
tr. M. Hamburger in Poems of Paul Celan, p. 99. 
77 Seamus Heaney, ''The Singer of Tales: On Joseph Brcxlsky" in The New York Times Book 
Review, 3 March 1996, p. 31 and The Redress of Poetry (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1995); Paul Breslin, "Heaney's Redress," in Poetry, Vol. clxviii, No. 6, Sept 1996, pp. 337-351. 
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Language, as shown in the previous chapter, is always already politics. Celan's 
poetry becomes political precisely through its explicit apoliticality. By refusing to be 
drafted for narrow and short term political objectives, by attempting to 'give it the 
shade,' poetry acquires a subversive dimension. Only by speaking in its own matter, 
Celan points out, can poetry speak in another, an entirely different matter.78 
Celan never perceives language as independent of historical reality. This is 
where he departs from some of the above positions. As opposed to Heidegger, he 
does not want to bring 'language through language to language.' Words in Celan's 
poems always retain their link with experiences that mean something specific. Much 
like reality cannot be understood outside language, Celan does not attempt to 
understand language outside reality. This, at least, is the belief of Dorothee Kohler-
L . b"hl 79 ugm u . 
But Celan knows that reality never is. It has to be searched and conquered. 80 It 
has to be opened up to multiple ways of seeing. This opening can only occur 
through language, and it can never be reached immediately. Critique of language 
always is a long process, saturated with obstacles and contradictions, obscurities and 




Came a word, came, 
came through the night, 
up -who? 




Night-and-night - Go 
to the eye, the moist one. 
* 
Go 
to the eye, 
th • 81 e moist one - ... 
78 Celan, "Der Meridian," p. 196. 
79 Dorothee Kohler-Luginbilhl, Poetik im Lichte der Utopie: Paul Celans poetologische Texte 
(Bern: Verlag Peter Lang, 1986), p. 58. 
8° Celan, "Antwort auf eine Umfrage der Librairie Plinker, Paris 1958" in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 
III, p. 168. 
81 Celan, "Engfilhrung," pp. 199-200, tr. Hamburger p. 141. 
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This passage constitutes the exact center of 'Stretto,' which is organized in a scheme 
of 4 + 1 + 4. It signifies a crucial turning point that is even intensified within the 
passage through a shift from past to present tense. The poem literally leaps from 
past to its exploration of the present. But we are still in a world of margins and 
silences, where the 'nobody asks after you' from the beginning of the poem 
continues to resonate strongly. All questions are covered up. We do not have 
words to talk about that which needs to be talked about. Language still drowns 
those who long for a voice. 
There is hope that words will come, come through the night, that they will break 
the silence and shine, that they will exert some sort of human agency. But then the 
aspiring word is once more suffocated by the return of the night, by the ashes, the 
overwhelming presence of Nazi death camps, the morbid crematoriums that 
extinguish all life and light. Not all is in vain, though, F6ti points out. She detects a 
new response to the initial commands of 'look' and 'go.' The poem now bears 
witness by going to the moist eye, whose weeping renders impossible luminosity and 
panoramic vision. 82 Others interpret this passage in a less optimistic way. Derrida 
hears above all a terrifying scream echoing back and forth between 'ash' and 'night,' 
a scream that recalls the all-consuming Holocaust, "the hell of our memory. "83 The 
crucial point for Szondi is that we have only just arrived at the turning point of the 
poem. It is still unthinkable that the word itself really comes, that it will shine in the 
night of sleeping words. At this point there is above all censorship and contradiction 
between, on the one hand, the world of the word that comes through the night in 
order to shine and, on the other hand, the world of ash, of absolute night, of "night-
and-night, which knows nothing but itself."84 
Out of the contradiction between the world of words and the world of ash and 
night emerges the necessity to push the boundaries of language games, to push them 
as far as it is necessary to be able to pierce through the night, to speak again about 
that which has been covered with ash. Thus, poetry must open up thinking space by 
asserting itself, as Celan believes, at its own margins. 85 The poem then signifies a 
"turn of breath," which Schmidt interprets as the struggle to breath, the call for 
voice, the body's effort to absorb the surrounding world and to extend itself beyond 
it.86 
82 Foti, "A Missed Interlocution: Heidegger and Celan," p. 89. See also Weissenberger, Die Elegie 
bei Paul Celan, pp. 49-50. 
83 Derrida, "Shibboleth for Paul Celan," pp. 50-1. 
84 Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefiihrt," pp. 70-4. 
85 Celan, "Der Meridian," p. 197. 
86 Schmidt "Black Milk and Blue," p. 155. Celan talks of poetry as a "turn of breath" (Atemwende) 
in "Der Meridian," p. 195. One of his later collections of poetry also carries this title. See 
Atemwende, in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, pp. 9-107. 
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Most of those who write poetry or poetics know, as Celan does, how crucial it is 
to search for a 'turn of breath.' Indeed, the attempt to stretch language games may 
well be the one of the most important defining characteristic of poetry. Poets, some 
say, are those who reject the instrumentality of prose, subvert established language 
codes, transgress limits and penetrate forbidden thinking spaces. 87 A poet renders 
strange that which is familiar and thus forces the reader to confront what s/he 
habitually has refused to confront. For Kristeva, poetic language disturbs, 
transgresses rules, fractures meaning. In doing so it "breaks up the inertia of 
language habits" and "liberates the subject from a number of linguistic, psychic, and 
social networks. "88 Nicole Brossard argues likewise that poetic practices, such as 
shaking the syntax, breaking grammatical rules, disrespecting punctuation and using 
blank space, have a profound effect on readers. They offer new perspectives on 
reality and make room for alternative ways of perceiving life and its meanings. 89 A 
poetic creation, Octavio Paz even argues, is above all an act of violence done to 
language. It "is revolutionary by nature."90 
WEIGHING DOWN THE NET: SOCIAL REALITY IN LIGHT OF 
ITS POETIC POSSIBILITIES 
Celan, and poetry in general, has brought us back to the key problematique of the 
previous chapter. Does not poetry's violation of linguistic rules run the risk of 
ending up in a language that is socially irrelevant? Is poetry not evoking the worst 
fears of the later Wittgenstein by looking for a language void of flaws? Have we 
simply returned to a logical positivist position that draws a direct link between words 
and meanings, that engages in a futile search for a more perfect, more logical, more 
authentic representation of reality? This need not be the case. 
Much like the later Wittgenstein, most poets reject a view of language as 
representation of reality. I have shown that ever since Mallarme the poetic word is 
no longer mimesis, but reality, poetic reality. But does this equation of poetic words 
with things, rather than signs, not lead into another cul de sac, namely linguistic 
idealism? Do poets live in a dream world where objects outside the poem have no 
qualities of their own? Are we still ignoring Wittgenstein's warning not to abandon 
the crude, imperfect language of everyday life? Some poets may adopt an avant-
gardist position that runs this risk. But nothing compels poetry to do so. Celan 
certainly refuses to detach poetry from concrete social practices, and so does the 
87 Joubert, La poesie, pp. 5, 55-59. 
88 
Kristeva, Recherches pour une semanalyze (Paris: Seuil, 1969), pp. 178-9, tr. L.S. Roudiez in the 
introduction to Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 2. 
89 Nicole Brossard, "Poetic Politics," in C. Bernstein (ed), The Politics of Poetic Form: Poetry and 
Public Policy (New York: ROOF, 1990), p. 79. 
90 Octavio Paz, The Bow and the Lyre, tr. R.L.C. Simms (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1973/1956), p. 3. 
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argument of this paper. If poets detach themselves and explore their own poetic 
reality, it is not to search for a perfect language or to ignore the multiple realities of 
social and political life. If a poet pretends that words are things, that the poem 
knows nothing but itself, s/he draws attention to the fact that words are arbitrary 
signs. Mimesis would amount to nothing but a reproduction of that which is. By 
refusing to go beyond the poem, the poet subverts the often unquestioned link 
between the sign and the referent, the non-linguistic reality that the sign designates. 
There is neither an idealist nor a positivist trait in this practice, but simply a desire to 
stretch language games beyond the narrow rules that they embody at a particular 
time and place. 
Subverting the arbitrariness of the signification of signs entails, as Celan pointed 
out above, that a poem asserts itself at its own margins. This is both the strength 
and weakness of poetry. To be effective, a poet must operate right at the edge of 
language games. A step to the right and the poem gets sucked into the linguistic 
vortex of the dominant discourse, a step to the left and what looms is a fall into the 
abyss of incomprehensibility. In both of cases the poem fails as a discursive form of 
dissent. It is unable to exert human agency. 
Poetry must go beyond what is. It must look for utopia. But the desire for 
utopia must stay within the possibilities of existing language games. This weighing 
down of poetic dissent may be against the intuition of radical resistance, but it is 
necessary in order to avoid the fatal step into the abyss to the left of the narrow cliff-
walk. It is necessary to engender human agency from poetic dissent. ~elan, in one 
of the poems that seek Atemwende, a "turn of breath:" 
In rivers north of the future 
I throw out my nets, which you 
weigh down, hesitantly, 
with shadows written by 
stones.91 
The metaphorical power of this short poem captures one of the key aspects of 
Celan' s engagement with language and social reality. One who throws out the net 
engages in an act of expectation. The hesitant weighing down of the net, Hans-
Georg Gadamer emphasizes, does not signify doubt or inner indecisiveness. Rather, 
it expresses the subtle process of placing the net into the right position: too much 
weight and it will sink, not enough and it will drift on the surface of the river, unable 
to catch anything at all.92 The unity of throwing out and weighing down captures 
the need to stretch language games while resisting the illusory temptation of eluding 
them altogether. 
91 Celan, "In den Fltissen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol, II, p. 14. 
92 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wer bin Ich und wer hist Du? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 35-9. 
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Only a carefully placed poetic net can capture voices of dissent that have the 
potential to transform social practices. Indeed, in his few poetological texts Celan 
emphasizes that poetry, while seeking freedom through its radical subversive 
behavior, is at the same time confined by the boundaries of existing language games. 
Thus, the language of poetry "attempts to measure the range of what is given and 
what is possible. "93 This means that a poem must be able to communicate. It cannot 
be obscure, it cannot seal itself off hermetically. It is, at least in the case of Celan, 
never far removed from the memory of pain and death and yet it must see beyond the 
narrow construction of this memory. 94 
Poetry is inevitably thrown into this tension between reality and utopia, between 
resisting language games and falling silent by overstepping their margins. The poem 
sees reality as process, rather than something single, static and unproblematic. Thus, 
utopia in Celan' s poetry is not idealistic, not a dream that exists merely in our minds. 
Poetic utopia is a perspective on reality, a perspective that "views reality in light of 
its possibilities. "95 The final passage of "Stretto" brings us deeper into the practical 
aspects of this problematique: 
At owl's flight, here, 
the conversations, day-gray, 












the water-level traces -
93 Celan, "Antwort auf eine Umfrage," p. 167. 
94 Celan "Ansprache in Bremen," p. 195; See also Hamburger, "Introduction," p. 27; Schmidt, 
"Black Milk and Blue," pp. 114-6; F6ti, Heidegger and the Poets, pp. 105-6; Leonard Olschner, 
"Poetic Mutations of Silence: At the Nexus of Paul Celan and Osip Mandelstam," in Fioretos, Word 
Traces, pp. 369-70. 
95 Kohler-Luginbiihl, Poetik im Lichte der Utopie, p. 266. 
96 Celan, "Engfiihrung," p. 204, tr. Hamburger pp. 147-9. 
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At first sight, the end of "Stretto" seems to be a return to its opening, to 'the terrain 
with the unmistakable track.' But Szondi warns of such a simplistic interpretation. 
Consider that the final passage is written within brackets. This places the passage 
outside the poem's formal 4 + 1 + 4 structure. Thus, Szondi believes that the 
evocation of the poem's opening at its end is done primarily to draw attention to the 
links with the preceding part, especially the 'conversations' and the 'water-level-
traces. ' 97 But there is also the 'owl's flight.' Is it Hegel's owl of Minerva, which 
spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk?98 Not likely, for Celan's search for 
utopia goes clearly beyond a mere interpretation of history. The owl's flight may 
evoke a twilight zone, the obscurities of the poem's opening terrain, the hour of 
transition between day and night.99 The immediately following 'day-gray' intensifies 
this moment of transition, of obscurity. Not the brightness of the day is evoked, but 
its grayness. Is this the earlier mentioned task of the poet not to 'keep yes and not 
unsplit,' to 'give it the shade'? Be it as it may, we know for sure what is 'day-gray,' 
namely the 'conversations ... of the water-level-traces.' Are these conversations that 
emerge from the depth of the earth, the depth of life, as the German original 
Grundwasserspuren (literally 'ground-water-traces') suggests? Is this the forgetting, 
the remembering, conversations about the basic condition of humanity?100 The key 
point for Szondi is that the 'water-level-traces' and the 'terrain with the 
unmistakable track' are one and the same: the word.101 
We have arrived back at the beginning of the poem. But while the beginning 
purposely deprived the reader of knowing the meaning of 'the terrain with the 
unmistakable track,' the ending lifts this suspension. · After reading the preceding 
parts of the poem, the reader now knows what the elusive meaning is. It is, at least 
according to Szondi, the very reading of that which precedes. 102 The 'conversations, 
day-gray, of the water-level-traces' take off where Nazi gas-chambers imposed 
silence. The 'water-level-traces' break this silence, turn into conversation, like the 
water underneath the earth bearing witness for lost life and, at some point, bubbling 
up and spurting onto the surface of the earth again. By now language is 
transformed, for the meaning of spurting, of spritzen, no longer bears the weight of 
its tainted association with the flowing of Jewish blood from knife-points. Language 
has opened up and turned against the flow of its own, narrowly constructed legacy. 
The spurting unto the surface of silenced conversations evokes another key 
concern of Celan. A poem, for him, is like a "message in a bottle" (Flaschenpost). It 
is sent out with the hope that some day it will be washed onto a shore, onto 
something open, a heart that seeks dialogue, maybe a receptive "you," a receptive 
97 Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefilhrt," pp. 58, 108. 
98 G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), p. 28. 
99 Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefiihrt," p. 95-6; Gold, "Reading Celan," p. 206. 
100 Weissenberger, Die Elegie bei Paul Celan, p. 53 
101 Szondi, "Durch die Enge gefilhrt," p. 108. 
102 Ibid., p. 108. 
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reality. 103 A poem, even if it always only speaks in its own matter, is dialogical by 
nature, because it also speaks in the interest of the Other. The message in the bottle 
leaves its author, embarks upon a undetermined dialogical journey with an 
undetermined dialogical task of finding the Other. The poem refuses to be tied 
down, continuously travels to include that which is strange, that which is different. 
Celan considers this 'turn of breath,' the extension toward the unfamiliar, the study 
and acceptance of otherness, as his "spiritual poetizing, if you will."104 Many who 
have interpreted Celan's poetry since Szondi's path-breaking essay have drawn 
attention to this central issue. Emmanuel Levinas is probably the most prominent, 
but by far not the only commentator who pointed out how Celan' s poetry searches 
for the Other, for an ethical and dialo gical relationship with her/him/it. The poem 
itself then becomes, in Levinas' own idiosyncratic terminology, "an unheard-of 
modality of the otherwise than Being."105 
The poem, according to Celan, "wants to reach the Other, it needs this Other, it 
needs face-to-face interaction."106 But if it wants to speak to the Other, if it wants to 
facilitate conversation across day-gray boundaries, then the poem cannot be obscure, 
it needs to communicate. Given the oppressive nature of existing language games, 
this communicability may not be immediately recognizable. The poem must, after 
all, stretch language games in order to be able to speak to the Other. This is why 
Celan believes that poems "lead a subversive, subterranean existence. "107 The 
message in the bottle may not be picked up immediately. At the point of its release 
there may be no language, no cultural understanding to make sense out of the bottled 
message. It still only searches for dialogue, it still only hopes to be w~shed ashore 
one day. It only just started to travel along subterranean 'water-level-traces,' 
seeking conversation, seeking the Other, seeking an opening to spurt up and reach 
the surf ace of language games. 
Indeed, as I mentioned before, Celan' s poem 'Stretto' has not yet been able to 
alter discursive practices as powerfully as 'Deathfugue' did. It may be one of the 
most analyzed poems of this century, but its impact has been confined largely to 
intellectual audiences. But 'Stretto' has nevertheless provided valuable insight into 
the workings of critique of language. It represents the abstract potential for human 
agency, the vision of a future language game that breaks currently imposed silences. 
For now, though, the message of Celan' s later poetry is still caught in a sealed bottle, 
103 Celan, "Ansprache in Bremen," p. 186. 
104 
Celan, cited in Foti, Heidegger and the Poets, p. 96. Celan, "Ansprache in Bremen," p. 186, 
"Der Meridian," pp. 196-198. 
105 
Emmanuel Levinas, "De l'etre a l'autre," in Noms Propres (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1976), pp. 59-
66. See also F6ti, Heidegger and the Poets, pp. 105-12; Evelyn Hunnecke, Poesie et Poetigue de 
Paul Celan, Doctorat d'Etat, Aix Marsaille I, 1987; Kohler-Luginbilhl, Poetik im Lichte der Utopie, 
pp. 59-65. 
106 Celan, "Der Meridian," p. 198. 
107 Celan cited in Kohler-Luginbiihl, Poetik im Lichte der Utopie, p. 59. 
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it still drifts somewhere on a desolate ocean, waiting to be washed ashore and picked 
up by a discursive practice that embodies dialogue, openness, transformability. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has ended a journey during which I have theorized human agency by 
scrutinizing various practices of dissent. The particular route that I pursued led 
away from great revolutionary acts towards less spectacular but equally, if not more 
effective, farms of resistance. 
Poetry served as a case study to demonstrate the potential for human agency 
contained in discursive forms of dissent. It is a potential that can only be unleashed 
through a long process. This is true of critique of language in general, whatever 
form it takes. There are no quick and miraculous forms of resistance to discursive 
domination. Discursive dissent can only work by digging, slowly, underneath the 
foundations of authority. It unfolds its power through a gradual and largely 
inaudible transformation of values. .. 
An analysis of poetic dissent, I have argued, has relevance that transcends the 
often narrow and elitist social circles within which poetry holds sway today. I have 
thus tried to draw attention to the larger dynamics of discursive dissent by exposing 
the workings of poetry in two parallel manners. 
At a practical level I showed how poetic dissent can be politically relevant, even 
though, or, rather, precisely because it refuses to be drawn into narrow political 
debates. Paul Celan' s engagement with the linguistic construction and 
reconstruction of the Holocaust demonstrates how poetry can deal with crucial 
political issues, how it can open up spaces to think and act. The manifestations of 
human agency that are unleashed through such poetic forms of dissent are elusive, 
primarily because one cannot identify a direct causal link between action and 
outcome. But this elusiveness does not render poetry, and discursive dissent in 
general, any less real or relevant. By engaging in discursive and linguistic struggles 
surrounding the aftermath of the Holocaust, Celan' s poetry contributed to the 
emergence of a more inclusive approach to German politics. 
At a more theoretical level, I investigated the precise functioning of poetic 
dissent in an attempt to illuminate the processes by which critique of language may 
be able to escape and transform the existing discursive order. It is through such an 
abstract analysis that the relatively elitist and esoteric domain of poetry is able to 
shed light on the working of more mundane forms of resistance embedded in daily 
acts of speaking and writing. In pursuing this line of inquiry I followed Walter 
The Politics of Apolitical Poetry 226 
Benjamin's advice that to get to concrete and socially relevant forms of 
philosophizing, one must first walk through a desert of abstraction.108 
The often abstract dimensions of poetic dissent epitomize the social issues at 
stake in the evolution of language games. Poetry does not solve the problem of 
linguistic domination, but it is unique - and offers valuable insights - insofar as it 
makes this problem the vortex of its existence. By asserting itself at its own margins, 
poetry demonstrates the potential and dangers entailed in critique of language. It 
demonstrates why any form of linguistic dissent that explores thinking spaces at the 
edge of language games must necessarily walk on a path that becomes thinner and 
thinner. Only a fine line separates radical linguistic dissent from incomprehensibility 
and the dangers of a logical-positivist search for a language void of flaws. If poetry 
is to retain its potential to exert human agency, then it cannot remove words from 
their social contexts. Linguistic forms of dissent can exert human agency only by 
accepting the constant risk of overstepping the edge of language games and plunging 
into bottomless social and political irrelevance. 
108 
Benjamin cited in Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992/1966), p. 15. 
AGAINST CONCLUDING 
THE QUESTION OF HUMAN AGENCY 
The power of what is erects the facades into which our consciousness 
crashes. It must seek to crash through them. 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik 
I 
This thesis has advanced suggestions about how to conceptualize human agency in a 
complex late modern world. I engaged in this endeavor through a genealogical 
inquiry into the theory and practice of popular dissent and a subsequent exploration 
of alternative, discourse oriented terrains of resistance. Throughout this intellectual 
journey I have aimed at making three distinct contributions to the study of human 
agency. 
First: I have demonstrated, against a fatalistic determinism that permeates much 
of the literature on structures and discourses, that human agency can still be exerted, 
even in a complex and rapidly changing late modern world. I have suggested that 
the most promising potential for human agency is contained in practices of dissent 
that engage discursive struggles and engender a slow transformation of societal 
values. Yet, it is one thing to identify discursive forms of dissent. It is an entirely 
different thing to conceptualize them such that they can be positively endowed with 
the capacity to exert human agency. I claimed that such an endowment is indeed 
possible, but that endeavors to pursue it must be careful not to say more than what 
we could possibly know. In other words, one must not pronounce anthropocentric 
judgments about what lies beyond human comprehension, one must not impose 
preconceived ideas upon a far more intricate mesh of social phenomena. 
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Second: Confronting these difficulties, I have advanced a positive concept of 
human agency that is neither grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a 
presupposed notion of the subject. In proposing such a conceptualization, I opposed 
a body of literature which stipulates that stable foundations are necessary to assess 
human agency. I demonstrated, by contrast, that accepting the contingent character 
of foundations is the very prerequisite for an adequate understanding of human 
agency. A contingent foundation can be provided by a specification of operational 
schemes. As opposed to a theory that attempts to comprehend what human agency 
is, a specification of operational schemes is content with facilitating understanding of 
how human agency functions in a specific spatio-temporal context. It is a set of 
guidelines about how to approach the complexities that arise from posing the 
question of human agency in a non-essentialist way. 
Third: I have tackled the above puzzles through an interdisciplinary approach, 
which is necessary to deal with circles of revealing and concealing that surround 
human agency. Such an approach has entailed constant moving back and forth not 
only between unconnected bodies of literature, but also between theory and practice, 
abstraction and everydayness, epistemology and ontology, space and time, discursive 
domination and possibilities for dissent that arise from fissures in them. Each of 
these sites is crucial. Each offers a unique vantage point, but none of them holds the 
key to ultimate insight. Indeed, every process of revealing is at the same time a 
process of concealing. This is to say that by opening up a particular perspective, no 
matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage 
point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Heidegger argues, 
runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act which 
"banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering." And where this 
ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for 
revealing. "1 This is why I have moved back and forth between different, sometimes 
incommensurable, insights into the question of human agency. Such an approach 
recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to 
think in circles, not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much 
attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places. 
II 
My attempt to conceptualize human agency through a specification of operational 
schemes has taken me, painted in very broad strokes, along the following circular 
trajectory of revealing and concealing: 
1 Martin Heidegger, ''The Question Concerning Technology," tr. D.F. Krell, in Basic Writings 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1993/1977), p. 332. 
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Discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of 
thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. Yet, discourses are 
not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. By moving the gaze 
from epistemology to ontology, I explored the ways in which individuals can use 
these cracks to escape aspects of discursive domination. To recognize the potential 
for human agency that may open up in these cracks, I shifted foci again, this time 
from the level of Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviors. Individuals can draw 
upon the thinking spaces opened up by mobile subjectivities and engage in countless 
daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values. Over an extended 
period of time, such tactical forms of dissent influence the evolution of discursive 
practices. I then scrutinized, by returning to epistemological levels, how these 
transformed discursive practices may engender processes of social change. 
Moving along these elusive and constantly shifting terrains is to resurrect a 
notion of human agency from a discursive viewpoint. Yet, it is not a notion based on 
a causal understanding of human agency - an understanding that presupposes an 
autonomous agent and a clearly separable and identifiable object upon which agency 
is projected. It is not a notion that attempts to capture an essence of human agency, 
that searches for universal and ahistoric elements in people's attempts to forge their 
environment. It is not a notion that embodies claims to totality, that believes every 
process of social change requires an agent to trigger it. Many social dynamics are 
beyond the influence of human agency, and certainly far beyond our ability to 
understand them adequately. Aspirations that deny these limits to cognition must be 
put to rest, filed ad acta as social science fiction. 
Ill 
The elusive nature of human agency renders conventional concluding remarks 
impossible. This is why I am not recapitulating in detail the findings and arguments 
of each individual research step. To gaze beyond these partial insights, to raise them 
to a higher level by squeezing each of the fragments into an overarching whole, 
would annihilate the unique vantage-point from whence they shed light on the 
question of human agency. The result: a preconceived and subjective mental image 
imposed upon a set of idiosyncratic social dynamics, one more reifying act of 
concealing, the closing of the very thinking space I have tried to open throughout 
this thesis. 
The following brief revisit of my research project is thus not to be seen as a 
synthesis of my findings, a final word on human agency. Rather, my revisit aims at 
illustrating the significance of my contribution for past, present and future 
understandings of human agency. In this sense, my concluding remarks address the 
implications entailed in recognizing that an understanding of human agency can 
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never be complete, that the very power of human agency is based on a constant 
process of becoming something else than what it is. 
IV 
,, 
I began my research with a relatively obscure sixteenth century text, Etienne de la 
Boe tie's Anti-One. I tried to disclose the social consequences entailed in the 
constitution of meaning by observing how this marginal text has given rise to 
influential and widespread practices of popular dissent that embody a particular, 
relatively narrow, image of human agency. I conducted this inquiry as a Nietzschean 
genealogy. As opposed to a mere historical account, a genealogy is an attempt to 
pierce through the facades into which our consciousness crashes. This is to say, as 
one commentator emphasizes, that to create a future (and a more inclusive 
constitution of human agency), one must first come to terms with, confront and 
appropriate the past.2 
" 
One of the central themes that my genealogical analysis has revealed is the 
widespread modern inability to come to terms with the death of God. La Boetie 
exemplifies the radical element of early modern thought, the refusal to ground an 
understanding of the world in Christian faith alone. Unchained from this obligation, 
but still bound by the larger need to ground knowledge in a stable foundation, la 
Boetie and many of his fellow Renaissance humanists reached back to ancient Greek 
philosophy and reasserted human agency by linking it to a quasi-religious faith in the 
expression of free will. God was replaced with an unbounded trust in the ability of 
human beings, males as it was implied, to elevate themselves to the measure of all 
things. Intellectual trends in subsequent periods strongly challenged this vision, but 
continued to reaffirm the more fundamental need for grounding an understanding of 
human agency in stable foundations. Reason and science provided this base during 
the Enlightenment. Romanticism then shifted foci from detached objectivity to 
emotion, passion and self-expression. But its vision of the world, at least among the 
mainstream representatives of romantic thought, remained anchored in a stable 
foundation, not in God or in logos, but in an autonomous self and a masculine 
revolutionary hero who rises above the corruptness of his time to advance the cause 
of freedom and justice. 
A genealogical inquiry into the assumptions that have guided modern 
understandings of dissent and human agency is an inquiry into the condition of late 
modern consciousness. Ideas about human agency which have emerged since the 
Renaissance remain influential. They continue to frame today's political and social 
practices. Late modern understandings of dissent revolve by and large around a 
2 Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 123. 
Against Concluding the Question of Human Agency 231 
humanist core that combines a romantic celebration of human agency with an 
Enlightenment trust in reason and science. As a result, one vision of human agency 
has come to prevail in mainstream societal perceptions, a vision that is based on a 
romantic and masculine image of heroic rebellion against authority, exemplified by 
the likes of demonstrating masses, striking workers, brick throwing students and 
fasting dissidents. This image of human agency has become further reified as 
attempts to assess its dynamics have become embedded in positivist epistemologies, 
in a desire to master the world and impose order upon its ever increasing 
complexities. Ensuing grand theoretical approaches to popular dissent, while 
drawing attention to some overt forms of repression, have often entrenched many of 
the more subtle, discursively based systems of domination (such as patriarchy). 
V 
Genealogical critique can open up crucial spaces to think and act by drawing 
attention to the narrow and arbitrary construction of social practices and political 
choices. In my case, I have tried to make room for alternative understandings of 
human agency by evoking the problematic aspects entailed in dominant approaches 
to popular dissent. 
But genealogical critique is neither unproblematic nor sufficient by itself. By 
articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox approaches, the 
impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that 
have been established through the initial framing of debates. Alternative 
conceptualizations of human agency must operate simultaneously at various levels to 
be successful in overcoming existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. 
Genealogical critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object 
of critique, of theorizing human agency without being constrained by the images, 
agendas, issues and terminologies that have been preset by orthodox debates. 
Part two carved out an escape route away from the claws of orthodoxy, and it 
did so through two parallel shifts. Instead of focusing on great revolutionary events, 
I tried to understand the slow transformation of values that precedes them. 
Everyday forms of resistance that bring about such discursive changes are mundane 
in appearance. Yet, the power they unleash may well promote human agency more 
successfully that the heroic acts of defiance which attract the attention of the media 
infused late modern world. This move towards a discursive understanding of 
domination and resistance was then complemented with a methodological shift from 
grand theories of dissent towards an approach that recognizes the contingent 
character of foundations, that deals with, rather than circumvents the death of God. 
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VI 
The thlrd and last part of this thesis explored discursive forms of dissent in an 
attempt to articulate a positive but non-essentialist notion of human agency. The 
difficulty of this process has consisted in advancing a general framework for 
understanding human agency without falling back into the temptation of anchoring 
such an attempt in stable foundations. To succeed in this endeavor requires a never 
ending balancing act between two equally fateful abysses. On one side looms a 
totalitarian essentialism that invariably reifies discursive practices of domination. A 
step towards the other side entails a fall into an epistemological relativism that offers 
no more ground from which to articulate critique and assert human agency. 
Embarking on this inevitable tightrope dance is to ground an understanding of 
human agency in nothingness, or, to be more precise, in contingent foundations. It is 
to resurrect hope out of despair. The key to this enterprise lies in demonstrating that 
human agency is possible even after doing away with the illusion of autonomy which 
lies at the heart of modern thought, even after accepting that there cannot be 
authentic knowledge. My particular pursuit of this task, which took me along the 
interactive links between discourse and dissent, diverges from some of the most 
influential current approaches. Many leading commentators on social affairs argue, 
as Terry Eagleton exemplifies, that "a certain provisional stability of identity is 
essential not only for psychical well-being but for revolutionary political agency. "3 
While recognizing the need for provisional foundations to articulate critique, my 
rethinking of dissent has located manifestations of human agency precisely in the 
fluidity of identity, in its constituted and multiple dimensions. Rather than sliding 
into "an irresponsible hymning of the virtues of schizophrenia," as Eagleton fears, 4 
an exploration of the discursive struggles that surround the pluralistic nature of 
identity is the very precondition for human agency and for an adequate assessment of 
the processes through which its transfonnative potentials are unleashed. 
VII 
My exploration of alternative, discourse oriented forms of dissent has focused 
primarily on manifestations of human agency that are hidden in the written word and 
in language in general. An engagement with Paul Celan' s poetry served to illustrate 
the larger issues that are at stake in articulating links between language, discourse 
and human agency. 
Languages, from the vantage-point of the later Wittgenstein, are not just 
mediums of communication or ways of representing the world. They embody the 
3 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 197-8. 
4 Ibid, p. 198. 
Against Concluding the Question of Human Agency 233 
social relationship between people and their environment. Languages are disguised 
political practices, for they silently frame, enforce and entrench systems of 
domination. But languages also offer opportunities to criticize, resist and exert 
human agency. 
To recognize that language is politics is to acknowledge that form and substance 
cannot be separated. The manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a 
thought is thought, is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing 
the world, a form that is somehow detached from the linguistic and social practices 
in which the speaker or writer is embedded. Science and philosophy, empirical 
analyses and literature, mathematics and poetry, are all bound by the form through 
which they convey their ideas. Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical 
structures, all of these stories and accounts, Michael Shapiro points out, implicitly 
advance political arguments. All of them, "no matter how much their style might 
protest innocence, contain a mythical level - that is they have a job to do, a 
perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny. "5 This is not to say that 
every account of, say social dynamics or historical events, is equally insightful or 
valid. But it is to recognize the political dimensions of language and to abandon the 
artificial separation between figurative and non-figurative speech, realist and non-
realist genres. 
All linguistic practices are metaphorical. But some tropes have been so 
extensively rehearsed and are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural 
traditions that they appear as authentic representations·of the real. 
Several far-reaching implications arise from recognizing the links between form 
and substance, language and politics. On an intellectual level, such a recognition 
opens up a range of writing and reading strategies that have the potential to exert 
human agency. If, as the later Wittgenstein argues, the relationship between words 
and meaning is not authentic, if language is not to be seen as representing something 
that lies outside of it, then the writing and reading of a critical and form-conscious 
text should not be directed primarily at revealing an argument, a single meaning, a 
linear representation, a link between what is said and what the said represents. One 
must venture beyond a mere rhetorical rejection of logical positivism. 
To break through the facades of deeply entrenched reading and wntmg 
strategies is to ease oneself into a different language game without looking for links 
to a world that has been objectified through a worn out set of metaphors. One must 
let go of old habits and follow a process of reframing meaning, a process that opens 
up new perspectives on realities we have rendered unproblematic, on political 
problems we have deemed insurmountable, on moral dilemmas we have silently 
entrenched. Celan' s poetry is an example of such a journey into a different world of 
5 Michael J. Shapiro, "Intrcxluction" to Language and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 
2. 
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meaning. His is an attempt to stretch the boundaries of language games, an effort to 
scream out a fragment of truth - temporary, incomplete, impossible, ironic - through 
the fog of worn out metaphors: 




right into the 
metaphor-flurry. 6 
VIII 
The poetic imagination does not hover above language. It cannot deliver authentic 
insight. If, indeed, the occasional poet unleashes the occasional roar of truth, its 
content will swirl up in a cloud of discursive dust and immediately blur into 
coalescing metaphor-flurries. 
I have focused on Celan' s poetry to illustrate, in both an abstract and concrete 
way, the potential and limits of discursive dissent. Poetry highlights the intricacy of 
interfering with the links between language games and social reality. It demonstrates 
that there are ways of breaking through the facades into which our consciousness 
habitually crashes. Because poetry is self-conscious about the substance of form and 
the metaphorical structure of language, it is able to shed light on processes by which 
the use of language can become a viable form of discursive dissent. It demonstrates 
how it is possible to reveal the gray shades of domination and resistance, how 
potential for human agency can emerge from questioning linguistically entrenched 
ideas, assumptions and social practices that have been placed beyond scrutiny. 
It is above all at this abstract level that the implications of poetic insight 
transcend the relatively limited and elitist social circles within which poetry usually 
operates today. I have focused on the specific workings and the social impact of 
Celan's poetic engagement with the constitution and reconstitution of the Holocaust 
legacy. The process by which Celan' s poetry has opened up spaces to think and act 
may be limited to specific linguistic, social and political dynamics in post-War 
Germany, but the larger lessons derived from this case study also shed light on the 
functioning of other, more mundane and daily forms of speaking and writing. All 
acts that interfere with discursive struggles have the potential to transform societal 
values and exert human agency. And all face a similar set of difficulties. 
6 Paul Celan, "Ein Drohnen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1986), p. 89, tr. P. Joris in Breathturn. Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1995), p. 215. 
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IX 
Discursive forms of dissent can engender human agency only through a slow process 
of transforming values. This process is saturated with obstacles and contradictions. 
Celan, one more time: 
Threadsuns 
above the grayblack wastes. 
A tree-
high thought 
grasps the light-tone: there are 
still songs to sing beyond 
mankind.7 
No matter how successful, no matter how well they grasp the light-tone and shine 
above the grayblack wastes, discursive forms of dissent are never complete. There 
will always be discursive fog around us. There will always be 'songs to sing beyond 
mankind,' beyond the discursive framing of social practices here and now. 
The need for discursive dissent will never cease. There is no emancipatory peak 
to be climbed. Dissent is the very act of climbing, doggedly, endlessly. It is not an 
event that happens once, a spectacular outburst of energy that overcomes the dark 
forces of oppression and lifts liberation into an superior state of perpetual triumph. 
"Everything becomes and returns eternally," Nietzsche says. "Escape is impossible!"8 
Even the fairest social order excludes aspects what does not fit into its view of the 
world. Inclusiveness lies in a constant process of disturbing language and rethinking 
meaning, rather than in an utopian final stage. 
A discursive notion of human agency is grounded precisely in the recognition 
that there is no end to the circle of revealing and concealing, of opening and closing 
spaces to think and act. Revealing is always an act, not something that remains 
stable. Anything else would suggest a static view of the world, one in which human 
agency is anihilated, one in which the future can never tear down the boundaries of 
the present. 
7 Celan, "Fadensonnen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 26, tr. P. Joris in 
Breathturn, p. 84. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967), p. 545, § 1058. 
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Just as the interaction of domination and resistance has no end, efforts of coming 
to terms with them will never arrive at a stage of ultimate insight. Because 
discursive dissent operates through a constant process of becoming something else 
than what it is, a theoretical engagement with its dynamics can never be exhaustive. 
An approach to understanding human agency can remain useful only as long as it 
stays open and resists the temptation of 'digging deeper' by anchoring itself in a 
newly discovered essence, a stable foundation that could bring oder and certainty to 
a complex and turbulent late modern world. 
Appendix 
ORIGINAL TEXT OF TRANSLATED CITATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Gott ist tot: aber so wie die Art der Menschen ist, wird es vielleicht noch 
jahrtausendelang Hohlen geben, in denen man seinen Schatten zeigt. - Und wir - wir 
milssen auch noch seinen Schatten besiegen! 1 
WEGGEBEIZf vom 
Strahlenwind deiner Sprache 
das bunte Gerede des An-
erlebten - das hundert-
ziingige Mein-




der Weg durch den menschen-
gestaltigen Schnee, 
.den Bil.Berschnee, zu 
den gastlichen 
Gletscherstuben und -tischen. 
Tief 
in der Zeitenschrunde, 
beim Wageneis 




Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1982/1882), p. 125. 
2 Paul Celan, ''Weggebeizt," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1986/1976), p. 31. 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
CHAPTER ONE 
Cela eft ce viure heureufement? cela f appelle il viure? ... Quelle condition eft plus 
miferable que de viure ainfi, qu 'on n' aie rien a foy, tenant d' autrui fon aife, fa 
liberte, fon corps & fa vie?3 
[I]l falloit dire que la domination de plufieurs ne pouuoit eftre bonne, puif que la 
puiff ance d'vn feul, deflors qu 'il prend ce tiltre de maiftre, eft dure & defraif onnable 
... c'eft vn extreme malheur d'eftre fubiect a vn maiftre, duquel on ne fe peut iamais 
affeurer qu'il foit bon, puifqu'il eft toufiours en fa puiffance d'eftre mauuais quand 
il voudra; & d'auoir plufieurs maiftres, c'eft, autant qu'on en a, autant de fois eftre 
extremement malheureux. 4 
Celui qui vous maiftrife tant n'a que deus yeulx, n'a que deus mains, n'a qu'vn 
corps, & n'a autre chofe que ce qu'a le moindre homme du grand & infini nombre de 
vos villes, finon que l'auantage que vous luy faites pour vous deftruire. D'ou a il 
pris tant d'yeulx, dont il vous efpie, fi vous ne les luy bailles? comment ail tant de 
mains pour vous fraper, fil ne les prend de vous? Les pieds dont il foule vos cites, 
d'ou les ail, fils ne font des voftres? Comment a il aucun pouuoir fur vous, que 
par vous?5 
[F]i on ne leur baille rien [les ti.rans], fi on ne leur obeit point, fans combattre, fans 
frapper, ils demeurent nuds & deffaits & ne font plu~ rien, finon que comme la 
racine, n'aians plus d'humeur ou aliment, la branche deuient feche & morte.6 
Soies refolus de not feruir plus, & vous voila libres. le ne veux pas que vous le 
pouffies ou l'esbranflies, mais feulement ne le fouftenes plus, & vous le verres, 
comme vn grand coloffe a qui on a defrobe la bafe, de fon pois mefme fondre en bas 
& fe rompre.7 
Pour la Boetie com.me pour Machiavel, l'autorite n'est fait que de !'acceptation des 
sujets: seulement l'un apprend au prince a forcer leur acquiescement, tandis que 
l'autre revele au peuple la puissance de son refus. En d'autres termes, le ·remede de 
Contr'Un, dont nous connaissons aujoud'hui l'efficacite politique, c'est la resistance 
passive, la desobeissance civile, le refus de collaborer a un ordre que l'on reprove. 8 
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3 
Etienne de la Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, ed. P. Bonnefon in Oeuvres Completes 
(Geneve, Slatkine Reprints, 1967 /1552), p. 49 
4 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 
5 Ibid., pp. 12-3. 
6 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
7 Ibid., p. 14. 
8 Pierre Mesnard, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politigue au XVIe Siecle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951/1935),, p. 
400. 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
Si deux, fi trois, fi quatre ne fe defendent d'vn, cela eft eftrange, mais toutesfois 
poffible ... mais mille, mais vn million, mais mille villes, fi elles ne fe defendent d'vn, 
cela n'eft pas couardife, elle ne va point iufques la ... Doncques quel monftre de vice 
eft cecy qui ne me rite pas ancore le tiltre de couardife ... ?9 
C'eft cela, que les hommes naiffans foubs le ioug, & puis nourris & efleues dans le 
feruage, fans regarder plus auant, fe contentent de viure comme ils font nes, & ne 
penfans point auoir autre bien ni autre droict que ce qu'ils ont trouue, ils prennent 
pour leur naturel l'eftat de leur naiffance.10 
Ces fix ont fix cent qui proufitent fous eus, & font de leurs fix cent ce que les fix 
font au tiran. Ces fix cent en tiennent fous eus fix mille, qu 'ils ont efleue en eftat, 
aufquels ils font donner ou le gouuernement des prouinces, ou le maniement des 
deniers, afin qu'ils tiennent la main a leur auarice & cruaute ... Grande eft la fuitte 
qui vient a pres cela, & qui voudra f amuf er a deuider ce filet, il verra que, non pas 
les fix mille, mais les cent mille, mais les millions, par cefte corde, fe tiennent au 
• 11 t:lran ... 
CHAPTER TWO 
STIMME DES VOLKES 
Du seiest Gottes Stimme, so glaubt ich sonst 
In heilger Jugend; ja, und ich sag es noch! 
Um unse Weisheit unbekiimmert 
Rauschen die Strome doch auch, und dennoch, ... 12 
Pour vous qui avec foi aux destinees du genre humain, prenez courage, l'avenir ne 
vous faillira point Yous serez persecutes, tourmentes, mais jamais vaincus. 13 
A certains moments de l'histoire, un grand souffle passe sur les masses; leurs 
respirations, leurs paroles, leurs mouvements se confondent. Alors rien ne leur 
resiste. 14 
9 La Boetie, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, pp. 5-6. 
10 Ibid., p. 22. 
11 Ibid., pp. 45-6. 
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12 
Friedrich Holderlin, "Stimme des Volkes," in Gedichte (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1979), p. 84. 
13 
Felicite de Lamennais, "Preface de 1835", in la Boetie, Le Discours de la Servitude Volontaire 
(Paris: Payot, 1978), p. 39. 
14 
Simone Weil, "Meditation sur l 'obeissance et la liberte," in Oeuvres completes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1991/1934-7), vol. II, p. 131. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Combien souffre ce monde, JX>Ur devenir celui qu l 'homme, detre fa9onne entre 
les quatre murs d'un livre! Qu'il soit ensuite remis aux mains de speculateurs et 
d 'extravagants qui le present d' avancer plus vite que son propre mouvement, 
comment ne pas voir la plus que de la malchance? Combattre vaille que vaille cette 
f atalite a l' aide de sa magie, ouvrir dans l' aile de la route, de ce qui en tient lieu, 
d 'insatiables randonnees, c 'est la tache des Matinaux.15 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Grosse, gliihende Wolbung 
mit dem sich hinaus- und hinweg-
wtihlenden Schwarzgestim-Schwarm: 
der verkieselten Stirn eines Widders 
brenn ich dies Bild ein, zwischen 
die Homer, darin, 
im Gesang der Windungen, das 




rennt er nicht an? 
Die Welt ist fort, ich muB dich tragen.16 
[L]e JX)Uvoir vient d'en bas; c'est-a-dire qu'il n'y a pas, au principle des relations 
de JX)Uvoir, et comme ma trice generale, une opposition binaire et globale entre les 
dominateurs et les domines, cette dualite se repercutant de haut en bas, et sur des 
groupes de plus en plus restraints jusque dans les profondeurs du corps social. Il 
faut plutot supJX>ser que les rapJX)rts de force multiples qui se forment et jouent 
dans les apareils de production, les families, les groupes restreints, les institutions, 





15 Rene Char, "Rougeur des Matinaux," tr. M. Worton as "Redress of the Dawnbreakers," in The 
Dawn Breakers (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 1992/1950), pp. 144-5. 
16 Paul Celan, "Grosse, gltihende Wolbung," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 97. 
17 Michel Foucault, La Volante de Savoir, Volume 1 of L'Histoire de la Sexualite (Paris: Edition 
Gallimard, 1976), p. 124. 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
Da jener Berg! Da jene Wolke! Was ist denn dran 'wirklich'? Zieht einmal das 
Phantasma und die ganze menschliche Zutat davon ab, ihr Nilchtemen! J a, wenn 
ihr das konntet! Wenn ihr eure Herkunft, Vergangenheit, Vorschule vergessen 
konntet - eure gesamte Menschheit und Tierheit! Es gibt filr uns keine 
'Wirklichkeit' - und auch filr euch nicht, ihr Nilchtemen ... 18 
FIRST INTERLUDE 
Denn es ist gerade diese Geste der Totalbegrilndung, die alles und jedes einem 
Begriff, einer Theorie, einer Position zu subsumieren sucht cxier vorgibt, es zu 
konnen, die jeden philosophischen "Meisterdiskurs" zu einer Herrschaftsform 
macht, zu einer intellektuellen Herrschaft des Selben, des Einen, in der kein Ort ist 
filr die Sicht des Anderen, Heterogenen.19 
CHAPTER SIX 
Nur mit Repressivitat ist der Staat nicht zu machen. Selbst Honecker war bestrebt, 
popular zu sein.20 
Wer der Meinung ist, daB es nicht schaden konne, antidemokratische Fernseh- und 
Rundfunksender zu horen oder Westzeitungen zu lesen, offnet sein Ohr dem 
Tcxifeind21 
La question n'est des lors plus celle du GLOBAL par rapport au LOCAL, ou celle 
du TANSNATIONAL par rapport au NATIONAL, c'est d'abord celle de cette 
soudaine commutation temporelle ou disparaissent non seulement le dedans et le 
dehors, letendu du territoire politique, mais encore, l' avant et l' apres de sa duree, de 
son histoire, au seul benefice d'un INST ANT REEL sur lequel, finalement, nul n'a 
prise.22 
18 
Nietzsche, Die frohliche Wissenschaft, p. 83. 
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Elisabeth List, Die Prasenz des Anderen: Theorie und Geschlechterpolitik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1993), p. 11. 
20 
Gunter Schabowski, Das Politburo: Ende eines Mythes (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1990), p. 173 
21 
Karl Eduard von Schnitzlex, quoted in Gunter Holzweissig, Massenmedien in der DDR (Berlin: Vexlag 
Gebriidex Holzapfel, 1989), p. 62. 
22 
Paul Virilio, La Vitesse de Liberation (Paris: Galilee, 1995), p. 31. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Ce que Nietzsche appelle l 'Entstehungsherd du concept de bon, ce n' est exactement 
ni l 'energie des forts, ni la reaction des faible; mais bien cette scene ou ils se 
distribuent les uns en face des autres, les uns au-dessus des autres; c'est l'espace 
qui les reparit et se creuse entre eux, le vide a travers lequel ils echangent leurs 
menaces et leurs mots.23 
Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es 
ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch zusgezeichnet, daB es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein 
um dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehort aber 
dann, daB es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein Seinsverhfiltnis hat. Und dies 
wiederum besagt: Dasein versteht sich in irgendeiner Weise und Ausdriicklichkeit in 
seinem Sein. Diesem Seienden eignet, daB mit und durch sein Sein dieses ihm selbst 
erschlossen ist Seinsverstiindnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins.2A 
S'il est vrai que partout s'etend et se precise le quadrillage de la "surveillance," il 
est d'autant plus urgent de deceler comment une societe entiere ne s'y reduit pas; 
quelles procedures poopulaires (elles aussi "minuscules" et quotidiennes) jouent 
avec les mecanismes de la discipline et ne s'y conforment que pour les toumer' 
enfin quell es "manieres de faire" f orment la contrepartie, du cote des 
consommateurs (ou "domines"?), des procedes muets qui organisent la mise en 
ordre sociopolitique.25 
[C]oment il combatit contre les diables et fist brusler cinq chambres d'enfer, et mist 
a sac la grande chambre noire, et getta Prosperpine u feu, et rompit quatre dentz a 
Lucifer et une corone au cul. .. et mille aultres petites joyeusetez toutes veritables.
26 
Lors, en soubriant, destacha sa belle braguette, et, timt sa mentule en l'air, les 
compissa si airgement au 'il en noya deux cens soixante mille quatre cens dix et 
huyt, sans les femmes et petiz enf ans. 
27 
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23 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la Genealogie, l 'Histoire," in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite(Paris: 
PUF, 1971), p. 156. 
24 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), p. 12. 
25 
Michel de Certeau, Arts de Faire, vol. I of L'Invention du Ouotidien (Paris, Gallimard, 
1990/1980), pp. xxxix-xl. 
26 
Frarn;ois Rabelais, La vie tres horrificgue du grand Gargantua. pere de Pantagrual, in Oeuvres 
completes, Vol. I (Paris: Editions Gamier Freres, 1962), p. 385. 
27 Ibid., p. 68. 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Dies hat mir groBte Milhe gemacht und macht mir noch immerfort die groBte Miihe: 
einzusehen, daB unsaglich mehr daran liegt, wie die Dinge heijJen, als was sie sind. 
Der Ruf, Name und Anchein, die Geltung, das iibliche MaB und Gewicht eines 
Dinges - im Ursprunge zu allermeist ein Irrtum und eine Willkiirlichkeit, den 
Dingen iibergeworfen wie ein Kleid und seinem W esen und selbst seiner Haut genz 
fremd - ist <lurch den Glauben daran und sein Fortwachsen von Geschlecht zu 
Geschlecht dem Dinge allmahlich gleichsam an- und eingewachsen und zu seinem 
Leibe selber geworden; der Schein von Anbeginn wird zuletzt fast immer zum 
Wesen und wirkt als Wesen! 28 
Was ist also Warheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphem, Metonymien, 
Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die poetisch 
und rhetorisch gesteigert, iibertragen, geschmiickt wurden und die nach langem 
Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich diinken: die Warheiten sind 
lliusionen,von denen man vergessen hat, daB sie welche sind ... 29 
Das Buch behandelt die philosophischen Probleme und zeigt - wie ich glaube - dass 
die Fragestellung dieser Probleme auf dem Missverstandnis der Logik unserer 
Sprache beruht. Man konnte den ganzen Sinn des Buches etwa in die W orte fassen: 
Was sich iiberhaupt sagen lasst, lasst sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden 
kann, dariiber muss man scheigen. 30 
CHAPTER NINE 
Dichter sein in diirftiger Zeit heiBt: singend auf die Spur der entflohenen Gotter 
achten. Darum sagt der Dichter zur Zeit der Weltnacht das Heilige.31 
Pre guntareis por que SU poesia 
no nos habla del suelo, de las hojas, 
de los grandes volcanes de su pais natal? 
Venid a ver la sangre por las calles, 
venid aver 
la sangre por las calles, 
venid a ver la sangre 
por las calles ! 32 
28 Nietzsche, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft, p. 84, § 58 
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29 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Uber Warheit und Ltige im aussermoralischen Sinn," m 
Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften, ed. J. Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968/1873), p. 102. 
30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1990/1922), p. 26. 
31 Martin Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 
272. 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
Kame, 
kame ein Mensch, 
kame ein Mensch zur Welt, heute, mit 
dem Lichtbart der 
Patriarchen: er dilrfte, 
sprach er von dieser 
~it, er 
diirfte 
nur lallen und lallen, . . 
rmmer-, rmmer-
zuzu.33 
Schwarze Milch der Frilhe wir trinken sie abends 
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts 
wir trinken und trinken 
wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Liiften da liegt man nicht eng 
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der schreibt 
der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar 
Margarete 
er schreibt es und tritt vor das Haus und es blitzen die Sterne er 
pfeift seine Riiden herbei 
er pfeift seine Juden hervor Hillt schaufeln ein Grab in der Erde 
er befiehlt uns spielt auf nun zum Tanz ... 34 
Schwarze Milch der Frilhe wir trinken dich nachts 
wir trinken dich mittags der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland 
wir trinken dich abends und morgens wir trinken und trinken 
der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland sein Auge ist blau 
er trifft dich mit bleiemer Kugel er trifft dich genau 
ein Mann wohnt im Haus dein goldenes Haar Margarete 
er hetzt seine Ruden auf uns er schenkt uns ein Grab in der Luft 
er spielt mit den Schlangen und traumet der Tod ist ein Meister aus 
Deutschland 
dein goldens Haar Margarete 
dein aschenes Haar Sulamitll35 
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32 Pablo Neruda, "Explico Algunas Casas," in Pablo Neruda: Five Decades (New York: Grove 
Press, 1974), p. 56. 
33 Celan, "Ttibingen, Janner," in Die Niemandsrose, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, 
34 Celan, "Todesfuge," in Mohn und Gedachtnis, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, p. 41. 
35 Ibid., p. 42. 
Verbracht ins 
Gelande 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
mit der untrilglichen Spur: 
Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weill, 
mit den Schatten der Halme: 
Lies nicht mehr - schau ! 
Schau nicht mehr - geh! 
Geh, deine Stunde 
hat keine Schwestem, du bist -
bist zuhause. Ein Rad, langsam, 
rollt aus sich selber, die Speichen 
klettem, 
klettem auf schwarzlichem Feld, die N acht 
braucht keine Sterne, nirgends 
fragt es nach dir. 
* 
Nirgends 
fragt es nach dir - 36 
Deckte es 
Kam, kam. 
Kam ein Wort, kam, 
kam durch die N acht, 
zu - wer? 




Nacht-und-Nacht. - Zurn 




zum feuchten -37 
36 Celan, "Engftihrung," in Sprachgitter, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, pp. 197-8. 
37 Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
245 
,, 
Original Text of Translated Citations 
In der Eulenflucht, hier, 














Sprich auch du, 
sprich als letzter, 
sag dein Spruch. 
Sprich -
Doch scheide das Nein nicht vom J a. 
Gib deinem Spruch auch den Sinn: 
gib ihm den Schatten. 
Gib ihm Schatten genug, 
gib ihm so viel, 
als du um dich verteilt weiBt zwischen 
Mittnacht und Mittag und Mittnacht. 39 
In den Flilssen nordlich der Zukunft 
werf ich das Netz aus, das du 
zogemd beschwerst 
mit von Steinen geschriebenen 
Schatten.40 
38 Ibid., p. 204. 
39 Celan, "Sprich auch Du," in Von Schwelle zu Schwelle, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. I, p. 135. 
40 Celan, "In den Flilssen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol, II, p. 14. 
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Original Text of Translated Citations 
AGAINST CONCLUDING THE QUESTION OF HUMAN AGENCY 
Die Macht des Bestehenden errichtet die Fassaden, auf welche das BewuBtsein 
aufprallt Sie muB es zu durchschlagen trachten.41 
Ein Drohnen: es ist 
die Watheit selbst 





ilber der grauschwarzen Odnis. 
Ein baum-
hoher Gedanke 
greift sich den Lichtton: es sind 
noch Lieder zu singen jenseits 
der Menschen. 43 
41 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992/1966), p. 29. 
42 Celan, "Ein Dr5hnen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 89. 
43 
Celan, "Fadensonnen," in Atemwende, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II, p. 26. 
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